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In the recent years, a number of recognition and authentication systems based on 
biometric measurements have been proposed. Algorithms and sensors have been 
developed to acquire and process many different biometric traits. Moreover, the 
biometric technology is being used in novel ways, with potential commercial 
and practical implications to our daily activities. The key objective of the book is 
to provide a collection of comprehensive references on some recent theoretical 
development as well as novel applications in biometrics. The topics covered in this 
book reflect well both aspects of development. They include biometric sample 
quality, privacy preserving and cancellable biometrics, contactless biometrics, novel 
and unconventional biometrics, and the technical challenges in implementing the 
technology in portable devices. The book consists of 15 chapters. It is divided into four 
sections, namely, biometric applications on mobile platforms, cancelable biometrics, 
biometric encryption, and other applications. The book was reviewed by editors Dr. 
Jucheng Yang and Dr. Norman Poh. We deeply appreciate the efforts of our guest 
editors: Dr. Girija Chetty, Dr. Loris Nanni, Dr. Jianjiang Feng, Dr. Dongsun Park and 
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In the recent years, a number of recognition and authentication systems based on 
biometric measurements have been proposed. Algorithms and sensors have been 
developed to acquire and process many different biometric traits. Moreover, the 
biometric technology is being used in novel ways, with potential commercial and 
practical implications to our daily activities. 
The key objective of the book is to provide a collection of comprehensive references on 
some recent theoretical development as well as novel applications in biometrics. The 
topics covered in this book reflect well both aspects of development. They include 
biometric sample quality, privacy preserving and cancellable biometrics, contactless 
biometrics, novel and unconventional biometrics, and the technical challenges in 
implementing the technology in portable devices. 
The book consists of 15 chapters. It is divided into four sections, namely, biometric 
applications on mobile platforms, cancelable biometrics, biometric encryption, and 
other applications. Chapter 1 gives an overarching survey of existing implementation 
of biometric systems on mobile devices. Apart from the conventional biometrics, 
biomedical data such as blood pressure, ECG and heart beat signal are considered. The 
authors highlight the technical challenges that need to be overcome. Chapter 2 
presents a biometric system based on hand geometry oriented to mobile devices. 
Chapter 3 exploits the recent advances in the biometric and heterogeneous wireless 
networks fields to provide an authentication platform that supports both physical and 
logical access management. 
Section 2 is a collection of four chapters on cancelable biometrics. Chapter 4 provides a 
comprehensive overview on privacy preserving biometrics, also the state of the art in 
this field and presents the main trends to be solved. In Chapter 5 the author proposes a 
new attack algorithm for fingerprint template protection which applies a fast 
polynomial reconstruction algorithm based on the consistency theorem. Also, the 
proposed attack method is evaluated, and compared with the known attack methods. 
Chapter 6 introduces the technology of contactless fingerprinting and explores its 
application. In chapter 7 the author proposes a novel method of cancelable biometric 
identification that combines biological data with the use of artifacts and is resistant to 
spoofing. 
XII      Preface
Section 3 groups three biometric encryption applications. Chapter 8 proposes a user-
specific biometric key with multimodal biometric for encryption. In Chapter 9, the 
authors apply a cryptography scheme known as the “Co-Z approach” to biometric 
systems. Chapter 10 presents a novel remote authentication scheme based on the 
secret-splitting concept for cloud computing applications.  
Finally, Section 4 groups a number of novel biometric applications. Chapter 11 
provides a comprehensive review of existing research work that exploits 
electrocardiograms (ECGs) for human identification as well as addresses several 
important technical challenges arise from this application. Chapter 12 investigates new 
magnetic sensing technologies for use in biometrics. In Chapter 13, the authors study 
run-time reconfigurable hardware platforms and hardware-software co-design 
techniques for biometric systems. Embedded systems based on programmable logic 
devices such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) are presented as case studies. 
Chapter 14 proposes a contactless biometric system based on the combination of hand 
geometry and palmprint using only low cost devices for medium security 
environments. The device uses infrared illumination and infrared camera in order to 
handle changing lighting conditions as well as complex background that contains 
surfaces and objects with skin-like colors. In Chapter 15 the biometric concept is 
applied to the fuel cells, microbial fuel cells and micromixer. The findings suggest that 
a novel flow slab design would be useful to improve Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel 
Cells (PEMFC) and can even be expanded to other types of cell, and the prototype will 
be useful in the design of a optimal biophysical passive micromixer and even show the 
feasibility and potential of biometric concept widely applied in biochemical, biological, 
chemical analysis, fuel cell and bioenergy. 
The book was reviewed by editors Dr. Jucheng Yang and Dr. Norman Poh. We deeply 
appreciate the efforts of our guest editors: Dr. Girija Chetty, Dr. Loris Nanni, Dr. 
Jianjiang Feng, Dr. Dongsun Park and Dr. Sook Yoon, as well as a number of 
anonymous reviewers. 
Jucheng Yang 
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Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics , Nanchang, Jiangxi province, 
China 
Norman Poh 
Centre for Vision, Speech and Signal Processing (CVSSP) 
Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences , University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey 
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Biometrics on Mobile Phone 
Shuo Wang and Jing Liu 
Department of Biomedical Engineering,  
School of Medicine, Tsinghua University 
P. R. China 
1. Introduction 
In an era of information technology, mobile phones are more and more widely used 
worldwide, not only for basic communications, but also as a tool to deal with personal 
affairs and process information acquired anywhere at any time. It is reported that there are 
more than 4 billion cell phone users over the world and this number still continues to grow 
as predicted that by 2015 more than 86% of the world population will own at least one cell 
phone (Tseng et al., 2010). 
The massive volume of wireless phone communication greatly reduces the cost of cell 
phones despite their increasingly sophisticated capabilities. The wireless communication 
capability of a cell phone has been increasingly exploited for access to remote services such 
as e-commerce and online bank transaction. Smart phones are providing powerful 
functionality, working as a miniaturized desktop computer or Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA). More excitingly, most of the state-of-the-art mobile phones are now being 
incorporated with advanced digital imaging and sensing platforms including various 
sensors such as GPS sensors, voice sensors (microphones), optical/electrical/magnetic 
sensors, temperature sensors and acceleration sensors, which could be utilized towards 
medical diagnostics such as heart monitoring, temperature measurement, EEG/ECG 
detection, hearing and vision tests to improve health care (Wang & Liu, 2009) especially in 
developing countries with limited medical facilities. 
These scenarios, however, require extremely high security level for personal information 
and privacy protection through individual identification against un-authorized use in 
case of theft or fraudulent use in a networked society. Currently, the most adopted 
method is the verification of Personal Identification Number (PIN), which is problematic 
and might not be secured enough to meet this requirement. As is illustrated in a survey 
(Clarke & Furnell, 2005), many mobile phone users consider the PIN to be inconvenient as 
a password that is complicated enough and easily forgotten and very few users change 
their PIN regularly for higher security as can been seen from Fig. 1. As a result, it is 
preferred to apply biometrics for the security of mobile phones and improve reliability of 
wireless services.  
As biometrics aims to recognize a person using unique features of human physiological or 
behavioral characteristics such as fingerprints, voice, face, iris, gait and signature, this 
authentication method naturally provides a very high level of security. Conventionally, 
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iris images, acceleration sensors for gait acquisition and relies on large-scale computer 
servers to perform identification algorithms, which suffers from several problems including 
bulky size, operational complexity and extremely high cost.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Frequency of the change of PIN code. Reprinted from Computers & Security, Vol. 24, 
Clarke & Furnell, 2005, Authentication of Users on Mobile Telephones - A Survey of 
Attitudes and Practices, pp. 519-527, with permission from Elsevier 
Mobile phone, with its unique features as small size, low cost, functional sensing platforms, 
computing power in addition to its wireless communication capability, is opening up new 
areas in biometrics that hold potentials for security of mobile phones, remote wireless 
services and also health care technology. By adding strong security to mobile phones using 
unique individual features, biometrics on mobile phones will facilitate trustworthy 
electronic methods for commerce, financial transactions and medical services. The 
increasing demand for pervasive biomedical measurement would further stimulate the 
innovations in extending the capabilities of a mobile phone as a basic tool in biometric area.  
This chapter is dedicated to drafting an emerging biomedical engineering frontier--
Biometrics on Mobile Phone. To push forward the investigation and application in this area, 
a comprehensive evaluation will be performed on the challenging fundamental as well as 
very practical issues raised by the biometrics on mobile phone. Particularly, mobile phone 
enabled pervasive measurement of several most important physiological and behavioural 
signals such as fingerprint, voice, iris, gait and ECG etc. will be illustrated. Some important 
technical issues worth of pursuing in the near future will be suggested. From the technical 
routes as clarified and outlined in the end of this chapter, it can be found that there is plenty 
of space in the coming era of mobile phone based biometric technology.  
2. Feasible scenarios of biometrics on mobile phone 
Incorporated with advanced sensing platforms which could detect physiological and 
behavioural signals of various kinds, many types of biometric methods could be 
implemented on cell phones. This offers a wide range of possible applications such as 
personal privacy protection, mobile bank transaction service security, and telemedicine 
monitoring. The use of sensor data collected by mobile phones for biometric identification 
and authentication is an emerging frontier and has been increasingly explored in the recent 
decade. A typical architecture of this technology can be seen in Fig. 2. 
 




Fig. 2. Mobile biometric authentication system (Xie & Liu, 2010) 
Several typical examples of recent advances which successfully implemented biometrics on 
mobile phones are described below. 
2.1 Fingerprint identification on mobile phone 
Fingerprint biometric has been adopted widely for access control in places requiring high 
level of security such as laboratories and military bases. By attaching a fingerprint scanner 
to the mobile phone, this biometric could also be utilized for phone related security in a 
similar manner. 
A typical example can be seen from a research that utilizes a fingerprint sensor for 
acquisition of fingerprint images and implements an algorithm on internal hardware to 
perform verification of users (Chen et al., 2005). Experiment results show that this 
implementation has a relatively good performance. The prototype of this mobile phone 
based fingerprint system could be seen in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. A schematic for fingerprint mobile phone (Redrawn from Chen et al., 2005) 
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Fig. 4. Snapshots of fingerprint security - Pro (retrieved from company release news 
http://itunes. apple.com/us/app/fingerprint-security-pro/id312912865?mt=8) 
One major inconvenience with mobile phone based fingerprint biometric is that it requires 
an external attachment as a scanner of fingerprint images. Recently, iPhone launched an 
application named Fingerprint Security by using its touch screen which does not require 
external scanner (shown in Fig. 4). 
2.2 Speaker recognition on mobile phone 
A voice signal conveys a person’s physiological characteristics such as the vocal chords, 
glottis, and vocal tract dimensions. Automatic speaker recognition (ASR) is a biometric 
method that encompasses verification and identification through voice signal processing. 
The speech features encompass high-level and low level parts. While the high-level features 
are related to dialect, speaker style and emotion state that are not always adopted due to 
difficulty of extraction, the low-level features are related to spectrum, which are easy to be 
extracted and are always applied to ASR (Chen & Huang, 2009).  
One major challenge of ASR is its very high computational cost. Therefore research has been 
focusing on decreasing the computational load of identification while attempting to keep the 
recognition accuracy reasonably high. In a research concentrating on optimizing vector 
quantization (VQ) based speaker identification, the number of test vectors are reduced by 
pre-quantizing the test sequence prior to matching, and the number of speakers are reduced 
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by pruning out unlikely speakers during the identification process (Kinnunen et al., 2006). 
The best variants are then generalized to Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) based modeling. 
The results of this method show a speed-up factor of 16:1 in the case of VQ-based modeling 




Fig. 5. Structure of a proposed ASR system. Reprinted from Proceedings of the 2009 Fourth 
International Multi-Conference on Computing in the Global Information Technology, Chen 
& Huang, 2009, Speaker Recognition using Spectral Dimension Features, pp. 132-137, with 
permission from IEEE 
 
 
Fig. 6. Voice biometric authentication for e-commerce transactions via mobile phone. 
Reprinted from Proceedings of 2006 2nd International Conference on Telecommunication 
Technology and Applications, Kounoudes et al., 2006, Voice Biometric Authentication for 
Enhancing Internet Service Security, pp. 1020-1025, with permission from IEEE 
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By far, Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) and GMM are the most prevalent 
techniques used to represent a voice signal for feature extraction and feature representation 
in state-of-the-art speaker recognition systems (Motwani et al., 2010). A recent research 
presents a speaker recognition that combines a non-linear feature, named spectral 
dimension (SD), with MFCC. In order to improve the performance of the proposed scheme 
as shown in Fig. 5, the Mel-scale method is adopted for allocating sub-bands and the pattern 
matching is trained by GMM (Chen & Huang, 2009). 
Applications of this speaker verification biometric can be found in person authentication 
such as security access control for cell phones to eliminate cell phone fraud, an identity 
check during credit card payments over the Internet or for ATM manufacturers to eliminate 
PIN number fraud. The speaker’s voice sample is identified against the existing templates in 
the database. If the claimed speaker is authenticated, the transaction is accepted or 
otherwise rejected as shown in Fig. 6 (Kounoudes et al., 2006).  
Although the research of speech processing has been developed for many years, voice 
recognition still suffers from problems brought by many human and environmental factors, 
which relatively limits ASR performance. Nevertheless, ASR is still a very natural and 
economical method for biometric authentication, which is very promising and worth more 
efforts to be improved and developed. 
2.3 Iris recognition system on mobile phone 
With the integration of digital cameras that could acquire images at increasingly high 
resolution and the increase of cell phone computing power, mobile phones have evolved 
into networked personal image capture devices, which can perform image processing tasks 
on the phone itself and use the result as an additional means of user input and a source of 
context data (Rohs, 2005). This image acquisition and processing capability of mobile phones 
could be ideally utilized for mobile iris biometric. 
Iris biometric identifies a person using unique iris patterns that contain many distinctive 
features such as arching ligaments, furrows, ridges, crypts, rings, corona, freckles, and a 
zigzag collarette, some of which may be seen in Fig. 7 (Daugman, 2004). It is reported that 
the original iris patterns are randomly generated after almost three months of birth and are 
not changed all life (Daugman, 2003). 
Recently, iris recognition technology has been utilized for the security of mobile phones. As 
a biometric of high reliability and accuracy, iris recognition provides high level of security 
for cellular phone based services for example bank transaction service via mobile phone.  
One major challenge of the implementation of iris biometric on mobile phone is the iris 
image quality, since bad image quality will affect the entire iris recognition process. 
Previously, the high quality of iris images was achieved through special hardware design. 
For example, the Iris Recognition Technology for Mobile Terminals software once used 
existing cameras and target handheld devices with dedicated infrared cameras (Kang, 2010). 
To provide more convenient mobile iris recognition, an iris recognition system in cellular 
phone only by using built-in mega-pixel camera and software without additional hardware 
component was developed (Cho et al., 2005). Considering the relatively small CPU 
processing power of cellular phone, in this system, a new pupil and iris localization 
algorithm apt for cellular phone platform was proposed based on detecting dark pupil and 
corneal specular reflection by changing brightness & contrast value. Results show that this 
algorithm can be used for real-time iris localization for iris recognition in cellular phone. In 
2006, OKI Electric Industry Co., Ltd. announced its new Iris Recognition Technology for 
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Mobile Terminals using a standard camera that is embedded in a mobile phone based on the 
original algorithm OKI developed, a snapshot of which can be seen in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Example of an iris pattern image showing results of the iris and pupil localization and 
eyelid detection steps. Reprinted from Pattern Recognition, Vol. 36, Daugman, 2003, The 
Importance of Being Random: Statistical Principles of Iris Recognition, pp. 279-291, with 
permission from Elsevier 
 
 
Fig. 8. Iris recognition technology for mobile terminals (OKI introduces Japan’s first iris 
recognition for camera-equipped mobile phones and PDAs, In: OKI Press Releases, 
27.11.2006, Available from http://www.oki.com/en/press/2006/z06114e.html) 
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Since iris image quality is less controllable with images taken by common users than those 
taken in the laboratory environment, the iris image pre-processing step is also very 
important for mobile applications. In recent research, a new pupil & iris segmentation 
method was proposed for iris localization in iris images taken by cell phone (Cho et al., 2006; 
Kang, 2010), the architecture and service scenarios of which is shown in Fig. 9. This method 
finds the pupil and iris at the same time, using both information of the pupil and iris 
together with characteristic of the eye image. It is shown by experimental results that this 
method has good performance in various images, even when they include motion or optical 
blurring, ghost, specular refection, etc. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Architecture and service models of mobile iris system. Reprinted from Procedia 
Computer Science, Vol. 1, Kang, 2010, Mobile Iris Recognition Systems: An Emerging 
Biometric Technology, pp. 475-484, with permission from Elsevier 
2.4 Unobtrusive user-authentication by mobile phone based gait biometrics 
Mobile phones nowadays contain increasing amount of valuable personal information such 
as wallet and e-commerce applications. Therefore, the risk associated with losing mobile 
phones is also increasing. The conventional method to protect user sensitive data in mobile 
phones is by using PIN codes, which is usually not secured enough. Thus, there is a need for 
improving the security level in protection of data in mobile phones. 
Gait, i.e., walking manner, is a distinctive characteristic for individuals (Woodward et al., 
2003). Gait recognition has been studied as a behavioral biometric for more than a decade, 
utilized either in an identification setting or in an authentication setting. Currently 3 major 
approaches have been developed for gait recognition referred to as the Machine Vision 
(MV) based gait recognition, in which case the walking behavior is captured on video and 
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video processing techniques are used for analysis, the Floor Sensor (FS) based gait 
recognition by placing sensors in the floor that can measure force and using this information 
for analysis and Wearable Sensor (WS) based gait recognition, in which scenario the user 
wears a device that measures the way of walking and recognize the pattern recognition for 
recognition purposes (Bours & Shrestha, 2010). Smart phone, such as an iPhone, is now 
incorporated with accelerometers working along three primary axes (as shown in Fig. 10), 
which could be utilized for gait recognition to identify the user of a mobile phone 
(Tanviruzzaman et al., 2009).  
 
 
Fig. 10. Three axes of accelerometers on an iPhone (Redrawn from Tanviruzzaman et al., 2009) 
 
 
Fig. 11. Block diagram of a gait based identification method. Reprinted from Proceedings of 
2005 30th IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 
Mäntyjärvi et al., 2005, Identifying Users of Portable Devices from Gait Pattern with 
Accelerometers, pp. 973-976, with permission from IEEE 
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Mobile phone based biometrics uses the acceleration signal characteristics produced by 
walking for verifying the identity of the users of a mobile phone while they walk with it. 
This identification method is by nature unobtrusive, privacy preserving and controlled by 
the user, who would not at all be disturbed or burdened while using this technology. The 
principle of identifying users of mobile phones from gait pattern with accelerometers is 
presented in Fig. 11. In this scenario, the three-dimensional movement produced by walking 
is recorded with the accelerometers within a mobile phone worn by the user. The collected 
data is then processed using correlation, frequency domain methods and data distribution 
statistics. Experiments show that all these methods provide good results (Mäntyjärvi et al., 
2005). 
The challenges of the method come from effect of changes in shoes, ground and the speed of 
walking. Drunkenness and injuries also affect performance of gait recognition. The effect of 
positioning the mobile phone holding the accelerometers in different places and positions 
also remains to be studied in future.  
2.5 ECG biometrics for mobile phone based telecardiology 
Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is the number one killer in many nations of the world. 
Therefore, prevention and treatment of cardiovascular disorders remains its significance in 
global health issues.  
With the development of telemedicine, mobile phone based telecardiology has been 
technologically available for real-time patient monitoring (Louis et al., 2003; Sufi et al., 2006; 
Lee et al., 2007; Lazarus, 2007; Chaudhry et at., 2007; Plesnik et al., 2010), which is becoming 
increasingly popular among CVD patients and cardiologists. In a telecardiology application, 
the patient’s Electrocardiographic (ECG) signal is collected from the patient’s body which 
can be immediately transmitted to the mobile phone (shown in Fig. 12) using wireless 
communication and then sent through mobile networks to the monitoring station for the 
medical server to perform detection of abnormality present within the ECG signal. If serious 
abnormality is detected, the medical server informs the emergency department for rescuing 
the patient. Prior to accessing heart monitoring facilities, the patient first needs to log into 
the system to initiate the dedicated services. This authentication process is necessary in 
order to protect the patient’s private health information. However, the conventional user 
name and password based patient authentication mechanism (as shown in Fig. 13) might 
not be ideal for patients experiencing a heart attack, which might prevent them from typing 
their user name and password correctly (Blount et al., 2007). More efficient and secured 
authentication mechanisms are highly desired to assure higher survival rate of CVD 
patients. 
Recent research proposed an automated patient authentication system using ECG biometric 
in remote telecardiology via mobile phone (Sufi & Khalil, 2008). The ECG biometrics, 
basically achieved by comparing the enrollment ECG feature template with an existing 
patient ECG feature template database, was made possible just ten years ago (Biel et al., 
2001) and has been investigated and developed by a number of researchers (Shen et al., 
2002; Israel et al., 2005; Plataniotis et al., 2006; Yao & Wan, 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Fatemian 
& Hatzinakos, 2009; Nasri et al., 2009; Singh and Gupta, 2009; Ghofrani & Bostani, 2010; Sufi 
et al., 2010b). The common features extracted from ECG signals contain three major feature 
waves (P wave, T wave and QRS complex) as shown in Fig. 14. The use of this sophisticated 
ECG based biometric mechanism for patient identification will create a seamless patient 
authentication mechanism in wireless telecardiology applications.  
 




Fig. 12. Architecture of an ECG acquisition and remote monitoring system. Reprinted from 
Proceedings of 2010 15th IEEE Mediterranean Electrotechnical Conference, Plesnik et al., 
2010, ECG Signal Acquisition and Analysis for Telemonitoring, pp. 1350-1355, with 
permission from IEEE 
 
 
Fig. 13. Username and password based authentication mechanism for mobile phone 
dependent remote telecardiology. Reprinted from Proceedings of 2008 International 
Conference on Intelligent Sensors, Sensor Networks and Information Processing, Sufi & 
Khalil, 2008, An Automated Patient Authentication System for Remote Telecardiology, pp. 
279-284, with permission from IEEE 
In the proposed system, the patient’s ECG signal is acquired by a portable heart monitoring 
device, which is capable of transmitting ECG signals via Bluetooth to the patient’s mobile 
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In the proposed system, the patient’s ECG signal is acquired by a portable heart monitoring 
device, which is capable of transmitting ECG signals via Bluetooth to the patient’s mobile 
  
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
14
phone. The mobile phone directly transmits the compressed and encrypted ECG signal to 
the medical server using GPRS, HTTP, 3G, MMS or even SMS. Upon receiving the 
compressed ECG, the original ECG of the patient is retrieved on the medical server through 
decompression and decryption. Then the medical server performs extraction of ECG feature 
template and matches the template against the ECG biometric database. The patient 
identification is achieved after the closest match is determined. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Typical ECG feature waves (Sufi et al., 2010a) 
In a later research (Sufi and Khalil, 2011), a novel polynomial based ECG biometric 
authentication system (as shown in Fig. 15) was proposed to perform faster biometric 
matching directly from compressed ECG, which requires less storage for storing ECG 
feature template. The system also lowered computational requirement to perform one-to-
many matching of biometric entity. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Architecture of patient identification from compressed ECG based on data mining. 
Reprinted from Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Vol. 34, Sufi & Khalil, 2011, 
Faster Person Identification Using Compressed ECG in Time Critical Wireless 
Telecardiology Applications, pp. 282–293, with permission from Elsevier 
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With this new ECG biometric authentication mechanism in place, the CVD patients log into 
the medical server and then have access to the monitoring facility without human 
intervention and associated delays, making the telecardiology application faster than 
existing authentication approaches, which eventually leads to faster patient care for saving 
life. 
Challenges for this ECG based biometric system involve the security of transmitting ECG 
from the patient to the medical server for privacy protection and the pertinence of ectopic 
beats, the presence of which either with the enrolment ECG or the recognition ECG could 
result in possible false non-match for a patient. 
2.6 Summary and discussion on different systems 
There are many more types of biometrics that could be implemented on mobile phones in 
addition to the above systems introduced in this section. Generally, several key factors 
should be considered when implementing such biometrics within a mobile phone. These 
factors will include user preference, accuracy and the intrusiveness of the application 
process. Table 1 illustrates how these factors vary for different types of biometrics. 
 






Ear shape recognition NA  High  
Facial recognition Medium  High  
Fingerprint recognition High  Very high  
Hand geometry Medium  Very high  
Handwriting recognition NA  Medium  
Iris scanning Medium  Very high  
Keystroke analysis Low  Medium  
Service utilization NA  Low  
Voiceprint verification High  High  
Table 1. Comparison of different biometric techniques for mobile phone. Reprinted from 
Computers & Security, Vol. 24, Clarke & Furnell, Authentication of Users on Mobile 
Telephones - A Survey of Attitudes and Practices, pp. 519-527, 2005 with permission from 
Elsevier 
The user preference is investigated in a survey (Clarke et al., 2003). The assigned accuracy 
category is based upon reports by the International Biometric Group (IBG, 2005) and 
National Physical Laboratory (Mansfield et al., 2001). The judgement of intrusiveness is 
performed according to whether or not the biometrics could be applied transparently.  
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It could be seen that apparent disparity exists between high authentication security and 
transparent authentication process. Biometric approaches that have the highest accuracy are 
also the more intrusive techniques. When implementing biometrics on mobile phones, a 
compromise between security and the convenience to the user is required. 
3. Open issues with biometrics on mobile phone 
Biometrics on mobile phone, as an emerging frontier, is very promising while still holding 
many technical problems to be well addressed in order to be widely and ideally adopted. 
Issues worth pursuing in future research not only involve biometrics and mobile phones 
alone, but also come with the applications and styles of implementation i.e. scenarios in 
which specific biometrics are used. 
3.1 Issues with biometrics 
The most critical issue with biometrics that needs continuous effort to work on is to 
recognize biometric patterns with higher accuracy. A biometric system does not always 
make absolutely right decisions, it can make two basic types of errors, the false match and 
false non-match. Error rates of typical biometrics are shown in Table 2. Correspondingly, 
Table 3 lists requirements on typical accuracy performance. It is apparent that there is still a 
large gap between the currently available technology and requirements of performance. 
 
Biometric FTE % FNMR % FMR1 % FMR2 % FMR3 % 
Face n/a 4 10 40 12 
Finger 4 2 2 0.001 <1 
Hand 2 1.5 1.5 n/a n/a 
Iris 7 6 <0.001 n/a n/a 
Voice 1 15 3 n/a n/a 
Table 2. Typical biometric accuracy performance numbers reported in large third party tests. 
FTE refers to failure to enroll, FNMR is non-match error rate, FMR1 denotes verification 
match error rate, FMR2 and FMR3 denote (projected) large-scale identification and 
screening match error rates for database sizes of 1 million and 500 identities, respectively. 
Reprinted from IEEE publication title: Proceedings of 2004 17th International Conference on 
Pattern Recognition, Jain et al., 2004, Biometrics: A Grand Challenge, pp. 935-942, with 
permission from IEEE 
 
 
Table 3. Typical intrinsic matcher (1:1) performance requirements. Reprinted from 
Proceedings of 2004 17th International Conference on Pattern Recognition, Jain et al., 2004, 
Biometrics: A Grand Challenge, pp. 935-942, with permission from IEEE 
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Other problems that need to be further studied include assurance of infeasibility of 
fraudulence and exploration of new features with existing biometrics and novel types of 
biometrics. Moreover, as computing power of current mobile phones is still very limited, 
processing methods of biometric patterns need to be adapted for lower burden on 
computation. 
3.2 Challenges to mobile phone 
In order to ensure the accuracy and efficiency of biometrics recognition on mobile phones, 
computing power and storage capacity of mobile phones are still needed to be significantly 
enhanced. Currently, the implementation of biometrics on mobile phones usually requires 
the simplification of algorithm used in conventional biometrics in order to be adapted for 
the relatively small CPU processing power of a cellular phone. This adaption will inevitably 
reduce the accuracy and security level, which highly limits the performance of mobile phone 
enabled biometric techniques. 
In addition, the essential hardware i.e. biometric sensors embedded on mobile phones are 
also required to provide better performance, e.g. higher resolution of image acquired with 
digital cameras on mobile phones, at lower cost while maintaining their miniaturization 
feature. 
3.3 Optimal implementation of biometrics on mobile phone 
Reasonable implementation of biometrics on mobile phone is important for wide adoption 
of this technology as the application of mobile phone based biometrics must work in a non-
intrusive manner for the convenience of users. Examples of feasible scenarios are described 
as keystroke analysis while texting messages, handwriting recognition while using 
transcriber function and speaker recognition whilst using microphones (Clarke & Furnell, 
2005). Another problem needs to be addressed is the compatibility with multiple platforms 
of mobile phones during the development of algorithms and software. 
3.4 Outlook of future development in mobile phone based biometrics 
Numerous types of biometrics hold the potentials of being implemented on mobile phones. 
According to the different types of signals needed to be collected for feature extraction, 
applicable biometric methods can be classified into the imaging type, mechanical type and 
electrical type.  
The imaging type includes, but is not limited to the recognition of face, teeth and palm print 
in addition to fingerprint and iris, utilizing images captured by the camera embedded in the 
mobile phone. The mechanical type involves voice, heart sound using microphones and 
blood pressure by specific and miniaturized sensors attached to the mobile phone. Not only 
ECG can be used in mobile biometrics, the electroencephalography (EEG) identification 
(Paranjape et al., 2001; Nakanishi et al., 2009; Bao et al., 2009) also has applicability in this 
new area. 
The mobile phone based biometrics is also developing towards a multimodal functionality, 
which combines several biometric recognition methods to provide more reliable and flexible 
identification and authentication.  
Promising applications include personal privacy security, e-commerce, mobile bank 
transactions, e-health technology, etc. A grand outlook of future development in mobile 
phone based biometrics is outlined in the diagram below (Fig. 16). 
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Biometric FTE % FNMR % FMR1 % FMR2 % FMR3 % 
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Hand 2 1.5 1.5 n/a n/a 
Iris 7 6 <0.001 n/a n/a 
Voice 1 15 3 n/a n/a 
Table 2. Typical biometric accuracy performance numbers reported in large third party tests. 
FTE refers to failure to enroll, FNMR is non-match error rate, FMR1 denotes verification 
match error rate, FMR2 and FMR3 denote (projected) large-scale identification and 
screening match error rates for database sizes of 1 million and 500 identities, respectively. 
Reprinted from IEEE publication title: Proceedings of 2004 17th International Conference on 
Pattern Recognition, Jain et al., 2004, Biometrics: A Grand Challenge, pp. 935-942, with 
permission from IEEE 
 
 
Table 3. Typical intrinsic matcher (1:1) performance requirements. Reprinted from 
Proceedings of 2004 17th International Conference on Pattern Recognition, Jain et al., 2004, 
Biometrics: A Grand Challenge, pp. 935-942, with permission from IEEE 
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4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we study how the mobile phone can be used in biometrics. This versatile 
technique has so far proven to be a unique and promising participant in the areas of 
biometrics. Not only can mobile phone deliver successful solutions in the traditional 
biometric arenas of human identification and authentication, it has also been instrumental in 
securing the resource-constrained body sensor networks for health care applications in an 
efficient and practical manner. At the same time, there remain many challenges to be 
addressed and a lot more new technologies to be explored and developed. Before successful 
consumer-ready products are available, a great deal of research and development is still 
needed to improve all aspects of the mobile phone based biometric system. With a modicum 
of expectation, it is hoped that this chapter will play a part in further stimulating the 
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1. Introduction
The incessant demand of security in modern society is requiring a certain effort on providing
protected and reliable frames for contemporary scenarios and applications such as bank
account access, electronic voting, commerce or border crossing frontiers in airports.
Biometrics is of essential importance due to their capability to identify individuals univocally
with low rates in false alarms, aiming to avoid the use of passwords, pin-codes or different
tokens for personal identification. Instead, biometrics claim to extract precise and unique
information from inidividuals based on whether behavioural or physical characteristics.
In fact, there are a wide range of possible techniques for biometric identification, whose
enumeration is far beyond the scope of this topic.
However, despite of avoiding the use of pin-codes, biometrics do not consider the case of
individuals being forced to provide the biometric data to the corresponding sensor, allowing
non-desired accesses. In other words, given a cash withdraw machine in a bank provided
with the most sofisticated biometric system able to detect even fake or non-living samples, if a
person is forced to present the required biometric data (iris, fingerprint, hand, . . . ), the system
would let enter that person, as long as the biometric template coincides with the acquired
data. Thus, individuals registered or enrolled within the systems could be used as keys to
access a complex door.
The presented approach proposes a stress detection system able to cope with this lack of
security, based on the fact that former situations take place provoking a huge response in
the human stress mechanism. Such response is impossible to disguise, providing a suitable
method to detect anomalous situations in where the whole security could be compromised.
This stress detection must provide precise and real-time information on the state-of-mind of
the individual, requiring a low number of physiological parameters to keep the acquisition
system as less invasive and intrusive as possible. Notice that this fact is an essential concern
due to the current misgivings on hygienic considerations.
Therefore, only two phsyiological signals are required, namely Galvanic Skin Response (Skin
Conductivity) and Heart Rate, since both provide accurate and precise information on the
physiological situation of individuals. The inclusion of adequate sensors for both signals
acquisitions require little hardware, being straightforward to include former sensors in current
biometric systems.
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Besides, this chapter proposes a wide variety of methods for stress detection, in order
to elucidate which method is more suitable for implementation and integration in future
biometric devices. In addition, methods are oriented for real-time applications, which in most
cases provoke a reduction in stress detection accuracy.
Finally, the study comes up with the conclusion that best approach combining accuracy and
real-time application is based on fuzzy logic, modelling the behaviour of individuals under
different stressing and non-stressing situations, creating a stress template gathering previous
physiological information.
The use of the proposed stress template is twofold: On the one hand, to collect and
gather the different behaviour of each individual under a variety of situations in order
to compare posterior physiological acquisitions. On the other hand, the idea of template
implies modelling each individual separately, providing a frame to distinguish to what
extent individuals react against stressing situations. This template is based on the idea that
human individuals react differently to a same event, and therefore, a stress detection system
cannot provide a result based on general parameters but concrete, personal and individualize
features.
2. Literature review
The problem of stress detection has been tackled with different approaches. However, former
works can be divided into two different groups, depending on the use of physiological signals
or other behavioural characteristics.
For example, the work presented by Andren & Funk (2005) provides a system able to compute
the stress level of an individual by the manner and rhythm in which a person types characters
on a keyboard or keypad. In addition, Dinges et al. (2007) provides a study of stress detection
based on facial recognition. Both approaches are related to behavioural human characteristics.
On the other hand, there exist many previous works related to stress detection based on
physiological signals. The essay presented by Begum et al. (2006) presents a study of stress
detection only based on Finger Temperature (FT), together with Fuzzy Logic Zadeh (1996),
and Case-Based Reasoning Andren & Funk (2005).
Focusing on stress detection by means of physiological signals, it is necessary to describe
which possible signals can be related to stress and their extent.
It is not common to focus only on one certain physiological feature, but on many of them, in
order to obtain further and more precise information about the state of mind. Considering
this multimodal approach, there are several articles which study a variety of parameters and
signals, as well as the combination among them.
Heart Rate variability (HR) has been considered as an earlier stress marker in human body,
being widely studied and analyzed. Several authors consider this signal in their reports:
Jovanov et al. (2003) presented a stress monitoring system based on a distributed wireless
architecture implemented on intelligent sensors, recording HR along different positions in
individual body by means of sensors located beneath clothes.
In additoin, the research provided in Angus et al. (2005); Zhai et al. (2005) proposes a system
considering Finger Temperature (FT), Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) and Blood Volume Pulse
(BVP). The main characteristic of this system lies on the fact that signals are acquired in
a non-intrusive manner and furthermore, these previous physiological signals provide a
predictable relation with stress variation.
There exist physiological signals of different nature like Pupil Dilation (PD) and Eyetracking
(ET) providing very precise information about frame stress. When an individual is
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Physiological Signals References
BVP (Blood Volume Pressure) Barreto & Zhai (2006); Picard & Healey (2000)
Lin et al. (2005); Zhai et al. (2005)
GSR (Galvanic Skin Response) Barreto & Zhai (2006); Picard & Healey (2000)
Lin et al. (2005); Moore & Dua (2004); Zhai et al. (2005)
PD (Pupil Dilation) Barreto & Zhai (2006); Lin et al. (2005); Zhai et al. (2005)
ST (Skin Temperature) Barreto & Zhai (2006); Zhai & Barreto (2006)
ECG, EKG (Electrocardiogram) Picard & Healey (2000)
Breath (RR) Picard & Healey (2000)
EMG (Electromyogram) Picard & Healey (2000)
EEG (Electroencephalogram) Picard & Healey (2000)
Table 1. Literature Review on physiological signals involved in stress detection.
under stress, PD is wider and the eye movement is faster. The article presented in
Prendinger & Ishizuka (2007), not only consider PD and ET, but also GSR, BVP and FT.
The main purpose of this approach is to recognize emotions, interest and attention from
emotion recognition, a very remarkable conclusion for future computer applications and for
the improvement of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) Kim & Ande (2008); Sarkar (2002a).
In summary, stress can be detected through many different manners, as stated in Sarkar
(2002a), where a wide study is carried out regarding previous physiological signals together
with others related to stress (Positron Emission Technology (PET) Healey & Picard (2005);
Sarkar (2002a), Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) Picard & Healey (2000);
Sarkar (2002b), Electroencephalography (EEG) Li & hua Chen (2006); Sarkar (2002a), likewise
Electromyograms (EMG) Chin & Barreto (2006a); Li & hua Chen (2006); Shin et al. (1998) or
Respiratory Rate (RR) Shin et al. (2004)). Nonetheless, these other signals lack of future
integrity because they involve more invasive acquisition procedures.
Table 1 gathers a summary on the signals involved in stress detection within literature.
Together with signal processing and feature extraction, the comparison algorithms to
elucidate the stress level of an individual are of great importance. There are some previous
work considering several approaches for stress detection. The work presented by N. Sarkar
Sarkar (2002a) proposes fuzzy logic (as M. Jiang and Z. Wang Jiang & Wang (2009)) to
elucidate to what extent a user is under stress. On the other hand, the research presented
by A. de Santos et al. de Santos Sierra et al. (2011) proposes the creation of a fuzzy stress
template to which subsequent physiological acquisitions could be compared and contrasted.
Other approaches have been proposed, based on different techniques like, SVM, k-NN, Bayes
classifier. In order to extend excesively the document, Table 2 contains a summary of previous
approaches within literature.
Finally, a matter of importance are both how stress is induced in individuals and the number
of samples to evaluate former approaches. Table 3 and Table 4 briefly show which experiments
have been involved for provoking stress and which populations were required in order
to validate stress detection algorithms. More extensiveley, the research by Lisetti & Nasoz
(2004) provides a complete study on emotion recognition including a deep literature review
on the experiments carried out to provoke emotions considering populations, algorithms,
approaches and so forth.
Moreover, special mention deserves the work presented by Healey & Picard (2005), since they
are considered pioneers on stress detection field.
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Algorithms References
SVM (Support Vector Machines) Barreto & Zhai (2006); Zhai et al. (2005)
ANOVA Analysis Lin et al. (2005)
Bayes classifier Zhai & Barreto (2006)
Fisher Analysis de Santos Sierra et al. (2010); Picard & Healey (2000)
k-NN de Santos Sierra et al. (2010)
Fuzzy Logic Begum et al. (2006); Sarkar (2002b)
de Santos Sierra et al. (2011); Sarkar (2002a)
Table 2. Literature Review on algorithms applied to stress detection.
Experiments References
Stroop Test Barreto & Zhai (2006); Zhai et al. (2005)
Zhai & Barreto (2006)
Videogames Lin et al. (2005)
Driver and Pilot Simulation Picard & Healey (2000)
Hyperventilation and Talk Preparation de Santos Sierra et al. (2011; 2010)
Table 3. Literature Review on experiment layouts oriented to provoke stress.
Populations References
6 male individuals Zhai et al. (2005)
42 adults with ALS1 Moore & Dua (2004)
14 males and 4 females Lin et al. (2005)
32 individuals Barreto & Zhai (2006); Zhai & Barreto (2006)
3 experienced drivers Healey & Picard (2005)
10 pilots (with and without experience) Healey & Picard (2005)
Table 4. Literature Review on populations involved in stress detection evaluation.
3. Physiological signals
Although several possible signals have been considered within the literature to detect stress
(Section 2), this paper proposes the use of two signals: Galvanic Skin Response (GSR), also
known as Skin Conductance (SC), and Heart Rate (HR). These two signals were selected
based on their properties regarding non-invasivity when being acquired and because their
variation is strongly related to stress stimuli Barreto & Zhai (2006); Healey & Picard (2005);
Prendinger & Ishizuka (2007).
Galvanic Skin Response (GSR), known also as electrodermal activity (EDA), is an indicator
of skin conductance Barreto & Zhai (2006); Shi et al. (2007). More in detail, glands in the skin
produce ionic sweat, provoking alterations on electric conductivity. First experiment dates
back to 1907, when Carl Jung first described some relation between emotions and the response
of this parameter Angus et al. (2005); Zhai et al. (2005).
GSR can be obtained by different methods, but the device proposed to acquire signals (Section
4.1) is based on an exosomatic acquisition. In other words, extracting skin conductivity
requires a small current passing through the skin. GSR is typically acquired in hand fingers
and its measure units are μSiemens (μΩ−1) Angus et al. (2005).
Main parameters of GSR like basis threshold, peaks or frequency variation vary enormously
among different individuals and thus, no general features can be extracted from GSR signals
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Galvanic Skin Response, GSR
Fig. 1. A GSR (Galvanic Skin Response signal) sample during the four stages: First Base Line
(BL1), Talk Preparation (TP), Hyperventilation (HV) and Second Base Line (BL2). Notice how
GSR arousal responds positively to stressing stimuli (HV and TP).
for a global stress detection purpose, since parameters extracted from GSR signals are strongly
related to each individual.
Figure 1 shows an original GSR signal, measured during the experiments. Reader may notice
the different arousal of this signal, depending on the stressing stimulus. Initials in Figure 1
stands for BL1 (Base Line 1), TP (Talk Preparation), HV (Hyperventilation) and BL2 (Base Line
2) whose meanings are extensively explained in Section 4.5.
On the other hand, Heart Rate (HR) measures the number of heartbeats per unit of time. HR
can be obtained at any place on the human body, being an accessible parameter to be easily
acquired Choi & Gutierrez-Osuna (2009); Jovanov et al. (2003).
HR describes the heart activity when the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) attempts to tackle
with the human body demands depending on the stimuli received Picard & Healey (2000).
Concretely, ANS react against a stressing stimulus provoking an increase in blood volume
within the veins, so rest of the body can react properly, increasing the number of heartbeats.
Most common methods for HR extraction consider to measure the frequency of the
well-known QRS complex in a electrocardiogram signal Bar-Or et al. (2004); Sharawi et al.
(2008). In contrast to ECG biometric properties Israel et al. (2005), HR is not distinctive enough
to identify an individual.
Summarizing, both HR and GSR behave differently for each individual, and therefore
posterior stress template must gathered properly this unique response in order to obtain an
accurate result in stress detection. Figure 2 shows an original HR signal (measured in Beats
per Minute, BPM), measured during the experiments. Reader may notice the different arousal
of this signal, depending on the stress stimuli. Initials in Figure 2 stands for BL1 (Base Line
1), TP (Talk Preparation), HV (Hyperventilation) and BL2 (Base Line 2) whose meanings are
extensively explained in Section 4.5.1.
4. Database acquisition
This section provides an overview of how the dataset was built considering the experimental
setup and the characteristics of the database and which psychological tests were carried
out to assess in which manner an individual is likely to react against stress situations
Yanushkevich et al. (2007).
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Algorithms References
SVM (Support Vector Machines) Barreto & Zhai (2006); Zhai et al. (2005)
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Bayes classifier Zhai & Barreto (2006)
Fisher Analysis de Santos Sierra et al. (2010); Picard & Healey (2000)
k-NN de Santos Sierra et al. (2010)
Fuzzy Logic Begum et al. (2006); Sarkar (2002b)
de Santos Sierra et al. (2011); Sarkar (2002a)
Table 2. Literature Review on algorithms applied to stress detection.
Experiments References
Stroop Test Barreto & Zhai (2006); Zhai et al. (2005)
Zhai & Barreto (2006)
Videogames Lin et al. (2005)
Driver and Pilot Simulation Picard & Healey (2000)
Hyperventilation and Talk Preparation de Santos Sierra et al. (2011; 2010)
Table 3. Literature Review on experiment layouts oriented to provoke stress.
Populations References
6 male individuals Zhai et al. (2005)
42 adults with ALS1 Moore & Dua (2004)
14 males and 4 females Lin et al. (2005)
32 individuals Barreto & Zhai (2006); Zhai & Barreto (2006)
3 experienced drivers Healey & Picard (2005)
10 pilots (with and without experience) Healey & Picard (2005)
Table 4. Literature Review on populations involved in stress detection evaluation.
3. Physiological signals
Although several possible signals have been considered within the literature to detect stress
(Section 2), this paper proposes the use of two signals: Galvanic Skin Response (GSR), also
known as Skin Conductance (SC), and Heart Rate (HR). These two signals were selected
based on their properties regarding non-invasivity when being acquired and because their
variation is strongly related to stress stimuli Barreto & Zhai (2006); Healey & Picard (2005);
Prendinger & Ishizuka (2007).
Galvanic Skin Response (GSR), known also as electrodermal activity (EDA), is an indicator
of skin conductance Barreto & Zhai (2006); Shi et al. (2007). More in detail, glands in the skin
produce ionic sweat, provoking alterations on electric conductivity. First experiment dates
back to 1907, when Carl Jung first described some relation between emotions and the response
of this parameter Angus et al. (2005); Zhai et al. (2005).
GSR can be obtained by different methods, but the device proposed to acquire signals (Section
4.1) is based on an exosomatic acquisition. In other words, extracting skin conductivity
requires a small current passing through the skin. GSR is typically acquired in hand fingers
and its measure units are μSiemens (μΩ−1) Angus et al. (2005).
Main parameters of GSR like basis threshold, peaks or frequency variation vary enormously
among different individuals and thus, no general features can be extracted from GSR signals
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Galvanic Skin Response, GSR
Fig. 1. A GSR (Galvanic Skin Response signal) sample during the four stages: First Base Line
(BL1), Talk Preparation (TP), Hyperventilation (HV) and Second Base Line (BL2). Notice how
GSR arousal responds positively to stressing stimuli (HV and TP).
for a global stress detection purpose, since parameters extracted from GSR signals are strongly
related to each individual.
Figure 1 shows an original GSR signal, measured during the experiments. Reader may notice
the different arousal of this signal, depending on the stressing stimulus. Initials in Figure 1
stands for BL1 (Base Line 1), TP (Talk Preparation), HV (Hyperventilation) and BL2 (Base Line
2) whose meanings are extensively explained in Section 4.5.
On the other hand, Heart Rate (HR) measures the number of heartbeats per unit of time. HR
can be obtained at any place on the human body, being an accessible parameter to be easily
acquired Choi & Gutierrez-Osuna (2009); Jovanov et al. (2003).
HR describes the heart activity when the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) attempts to tackle
with the human body demands depending on the stimuli received Picard & Healey (2000).
Concretely, ANS react against a stressing stimulus provoking an increase in blood volume
within the veins, so rest of the body can react properly, increasing the number of heartbeats.
Most common methods for HR extraction consider to measure the frequency of the
well-known QRS complex in a electrocardiogram signal Bar-Or et al. (2004); Sharawi et al.
(2008). In contrast to ECG biometric properties Israel et al. (2005), HR is not distinctive enough
to identify an individual.
Summarizing, both HR and GSR behave differently for each individual, and therefore
posterior stress template must gathered properly this unique response in order to obtain an
accurate result in stress detection. Figure 2 shows an original HR signal (measured in Beats
per Minute, BPM), measured during the experiments. Reader may notice the different arousal
of this signal, depending on the stress stimuli. Initials in Figure 2 stands for BL1 (Base Line
1), TP (Talk Preparation), HV (Hyperventilation) and BL2 (Base Line 2) whose meanings are
extensively explained in Section 4.5.1.
4. Database acquisition
This section provides an overview of how the dataset was built considering the experimental
setup and the characteristics of the database and which psychological tests were carried
out to assess in which manner an individual is likely to react against stress situations
Yanushkevich et al. (2007).
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Fig. 2. A HR (Heart Rate signal) sample during the four stages: First Base Line (BL1), Talk
Preparation (TP), Hyperventilation (HV) and Second Base Line (BL2).
4.1 Overview
The experiments were carried out in a Faraday room in the Human Psychology Laboratory
from Psychology Faculty of Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), endowed with
electromagnetic, thermal and acoustic insulation, with the aim of collecting HR and GSR
signals from each participant.
The device proposed to carry out these experiments is I-330-C2 PHYSIOLAB (J &J
Engineering) able to process and store 6 channels including EMG (Electromyography), ECG
(Electrocardiogram), RR (Respiration Rate), HR and GSR. Sensors were attached to hand right
(or left, but not both) fingers Cai & Lin (2007), wrist and ankle, in order to acquire both HR
and GSR, avoiding sensors detachments, unplugged connectors to analog-to-digital converter
and/or software acquisition errors. Moreover, sample acquisition rate is one sample per
second for both HR and GSR.
4.2 Participants
The participants were students from Psychology Faculty (UCM) and Social Work (UCM),
being a total of 80 female individuals, with ages from 19 to 32 years old, with an average
of 21.8 years old and a standard deviation of 2.15. The lack of male individuals is due to the
Faculty where the experiment took place, given the fact that the percentage of male students
is almost negligible in comparison to the amount of females.
4.3 Task justification
Provoking stress on an individual requires a specific experimental design in order to obtain
an adequate arousal to the proposed physiological signal Dinges et al. (2007); Healey & Picard
(2005). Concretely, this paper proposes to induce stress by using Hyperventilation and Talk
Preparation Cano-Vindel et al. (2007).
Hyperventilation (HV) is defined as a certain kind of breath, which exceeds standard
metabolic demands, as a result of excess in respiratory rhythm.
As a consequence, several physiological changes emerge: arterial pressure diminution in
blood until a certain level so-called hypocapnea Cano-Vindel et al. (2007); Zvolensky & Eifert
(2001), and blood pH increment, known as alkalosis.
However, voluntary hyperventilation does not produce always an actual anxiety reaction
Cano-Vindel et al. (2007), and therefore, an additional anxiogenic task is required to ensure
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that a positive valence in terms of stress response is provoked. Such a task is Talk Preparation
(TP).
Results provided by Cano-Vindel et al. (2007); Zvolensky & Eifert (2001) highlight the fact
that hyperventilation produces a physiological reaction similar to that reaction induced by
a threatening task of preparing a talk.
As a conclusion, talk preparation and hyperventilation provoke both an alteration in
physiological parameters together with different emotional experiences. These previous tasks
have been widely studied and evaluated with positive results, and they are very suitable to
induce stressing stimuli on individuals.
4.4 Tests
When performing psychological experiments, an important tool to validate results requires
the utilization of tests to extract subjective information from the individual.
There exist several tests able to provide information about the predisposition of a certain
individual to be affected by anxiety and stress: ISRA test (Inventory of Situations and
Responses of Anxiety Miguel-Tobal & Cano-Vindel (2002)), IACTA test (Cognitive Activity
Inventory on Anxiety Disorders Cano-Vindel & Miguel-Tobal (2001)) and ASI (Anxiety
Sensitivity Index Peterson & Reiss (1992)).
The two former tests were developed by Cano-Vindel (Professor of Faculty of Psychology,
Complutense University of Madrid) together with his research group, and have been
widely used and accepted by scientific community Cano-Vindel & Miguel-Tobal (2001);
Cano-Vindel et al. (2007).
The tests used to detect predisposition to anxiety are described as follows:
• ISRA: Inventory designed according to the model of three response systems which
evaluates signs of anxiety in a Cognitive level (C), Physiological level (P), and Motor (M).
Furthermore, the addition of this three values provides a general measure of anxiety level,
denoted by Total (T). ISRA test also includes to assess tendency to show anxiety in four
areas, namely Assessment situations (F1), Interpersonal situations (F2), Phobics situations
(F3) and Daily life situations (F4).
This test provides good psychometrics properties, excellent internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alpha .99), good test-reset reliability (.81 for T) and good capability in
discriminating different samples.
• IACTA: This test is able to measure sub-scales of social phobia, panic attacks and
agoraphobia.
• ASI: This index provides information about the fear to anxiety symptom. Three different
factors are measured: Physical worries, social worries and thoughts related to mental
handicap. Subjects with a high total score in ASI show more elevated levels of anxiety after
hyperventilation task compared to subjects with a low score. However, physical worries is
the main factor to predict the anxiety level after hyperventilation in both no-clinic subjects
and panic disorders patients Cano-Vindel et al. (2007); Zvolensky & Eifert (2001).
4.5 Procedure
The experiments were split into two sessions:
• First session regards a subject selection, applying ISRA, IACTA and ASI test.
• Second session consisted of the HR and GSR sample acquisition under hyperventilation
and talk preparation.
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Fig. 2. A HR (Heart Rate signal) sample during the four stages: First Base Line (BL1), Talk
Preparation (TP), Hyperventilation (HV) and Second Base Line (BL2).
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that hyperventilation produces a physiological reaction similar to that reaction induced by
a threatening task of preparing a talk.
As a conclusion, talk preparation and hyperventilation provoke both an alteration in
physiological parameters together with different emotional experiences. These previous tasks
have been widely studied and evaluated with positive results, and they are very suitable to
induce stressing stimuli on individuals.
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When performing psychological experiments, an important tool to validate results requires
the utilization of tests to extract subjective information from the individual.
There exist several tests able to provide information about the predisposition of a certain
individual to be affected by anxiety and stress: ISRA test (Inventory of Situations and
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Inventory on Anxiety Disorders Cano-Vindel & Miguel-Tobal (2001)) and ASI (Anxiety
Sensitivity Index Peterson & Reiss (1992)).
The two former tests were developed by Cano-Vindel (Professor of Faculty of Psychology,
Complutense University of Madrid) together with his research group, and have been
widely used and accepted by scientific community Cano-Vindel & Miguel-Tobal (2001);
Cano-Vindel et al. (2007).
The tests used to detect predisposition to anxiety are described as follows:
• ISRA: Inventory designed according to the model of three response systems which
evaluates signs of anxiety in a Cognitive level (C), Physiological level (P), and Motor (M).
Furthermore, the addition of this three values provides a general measure of anxiety level,
denoted by Total (T). ISRA test also includes to assess tendency to show anxiety in four
areas, namely Assessment situations (F1), Interpersonal situations (F2), Phobics situations
(F3) and Daily life situations (F4).
This test provides good psychometrics properties, excellent internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alpha .99), good test-reset reliability (.81 for T) and good capability in
discriminating different samples.
• IACTA: This test is able to measure sub-scales of social phobia, panic attacks and
agoraphobia.
• ASI: This index provides information about the fear to anxiety symptom. Three different
factors are measured: Physical worries, social worries and thoughts related to mental
handicap. Subjects with a high total score in ASI show more elevated levels of anxiety after
hyperventilation task compared to subjects with a low score. However, physical worries is
the main factor to predict the anxiety level after hyperventilation in both no-clinic subjects
and panic disorders patients Cano-Vindel et al. (2007); Zvolensky & Eifert (2001).
4.5 Procedure
The experiments were split into two sessions:
• First session regards a subject selection, applying ISRA, IACTA and ASI test.
• Second session consisted of the HR and GSR sample acquisition under hyperventilation
and talk preparation.
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4.5.1 First session
Several collective assessments were carried out applying ISRA, IACTA and ASI test.
Participants were to fulfill previous tests in the same order as described previously. The
average length of this step was deemed to be about 50 minutes.
Finally, two groups (namely Group 1 and Group 2) were created ensuring that
the distribution of their respective anxiety levels, measured by psychological tests
Cano-Vindel & Miguel-Tobal (2001); Miguel-Tobal & Cano-Vindel (2002), were similar. In
other words, this selection seeks to avoid one group containing people which barely react
against stress, and other group with people which overreact under stressing conditions.
Therefore, both groups must be well-balanced in terms of anxiety levels in order to validate
the experiments.
Participants from Group 1 underwent an experimental session using physiological and
subjective signals under following conditions: calm state (base line, namely BL1), stimulating
task (hyperventilation, HV), threatening task (talk preparation, TP) and base line post-stress
(BL2). On the other hand, the order of tasks was swapped for participants from Group 2: calm
state (base line), threatening task (talk preparation), stimulating task (hyperventilation) and
base line post-stress. Main reason to alter the order consists of making independent the task
order from the results obtained Cano-Vindel et al. (2007); Miguel-Tobal & Cano-Vindel (2002).
The emotional experience was assessed after each situation (Base line (BL1), threatening
(TP) and stimulating task (HV) and base line post-stress (BL2)), using a Likert scale (0-100)
Cano-Vindel et al. (2007).
Specifically, individuals were asked to evaluate the following emotional parameters:
displeasure, anxiety level, corporal sensations and thoughts lack of control. In fact, control
dimension was divided into two variables to explore possible differences among previous
facets. Lack of control on observable behavior was not assessed, since the subjects were
strongly indicated not to move during the experiment procedure, in order to avoid noise in
physiological signal acquisition (Section 4.1).
Furthermore, a precise order was given to avoid ambiguities regarding emotions: ‘Assess
anxiety level/intensity experimented at this very precise moment’. Usually, participants did
not understand the meaning of evaluating their emotions (which emotion?).
After this four parameters evaluation (i.e., displeasure, anxiety level, corporal sensations
and thoughts lack of control), next step was carried out, consisting of recording Heart Rate
(HR) and Galvanic Skin Response (GSR), together with new evaluations of previous four
parameters (displeasure, anxiety level, corporal sensations and thoughts lack of control)
regarding emotional experience.
The experimental session consisted of the following steps for participants from Group 1:
• Sensors location and adaptation time. After this adaptation time (variable time), base line
of physiological signals (heart rate and skin conductivity) were taken under rest situation,
during 2 minutes. Once the signals were recorded, a new assessment of emotional
parameters was carried out. Besides, this step is so-called BL1.
• Hyperventilation task (HV), consisting of deep and fast breathes each 3 seconds, conducted
by a sound produced by the experimenter. This task was performed till the individual
realized clearly of changes in his or her corporal sensations. The participant let the
experimenter know that moment, by the use of a simple word. The experimenter made the
participant to breath deeply three times more, recording after that moment physiological
signals (90 seconds), followed by a new evaluation of the emotional parameters.
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• Talk preparation task facing an audience (TP). The experimenter asked the individual to
prepare mentally a talk of few minutes on a certain topic explained during the lectures that
these students attended, in order to be recorded by a video-camera. After three minutes,
new appraisal of emotional parameters were inquired, recording again HR and GSR (90
seconds), informing the participant that the talk was not necessary anymore.
• Rest period (BL2). The experiment comes to an end, and post-stress base line is
recorded during 2 minutes, acquiring HR and GSR signals, together with a new subjective
evaluation of the emotional parameters.
Obviously, BL1 implies no stressing stimuli on the individual in contrast to HV and TP.
However, nothing can be assured in relation to BL2, since it cannot be considered neither
as a stressing nor as a relaxing state Cano-Vindel & Miguel-Tobal (2001); Cano-Vindel et al.
(2007); Miguel-Tobal & Cano-Vindel (2002).
Individuals from Group 1 carried out the talk preparation task (TP), after base line state (BL1),
followed by the hyperventilation task (HV), ending with post-stress base line (BL2). On the
other hand, individuals from Group 2 performed the experiment in the following order: BL1,
TP, HV and BL2.
4.6 Database discussion
A biometric database based on a certain physical characteristic, e. g. Iris, consists of different
samples taken from a wide range of users during different sessions separated by a lapse
of time of days, weeks or even months. On the contrary, the database gathered in these
experiments does not verify any of the previous points described above.
This stress database consists of a unique sample of a very specific set of individuals, namely
female students with ages on the interval 19 to 32 years old, with an average of 21.8 years old
and a standard deviation of 2.15 (Section 4.2).
However, there exists justification for this drawback. A psychological experiment is far
from being repeatable, since the specific tasks previously described (Section 4.3) require a
component of surprise and unexpectedness. In other words, if an individual carries out again
the same tasks, even after an undefined period of time, such person would be prepared to
come through the task, and what is more, the response of her or his physiological signals will
not be certainly the same Cano-Vindel et al. (2007).
Obviously, a third session similar to second one (first session consisted of answering tests
ISRA, IACTA and ASI, second session attempted to register the physiological signals) could
have taken place with different tasks. Though, this option was rejected, since different tasks
provoke different stress responses Chin & Barreto (2006b); Fairclough (2009); Kim & Ande
(2008); L. et al. (2007), and therefore, the signals registered in both sessions would not
correspond to same degrees of stress.
The physiological response to a stressing agent is strongly related to each individual and such
a response is similar, independently of the time during the stressing stimulus provoked the
response Yerkes & Dodson (1908). As an overview, the stress mechanism could be considered
as a linear temporal invariant system, which provides certain outputs depending on the
inputs. Therefore, same inputs produce same outputs. Moreover, stress mechanism extracts
some information from the stimuli, so that if such stressing agent appears again, the human
body is able to react faster and better, compared to first time Lin et al. (2005); Rosch (1996).
This characteristic makes useless to repeat same tasks after a certain period of time, and
furthermore makes unnecessary a third session with different tasks, since the response will
not be the same, as the stimuli provided by different task, provoke different responses. Then,
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this implies that these experiments assure that a final stress detection system is able to detect
stress in real applications, despite of being train with the presented database.
Finally, it is difficult, even for expert psychologists, to state whether the response among
female and male individuals differs as much as previous response varies within female
individuals Sapolsky (1988). Several researchers support the idea that male and female
individuals suffer different responses when stress agent endures through time, (e.g., a great
amount of work at job, a bad economical situation, and so forth), but they have similar
responses when stress stimuli consist of specific actions in a very short period of time, e.g.
an accident, an armed robbery and the like Lin et al. (2005).
Thereby, it is justified to extend the results obtained with this database to a wider population,
even containing males and females. Nonetheless, the algorithm responsible for detecting
stress has been implemented independently of this likely drawback, since it considers how an
individual behaves under both stress and relax situation. This procedure provides in theory
more independence from database population.
5. Template extraction
Before describing the different approaches compared within this paper, how the template is
created is explained, combining both the physiological signals and the different stressing and
non-stressing tasks.
In other words, the template extraction is required so that the system could create a
profile in order to contrast, whether a user is actually under stress. This template is
based on specific characteristics extracted from individual concerning parameters from the
physiological signals HR and GSR.
On the other hand, once the user is associated to a template, the individual is able to access the
system, and therefore a template comparison is required. Both steps are described in following
sections.
First step consists of extracting a stress template from the user. Such a template describes the
behavior of HR and GSR signals in both situations calm state (relax) and excited state (stress).
As stated in Section 4.1, HR and GSR signals are recorded by I-330-C2 PHYSIOLAB (J &J
Engineering) able to process and store 6 channels including EMG, ECG, RR, HR and GSR.
The main aim of a stress detection system consists of elucidating calm state (relax) or excited
state (stress). Therefore, the system must know how both signals (HR and GSR) behave in
both situations. Since these states cannot be controlled easily by an individual, calm state and
excited state must be induced while HR and GSR are recorded.
Each user must undergo the experiments described previously (Section 4.5). Briefly, as an
overview, there exist four stages in the experiments:
• First stage (BL1): Elicit a relax state by suggesting the individual to sit comfortably.
• Second stage (HV): Hyperventilation, i.e., deep and fast respirations.
• Third stage (TP): Speech/talk preparation.
• Forth stage (BL2): Relax state.
Three states emerge from previous stages (Section 4.5): Calm state (First stage, BL1), Excited
state (Second and Third stage, HV and TP) and post-excited state (Forth stage, BL2). This
latter state regards the fact that after a stress short period of time, HV and GSR require more
time to achieve a calm state. Thereby, forth stage and first stage diverge in terms of HR and
GSR despite of corresponding to the same instructions in the experiment.
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Fig. 3. Graphic representation of γ. Notice how the relation between HR and GSR varies
depending on the stressing stimuli (BL1, TP, HV and BL2).
The experiments involve Hyperventilation (HV) and Talk Preparation (TP), as presented in
Section 4.3. However, any task involving a considerable cognitive load (such mathematical
operations, color distinction, Stroop test and so forth) may come in useful for inducing stress
in a similar manner as previous task met such a required goal Cano-Vindel et al. (2007);
Conway et al. (2000); Healey & Picard (2005); Kim & Ande (2008).
Mathematically, both HR and GSR are considered as stochastic signals. Therefore, H
represents the space of HR possible signals and G represents the space of GSR possible signals.
Each stage will come up with a pair of signals h ∈ H and g ∈ G according to the experimental
task conducted in each situation. Thus, a template extraction requires four pair of signals,
namely γ = [(h1, g1), (h2, g2), (h3, g3), (h4, g4)] ∈ H× G corresponding to how the individual
behaves under different states. Notice that signals hi and gi are not normalized, in contrast
to previous approaches Angus et al. (2005); Healey & Picard (2005) . The decision to avoid
normalization was done based on the experience, since data without normalization provided
more accurate results in terms of stress detection.
Once γ is obtained, for each pair of signals, (hi, gi), i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, a mean vector is obtained
together with the deviation for each pair. In other words, four parameters are obtained: ζhi =
h̄i and ζgi = ḡi, which represent the mean of signals hi and gi in addition to σhi and σgi
related to the dispersion for each pair. Finally, stress template, namely T is described by
T = (ζhi , ζgi , σhi , σgi ), i = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Figure 3 provides a visual example of a scattering representation of each pair of signals γ.
Notice how non-stressing stimuli provokes a low excitation in GSR (Figure 3, ), and on the
contrary, the evidence of an arousal when undergoing on stressing tasks like Talk Preparation
(Figure 3, ) and Hyperventilation (Figure 3, ).
The aim of this action is to described the information in HR and GSR by four Gaussian
distributions, centered in (ζhi , ζgi ) and with standard deviation σhi and σgi . This approach
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Fig. 3. Graphic representation of γ. Notice how the relation between HR and GSR varies
depending on the stressing stimuli (BL1, TP, HV and BL2).
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The aim of this action is to described the information in HR and GSR by four Gaussian
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Task HR GSR ζh ζg σh σg
BL1 103.2 13.22 3.84 1.13
TP 98.9 25.28 5.74 1.13
HV 96.14 33.18 9.5 1.31
BL2 90.67 25.60 6.69 1.32
Table 5. Parameters extracted from GSR and HR signals in relation to experimental task (BL1,
TP, HV and BL2). Those pieces of signals (columns HR and GSR) have been extracted from
Figure 2 and Figure 1 respectively.
will facilitate the implementation of fuzzy antecedent membership functions by Gaussian
distributions in a posterior fuzzy decision algorithm. This approach will facilitate a system
access (section 6) implementation based on fuzzy logic, able to provide a more accurate
decision on the degree of stress of a certain individual.
Furthermore, Table 5 provides a visual example of how previous parameters ζhi , ζgi , σhi and
σgi , i = {1, 2, 3, 4} are extracted from signals HR and GSR (Figure 1 and Figure 2) depending
on the experimental task (BL1, TP, HV and BL2).
Let tT be the time used to acquire both signals in order to extract the stress template.
Evidently, the performance of the system depends on this parameter, since the longer tT , the
more information the system obtains, and therefore, the stress template may be more accurate.
A study regarding this relation between tT and system performance is presented in Section
7.3.
Finally, after template extraction, the template must be stored. The template T requires
16×32 bits, since each template element (whatever ζhi , ζgi , σhi or σgi ), is represented by a
float element. In other words, 512 bits, i.e. 64 Bytes.
6. Stress detection
After a stress template extraction, T describes how an individual behaves under stressing
and non-stressing situations. This section describes how the stress detection procedure is
performed in addition to an overview on the algorithm involved to elucidate on the degree of
stress. Once the user is enrolled, and a template is created, describing how such a user behaves
under different stressing situations, the subject is able to access the system. In other words,
the system is able to decide whether a certain registered user is under stressing stimuli. First
requirement for a stress detection system access regards user identification and verification.
The individual attempting to access the system, must be firstly identified so that the system
can load his/her template, P . This step is indispensable, otherwise, the system could not
contrast the information (resulting from a HR and GSR acquisition) presented by the user.
Firstly, the signals GSR and HR must be measured from the individual. This acquisition
process lasts a variable time, tacq (acquisition time), responsible for the performance of the
overall system, in addition to tT . In fact, the main difference between tacq and tT relies on
the fact that tT is related to the required time to obtain template T and tacq regards the time
needed to decide to what extent an individual is under stress. Both are measured in seconds,
and main aim of posterior expert system consists of obtaining highest accuracy in detecting
stress by requiring shortest time of tacq and tT .
This compromise will be discussed in Section 7.3.
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This document proposes five different approaches to solve stress detection, given a template
and two physiological signals: GMM McLachlan & Basford (1988), k-Nearest Neighbour
(k-NN) Nilsson (1996), Fisher’s linear discriminant analysis Michie et al. (1994), Support
vector machines (SVMs) Wang (2009) and Fuzzy Logic Zadeh (1996).
6.1 Gaussian mixture model
Let x be a two-dimensional observation describing a sample of both GSR and HR. The






πig(x; μ i, Σ i) (1)







2 (x−μ i)TΣ−1i (x−μ i) (2)
where K is the number of mixtures, the parameter φc = {πi, μ i, Σ i}Ki=1 consists of the mixture
weight πi (Σπi = 1), the mean vector μ i and the covariance matrix Σ i of the ith Gaussian
component ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , K, in the c class. In fact, Eq. 2 is a specific case with d = 2
McLachlan & Basford (1988); Wolfe (1970), since there are only two physiological signals, HR
and GSR.
The parameters represented by φc are estimated by applying the Expectation Maximization
(EM) algorithm Wolfe (1970). Let {xt}Nt=1 be the training samples, then EM algorithm finds





The k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN) is a simple method used for density estimation. The






where the integral is carried out over the volume V. This integral can be approximated by the
relation θ ∼ p(x)V when V is small.
In fact, the probability θ may be approximated by the proportion of samples falling within V,
so that θ ∼ kn .
The distance metric used in k-NN methods can be described by a simple Euclidean distance.




A deeper understanding of k-NN is provided in Nilsson (1996).
6.3 Fisher linear discriminant analysis
Fisher’s linear discriminant analysis is an empirical method for classification based purely
on attribute vectors Michie et al. (1994). A hyperplane in th p-dimensional attribute space
is chosen to separate the known classes as accurate as possible. Points are then classifed
according to the side of the hyperplane that they fall on.
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contrast the information (resulting from a HR and GSR acquisition) presented by the user.
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overall system, in addition to tT . In fact, the main difference between tacq and tT relies on
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More precisely, in the case of two classes, let x̄, x̄1, x̄2 be respectively the means of the attribute
vectors overall and for the two classes. Suppose that a coefficient set a1, . . . , ap is given,
obtaining the particular linear combination attributes g(x) = ∑ ajxj , which is called the
discriminant between the classes.
The criterion proposed by Fisher is the ratio of between-class to within-class variances.




is maximum, where m1 and m2 are the group means and SW is the pooled within-class sample




where Σ̂1 and Σ̂2 are the maximum likelihood estimates of the covariance matrices of classes
ω1 and ω2 respectively, with ni samples in class ωi.
6.4 Support vector machines
Support vector machines (SVMs) have been widely applied to pattern classification problems
and non-linear regressions Wang (2009).
After SVM classifiers are trained, they can be used to predict future trends.
In this case, the supervised classification that involves two steps: firstly, an SVM is trained as
a classifier with a part of the data in a specific data set. In the second step (i.e., prediction), we
use the classifier trained in the first step to classify the rest of the data in the data set.
The SVM is a statistical learning algorithm pioneered by Vapnik Vapnik (1995). The basic
idea of the SVM algorithm is to find an optimal hyper-plane that can maximize the margin (a
precise definition of margin will be given later) between two groups of samples. The vectors
nearest to the optimal hyper-plane are called support vectors.
In comparison with other algorithms, SVMs have shown outstanding capabilities in dealing
with classification problems.
6.5 Fuzzy logic
An automatic decision algorithm must elucidate a certain output accordingly to specific
inputs. There exist several kinds of decision strategies in relation to the concrete task to solve
Andren & Funk (2005); Jiang & Wang (2009); Liao et al. (2005).
The decision algorithm proposed in this article is based on fuzzy logic Zadeh (1996), since
it is a very suitable strategy considering the data involved. In other words, a fuzzy decision
algorithm provides an indefinite output allowing, however, to achieve a more precise decision
than by using crisp decision algorithms Begum et al. (2006); Picard & Healey (2000); Sarkar
(2002a;b).
As a main description, a stress fuzzy decision algorithm attempts to elucidate to what extent
a certain individual is under stressing stimuli, by capturing his or her physiological HR and
GSR signals during tacq seconds, and comparing his or her response with a previous stored
template T , obtained by a prior acquisition carried out during tT seconds. It is on that
template comparison where this decision algorithm focuses on.
Any fuzzy decider requires different elements, which are described in subsequent points:
• Antecedent membership functions. The antecedent membership functions attempt to
represent the information extracted from input, and they constitute in fact the template
T itself.
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Two different groups of antecedent membership functions are required by this system.
Both groups of functions describes how HR and GSR behave under previous four
situations (BL1, TP, HV, BL2).
• Consequent membership functions. The aim of these membership functions consists of
describing the output of the system. This paper proposes an output on the interval [0, 1],
where 0 represents relax state and 1, stress state.
• Rule description. The rules describing how to transform the information provided in
antecedent membership functions into consequent functions is maybe the most important
part of a fuzzy decision system Pedrycz (1994). Rules provide a method to combine
properly the information supplied by previous membership functions in order to produce
an output stating to what extent an individual is under stress.
7. Results
This section aims at comparing the results provided by former approaches: GMM, k-NN,
Fisher Discriminant Analysis, SVM and Fuzzy Logic, considering previous parameters:
threshold ρth and temporal parameters (tT and tacq).
7.1 Database: Training, validation and testing data
In order to obtain valid results, the database must be divided into three groups:
• Training data: Used to extract the template, i.e., T = (ζhi , ζgi , σhi , σgi ).
• Validation data: Used to fixed threshold ρth and temporal parameters (tT and tacq) in order
to maximize the performance of the system.
• Testing data: Used to obtain which implementation and metric is most suitable, and
therefore, which is the performance of the whole system.
For each individual, a vector containing tT seconds of γ (for each task BL1, HV, TP and BL2)
was used for training data; a vector of tacq seconds for each task was used to validate the
system, and rest of the data was used as testing data. This latter testing data will be split
in slots of tacq seconds. Notice that one second corresponds to one sample in HR and GSR
one-dimensional signals (Section 4.1). This assignment is done randomly. Notice that this
validation scheme is similar to a K-fold cross-validation.
The justification for this division is based on the research carried out by Picard & Healey
(2000), where several physiological signals (not only HR and GSR) were recorded during a
period of time of thirty-two days in a same person. Eight emotions were provoked during
thirty minutes per day, and no substantial changes were appreciated during that period in
each emotions. In other words, physiological signals behave similarly in each task through
time, and therefore h and g signals can be divided into smaller parts, considering each segment
as an independent acquisition.
7.2 Stress evaluation parameters
A stress detection system must reach a compromise between detecting properly which
individuals are under stress situations, and which individuals are in a relax state.
Thereby, two assessment parameters are defined:
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Two different groups of antecedent membership functions are required by this system.
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system, and rest of the data was used as testing data. This latter testing data will be split
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individuals are under stress situations, and which individuals are in a relax state.
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• True Stress Detection rate (TSD): When the system properly detects stress when an
individual is under stress stimuli. This TSD factor corresponds to the sensitivity statistical
measure, since TSD can be described as follows in Eq. 5:
TSD =
#True Positives
#True Positives + #False Negatives
(5)
where a True Positive means classifying as stressed an individual which is indeed under
stress, and False Negative means classifying as relaxed an individual which is under
stressing situations.
• True Non-Stress Detection rate (TNSD): When the system correctly detects no stress in
an individual and the subject is indeed not under stressing situations. This TNSD factor
corresponds to the specificity statistical measure, since TNSD can be described by Eq. 6:
TNSD =
#True Negatives
#True Negatives + #False Positives
(6)
where a True Negative means classifying as non-stressed an individual which is not under
stress, and False Positive means classifying as stressed an individual which is calm and
relaxed.
Obviously, TSD and TNSD depend strongly on threshold ρth. If ρth → 0 then the system
considers every output as a stress stimuli (TSD decreases, TNSD increases) and vice versa.
Therefore, a compromise must be achieved by finding a threshold ρth where TSD equals
TNSD. This threshold is defined as True Equal Stress Detection rate (TESD).
Notice that the higher TESD, the more accurate the performance of the system.
At this point, one question arises: Which is the best indicator (TESD,TSD or TNSD) to
provide an evaluation on the performance of a stress detection system? TESD is obtained
with validation data, and therefore threshold ρth and temporal parameters tT and tacq are
fixed to maximized TESD. These parameters are set a posteriori Yanushkevich et al. (2007). On
the other hand, TSD and TNSD are obtained with testing data, i.e. TSD and TNSD give an
understanding on how the system behaves with real data. Notice that previous parameters
(ρth, tT and tacq) have been already fixed and adapted with validation data, and therefore the
performance of the system might be barely unbalanced. In other words, TSD and TNSD will
not be equal at TESD, but TSD could increase in expense of TNSD or vice versa.
This suggests that TESD is a fine system performance indicator, since it provides an
approximation based on validation data. However, TSD and TNSD provides a real rate of the
performance. Obviously, TESD cannot be always calculated in previous schemes (Section ??),
as TESD requires both stressing and non-stressing data during the training and the validation
data.
7.3 Temporal parameters
The performance of the system (TSD and TNSD) not only depends on previous threshold ρth
but also on two temporal parameters: Template time (tT ) and Acquisition time (tacq). The
former time regards the required time to obtain the template, and the latter is related to the
time demanded to acquire stress information from an individual.
38 Recent Application in Biometrics Real-Time Stress Detection by means of Physiological Signals 17
Evidently, the longer tT and tacq, the more accurate the system is. However, in real
applications, time is the most valued asset, and therefore, a balance among tT , tacq, TSD and
TNSD must be achieved.
These temporal parameters are fixed during the validation step, and remain constant during
the testing stage.
Figure 4 provides information about how TSD varies in relation to different values of tT and
tacq.



















Fig. 4. Relation between TESD Performance and time to obtain template (tT ) and acquisition
time (tacq). These values were obtained with ρth = 0.27.
Reader can notice how the performance in detecting stress (TSD) increases as tT and tacq do
so. In fact, a TESD= 99.16% (Figure 4, ) is obtained with tT = 17s and tacq = 17s,
which means that physiological signals GSR and HR from an individual are measured during
tT = 17s, and furthermore, that in subsequent accesses, such an individual must present their
physiological signals during tacq = 17s, so the system can decide to what extent is under
stress.
As before, the results obtained in this section are achieved for a given scheme, concretely
Fuzzy Logic. In order to obtain the best combination of parameters, this procedure must be
repeated for each scheme and implementation.
7.4 Evaluation performance
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed approaches, the procedure presented
previously was carried out for every system. A detailed description of these results is far
beyond the scope of this section and therefore, Table 6 is presented to compared former
methods when detecting stress. Reader may notice that the performance of the proposed
methods depends on the temporal parameters tT and tacq, all of them measured in seconds.
The best result in every scheme is achieved with scheme BL1+HV which means that for an
accurate stress detection, only two tasks are required: a relaxing situation and a stressing
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GMM k-NN Disc. Anal. SVM Fuzzy Logic
(tT = 5, (tT = 5, (tT = 7, (tT = 5, (tT = 7,
tacq = 10) tacq = 5) tacq = 10) tacq = 10) tacq = 10)
TSD 95.1 ± 0.2 92.8 ± 0.4 95.6 ± 0.3 95.6 ± 0.4 99.5 ± 0.3
TNSD 86.3 ± 0.4 97.3 ± 1.3 96.7 ± 0.4 96.7 ± 0.3 97.4 ± 0.2
Table 6. Comparative stress detection performances. Best result is achieved with fuzzy logic,
although the rest of the results are competitive when compared to those obtained within
literature. Temporal parameters are provided in seconds and rates in percentage (%).
Reference Stress Detection Physiological Population
Rate (%) Signals
Healey & Picard (2005) 97.4% ECG, EMG, RR, GSR Not provided
Wagner et al. (2005) 79.5-96.6% ECG, EMG, RR, GSR 1 subject
Cai & Lin (2007) 85-96% BVP, ST, RR, GSR Not provided
Guang-yuan & Min (2009) 75-85% ECG, EMG, RR, GSR 1 subject
Kulic & Croft (2005) 76% ECG, EMG, GSR 8 subjects
Sharawi et al. (2008) 60-78% ST, GSR 35 subjects
Best of our proposed methods 99.5% HR, GSR 80 subjects
Table 7. A comparison between approaches comparing stress detection rates, physiological
signals and population involved. The initials ST stand for Skin Temperature.
situation. An outstanding result, since it allows to decrease (in terms of time) the template
extraction step, among other aspects discussed in posterior Section 8.
The conclusion is that stress can be detected by means of fuzzy logic with an accuracy of
99.5% recording the signal of the user during 10 seconds to create the template and 7 seconds
for stress detection. These results highlight the improvement achieved in comparison to other
approaches, showed in Table 7, providing the following parameters to be compared: Stress
Detection rate (TSD), the physiological signals involved and the population used to evaluate
the proposed approach. This improvement is achieved not only in terms of accuracy in stress
detection, but also in relation to the number of physiological signals (only HR and GSR) and
the population.
8. Conclusions and future work
The proposed stress detection systems are able to detect stress by using only two physiological
signals (HR and GSR) providing a precise output indicating to what extent a user is under a
stressing stimulus.
In addition, HR and GSR allows a plausible future integration of former proposed systems on
current biometric systems, achieving and increase in the overall security.
Main characteristics of the proposed systems regard non-invasiveness, fast-oriented
implementation and an outstanding accuracy in detecting stress when compared to previous
approaches in literature.
In other words, the system can detect stress almost instantly, allowing a possible integration
in real-time systems. Notice that only two physiological signals are involved in contrast
to the amount of features required to elucidate on the stress degree provided by previous
approaches.
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An individualization of not only the template T , but also ρth, tT and tacq must be adapted for
each individual, so that the overall performance can be increased.
These parameters (ρth, tT and tacq) have been fixed for the whole database within this work,
and therefore, if a different version of these parameters is considered for each individual, then
the accuracy of the system could be increased. This implementation remains as future work.
The database acquisition was based on psychological experiments carried out by expert
psychologists. These experiments ensure that stressing situations are provoked on an
individual, validating posterior HR and GSR acquisitions.
This paper provides a decision system able to detect stress with an accuracy of 99.5% using
fuzzy logic and 10 seconds to extract the stress template and 7 seconds to detect stress on an
individual using two physiological signals HR and GSR measured only during two tasks: a
stressing task and a relaxing stage.
The rest of the approaches are also competitives in terms of computational cost and
performance. This results are achieved due to the fact that the stress template provides precise
information on the state of mind of individuals, coming up with an innovative concept in
stress detection. A combination of approaches is regarded as future work.
Finally, these systems may be applicable in scenarios related to aliveness detection (e.g.,
detecting if an individual is accessing a biometric system with an amputated finger), civil
applications (e.g., driver control), withdrawing money from a cash dispenser, electronic voting
(e.g., someone is forced to emit a certain vote) and so forth. Moreover, future research entails
an integration in mobile devices.
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Due to the relevant innovations in the ICT domain, today, a lot of services is being provided
with a self–service approach to an even more great number of people simplifying several
tasks of everyday life (e.g., cash retrieval by ATM, remote-banking, etc.). The key aspect
to fully enable such services and make them wide accepted by peopole is the possibility
to reliably count on biometric identification mechanisms (Adeoye, 2010; BTAM, 2010; Elliott
et al., 2007; Li & Zhang, 2010; Sonkamble et al., 2010). Some of them are already exploited in
several real–life scenarios, like the Access Control–Border Management in Hong Kong or the
Access Control–Restricted Area Access by Canadian Air Transport Authority (BTAM, 2010).
However, some of such services could be very critical and so, their provisioning, should be
managed very carefully in order to avoid the possibility of malicious operations. So, the best
way to support the evolution of automatic services providing is to develop a system, also
automatic, which is able to trust in a secure and flexible way the identity of people that need
to access such services. Such a system should be of easy integration in several scenarios,
especially with respect to existing infrastructures, and should be designed to respect all the
relevant privacy issues while providing to the users all the feelings (about reliability, safety
and usability) needed to make the system acceptable.
In such a context, this book chapter aims at presenting an automatic personal identification
system developed by WEST Aquila (WESTAquila, 2010). The system, described in detail later,
exploits the recent advances in the biometric and heterogeneous wireless networks fields to
provide a true authentication platform supporting several services encompassing physical
access (e.g., to restricted areas or vehicles) as well as logical access (e.g., to personal services
like e-banking) management. This is realized by maintaining a full control over critical data
(biometric) that are used for the authentication. In fact, the main component of the system is
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a novel biometric badge, i.e., a smartcard equipped with a biometric reader (i.e., a fingerprint
reader) and a short–medium range wireless transceiver which allow the identification of both
the card and the card owner. In other words, it constitutes a system–on–badge: when required,
the card owner is identified through an on–system biometric matching and only the result of
such a matching is sent (appropriately ciphered) through the wireless interface towards the
rest of the system. Therefore, personal biometric data is always under the full control of its
owner, leading to high levels of security and privacy protection.
The intended content of this chapter will be to illustrate the badge as a biometric system and its
usage in two case studies: (i) physical access of authorized people in a restricted area, which
involves also physical positioning of the badge owner and (ii) logical access of authorized
people in an e-banking–like scenario.
2. System architecture description
The proposed system is composed by a set of elements (Fig. 1) enabling high level of flexibility
and reliability, needed to make this proposal as a reference in the field of personal automatic
identification systems, where particular emphasis is on aspects like robustness, ease–of–use
and privacy.
Fig. 1. Logical System Architecture
2.1 Biometric Badge (BB)
The key point of the proposed system is our embedded biometric badge (Fig. 2), which is a
“system–on–badge” performing four main tasks: (i) enable the localization of its owner using
distributed positioning techniques, (ii) scan and verify fingerprints of people, (iii) check if
an user is the badge’s owner based on fingerprint matching, and (iv) send related outcomes
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wirelessly to the rest of the system (e.g., the DU which interconnects the badge to the rest of
the infrastructure), without the need to transmit the owners’ biometric data over the wireless
medium (so, in a secure way from the point of view of transmitting critical data of the users).
Fig. 2. WEST Aquila’s Biometric Badge – components
The badge is equipped with:
• the Texas Instruments’ SoC CC2430 (TI, 2009), which embeds a 8051 micro controller and
a CC2420 radio transceiver, compliant with the IEEE 802.15.4 (IEEE, 2006) standard. It is
used for wireless medium-range communications, as well as localization operations;
• a fingerprint sensor reader with its embedded “companion chip” provided by
UPEK (UPEK, 2009). This chip is the key element for handling biometric data: it allows
to authenticate people based on fingerprint information, as well as store data in a memory
protected even from physical external attacks. Moreover, only this chip and the gateway
are aware on how to decode the messages they send to each other;
• a RFID tag based on the ISO15693 standard and its companion chip provided by
Montalbano Technology (Montalbano, 2009), which allow the microcontroller to get access
to data stored in the tag;
• a rechargeable battery, its driver to monitor the charge status, and a user interface with 8
leds and a push-button.
Such features allow the badge to support a full range of applications (Fig. 3), mainly due to
the embedded fingerprint reader enabling both civil and military use of such a technology in
a secure and safe way.
2.2 Distributed Unit (DU)
Every DU is logically constituted by a “Gateway” (GW), one or more “Readers” (RDs) and one
or more “Actuators” (ATs) communicating one another using wireless or wired technologies.
The whole system can rely on several DUs, networked through secure communications with
a Central Processing Station (CPS) and related controlled systems (Fig. 1). Each DU maintains
synchronization of data with the central system and allows secure communications among
the system components.
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Fig. 3. WEST Aquila’s Biometric Badge – features
2.3 Gateway (GW)
The Gateway is the central element of each DU. It communicates in a secure way with the
RDs, with the ATs and back with the Central Processing Station (CPS). Its main function is
to provide an interface between the BBs and the CPS, both upwards and downwards. In
the upwards flow, the GW collects data from BBs through its associated RDs, interprets the
information contained within each packet and sends it to the CPS. In the downwards flow, the
GW receives instructions from the CPS and controls accordingly the ATs to grant or deny the
access to the BB.
2.4 Reader (RD)
The Reader is the element for interfacing the DU with the BBs. Its role is to communicate
wirelessly with the BBs, and it uses two mechanisms: the IEEE 802.15.4 communication
standard and a proximity–based RFID technology. As a logical component of the system,
it is not allowed to locally decode the data, but it simply forwards it towards the GW over
a secure communication channel. The communication between the RD and the GW can be
either wired or wireless. In the latter case, it can be direct, when they are in the communication
range of each other, or indirect, i.e., multi-hop through intermediate RDs. When it is wireless
and indirect, then the RDs constitutes a network of readers (NRD), organized into a ZigBee
Cluster Tree (ZigBee, 2008), (Koubâa et. al, 2008).
2.5 Actuator (AT)
The Actuator is a device in direct contact with the Controlled System (Fig. 1) and it constitutes
the interface with the GW so that the operations needed to provide the requested services to
the BB owner are executed, when he/she has passed the authentication process, or the safety
procedures when the authentication fails are applied. Similarly to the NRD, multiple ATs
might form a multi–hop wireless network (NAT) to reach the GW.
8 Recent Application in Biometrics Automatic Personal Identification System for Security in Critical Services: Two Case Studies based on a Wireless Biometric Badge 5
2.6 Central Processing System (CPS)
The Central Processing System contains all data related to the whole system configuration.
This implies that it stores and handles all the data related to the UDs and the BBs that have
grants with the different UDs, as well as it handles the services that BB’s owners can use when
they request for them after a successful authentication. CPS communicates in a secure way
with UDs and it is the interface with “System Administrator” (SA). The SA is in charge of
two main tasks: (i) deliver the BBs to the people having rights of owning one of them and (ii)
add and update in the CPS all data related to the system configuration, i.e., the association
between the BB’s ID and the services to which it can grant the access to its owner.








NAT Network of Actuators
NRD Network of Readers
RD Reader
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indicator
SA System Administrator
SoC System-on-Chip
SW The application module running on the GW
for communicating with the companion chip on the BB
uC Micro Controller
Table 1. Acronyms
2.7 System security framework
It is of paramount importance to clearly state that the security of the system is based on a novel
framework of network security built on top of the framework provided by UPEK (UPEK, 2009)
for its chips.
The “companion chip” is embedded in the fingerprint reader on board of each badge and is the
element able to handle all the biometric aspects. When the authentication process is running,
this chip is in communication with the GW over a wireless secure channel, where data travels
ciphered by that chip. On the GW a UPEK–made application runs: it is the only component
in the whole system able to decode these messages. This leads to an interesting aspect of
the system in terms of security: the microcontroller on board of the badge is definitely not
able to communicate with the companion chip. It can only switch it on or off or ask the GW
to activate the procedures. In other words, the biometric part is usable if and only if the
proposed system is able to establish a secure connection between the companion chip on the
badge and the application running on the GW (Fig. 4). The security of this communication is
granted by the fact that it is ciphered using a symmetric key based mechanism. These keys
are unique for each badge and provided during the so called “key provisioning” performed
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to activate the procedures. In other words, the biometric part is usable if and only if the
proposed system is able to establish a secure connection between the companion chip on the
badge and the application running on the GW (Fig. 4). The security of this communication is
granted by the fact that it is ciphered using a symmetric key based mechanism. These keys
are unique for each badge and provided during the so called “key provisioning” performed
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Fig. 4. Secure connection for biometric operations
when the badge is registered into the system for the first time. They are stored both in the
gateway and in the “secure memory” of the companion chip. This memory is designed
by UPEK to resist also to HW attacks and contains the fingerprints template. Furthermore,
the communication is ciphered using a random component that modifies the content of the
message so that its eventual sniffing doesn’t provide useful information. The intermediate
software and hardware elements between the companion chip and the application running
on the GW during the authentication process simply act as packets’ forwarders.
Since the BB is also equipped with RFID communication capabilities, there is the possibility
to introduce another level of system security, granted by a novel mechanism we called “ring
check”. When the BB is really close to a RD, the RFID technology is activated. Then, RD
writes in the BB’s tag memory a ciphered code to allow the BB to recognize it as a qualified
reader. The uC on the badge gets this code and checks its consistency to identify if it has not
been altered. If it recognizes it, then on the BB side there is a confidence to be communicating
with a verified reader. Then BB builds a packet with a “reader ok” status field set and that
code, then sends this message to the GW, using the IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver. By this way, the
BB can authenticate the system with which it is currently communicating and the system can
check if the BB is not corrupted, by checking the integrity of the code returned back to it. In
other words, the system checks if the RFID and IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers and related storage
areas are both working.
2.8 System configurations
Starting from the logical architecture shown in Fig. 1, it is possible to derive several physical
configurations that could be applied depending on the different needs. In particular, based on
the possibilities offered by the allocation of the different components of the DU and the CPS
onto a single HW or multiple communicating devices, several combinations of alternative
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configurations can be identified. As an example, Fig. 5 shows 2 different scenarios. The
red elements, FP and SW, represent the components dedicated to manage the biometrics
operations. i.e., SW is the only component able to decode and manage information about
the result of biometric verification coming from FP.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. Two different configurations
Fig. 5a refers to a scenario where CPS and GW are allocated on a single physical machine.
A wireless interface is used to communicate with the RD units, organized into a network of
readers. Fig. 5b shows a configuration where the system is fully distributed, i.e., CPS, GW and
RDs are mapped onto different machines. The communication between these components
might be based on IP protocols, like over Internet.
Although several other combinations are possible, these two scenarios are our reference to the
case studies described in the following sections.
3. Case Study 1 – Physical access to a critical area
Let us assume that a SA has released a number of BBs to a number of authorized people by
means of an enrollment procedure, then each one of them will have an enabled BB storing
their own fingerprint, while the central system will be aware of the basic access rights of BB
and related persons.
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Fig. 6. Case Study 1 – Physical access to a critical area
The access to a critical area towards a controlled gate will be performed by means of the
following steps (Fig. 6):
1. The BB is in stand–by mode, i.e., it is waiting for a beacon sent by one of the ZigBee RD
forming a Cluster Tree topology (Hauer et al., 2011; Jurcik et al., 2010).
2. When the BB enters the ZigBee area, it is able to ear the beacons sent by the RDs and
to communicate with the control unit on the gate in order to communicate its arrival.
In this context, the badge implements the positioning solution as described in (Tennina,
Di Renzo, Santucci & Graziosi, 2009) and summarized in the next subsections. In such a
way, the DU is able to communicate with the central system in order to make in advance
any control related to the badge identification (i.e., to check if it is allowed to access the
gate it is approaching).
3. The BB is allowed to pass the gate, the DU will wait for the proximity of the BB.
4. When the BB is close to the gate then DU will request to the BB to start the personal
identification, i.e., the BB will ask the owner to scan his/her fingerprint, it compares that
scan with the stored one, and the result of such a verification is sent back to the DU, being
the only unit able to decode that information.
5. If the identification is successful the DU will open the gate, otherwise proper actions
defined by the system administrator will be taken.
52 Recent Application in Biometrics Automatic Personal Identification System for Security in Critical Services: Two Case Studies based on a Wireless Biometric Badge 9
Fig. 7 shows the setup used for the experimental testbed, where a Notebook plays the role of
the GW: it has a RFID reader (on the right–hand side) and a ZigBee reader (on the left–hand
side); furthermore it switches on a lamp to confirm the successful authentication, as well as
feedbacks the user in a demo GUI (Fig. 8).
Fig. 7. Biometric Authentication – Setup
Fig. 8. Biometric Authentication – Successful verification
3.1 ESD: an improved optimization SW routine for positioning
The badge is equipped with a novel distributed localization algorithm, which is called ESD
(Enhanced Steepest Descent) (Tennina, Di Renzo, Santucci & Graziosi, 2009). In particular,
since this method represents an improved version of the well-known Steepest Descent (SD),
the latter one is briefly summarized as well.
Let us consider NA wireless nodes {Ai}NAi=1 distributed in the region of interest, whose exact
locations in the considered scenario are known, based on a predefined and common reference
system of coordinates. These nodes are called reference or anchors nodes. Let us assume
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with unknown location are present in the same area.
These nodes are called unknown or blind nodes. Both these wireless nodes have a simple
radio interface to communicate, which allows not only data exchange but also distance
measurements. The main goal of a positioning system is to use the anchor nodes to estimate
the position of the blind nodes in the specified coordinate system. In particular, position
estimation algorithms require a minimum of either three or four reference nodes in a two–
and tree–dimensional coordinate system, respectively (Perkins et al., 2006). In our context it is
obviously assumed that Ai are the ZigBee Readers, while Uj are the Biometric Badges.
The following notation will be used to describe the algorithm: (i) bold symbols are used to
denote vectors and matrices, (ii) (·)T denotes transpose operation, (iii) �(·) is the gradient
operator, (iv) �·� is the Euclidean distance, (v) ∠(·, ·) is the phase angle between two vectors,
(vi) ûj = [uj,x, uj,y, uj,z]T with j=1,.., NU denotes the estimated position of the unknown
node Uj, (vii) uj = [uj,x, uj,y, uj,z]T is the trial solution of the optimization algorithm for
the unknown node Uj, (viii) ai = [xi, yi, zi]T with i=1,.., NA are the positions of the
anchor/reference nodes Ai, and (ix) dj,i denotes the estimated (via ranging measurements)
distance between reference node Ai and the unknown node Uj.
3.1.1 Multilateration methods
Both SD and ESD algorithms belong to the family of the multilateration methods. In particular,
in such methods the position of an unknown node Uj is obtained by minimizing the error cost















The minimization of the error cost function can be realized using a variety of numerical
optimization techniques, each one having its own advantages and disadvantages in terms
of accuracy, robustness, speed, complexity, and storage requirements (Nocedal & Wright,
2006). Since optimization methods are iterative by nature, we will denote by the index k
the k–th iteration of the algorithm, and with F(uj(k)) and uj(k) the error cost function and the
estimated position at the k–th iteration, respectively.
Steepest Descent (SD) The SD is an iterative line search method that allows to find the (local)
minimum of the cost function in Equation 1 at step k + 1 as follows (Nocedal & Wright, 2006,
pp. 22, sec. 2.2):
uj(k + 1) = uj(k) + αk · p(k) (2)
where αk is a step length factor, which can be chosen as described in (Nocedal & Wright,
2006, pp. 36, ch. 3), and p(k) = −�(F(uj(k))) is the search direction of the algorithm. In
particular, when the optimization problem is linear, some expressions exist to compute the
optimal step length in order to improve the convergence speed of the algorithm. On the other
hand, when the optimization problem is non-linear, as considered for positioning problems, a
fixed and small step value is in general preferred in order to reduce the oscillatory effect when
the algorithm approaches a solution. In such a case, we have αk = 0.5μ (Santucci et al., 2006),
where μ is the learning speed.
Enhanced Steepest Descent (ESD) The SD method provides, in general, a good accuracy in
estimating the final solution. However, it often requires a large number of iterations, which
may result in a too slow convergence speed for mobile ad–hoc wireless networks. The
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proposed ESD algorithm aims at improving the convergence speed of the SD algorithm, while
trying to maintain its good accuracy for position estimation. The basic idea behind the ESD
algorithm is to adjust the step length value αk as a function of the current and previous search
directions p(k) and p(k − 1), respectively. In particular, αk is adjusted as shown in Equation 3,
where θk = ∠(p(k), p(k − 1)), 0 < γ < 1 is a linear increment factor, δ > 1 is a multiplicative




αk = αk−1 + γ
αk = αk−1/δ
αk = αk−1
i f θk < θmin
i f θk > θmax
otherwise
(3)
By using the four degrees of freedom γ, δ, θmin and θmax, the convergence rate of the algorithm,
and the oscillatory phenomenon when approaching the final solution can be simultaneously
controlled in a simple way and without appreciably increasing the complexity of the algorithm
when compared to the SD method. Basically, the main advantage of the ESD algorithm is the
adaptive optimization of the step length factor αk at run time, which allows to dynamically
either accelerate or decelerate the convergence speed of the algorithm as a function of the
actual value of the function to be optimized
3.1.2 Positioning system validation
Localization is performed in a fully RSSI–based distributed and decentralized fashion for the
blind node. In other words, each blind node receives data from the fixed anchor/reference
nodes (see Fig. 9a) and convert the RSSI measurements of each packet into an estimation
of distance. It is well known that RSSI is as simple as really inaccurate, but this distance
estimation accuracy has been improved on the blind node side, by allowing anchor nodes to
perform an innovative on–line radio signal propagation characteristics estimation (Tennina
et al., 2008).
In order to validate the proposed solutions, and have a sound understanding of the
performance of the ESD algorithm in realistic scenarios, we have conducted a campaign
of measurements during the opening ceremony day of the NCSlab on March 27, 2008
(Fig. 9b). The event was characterized by a half-day kick–off conference during which the
past, present, and future activities of the laboratory were presented. The kick–off conference
was attended by several people, and offered a good occasion to test the performance of
the deployed network, and, in particular, to test the achievable performance in a realistic
GPS-denied environment, where the propagation characteristics of the radio channel changed
appreciably during the event due to the people’s movement inside the room (i.e., dynamic
indoor environment). The duration of the event was approximately three hours and forty
minutes, thus providing enough statistical data to well support our findings and conclusions.
This ceremony was characterized by four main phases, well describing the dynamic nature of
the event and, as a consequence, the dynamic nature of the propagation environment to be
analyzed. In what follows there is a brief description of each phase.
1. The first phase, which took place before the starting of the opening ceremony, is
characterized by a progressive increase of the number of people inside the room, some
of them very close and in motion around the blind node to be localized (i.e., the dot point
in Fig. 9c).
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(a) Battery powered anchor node (b) Plan of the NCSlab
(c) Host Application
Fig. 9. ESD Positioning Validation – Experimental Setup
2. The second phase, which took place during the development of the ceremony, is
characterized by several people (staying either seated or stand) inside the room, and some
people coming in and going out the room.
3. The third phase, which took place at the end of the ceremony, is characterized by the vast
majority of people staying stand and leaving the conference room.
4. The fourth phase corresponds to the scenario with no people in the room, thus giving a
virtually static indoor scenario with almost fixed propagation characteristics.
Fig. 9c the host application interface with anchor (cross points) and blind (dot point) nodes
deployed during the field tests and available to the user to analyze the behavior of localization
and tracking operations.
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The setup was characterized by the following main settings: (i) 9 anchor nodes, distributed on
the room’s perimeter, and 1 blind node have been considered, (ii) all the nodes were placed
on the top of wood supports, (iii) the anchor nodes broadcasted their ID and position every
800 milliseconds as well as estimated the radio signal propagation characteristics as described
in (Tennina et al., 2008), and (iv) every RSSI used by the blind node was obtained by averaging
10 RSSIs (Average RSSI) per anchor.































Ph1 Ph2 Ph3 Ph4
Fig. 10. Estimated propagation parameters during the NCSlab’s opening ceremony
In Fig. 10, the estimated propagation parameters A and n (Tennina et al., 2008) are reported
as a function of time. We can readily figure out that there is a significant fluctuation of these
parameters during the progress of the conference, and, as expected, the variation gets large
during Phase 1 and 3, and, in particular, during Phase 2, while they are almost constant
during Phase 4, which represents a virtually static reference scenario. This figure qualitatively
suggests that using an outdated estimate for the channel parameters may certainly yields less
accurate estimates of the distances and thus of the position of the blind node.
Finally, Fig. 11 shows the positioning accuracy of the proposed ESD algorithm running on
the blind node when it can resort on the estimations of the propagation parameters updated
on–line by the anchor nodes. As we can see, even if the dynamic of the environment might
change dramatically the propagation conditions, the positioning accuracy is good enough, i.e.,
with an average error generally less than 2 meters, and stable, i.e., no major fluctuations.
Similar accuracies have been obtained in recent experimental trials (Tennina, Pomante,
Graziosi, Di Renzo, Alesii & Santucci, 2009).
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Fig. 11. ESD positioning accuracy with on-line dynamic propagation parameters estimation
4. Case Study 2 – Logical access to a critical area
The security framework described in Section 2.7 allows the exploitation of the badge virtually
everywhere. A typical scenario is the home banking, where users access remotely to their bank
account. Nowadays they usually receive a one–time password generator, which is used when
the bank’s web page ask it. The idea is to grant access to such services by relying on the higher
security levels guaranteed by the usage of biometric–based authentication. By simply using a
PC with an IEEE 802.15.4 radio interface (today it is available as an external USB dongle, but
in the near future it will be probably integrated into the PC’s motherboards as for IEEE 802.11
radio interfaces) and a classical Internet connection, the badge is able to establish a secure
connection between its on-board companion chip and the management SW by means of the
PC and the Internet that are used to reach the gateway. Basically, the PC acts as a RD.
Fig. 12 shows an example of such a configuration where the access to a web site is authorized
only when a verification operations is correctly performed by means of the biometric badge.
In such a scenario, the web server acts as the GW, so managing the companion chip of the
badge by means of a secure connection that exploits the Internet and the connection from the
PC to the badge. The web server asks the badge for the authentication of its owner and based
on the result (that, in this case, only the web server is able to decode) it grants or denies the
access to the web site.
In order to clarify the whole procedure, let assume that the system is used to manage the
access to an online bank account. As for the case study 1, the SA has released a number of BB
to a number of authorized people by means of an enrollment procedure. Some of these BB are
enabled to identify the user in order to allow him/her to access to the bank account. Finally,
the user has a personal computer with an IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver in order to communicate
with the BB (like the one shown in Fig. 13).
The access to the bank account will be performed through a web interface and by means of
the following steps:
1. The user tries to access the bank account on the server and he/she is accordingly redirected
to an identification page where some credentials (i.e., username and password) are
requested (Fig. 14).
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Fig. 12. Case Study 2 – Logical Access to a Critical Area
(a) USB IEEE 802.15.4 dongle and the
badge
(b) Personal web site
Fig. 13. Case Study 2 – Logical Access to a Critical Area – Prototypes
2. Then the system asks the user to activates the badge. The BB is then able to establish a
secure connection with the web server and the SW running therein starts communicating
with the companion chip.
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Fig. 14. Case Study 2 – Logical Access to a Critical Area – Login
Fig. 15. Case Study 2 – Logical Access to a Critical Area – Biometric Authentication
3. The web server asks the BB to start the personal identification, i.e., the user will scan
his/her fingerprint, while the BB compares it with the stored one, and the result of such
a verification is sent back to the web server that is the only unit able to decode such an
information (Fig. 15).
4. If the identification is successful, the web server grants the access to the bank account web
site (Fig. 16), otherwise the proper actions defined by the system administrator are taken.
It is worth noting that the user’s PC and the server can be in different location everywhere in
the world, they only need an Internet connection to communicate.
5. Conclusions
The system presented in this chapter is an innovative solution to the problem of automatic
and secure advanced services provision, and it is able to guarantee users’ identity in a easy
and safe way. Although this system is flexible enough to be used in several domains, it meets
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the more rigid laws about the users’ privacy without compromising its ease of use, that is
the main factor to make it accepted and widely used. The key component is the innovative
biometric badge which implements the concept of system–on–badge: a system that is able to
automatically perform and check fingerprint scans, in order to verify if the badge owner is
actually the person to whom the badge was delivered. Furthermore, it is able to communicate
only the results of this verification to the remaining part of the system without the need to
share sensible data, i.e., users’ biometric information. The use of mature, reliable and low-cost
technologies, accurately integrated, is the basis to truly achieve high level of pervasiveness of
the biometric techniques in order to support the most important human activities.
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1. Introduction
The Internet has consolidated itself as a very powerful platform that has changed the
communication and business way. Nowadays, the number of users navigating through
Internet is about 1,552 millions according to Internet World Stats. This large audience
demands online commerce, e-government, knowledge sharing, social networks, online
gaming . . . which grew exponentially over the past few years. The security of these
transactions is very important considering the number of information that could be
intercepted by an attacker. Within this context, authentication is one of the most important
challenges in computer security. Indeed, the authentication step is often considered as the
weakest link in the security of electronic transactions. In general, the protection of the message
content is achieved by using cryptographic protocols that are well known and established.
The well-known ID/password is far the most used authentication method, it is widely spread
despite its obvious lack of security. This is mainly due to its implementation ease and to
its ergonomic feature: the users are used to this system, which enhances its acceptance and
deployment. Many more sophisticated solutions exist in the state of the art to secure logical
access control (one time passwords tokens, certificates . . . ) but none of them are used by a
large community of users for a lack of simplicity usage (O’Gorman, 2003).
Among the different authentication methods of an individual, biometrics is often presented
as a promising solution. Few people know that biometrics has been used for ages for
identification or signature purposes. Fingerprints were already used as a signature for
commercial exchanges in Babylon (-3000 before JC). Alphonse Bertillon proposed in 1879 to
use anthropometric information for police investigation. Nowadays, all police forces in the
world use this kind of information to solve crimes. The first prototypes of terminals providing
an automatic processing of the voice and digital fingerprints have been defined in the middle
of the years 1970. Today, a large number of biometric systems are used for logical and physical
access control applications. This technology possesses many favorable properties. First, there
is a strong link between the user and its authenticator. As for example, it is not possible to
loose its fingerprint as it could be the case for a token. Second, this solution is very usable:
indeed, it is very convenient for a user to authenticate himself/herself by putting his/her
finger on a sensor or making a capture of the face. Last, biometrics is an interesting candidate
to be a unique user’s authenticator. A study done by NTA group in 2002 (Monitor, 2002)
on 500 users showed that there was approximately 21 passwords per user, 81% of them use
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common passwords and 30% of them write their passwords in a file. The uniqueness inherent
to any biometric information is a helpful property to solve the aforementioned problems.
Of course, some drawbacks are also inherent to this technology (Bolle et al., 2002). Whereas
the uniqueness can be considered as an advantage, it could also allow an attacker to trace
operations done by an user through the logging of authentication sessions. Then the biometric
verification step ensures with a high probability that the user is the genuine one but there is
still some possibilities the user is an attacker. This is a far different approach than checking if a
password is correct or not. One of the biggest drawbacks of biometrics is the impossibility to
revoke the biometric data of a user if they are compromised (Galbally et al., 2008). This point
is related to the users acceptance that need to be sure that their privacy will be respected: how
can people be sure that their personal data collected during the enrollment step will not be
stolen or diverted and used for other purposes ? This pregnant issue limits the operational
use of biometrics for many applications. As for example, in France, it is forbidden to establish
a centralized database of biometric data because it is considered too dangerous from a privacy
point of view.
The objective of this chapter is to realize an overview on the existing methods to enhance the
privacy of biometrics. Section 2 is dedicated to a study of the threats involving privacy in
biometric systems, and the ensuing requirements. We present in section 3 some biometrics
based secure storage and template protection schemes. Section 4 deals with the remaining
challenges in this domain. We conclude this chapter in section 5.
2. Privacy: threats and properties
We present in this section privacy issues concerning authentication schemes and biometric
ones.
2.1 Privacy and personal data
The word privacy means different things to different people; hence the reference (Solove,
2009) has indicated the complexity of defining privacy. Instead of proposing an overview
of different conceptual definitions, we formalize a core definition in which privacy means
not only keeping a secret but also covering information and activities involving each person.
Referring to some jurisdictions like the European Data Protection Directive (Dir95/46/EU),
we give the following definitions:
Definition 1. Personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(data subject).
Definition 2. An identifiable person is someone who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
It is clear that biometric systems (detailed in the next section) are designed to identify
individuals. So, to examine the implication of privacy using biometric data, it is first
necessary to define what is a biometric system and to study to what extent biometric data
concerns/threats privacy. Then, we will be able to examine whether this data is personal and
to measure the amount of sensitive information it reveals.
2.2 On biometric systems
We begin with a theoretical definition.
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Definition 3. A biometric system can be viewed as a signal detection system with a pattern recognition
architecture that senses a raw biometric signal, processes this signal to extract a salient set of features
called biometric identifier or template and compares these features against the ones stored in the database
(Jain et al., 2006).
More precisely, all biometric systems involve two steps.
• Enrollment step
Biometric data (fingerprint, face, iris. . . ) are captured, transformed into a template linked to
the individual and stored as a reference.
• Verification step
A new template is issued from a new capture, and compared to the stored reference template.
Given any biometric modality (fingerprint, face, iris. . . ), its representation is not unique.
As an illustration, consider fingerprint as a subject of study. Then, there are four different
wide-spread fingerprint representations:
• Image-based representation
Two fingerprints are superimposed and the correlation between corresponding pixels is
computed for different alignments.
• Minutiae-based representation
It is the most popular and widely used technique. A fingerprint appears as a surface
alternating parallel ridges and valleys in most regions. Minutiae represent local
discontinuities and mark positions where the ridge ends or splits. Minutiae-based
matching consists in finding the alignment that results in the maximum number of
minutiae pairings.
• Ridge feature-based approach
Other features of the fingerprint ridge pattern (e.g., local orientation and frequency, ridge
shape, texture information) may be extracted more reliably than minutiae in low-quality
images.
• Pores-based representation
With the current development of high resolution sensors, fine fingerprint features such as
sweat pores can be considered.
To study privacy issues involved in biometric systems, we explore now how a biometric
identifier is personal and sensitive. Two types of errors are present at the verification step:
• false match: the verification process outcome is that biometric measurements from two
different persons are from the same person
• false non-match: the verification process outcome is that two biometric measurements from
the same person are from two different persons
These two types of errors are quantified by the false acceptance rate and the false rejection rate,
respectively. Figure 1 presents the error rates of four popular biometric modalities.
2.3 Biometrics and privacy
Biometric data, in its raw or template form (like minutiae template), is in most cases personal
data. The reference (Pakanti et al., 2002) estimated a probability that two fingerprints will
falsely match as 5.5 ∗ 10−59. This probability is very low and shows that minutiae information
can uniquely identify a person. In practice, as deduced from figure 1, deployment of biometric
systems does not imply that the recognition is a fully solved problem. The accuracy changes
67n O rview on P ivacy Preserving Biometrics
2 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
common passwords and 30% of them write their passwords in a file. The uniqueness inherent
to any biometric information is a helpful property to solve the aforementioned problems.
Of course, some drawbacks are also inherent to this technology (Bolle et al., 2002). Whereas
the uniqueness can be considered as an advantage, it could also allow an attacker to trace
operations done by an user through the logging of authentication sessions. Then the biometric
verification step ensures with a high probability that the user is the genuine one but there is
still some possibilities the user is an attacker. This is a far different approach than checking if a
password is correct or not. One of the biggest drawbacks of biometrics is the impossibility to
revoke the biometric data of a user if they are compromised (Galbally et al., 2008). This point
is related to the users acceptance that need to be sure that their privacy will be respected: how
can people be sure that their personal data collected during the enrollment step will not be
stolen or diverted and used for other purposes ? This pregnant issue limits the operational
use of biometrics for many applications. As for example, in France, it is forbidden to establish
a centralized database of biometric data because it is considered too dangerous from a privacy
point of view.
The objective of this chapter is to realize an overview on the existing methods to enhance the
privacy of biometrics. Section 2 is dedicated to a study of the threats involving privacy in
biometric systems, and the ensuing requirements. We present in section 3 some biometrics
based secure storage and template protection schemes. Section 4 deals with the remaining
challenges in this domain. We conclude this chapter in section 5.
2. Privacy: threats and properties
We present in this section privacy issues concerning authentication schemes and biometric
ones.
2.1 Privacy and personal data
The word privacy means different things to different people; hence the reference (Solove,
2009) has indicated the complexity of defining privacy. Instead of proposing an overview
of different conceptual definitions, we formalize a core definition in which privacy means
not only keeping a secret but also covering information and activities involving each person.
Referring to some jurisdictions like the European Data Protection Directive (Dir95/46/EU),
we give the following definitions:
Definition 1. Personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(data subject).
Definition 2. An identifiable person is someone who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
It is clear that biometric systems (detailed in the next section) are designed to identify
individuals. So, to examine the implication of privacy using biometric data, it is first
necessary to define what is a biometric system and to study to what extent biometric data
concerns/threats privacy. Then, we will be able to examine whether this data is personal and
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Definition 3. A biometric system can be viewed as a signal detection system with a pattern recognition
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called biometric identifier or template and compares these features against the ones stored in the database
(Jain et al., 2006).
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A new template is issued from a new capture, and compared to the stored reference template.
Given any biometric modality (fingerprint, face, iris. . . ), its representation is not unique.
As an illustration, consider fingerprint as a subject of study. Then, there are four different
wide-spread fingerprint representations:
• Image-based representation
Two fingerprints are superimposed and the correlation between corresponding pixels is
computed for different alignments.
• Minutiae-based representation
It is the most popular and widely used technique. A fingerprint appears as a surface
alternating parallel ridges and valleys in most regions. Minutiae represent local
discontinuities and mark positions where the ridge ends or splits. Minutiae-based
matching consists in finding the alignment that results in the maximum number of
minutiae pairings.
• Ridge feature-based approach
Other features of the fingerprint ridge pattern (e.g., local orientation and frequency, ridge
shape, texture information) may be extracted more reliably than minutiae in low-quality
images.
• Pores-based representation
With the current development of high resolution sensors, fine fingerprint features such as
sweat pores can be considered.
To study privacy issues involved in biometric systems, we explore now how a biometric
identifier is personal and sensitive. Two types of errors are present at the verification step:
• false match: the verification process outcome is that biometric measurements from two
different persons are from the same person
• false non-match: the verification process outcome is that two biometric measurements from
the same person are from two different persons
These two types of errors are quantified by the false acceptance rate and the false rejection rate,
respectively. Figure 1 presents the error rates of four popular biometric modalities.
2.3 Biometrics and privacy
Biometric data, in its raw or template form (like minutiae template), is in most cases personal
data. The reference (Pakanti et al., 2002) estimated a probability that two fingerprints will
falsely match as 5.5 ∗ 10−59. This probability is very low and shows that minutiae information
can uniquely identify a person. In practice, as deduced from figure 1, deployment of biometric
systems does not imply that the recognition is a fully solved problem. The accuracy changes
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Fig. 1. Illustrations of error rates for different biometric modalities (Teoh et al., 2004b)
depending on different factors (the used modality, the population characteristics, the test
conditions and the employed sensor to mention a few) but is never perfect. However, the
obtained performances are considered sufficient to conclude that biometric data identifiers
can recognize persons. Thus, they are personal or very personal, in the sense that they consist of
information collected from an observation of the individual physical itself.
In return, biometric data are generally considered as sensitive data involving ethical and
privacy contests.
2.3.1 Privacy threats in biometric systems
We summarize below potential privacy pitfalls arising when using a biometric identifier
(fingerprint modality being again focused on):
1. Biometric information (especially raw images) can expose sensitive information such as
information about one’s health, racial or ethnic origin and this information can then
provide a basis for unjustified discrimination of the individual data subjects (Mordini &
Massari, 2008).
2. As revealed in (Schneier, 1999), biometric data are unique identifiers but are not secret:
fingerprint is leaved on everything we touch, faces can be easily acquired and voice can
be simply recorded. Hence, the potential collection and use of biometric data without
knowledge of its owner, without his/her consent or personal control make this information
very sensitive.
3. Many proponents of biometric systems claim that it is sufficient to store a compact
representation of the biometric (template) rather than the raw data to ensure privacy of
individuals. They consider that template is not sensitive information because it does not
allow the reconstruction of the initial signal. Recently, several research works showed that
this reconstruction is possible. For example, fingerprint can, in fact, be reconstructed from
a minutiae template (Cappelli et al., 2007), (Feng & Jain, 2009).
4. The linkage problem which means the possibility to cross matched data across different
services or applications by comparing biometric references is another privacy concern. The
uniqueness of biometric characteristics allows an intruder to link users between different
databases, enabling violations as tracking and profiling individuals.
5. A function creep is another privacy risk. Here, the acquired biometric identifiers are later
used for purposes different from the intended ones. For example, an application initially
intended to prevent misuse of municipal services may gradually be extended to rights to
buy property, to travel, or the right to vote without the consent of individuals.
6. The inherent irrevocability of biometric features in case of data misuse like database
compromise or identity theft makes biometrics very sensitive.
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With the present risks on privacy violation, carefully handling biometric data becomes more
important. Considering the implication of personal sensitive data, the use of biometrics
falls within the purview of legislation and laws. In reality, regulations and legislation have
codified what Judge Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis summarized in 1890 as the right of the
individual to be alone (Warren & Brandeis, 1890) (this reference is considered as the birthplace
of privacy rights), and expanded the notion of data protection beyond the fundamental right
to privacy. In the sequel, we are interested in the main attack vectors concerning biometric
systems.
2.3.2 Biometric attack vectors
Possible attacks points (or attack vectors) in biometric systems have been discussed from
different viewpoints. First, we can mention the scheme of figure 2, provided by the
international standard ISO /IEC JTC1 SC37 SD11, which identifies where possible attacks can
be conducted.
Fig. 2. ISO description of biometric systems
Besides, some of the early works by Ratha, Connell and Bolle (Ratha et al., 2001), (Bolle et al.,
2002) identified weak links in each subsystem of a generic authentication system. Eight places
where attacks may occur have been identified, as one can see in figure 3.
We do not detail in the present chapter all the types of attacks identified by Ratha. We only
focus on attacks concerning privacy. This corresponds to the points 6 and 7 in figure 3.
These points are related to attacks violating template protection. Generally, attacks directly
threatening biometrics template can be of different types. For instance, an attacker could:
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Fig. 3. Ratha’s model attack framework
• attempt to capture a reference template
• substitute a template to create a false reference
• tamper the recorded template
• compromise the database by stealing all its records
Such attacks can be very damaging, owing to unavoidable exposure of sensitive personal
information and identity theft. Therefore basic requirements that any privacy preserving
biometric system should fulfill will be stated in the following.
2.3.3 Requirements of privacy protection
In view of our discussion about biometric systems vulnerabilities and possible threats, a few
desirable properties are required, regarding the system safety. A critical issue in the biometric
area is the development of a technology to handle both privacy concerns and security goals,
see (Jain et al., 2008) for example. We detail now the key considerations for privacy protection.
• All deployments of biometric technology should be implemented with respect to local
jurisdictional privacy laws and regulations.
• Today, some legal frameworks introduce the idea of Privacy by Design. This new
paradigm requires that privacy and data protection should be integrated into the design
of information and communication technologies. The application of such principle would
emphasize the need to implement Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) that we will see
after.
As explained in the reference (Adler, 2007), privacy threat is closely related to security
weakness. Therefore a particular attention has been paid to privacy enhancing techniques.
The aim is to combine privacy and security without any tradeoff between these two basic
requirements. Among the techniques related to privacy enhancing, we can mention recent
trends:
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• Biometric encryption
Based on cryptographic mechanisms, the ANSI (American National Standards Institute)
proposes X9.84 standard as a means to manage biometric information. ANSI X9.84 rules
were designed to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of biometric information
using encryption algorithms. Even if cryptography has proven its ability to secure data
transmission and storage, it becomes inadequate when applied to biometric data. Indeed,
owing to the variability over multiple acquisitions of the same biometric trait, one cannot
store a biometric template in an encrypted form and then perform matching in the
encrypted domain: cryptography is not compatible with intra-user variability. Therefore
the comparison is always done in the biometric feature domain which can make it easier
for an attacker to obtain the raw biometric data. Since the keys and a fortiori the biometric
data are controlled by a custodian, most privacy issues related to large databases remain
open.
• Template protection schemes
To solve this problem, recently some algorithms known as template protection schemes
have been proposed. These techniques, detailed in section 3.1, are the most promising for
template storage protection.
• Anonymous database
The idea in anonymous data is to verify the membership status of a user without knowing
his/her true identity. A key question in anonymous database is the need for secure
collaboration between two parties: the biometric server and the user. The techniques
presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3 fulfill this requirement.
In this chapter, privacy protection is be considered from two points of view: trusted systems
and template protection. Recently, some template protection schemes have been proposed.
Ideally, these algorithms aim at providing the following properties as established in the
reference (Maltoni et al., 2009), and fulfill the privacy preserving issues 1 to 6 raised at page 4.
• Non-reversibility
It should be computationally infeasible to obtain the unprotected template from the
protected one. One of the consequences of this requirement is that the matching needs
to be performed in the transformed space of the protected template, which may be very
difficult to achieve with high accuracy. This property concerns points 1 to 3.
• Accuracy
Accuracy recognition should be preserved (or degraded smoothly) when protected
templates are involved. Indeed, if the accuracy of recognition degrades substantially, it
will constitute the weakest link in the security equation. For example, instead of reversing
the enrolment template, the hacker may try to cause a false acceptance attack. Thus, it
is important that the protection technique does not substantially deteriorate the matching
accuracy. This property is a general one.
• Cancelability and Diversity
It should be possible to produce a very large number of protected templates (to be used
in different applications) from the same unprotected template. This idea of cancelable
biometrics was established for the first time in the pioneering references (Ratha et al.,
2001) and (Bolle et al., 2002). To protect privacy, diversity means the impossibility to
match protected templates from different applications (this corresponds to the notion of
non linkage). Points 4 and 5 are concerned with diversity while point 6 with cancelability.
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Compared to (Maltoni et al., 2009), we wish to add an extra property which will be used in
the sequel:
• Randomness
The knowledge of multiple revoked templates does not help to predict a following
accepted one. This property deals with points 3 and 4.
Since some basic requirements in terms of privacy protection have been stated, biometric
techniques fulfilling these requirements are detailed in the next section.
3. Privacy enhancing biometric techniques
In this section, we focus on some recent solutions brought by researchers in biometrics to
handle template protection issues. These solutions generally aim at guaranteeing privacy
and revocability. First, we detail promising solutions concerned with the storage of biometric
templates in secure elements. Then, we emphasize on two approaches dealing with privacy
enhancing biometric techniques: the first one is called biometric cryptosystems and the second
is known as BioHashing.
3.1 Storage in secure elements
A key question is in relation with the place of storage of data and its security: Is it conserved
in a local way (e.g. token)? Or in a central database with different risks of administration,
access and misuse of this database? The problem becomes more relevant when dealing
with large scale biometric projects such as the biometric passport or the national electronic
identity card. Different organisations like the CNIL in France warn against the creation of
such databases especially with regard to modality with traces as is the case for fingerprint
(it is possible to refer to the central database to find the identity of those who left their
traces). The INES debate launched in 2005 is a good illustration of the awareness of such
subject (Domnesque, 2004). The use of biometrics may pose significant risks that encourage
link ability and tracing of individuals and hence violating the individual liberties. So, the
security of the stored biometric data remains challenging and this crucial task is pointed out
by experts and legislation authorities. In this section, we study the storage of data in a secure
local component: the Secure Element.
In (Madlmayr et al., 2007) one can find the following definition:
Definition 4. The Secure Element is a dynamic environment, where applications are downloaded,
personalized, managed and removed independently with varying life cycles.
It is mainly used in smart cards or mobile devices to host sensitive data and applications such
as biometrics templates or payment applications. It allows a high level of security and trust
(e.g. the required security level for payment applications is set to Common Criteria EAL5+).
The Secure Element can be seen as a set of logical components: a microprocessor, some
memory, an operating system and some applications. The secure element operating systems
are known as MULTOS, Windows for Smart Cards, ZeitControl, SmartCard .NET and the
most widespread: Java Card. Java Card is an adaptation of the well-known Java technology
to smart card constraints. Java Card is an open language, which explains its great success.
Based on a virtual machine environment, it is very portable (following the famous Write Once,
Run Everywhere) and allows several applications to be installed and run on the same card.
But some drawbacks are also inherent to this technology: indeed the cohabitation of
applications raises some questions. How and when to load the applications? Shall
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applications loading be secured ? How to isolate applications from each others ? How long
is the life cycle of a single application on the card ? How to determine the privileges of an
application ?... Answers to these issues are provided by the GlobalPlatform technology.
3.1.1 GlobalPlatform overview
The GlobalPlatform technology is the fruit of the GlobalPlatform consortium’s work.
The GlobalPlatform consortium (formerly named Visa Open Platform) is an organization
established in 1999 by leading companies from the payment and communications industries,
the government sector and the vendor community. The GlobalPlatform specifications cover
the entire smart card infrastructure: smart cards, devices and systems. Consistently written,
this set of specifications allows developing multi-applications and multi-actors smart cards
systems. It specifies the technical models that meet the business models requirements.
The GlobalPlatform card specification (GlobalPlatform, 2006) defines the behavior of a
GlobalPlatform Card. As it is shown in figure 4, the GlobalPlatform card architecture
comprises security domains and applications. A Security Domain acts as the on-card
representatives of off-card entities. It allows its owner to control an application in a secure
way without sharing any keys nor compromising its security architecture. There are three
main types of Security Domain, reflecting the three types of off-card authorities recognized by
a card: Issuer Security Domain, Application Provider Security Domain and Controlling Authority
Security Domain.
3.1.2 Application to biometric template secure storage
The secure storage of biometric templates on a GlobalPlatform card is realized by an
application. This dedicated application is installed, instantiated, selected and pushed a
reference biometric template. In the verification case, the minutia are pushed to the
application which processes a match-on-card verification and returns the result to the outside
world.
In order to host this application, an Application Provider Security Domain must previously
be created on the card. This security domain is personalized with a set of cryptographic keys
and can then provide the application with security services such as cryptographic routines
support and secure communications.
The application is involved in both the user enrolment and verification. For those two phases,
the application queries the security services of its associated security domain.
During the user enrolment process, a secure communication channel is established between
an off-card entity (in the present case a personalization bureau) and the application intended
to store the reference biometric template. To this purpose, the security domain handles
the handshake between the off-card entity and the application and unwraps the ciphered
biometric template prior to forwarding it to the application. Three security levels are available
for the secure communication: authentication, integrity and confidentiality.
During the verification process, a secure communication channel is established following the
previous scheme. Contrary to the enrolment step, in this phase, the minutiae (and not the
reference template) are ciphered and sent to the application. Hence the verification process
takes place on card in a secure manner.
We have seen in this section how the Secure Element, a tamper proof component, ensures
the secure storage of biometric templates. Indeed, thanks to the GlobalPlatform architecture,
the access to the application devoted to the storage of the template and performing the
match-on-card verification is secured successively by authentication of the off-card entity,
check of data integrity and data ciphering for confidentiality purpose.
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Fig. 4. GlobalPlatform Card Architecture (source: GlobalPlatform)
The next sections are concerned with two algorithmic-based solutions dealing with biometric
template protection.
3.2 Cryptographic based solutions
Secure sketches have been introduced by Dodis et al. and formalized for a metric space H
and the associated distance d, in relation to biometric authentication in (Dodis et al., 2004),
(Dodis et al., 2006). A secure sketch considers the problem of error tolerance, existing in
biometric authentication context: a template b ∈ H must be recovered from any sufficiently
close template b� ∈ H and a additional data P. At the same time, the additional data P must
not reveal too much information on the original template b. It uses the notion of minimal
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entropy H∞(X) of a random variable X, defined by the maximal number k such that for all
x ∈ X, the probability P(X = x) ≤ 2−k.
Definition 5. A (H, m, m�, t)-secure sketch is a pair of functions SS and Rec such as:
• The randomized function SS takes as input a value b ∈ H and outputs a public sketch in {0, 1}∗,
such that for all random variable B in H, with minimal entropy H∞(B) ≥ m, the conditional
minimal entropy H∞(B|SS(B)) ≥ m�.
• The deterministic function Rec takes as input a sketch P = SS(b) and a value b� ∈ H and outputs
a value b�� ∈ H such that b�� = b if the distance d(b, b�) ≤ t.
The first secure sketch was proposed by Juels et Wattenberg in (Juels & Wattenberg, 1999). This
scheme is called fuzzy commitment and uses error-correcting codes. The fuzzy vault scheme of
Juels and Sudan (Juels & Sudan, 2001) is also a secure sketch in an other metric.
A binary linear [n, k, d] code C is a vectorial sub-space of {0, 1}n having a dimension k and
composed of vectors x having a Hamming weight wH(x) ≥ d, where wH(x) is the number
of non-zero coordinates of x. The correction capacity of this code is t = �(d − 1)/2�. More
details on error-correcting codes are given in the book (MacWilliams & Sloane, 1988).
In this construction, the metric space is {0, 1}n, with the Hamming distance dH . Let C be
a binary linear code with parameters [n, k, 2t + 1]. Then a ({0, 1}n, m, m − (n − k), t)-secure
sketch is designed as follows:
• The function SS takes as input a value b ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs a sketch P = c ⊕ b, where
c ∈ C is a randomly chosen codeword.
• The function Rec takes as input a sketch P and a value b� ∈ {0, 1}n, decodes b� ⊕ P in a
codeword c� et returns the value c� ⊕ P.
The following authentication system is directly related to the previous secure sketch:
Biometric authentication with fuzzy commitment
1. Enrollment: the user registers his biometric template b and sends the sketch P = c⊕ b, with H(c)
to the database, where H is a cryptographic hash function and c ∈ C is a codeword randomly
chosen.
2. Verification: the user sends a new biometric template b� to the database which computes P ⊕ b�.
Then the database decodes it in a codeword c� and checks if H(c) = H(c�). In cas of equality, the
user is authenticated.
According to the minimum distance 2t + 1 of the code, the new biometric template b� is
accepted if and only if the Hamming distance dH(b, b�) ≤ t. The authentication system is
based on the following property: if the distance dH(b, b�) = ε is lower than the correction
capacity of the code, then it is possible to recover the original codeword c from the word c ⊕ ε.
Applications of this protocol are proposed in face recognition (Kevenaar et al., 2005) or
fingerprints (Tuyls et al., 2005), using BCH codes. This fuzzy commitment scheme is also used
for iris recognition, where iris templates are encoded by binary vectors of length 2048, called
IrisCodes (Daugman, 2004a;b). For example a combination of Hadamard and Reed-Solomon
codes is proposed in (Hao et al., 2006), whereas a Reed-Muller based product code is chosen
in (Chabanne et al., 2007).
The previous scheme ensures the protection of the biometric template if the size of the
code C is sufficient, whereas the loss of entropy of the template is directly connected to the
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Fig. 4. GlobalPlatform Card Architecture (source: GlobalPlatform)
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According to the minimum distance 2t + 1 of the code, the new biometric template b� is
accepted if and only if the Hamming distance dH(b, b�) ≤ t. The authentication system is
based on the following property: if the distance dH(b, b�) = ε is lower than the correction
capacity of the code, then it is possible to recover the original codeword c from the word c ⊕ ε.
Applications of this protocol are proposed in face recognition (Kevenaar et al., 2005) or
fingerprints (Tuyls et al., 2005), using BCH codes. This fuzzy commitment scheme is also used
for iris recognition, where iris templates are encoded by binary vectors of length 2048, called
IrisCodes (Daugman, 2004a;b). For example a combination of Hadamard and Reed-Solomon
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redundancy of the code. Security of this system is however limited: biometrics templates are
not perfectly random and their entropy is difficult to estimate. Moreover, the protection of the
biometric template is related to the knowledge of the random codeword c. This codeword is
direclty used by the database during the verification phase.
In order to enhance the security of the previous scheme, Bringer et al. have proposed a
combination of a secure sketch with a probabilistic encryption and a PIR protocol1 in (Bringer
& Chabanne, 2009; Bringer et al., 2007). The following biometric authentication protocol gives
a simplified description of their scheme (without PIR protocols) and illustrates nicely the
possibilities proposed by homomorphic encryptions for privacy enhancement in biometric
authentication.
The Goldwasser-Micali probabilistic encryption scheme is the first probabilistic encryption
scheme proven to be secure under cryptographic assumptions (Goldwasser & Micali, 1982;
1984). The semantic security of this scheme is related to the intractability of the quadratic
residuosity problem . The Goldwasser-Micali scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 6. Let p and q be two large prime numbers, N be the product p.q and x be a non-residue
with a Jacobi symbol 1. The public key of the crypto-system is pk = (x, N) and the private key is
sk = (p, q). Let y be randomly chosen in Z∗n. A message m ∈ {0, 1} is encrypted in c, where
c = Enc(m) = y2xm mod n. The decryption function Dec takes an encrypted message c and returns
m, where m = 0 if c is a quatratic residue and 1 otherwise.
This scheme encrypts a message bit by bit. The encryption of a message of n bits m =
(m1, . . . , mn) with the previous scheme is denoted Enc(m) = (Enc(m1), . . . , Enc(mn)), where
the encryption mechanism is realized with the same key. The Goldwasser-Micali scheme
clearly verifies the following property:
Dec(Enc(m, pk)× Enc(m�, pk), sk) = m ⊕ m�.
This homomorphic property is used for the combination of this cryptosystem with the secure
sketch construction of Juels and Wattenberg.
The biometric authentication scheme uses the following component: the user U who needs
to be authenticated to a service provider SP. The service provider has access to a database
where biometrics templates are stored. These templates are encrypted with cryptographic
keys, generated and stored by a key manager KM who has no access to the database. For
privacy reasons, the service provider SP has never access to the private keys.
For each user U, the key manager KM generates a pair (pk, sk) for the Goldwasser-Micali
scheme. The public key pk is published and the private key is stored in a secure way. The
biometric authentication system is described as follows:
Biometric authentication with homomorphic encryption
1. Enrollment: The user U registers his biometric template b to the service provider. The service
provider randomly generates a codeword c ∈ C, computes H(c) where H is a cryptographic
hash function and encrypts Enc(c ⊕ b) with the Goldwasser-Micali scheme and the public key
pk , and finally stores it in the database.
2. Verification: the user U encrypts his biometrics template Enc(b�) with pk and sends it to the
service provider. The service provider recovers Enc(c⊕ b) and H(c) from the database, computes
and sends the products Enc(c ⊕ b) × Enc(b�) to the key manager. The key manager decrypts
1 Private Information Protocol, see (Chor et al., 1998).
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Dec(Enc(c ⊕ b)× Enc(b�)) = c ⊕ b ⊕ b� with its private key sk and sends the result to the service
provider who decodes it in a codeword c�. The service provider finally checks if H(c) = H(c�).
Homomorphic property of the Goldwasser-Micali scheme ensures that biometrics templates
are never decrypted during the verification phase of the authentication protocol. Moreover,
the service provider who has access to the encrypted biometric data does not possess the
private key to retrieve the biometric templates and the key manager who generates and stores
the private keys has never access to the database.
Other encryption schemes with suitable homomorphic property can be used as the
Paillier cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999) or the Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem (Damgard & Jurik,
2001). Homomorphic cryptosystems have been recently used for several constructions of
privacy-compliant biometric authentication systems. For example, a face identification system
is proposed in (Osadchy et al., 2010), whereas iris and fingerprint identification mechanisms
are described in (Barni et al., 2010; Blanton & Gasti, 2010).
3.3 BioHashing
The previous cryptosystems represent promising solutions to enhance the privacy. However,
the crucial issues of cancelability and diversity seem to be not well addressed by these
techniques (Simoens et al., 2009).
Besides biometric cryptosystems design, transformation based approaches seem more suited
to ensure the cancelability and diversity requirements and more generally, fulfill the
additional points raised page 7: non-reversibility, accuracy and randomness. The principle of
transformation based methods can be explained as follows: instead of directly storing the raw
original biometric data, it is stored after transformation relying on a non-invertible function.
So, the prominent feature shared by these techniques takes place at the verification stage,
which is performed in the transformation field, between the stored template and the newly
acquired template. Moreover, these techniques are able to cope with the variability inherent
to any biometrics template.
The pioneering work (Ratha et al., 2001) introduces a distortion of the biometric signal by
a chosen transformation function. Hence, cancelability is ensured: each time a transformed
biometric template is compromised, one has just to change the transformation function to
generate a new transformed template. The diversity property is also guaranteed, since
different transformation functions can be chosen for different applications.
Among the transformation based approaches, we detail in this chapter the principle
of BioHashing. BioHashing is a two factor authentication approach which combines
pseudo-random number with biometrics to generate a compact code per person. The first
work referencing the BioHashing technique is presented on face modality in (Goh & Ngo,
2003). Then the same technique has been declined to different modalities in the references
(Teoh et al., 2004c), (Teoh et al., 2004a), (Connie et al., 2004) and more recently (Belguechi,
Rosenberger & Aoudia, 2010), to mention just a few.
Now, we detail the general principle of BioHashing.
3.3.1 BioHashing principle
All BioHashing methods share the common principle of generating a unitary BioCode from
two data: the biometric one (for example texture or minutiae for fingerprint modality) and a
random number which needs to be stored (for example on a usb key, or more generally on a
token), called tokenized random number. The same scheme (detailed just below) is applied both:
77n O rview on P ivacy Preserving Biometrics
12 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
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c = Enc(m) = y2xm mod n. The decryption function Dec takes an encrypted message c and returns
m, where m = 0 if c is a quatratic residue and 1 otherwise.
This scheme encrypts a message bit by bit. The encryption of a message of n bits m =
(m1, . . . , mn) with the previous scheme is denoted Enc(m) = (Enc(m1), . . . , Enc(mn)), where
the encryption mechanism is realized with the same key. The Goldwasser-Micali scheme
clearly verifies the following property:
Dec(Enc(m, pk)× Enc(m�, pk), sk) = m ⊕ m�.
This homomorphic property is used for the combination of this cryptosystem with the secure
sketch construction of Juels and Wattenberg.
The biometric authentication scheme uses the following component: the user U who needs
to be authenticated to a service provider SP. The service provider has access to a database
where biometrics templates are stored. These templates are encrypted with cryptographic
keys, generated and stored by a key manager KM who has no access to the database. For
privacy reasons, the service provider SP has never access to the private keys.
For each user U, the key manager KM generates a pair (pk, sk) for the Goldwasser-Micali
scheme. The public key pk is published and the private key is stored in a secure way. The
biometric authentication system is described as follows:
Biometric authentication with homomorphic encryption
1. Enrollment: The user U registers his biometric template b to the service provider. The service
provider randomly generates a codeword c ∈ C, computes H(c) where H is a cryptographic
hash function and encrypts Enc(c ⊕ b) with the Goldwasser-Micali scheme and the public key
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acquired template. Moreover, these techniques are able to cope with the variability inherent
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The pioneering work (Ratha et al., 2001) introduces a distortion of the biometric signal by
a chosen transformation function. Hence, cancelability is ensured: each time a transformed
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generate a new transformed template. The diversity property is also guaranteed, since
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Among the transformation based approaches, we detail in this chapter the principle
of BioHashing. BioHashing is a two factor authentication approach which combines
pseudo-random number with biometrics to generate a compact code per person. The first
work referencing the BioHashing technique is presented on face modality in (Goh & Ngo,
2003). Then the same technique has been declined to different modalities in the references
(Teoh et al., 2004c), (Teoh et al., 2004a), (Connie et al., 2004) and more recently (Belguechi,
Rosenberger & Aoudia, 2010), to mention just a few.
Now, we detail the general principle of BioHashing.
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All BioHashing methods share the common principle of generating a unitary BioCode from
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• at the enrollment stage, where only the BioCode is stored, instead of the raw original
biometric data
• at the verification stage, where a new BioCode is generated, from the stored random
number
Then the verification relies on the computation of the Hamming distance between the
reference BioCode and the newly issued one. This principle allows BioCode cancelability
and diversity by using different random numbers for different applications.
More precisely, the BioHashing process is illustrated by the figure 5. One can see that it is
a two factor authentication protection scheme, in the sense that the transformation function
combines a specific random number whose seed is stored in a token with the biometric feature
expressed as a fixed-length vector F = ( f1, . . . , fn), F ∈ Rn.
Fig. 5. BioHashing: Ratha’s method
Then BioHashing principle, detailed in (Belguechi, Rosenberger & Aoudia, 2010) for example,
consists in the projection of the (normalized) biometric data on an orthonormal basis obtained
from the random number. This first step somehow amounts to hide the biometric data in
some space. The second step relies on a quantization which ensures the non-invertibility of
BioHashing: from the final BioCode, it is impossible to obtain the original biometric feature.
Let us give more details on the involved stages: random projection and quantization.
• Random projection
It has been shown in (Kaski, 1998) that random mapping can preserve the distances in
the sense that the inner product (which represents a way of measuring the similarity
between two vectors from the cosine of the angle between them) between the mapped
vectors closely follows the inner product of the initial vectors. One condition is that the
involved random matrix R consists of random values and the Euclidean norm of each
column is normalized to unity. The reference (Kaski, 1998) proves that the closer to an
orthonormal matrix the random matrix R is, the better the statistical characteristics of
the feature topology are preserved. As a consequence, in the BioHashing process, the
tokenized random number is used as a seed to generate m random vectors ri, i = 1, . . . , m.
After orthonormalization by the Gram-Schmidt method, these vectors are gathered as the






The following Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma (1984), studied in (Dasgupta & Gupta,
1999), (Teoh et al., 2008) is at the core of the BioHashing efficiency:
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Lemma 1. For any 0 < ε < 1 and any integer k, let m be a positive integer verifying m ≥
4 log(k)
ε2/2−ε3/3 . Then, for any set S containing k points in R
n, there exists a map f : Rn → Rm such
that:
∀x, y ∈ S, (1 − ε)||x − y||2 ≤ || f (x)− f (y)||2 ≤ (1 + ε)||x − y||2 (1)
In other words, Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma states that any n point set in Euclidian
space can be embedded in suitably high (logarithmic in k, independent of n) dimension
without distorting the pairwise distances by more than a factor of 1 ± ε. As a conclusion
of this first step, we can say that the pairwise distances are well conserved by random
projection under the previous hypotheses on the random matrix. Notice that this distance
conservation becomes better when m increases, therefore one can consider m = n.
The resulting vector is denoted W = (W1, . . . , Wm), with W = F.O ∈ Rm, see
figure 6.
• Quantization
This step is devoted to the transformation in a binary-valued vector of the previous
real-valued vector resulting from the projection of the original biometric data on an
orthonormalized random matrix. A reinforcement of the non-invertibility (also relying on
the random projection process) of the global BioHashing transformation ensues from this
quantization. It requires the specification of a threshold τ to compute the final BioCode
B = (B1, . . . , Bm) following the formula:
Bi =
{
0 if Wi ≤ τ
1 if Wi > τ
(2)
In practice, the threshold τ is chosen equal to zero so that half of Wi are larger than the
threshold and half smaller. This, in order to maximize the information content of the
extracted m bits and to increase the robustness of the resultant template. To this purpose,
one may compute the median of the referenced vectors W and use it as a threshold.
These two steps are illustrated by the figure 6.
Fig. 6. BioCode generation
In the literature, one can find that the previous general technique has been applied to several
biometric modalities to obtain the biometric template F. In (Teoh et al., 2004a), integrated
Wavelet Fourier-Mellin transform is applied to fingerprint raw image. This requires the a
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After orthonormalization by the Gram-Schmidt method, these vectors are gathered as the
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conservation becomes better when m increases, therefore one can consider m = n.
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quantization. It requires the specification of a threshold τ to compute the final BioCode
B = (B1, . . . , Bm) following the formula:
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0 if Wi ≤ τ
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In practice, the threshold τ is chosen equal to zero so that half of Wi are larger than the
threshold and half smaller. This, in order to maximize the information content of the
extracted m bits and to increase the robustness of the resultant template. To this purpose,
one may compute the median of the referenced vectors W and use it as a threshold.
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In the literature, one can find that the previous general technique has been applied to several
biometric modalities to obtain the biometric template F. In (Teoh et al., 2004a), integrated
Wavelet Fourier-Mellin transform is applied to fingerprint raw image. This requires the a
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priori detection of the core point and produces a translation and rotation-invariant feature.
Besides, integrated Wavelet Fourier-Mellin transform has been applied to face raw image in
(Teoh & Ngo, 2005), while Fisher Discriminant Analysis (FDA) for face images is developed
in (Teoh et al., 2004b), with a slightly different quantification step. Both Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) and Fisher Discriminant Analysis are at the core of PalmHashing developed in
(Connie et al., 2004) from the ROI of the raw palmprint image. In two recent papers (Belguechi,
Rosenberger & Aoudia, 2010), (Belguechi, Hemery & Rosenberger, 2010), we propose to
extract biometric templates from minutiae representation, by using a Gabor filterbank, after a
detection process of the region of interest.
3.3.2 Discussion
The conclusion shared by the previously mentioned references is that BioHashing has
significant advantages over solely biometrics or token usage, such as extremely clear
separation of the genuine and the imposter population and zero EER (Equal Error Rate) level.
But, among other papers, the reference (Kong et al., 2005) reveals that the outstanding
0% EER achievement of BioHashing implies the unrealistic assumption that the tokenized
random number (TRN) would never be lost, stolen, shared or duplicated. In this paper,
it is also pointed out that if this assumption held, the TRN alone could serve as a perfect
password, making biometrics useless. The presented results show that the true performance
of BioHashing is far from perfect and even can be worst than the basic biometric system.
The results of some tests on different modalities are given in (Lumini & Nanni, 2006). For
fingerprint texture template for example, the authors have demonstrated that the performance
of the system in term of EER moves from 7.3% when no hashing is performed to 10.9% when
basic BioHashing is operated under the hypothesis that the token is always stolen, while EER
is evaluated to 1.5% in case where no TRN is stolen (FVC2002-DB2). These scores are also
discussed in our papers (Belguechi, Rosenberger & Aoudia, 2010), (Belguechi, Hemery &
Rosenberger, 2010) where different cases are considered, depending on whether the token
is stolen or not.
3.4 Summarization
We saw in the previous sections different solutions to protect the biometric information. On
the one hand using a Secure Element to store a biometric template is one convenient solution
and is already operational. Even if it is technically possible to cancel a biometric template (by
updating the content of the SE), this solution does not give any guarantee about the required
cancelability properties. The security of a SE is often evaluated by a certification level (as for
example EAL4+ for common criteria) giving some elements about the possibility for an hacker
to obtain the biometric template.
On the other hand algorithmic solutions propose nice solutions to protect biometric templates
privacy. Cryptography based approaches avoid the transmission of biometric templates but
does not solve the non revocability problem. BioHashing reveals itself as a promising solution
and seems to respect many privacy properties defined previously. This approach needs to be
further studied, especially considering attacks.
4. Research challenges
Even if some solutions exist, there are many challenges to deal with in the future.
How can we evaluate cancelable biometric systems ?
Before proposing new privacy protection schemes for biometric templates, it becomes urgent
to define objective evaluation methods for these particular systems. Of course, this type of
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biometric systems can be evaluated through existing standards in performance evaluation
(see (El-Abed et al., 2010) for example) but it is not sufficient. Computing the EER value or
the ROC curve does not give any information on how the system protects the privacy of
users. Some researchers try to analyze the security and privacy of these systems by taking
into account some scenarios. The robustness to an attack is often quantified as for example by
the resulting EER or FRR values when the attacker caught some additional information that
he/she was not supposed to have. There is a lot of work on this subject.
How to increase the BioCode length?
In order to prevent brute force attack consisting in testing different values of the BioCode, it
is necessary to increase the size of the generated BioCode. Many solutions to this problem
exist. First, one simple solution is to use different biometric information. One can generate
a BioCode for the fingerprint of each hand finger. There is no reason to have a statistical
correlation between information provided by the template of each fingerprint. This solution
solves the problem of the size and the associated entropy but it is less usable for an user as
he/she has to provide as for example the fingerprint of each hand. Second, it is possible
to increase the size of the BioCode by using an adapted representation. As for example,
computing a BioCode from minutiae (where 30 are detected in average for a fingerprint)
provides smaller BioCode compared to a texture representation. So it is necessary to carefully
study biometric data representation.
How many times can we cancel a BioCode ?
The objective of a cancelable biometric information is to be able to generate it again in case of
known attack. The question is to quantify the possibility to revoke this data a certain amount
of times. Suppose an attacker is listening to the authentication session and can have different
values of the BioCode, the problem is to know if he/she is able to predict an authorized
BioCode. It is necessary to analyze as for example if some bits keep the same value in the
BioCode after regeneration.
To what extent is it usable in an operational context ?
There are some (not so much) publications in this domain but very few industrial solutions
(except those using a SE). This domain is not enough mature. Using a secure element to store
the biometric data and realizing a match on card is well known. It could be interesting to
combine a hardware solution using a secure element and an algorithmic solution. We are
currently working on this aspect. The next step is also to be able to make a capture on card
with an embedded biometric sensor to limit the transmission of the biometric data.
5. Conclusion
Biometrics is a very attractive technology mainly because of the strong relationship between
the user and its authenticator. Unfortunately, many problems are also associated with this
authentication solution. The main one concerns the impossibility to revoke a biometric data.
Besides there is a major concern for ethical and security reasons. We presented in this chapter
the main issues in this field and some solutions in the state of the art based on secure storage
of the biometric template or using algorithmic solutions. Even if these methods bring some
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priori detection of the core point and produces a translation and rotation-invariant feature.
Besides, integrated Wavelet Fourier-Mellin transform has been applied to face raw image in
(Teoh & Ngo, 2005), while Fisher Discriminant Analysis (FDA) for face images is developed
in (Teoh et al., 2004b), with a slightly different quantification step. Both Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) and Fisher Discriminant Analysis are at the core of PalmHashing developed in
(Connie et al., 2004) from the ROI of the raw palmprint image. In two recent papers (Belguechi,
Rosenberger & Aoudia, 2010), (Belguechi, Hemery & Rosenberger, 2010), we propose to
extract biometric templates from minutiae representation, by using a Gabor filterbank, after a
detection process of the region of interest.
3.3.2 Discussion
The conclusion shared by the previously mentioned references is that BioHashing has
significant advantages over solely biometrics or token usage, such as extremely clear
separation of the genuine and the imposter population and zero EER (Equal Error Rate) level.
But, among other papers, the reference (Kong et al., 2005) reveals that the outstanding
0% EER achievement of BioHashing implies the unrealistic assumption that the tokenized
random number (TRN) would never be lost, stolen, shared or duplicated. In this paper,
it is also pointed out that if this assumption held, the TRN alone could serve as a perfect
password, making biometrics useless. The presented results show that the true performance
of BioHashing is far from perfect and even can be worst than the basic biometric system.
The results of some tests on different modalities are given in (Lumini & Nanni, 2006). For
fingerprint texture template for example, the authors have demonstrated that the performance
of the system in term of EER moves from 7.3% when no hashing is performed to 10.9% when
basic BioHashing is operated under the hypothesis that the token is always stolen, while EER
is evaluated to 1.5% in case where no TRN is stolen (FVC2002-DB2). These scores are also
discussed in our papers (Belguechi, Rosenberger & Aoudia, 2010), (Belguechi, Hemery &
Rosenberger, 2010) where different cases are considered, depending on whether the token
is stolen or not.
3.4 Summarization
We saw in the previous sections different solutions to protect the biometric information. On
the one hand using a Secure Element to store a biometric template is one convenient solution
and is already operational. Even if it is technically possible to cancel a biometric template (by
updating the content of the SE), this solution does not give any guarantee about the required
cancelability properties. The security of a SE is often evaluated by a certification level (as for
example EAL4+ for common criteria) giving some elements about the possibility for an hacker
to obtain the biometric template.
On the other hand algorithmic solutions propose nice solutions to protect biometric templates
privacy. Cryptography based approaches avoid the transmission of biometric templates but
does not solve the non revocability problem. BioHashing reveals itself as a promising solution
and seems to respect many privacy properties defined previously. This approach needs to be
further studied, especially considering attacks.
4. Research challenges
Even if some solutions exist, there are many challenges to deal with in the future.
How can we evaluate cancelable biometric systems ?
Before proposing new privacy protection schemes for biometric templates, it becomes urgent
to define objective evaluation methods for these particular systems. Of course, this type of
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biometric systems can be evaluated through existing standards in performance evaluation
(see (El-Abed et al., 2010) for example) but it is not sufficient. Computing the EER value or
the ROC curve does not give any information on how the system protects the privacy of
users. Some researchers try to analyze the security and privacy of these systems by taking
into account some scenarios. The robustness to an attack is often quantified as for example by
the resulting EER or FRR values when the attacker caught some additional information that
he/she was not supposed to have. There is a lot of work on this subject.
How to increase the BioCode length?
In order to prevent brute force attack consisting in testing different values of the BioCode, it
is necessary to increase the size of the generated BioCode. Many solutions to this problem
exist. First, one simple solution is to use different biometric information. One can generate
a BioCode for the fingerprint of each hand finger. There is no reason to have a statistical
correlation between information provided by the template of each fingerprint. This solution
solves the problem of the size and the associated entropy but it is less usable for an user as
he/she has to provide as for example the fingerprint of each hand. Second, it is possible
to increase the size of the BioCode by using an adapted representation. As for example,
computing a BioCode from minutiae (where 30 are detected in average for a fingerprint)
provides smaller BioCode compared to a texture representation. So it is necessary to carefully
study biometric data representation.
How many times can we cancel a BioCode ?
The objective of a cancelable biometric information is to be able to generate it again in case of
known attack. The question is to quantify the possibility to revoke this data a certain amount
of times. Suppose an attacker is listening to the authentication session and can have different
values of the BioCode, the problem is to know if he/she is able to predict an authorized
BioCode. It is necessary to analyze as for example if some bits keep the same value in the
BioCode after regeneration.
To what extent is it usable in an operational context ?
There are some (not so much) publications in this domain but very few industrial solutions
(except those using a SE). This domain is not enough mature. Using a secure element to store
the biometric data and realizing a match on card is well known. It could be interesting to
combine a hardware solution using a secure element and an algorithmic solution. We are
currently working on this aspect. The next step is also to be able to make a capture on card
with an embedded biometric sensor to limit the transmission of the biometric data.
5. Conclusion
Biometrics is a very attractive technology mainly because of the strong relationship between
the user and its authenticator. Unfortunately, many problems are also associated with this
authentication solution. The main one concerns the impossibility to revoke a biometric data.
Besides there is a major concern for ethical and security reasons. We presented in this chapter
the main issues in this field and some solutions in the state of the art based on secure storage
of the biometric template or using algorithmic solutions. Even if these methods bring some
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improvements, many things need to be done in order to have a totally secure solution. We
detailed some trends to work on in the near future.
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1. Introduction  
With a growing concern regarding security, interest in biometrics is increasing. Since 
biometrics utilizes a user’s physiological or behavioral characteristic, which is unique and 
immutable, the compromise of biometric templates is a serious problem. Fingerprint 
authentication system is one of the most widely used biometric authentication systems. In 
general, in the enrollment procedure, the features are extracted from the enrollment image 
and are stored as a template. The template is compared to the features extracted from the 
verification image. Unlike passwords, however, biometrics has no or little substitutions. For 
example, if one’s fingerprint template is compromised, he or she cannot use that fingerprint 
for any other fingerprint authentication system from then on. 
Ratha et al. have introduced cancelable biometrics as a remedy for the problem of 
compromised templates (Bolle et al., 2002; Ratha et al., 2001). Cancelable biometrics distorts 
or transforms a user’s template using some non-invertible functions to obscure the user’s 
raw physical characteristics, and its matching is performed in a transformed domain. When 
a template is compromised, a new biometric template is issued (like a new enrollment of a 
new user) by distorting the biometric traits in a different way using a new instance of the 
non-invertible function. Ratha et al. proposed the surface folding scheme for cancelable 
fingerprint templates (Ratha et al., 2007). They proposed a one-way transformation which 
moves minutia positions using two-dimensional Gaussian functions defined over the feature 
domain. However, if an attacker obtains two transformed templates and transformation 
parameters, the original template is recovered by a dictionary attack (Shin et al., 2009). 
Fuzzy vault is a crypto-biometric algorithm proposed by Juels et al. (Juels & Sudan, 2002). It 
gives a promising solution to personal privacy and fingerprint template security problems. 
Clancy et al. and Uludag et al. suggested the method for applying the fuzzy vault to 
fingerprint authentication, which is named as fuzzy fingerprint vault (Clancy et al, 2003; 
Uludag et al., 2005). It generates a lot of chaff minutiae and mixes them up with the real 
minutiae. Then, the real minutiae are projected on a randomly generated polynomial, and 
the chaff minutiae are projected off the polynomial. The polynomial is successfully 
reconstructed using either brute-force search or Reed-Solomon code if a sufficient number of 
real minutiae are chosen. The genuine user can choose a sufficient number of real minutiae 
by presenting his or her fingerprint while the impostors cannot. Some researchers have 
implemented the fuzzy vault for fingerprints, and have protected the fingerprint minutiae 
by adding chaff points into the vault (Chung et al., 2006; Clancy et al., 2003; Dodis et al., 
20 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
Osadchy, M., Pinkas, B., Jarrous, A. & Moskovich, B. (2010). Scifi - a system for secure face
identification, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Paillier, P. (1999). Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosiy classes,
EUROCRYPT’99, Vol. 1592 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 223–238.
Pakanti, S., Prabhakar, S. & Jain, A. K. (2002). On the individuality of fingerprint, IEEE Trans.
Pattern Anal. Machine Intell. 24(8): 1010–1025.
Ratha, N., Connelle, J. & Bolle, R. (2001). Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based
authentication system, IBM Systems J. 37(11): 2245–2255.
Schneier, B. (1999). Inside risks: the uses and abuses of biometrics, Commun. ACM 42: 136.
Simoens, K., Chang, C. & Preneel, B. (2009). Privacy weaknesses in biometric sketches, 30th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Solove, D. (2009). Understanding privacy, Harvard university press.
Teoh, A., Kuanb, Y. & Leea, S. (2008). Cancellable biometrics and annotations on biohash,
Pattern recognition 41: 2034–2044.
Teoh, A. & Ngo, D. (2005). Cancellable biometrics featuring with tokenised random number,
Pattern Recognition Letters 26: 1454–1460.
Teoh, A., Ngo, D. & Goh, A. (2004a). Biohashing: two factor authentication featuring
fingerprint data and tokenised random number, Pattern recognition 40.
Teoh, A., Ngo, D. & Goh., A. (2004b). An integrated dual factor authenticator based on
the face data and tokenised random number, 1st International conference on biometric
authentication (ICBA), Hong Kong.
Teoh, A., Ngo, D. & Goh, A. (2004c). Personalised cryptographic key generation based on
facehashing, Computers and Security Journal 23(07): 606–614.
Tuyls, P., Akkemans, A., Kevenaar, T., Schrijen, G., Bazen, A. & Veldhuis, R. (2005). Practical
biometric authentication with template protection, Audio and Video based Personal
Authentication, pp. 436–446.
Warren & Brandeis (1890). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review (IV).
84 Recent Application in Biometrics
5 
Protection of the Fingerprint Minutiae 
Woo Yong Choi1, Yongwha Chung2 and Jin-Won Park3 
1Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), 
2Korea University, 
3Hongik University 
Republic of Korea 
1. Introduction  
With a growing concern regarding security, interest in biometrics is increasing. Since 
biometrics utilizes a user’s physiological or behavioral characteristic, which is unique and 
immutable, the compromise of biometric templates is a serious problem. Fingerprint 
authentication system is one of the most widely used biometric authentication systems. In 
general, in the enrollment procedure, the features are extracted from the enrollment image 
and are stored as a template. The template is compared to the features extracted from the 
verification image. Unlike passwords, however, biometrics has no or little substitutions. For 
example, if one’s fingerprint template is compromised, he or she cannot use that fingerprint 
for any other fingerprint authentication system from then on. 
Ratha et al. have introduced cancelable biometrics as a remedy for the problem of 
compromised templates (Bolle et al., 2002; Ratha et al., 2001). Cancelable biometrics distorts 
or transforms a user’s template using some non-invertible functions to obscure the user’s 
raw physical characteristics, and its matching is performed in a transformed domain. When 
a template is compromised, a new biometric template is issued (like a new enrollment of a 
new user) by distorting the biometric traits in a different way using a new instance of the 
non-invertible function. Ratha et al. proposed the surface folding scheme for cancelable 
fingerprint templates (Ratha et al., 2007). They proposed a one-way transformation which 
moves minutia positions using two-dimensional Gaussian functions defined over the feature 
domain. However, if an attacker obtains two transformed templates and transformation 
parameters, the original template is recovered by a dictionary attack (Shin et al., 2009). 
Fuzzy vault is a crypto-biometric algorithm proposed by Juels et al. (Juels & Sudan, 2002). It 
gives a promising solution to personal privacy and fingerprint template security problems. 
Clancy et al. and Uludag et al. suggested the method for applying the fuzzy vault to 
fingerprint authentication, which is named as fuzzy fingerprint vault (Clancy et al, 2003; 
Uludag et al., 2005). It generates a lot of chaff minutiae and mixes them up with the real 
minutiae. Then, the real minutiae are projected on a randomly generated polynomial, and 
the chaff minutiae are projected off the polynomial. The polynomial is successfully 
reconstructed using either brute-force search or Reed-Solomon code if a sufficient number of 
real minutiae are chosen. The genuine user can choose a sufficient number of real minutiae 
by presenting his or her fingerprint while the impostors cannot. Some researchers have 
implemented the fuzzy vault for fingerprints, and have protected the fingerprint minutiae 
by adding chaff points into the vault (Chung et al., 2006; Clancy et al., 2003; Dodis et al., 
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2004; Kanak & Sogukpinar, 2007; Nandakumar et al., 2007; Uludag et al., 2005). Lagrange 
interpolation (Hildebrand, 1987) is the most widely used polynomial interpolation method. 
However, it requires a little much time especially when the degree of polynomial is large. 
Brute-force search is employed for polynomial reconstruction attempts until the true 
polynomial is reconstructed, and Lagrange interpolation is used to interpolate the 
polynomial. Therefore, even if the real minutiae are chosen more than the degree of the 
polynomial, the brute-force search cannot reconstruct the polynomial in real-time when 
several chaff minutiae are chosen along with the real minutiae. All the previous results 
adopted the brute-force search to reconstruct the polynomial or skipped the procedure for 
polynomial reconstruction because of its difficulty (Li et al., 2006). In this work we propose a 
fast algorithm for polynomial reconstruction. To reduce the execution time, it determines 
the candidate sets with chaff points by using the Gaussian elimination and excludes them 
from the reconstruction trial. Since the Gaussian elimination is a time-consuming process, 
we have found a recursive formula to perform the Gaussian elimination effectively by using 
the Consistency Theorem (Anton, 1994). We confirmed that the proposed algorithm can be 
performed in real time even at the worst case. 
There are a few attack methods on the fuzzy vault. Scheirer et al. suggested the methods of 
attacks against fuzzy vault including the attack via record multiplicity, which is known as 
the correlation attack (Scheirer & Boult, 2007). The correlation attack gives very powerful 
attack method when two fuzzy vaults obtained from the same fingerprint are available. On 
the other hand, when only one fuzzy vault is compromised and no additional information is 
available, brute-force attack can be used. Brute-force attack is employed for polynomial 
reconstruction attempts using the random combination of points until the true polynomial is 
reconstructed. In this work we propose a new attack algorithm which applies a fast 
polynomial reconstruction algorithm based on the Consistency Theorem. Also, we evaluate 
the proposed attack method, and compare it with the known attack methods such as the 
brute-force attack and the correlation attack.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The conventional fingerprint authentication methods 
are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the fuzzy fingerprint vault system and the 
proposed polynomial reconstruction algorithm followed by experimental results. In Section 
4, various attack methods for fuzzy fingerprint vault (brute-force attack, correlation attack, 
and the fast polynomial reconstruction attack) and the experimental results are explained. 
Section 5 summarizes the conclusion. 
2. Fingerprint authentication 
Fingerprint recognition is the most common biometric method for authentication. Since 
everyone’s fingerprint is unique and invariable during life, fingerprint has been used as the 
evidence of forensic science and the personal authentication method. Modern fingerprint 
recognition began in 1684, when Nehemiah Grew studied and described ridges, furrows 
and pores on hand and foot surfaces. In the late 1960s, the Live-Scan system which records 
fingerprints electronically was developed, which was a turning point of fingerprint 
recognition. Fingerprint was centralized into database, and the automatic fingerprint 
recognition system has been developed consistently. 
A fingerprint authentication system consists of fingerprint sensor, pre-processing, feature 
extraction, storage, and matching as shown in Fig. 1. The fingerprint pattern is captured by a 
fingerprint sensor. A fingerprint sensor takes a snapshot of a fingerprint and saves it into an 
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image file. From the image, unique features of each fingerprint are extracted and saved in 
the storage. The storage may be either a central database or a smartcard. Before feature 
extraction, pre-processing is performed to extract the reliable features from the image. For 
fingerprint matching, features of an input fingerprint are compared to the features of the 
enrolled fingerprint data. By comparing similarity between two fingerprint feature sets, it is 
decided whether the two fingerprints are from the same person or not. 
The fingerprint recognition algorithms can be classified into two categories: image-based 
and minutiae-based. Image-based methods are based on optical correlation and transform 
based features. The image-based methods lack the ability to track with variations in 
position, scale, and orientation angle, and hence, they cannot give reliable recognition 
accuracy. Nevertheless, the image-based methods have been studied continuously because 
of the following properties (Nanni & Lumini, 2009; Yang & Park, 2008). First, the image-
based methods can be combined with the minutiae-based methods to improve the 
accuracies of the fingerprint authentication systems. Second, fingerprint features can be 
represented by a fixed length vector, which is suitable for various learning systems. 
Minutiae-based methods are more popular matching techniques, which are included in 
almost all contemporary fingerprint identification and verification systems. They are based 
on the minutiae, such as ending, bifurcation, and singular points in the fingerprint, which 
have been known to be effective for fingerprint recognition. The minutiae form a pattern of 
points, and hence several well-known point pattern matching algorithms have been 
proposed in the late 80’s.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the fingerprint authentication system (Pan et al., 2003) 
A fingerprint authentication system has two phases: enrollment and verification. In the off-
line enrollment phase, an enrolled fingerprint image is preprocessed, and the minutiae are 
extracted and stored. In the on-line verification phase, the similarity between the enrolled 
minutiae and the input minutiae is examined.  
Image preprocessing refers to the refinement of the fingerprint image against the image 
distortion (poor contrast, flaw, smudge, etc.) obtained from a fingerprint sensor. Minutiae 
Extraction refers to the extraction of features from the fingerprint image. After this step, 
some of the minutiae are detected and stored into a pattern file, which includes the position, 
the orientation, and the type (ridge ending or bifurcation) of the minutiae.  
The input fingerprint minutiae are compared with the enrolled fingerprint minutiae. 
Actually, Minutiae Matching is composed of the alignment stage and the matching stage. In 
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are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the fuzzy fingerprint vault system and the 
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and the fast polynomial reconstruction attack) and the experimental results are explained. 
Section 5 summarizes the conclusion. 
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and pores on hand and foot surfaces. In the late 1960s, the Live-Scan system which records 
fingerprints electronically was developed, which was a turning point of fingerprint 
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image file. From the image, unique features of each fingerprint are extracted and saved in 
the storage. The storage may be either a central database or a smartcard. Before feature 
extraction, pre-processing is performed to extract the reliable features from the image. For 
fingerprint matching, features of an input fingerprint are compared to the features of the 
enrolled fingerprint data. By comparing similarity between two fingerprint feature sets, it is 
decided whether the two fingerprints are from the same person or not. 
The fingerprint recognition algorithms can be classified into two categories: image-based 
and minutiae-based. Image-based methods are based on optical correlation and transform 
based features. The image-based methods lack the ability to track with variations in 
position, scale, and orientation angle, and hence, they cannot give reliable recognition 
accuracy. Nevertheless, the image-based methods have been studied continuously because 
of the following properties (Nanni & Lumini, 2009; Yang & Park, 2008). First, the image-
based methods can be combined with the minutiae-based methods to improve the 
accuracies of the fingerprint authentication systems. Second, fingerprint features can be 
represented by a fixed length vector, which is suitable for various learning systems. 
Minutiae-based methods are more popular matching techniques, which are included in 
almost all contemporary fingerprint identification and verification systems. They are based 
on the minutiae, such as ending, bifurcation, and singular points in the fingerprint, which 
have been known to be effective for fingerprint recognition. The minutiae form a pattern of 
points, and hence several well-known point pattern matching algorithms have been 
proposed in the late 80’s.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the fingerprint authentication system (Pan et al., 2003) 
A fingerprint authentication system has two phases: enrollment and verification. In the off-
line enrollment phase, an enrolled fingerprint image is preprocessed, and the minutiae are 
extracted and stored. In the on-line verification phase, the similarity between the enrolled 
minutiae and the input minutiae is examined.  
Image preprocessing refers to the refinement of the fingerprint image against the image 
distortion (poor contrast, flaw, smudge, etc.) obtained from a fingerprint sensor. Minutiae 
Extraction refers to the extraction of features from the fingerprint image. After this step, 
some of the minutiae are detected and stored into a pattern file, which includes the position, 
the orientation, and the type (ridge ending or bifurcation) of the minutiae.  
The input fingerprint minutiae are compared with the enrolled fingerprint minutiae. 
Actually, Minutiae Matching is composed of the alignment stage and the matching stage. In 
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order to match two fingerprints captured with unknown direction and position, the 
differences of the direction and the position between two fingerprints should be detected, 
and alignment between them needs to be executed. Therefore, in the alignment stage, 
transformations such as translation and rotation between two fingerprints are estimated, 
and two minutiae are aligned according to the estimated parameters. If alignment is 
performed accurately, the matching stage is referred to point matching simply. In the 
matching stage, two minutiae are compared based on their position, orientation, and type. 
Then, a matching score is computed. 
3. Fuzzy fingerprint vault 
3.1 Enrollment procedure 
Fig. 2 shows the block diagram of the enrollment procedure of the Fuzzy Fingerprint Vault 
(FFV) system. Given the fingerprint image to be enrolled, we first extract minutiae from the 
image to form a locking set of the form. 
 { |1 }i eL i n= ≤ ≤m  (1) 
where ( , , , )i i i i ix y tθ=m  is the i-th enrollment minutia, and ne is the number of the 
enrollment minutiae. Then, a number of chaff minutiae are generated and constitute a 
minutia set along with the real minutiae. After adding the chaff minutiae, the total number 
of minutiae is nr. All arithmetic operations are conducted in a finite field of order 220, namely 
GF(220). Thus, each coordinate is scaled to the range [0, 1024] for the purpose of the 
arithmetic in GF(220). A finite field (Stallings, 2005) is a field with a finite number of 
elements, also called a Galois field. All operations performed in the finite field result in an 
element within that field. For polynomial representation, we define the finite field over the 
irreducible polynomial x20 + x3 + 1. Then, we randomly select (k + 1) elements from GF(220) 
and generate a k-degree polynomial as follows. 
 20 1 2( )
k
kp u a a u a u a u= + + + +  (2) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the enrollment procedure of the FFV system (Choi et al., 2009) 
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This polynomial becomes the secret to be protected. As in the work of Uludag et al., we 
concatenate x and y coordinates of a minutia to arrive at the locking/unlocking data unit u. 
Then, we project the real and the chaff points (i.e., minutiae) on and off the polynomial, 
respectively. That is, 
 i
i
( ) if  is real










where δi is a non-zero element of GF(220). Finally, the vault is constituted by the real and the 
chaff points, and the secret. The secret should be stored in a hashed form, instead of in the 
clear form. 
3.2 Verification procedure 
Fig. 3 shows the block diagram of the verification procedure of the FFV system. Given the 
fingerprint image to be verified, the minutiae are first extracted from the image and the 
verification minutiae set V is denoted by 
 { |1 }i vV i n= ≤ ≤m  (4) 
where ( , , , )i i i i ix y tθ=m  is the i-th verification minutia, and nv is the number of the 
verification minutiae. Then, the verification minutiae are compared with the enrolled 
minutiae with real and chaff minutiae mixed, and an unlocking set U is finally selected. 
 { |1 }i mU i n= ≤ ≤m  (5) 
where nm is the number of the matched minutiae. The vault can be successfully unlocked 
only if U overlaps with L to a great extent.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the verification procedure of the FFV system (Choi et al., 2009) 
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These nm points may contain some chaff points as well as the real points even if the user is 
genuine. Hence, in order to interpolate the k-degree polynomial, we have to select (k + 1) 
real points from among the nm points. After the polynomial is interpolated, it is compared 
with the true polynomial stored in the vault. A decision to accept/reject the user depends on 
the result of this comparison. If |U ∩ L| ≥ (k + 1), the k-degree polynomial can be 
successfully reconstructed by using the brute-force search. The most widely used algorithm 
for polynomial interpolation is the Lagrange interpolation. The number of cases that select (k 
+ 1) minutiae from nm minutiae is C(nm, k + 1). Let nreal be the number of real minutiae in set 
U, then the number of cases that correctly reconstruct the polynomial is C(nreal, k + 1). 
Therefore, the average number of polynomial interpolation is 









Furthermore, when a higher degree of polynomial is used, the Lagrange interpolation needs 
much more time to reconstruct the polynomial. More precisely, it can be done in O(k log2(k)) 
operations (Gathen & Gerhardt, 2003). Hence, it becomes impracticable as nm and/or k 
increases. So, Uludag used only 18 minutiae to prevent nm from being too large (Uludag et 
al., 2005). 
Juels et al. suggested that the chaff points can be removed by means of the Reed-Solomon 
decoding algorithm (Juels & Sudan, 2002). Among various realizations of the Reed-Solomon 
code, we used the Gao’s algorithm (Gao, 2003), which is one of the fastest Reed-Solomon 
decoding algorithms. It compensates one chaff point at the cost of one real point, so if there 
are many chaff points are matched along with real points, it is quite probable that the right 
user is rejected (i.e., false negative). The situation becomes much more serious when the 
degree of polynomial increases. 
3.3 Polynomial reconstruction  
If the matched point set of equation (5) contains more than (k + 1) real point, the true 
polynomial can be reconstructed by using the brute-force search. Brute-force search chooses 
(k + 1) points from among nm points and tries to reconstruct the k-degree polynomial using 
the Lagrange interpolation, which requires a relatively large number of computations. So, 
when the matched point set contains many chaff minutiae, the number of the Lagrange 
interpolation to be performed increases exponentially, and hence, the polynomial 
reconstruction cannot be performed in real time.  
In this section, we introduce a fast algorithm for the polynomial reconstruction (Choi et al., 
2008). To begin with, let us consider the following theorem which provides the conditions 




Let us consider a linear system of (k + 2) equations with (k + 1) unknowns. 
Consistency Theorem. If Ax = b is a linear system of m equations with n unknowns, 
then the followings are equivalent. 
(a) Ax = b is consistent. 
(b) b is in the column space of A. 
(c) The coefficient matrix A and the augmented matrix [A | b] have the same rank. 
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Then, the corresponding augmented matrix W is of the form. 
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It is straightforward that the rank of matrix U is (k + 1). According to the Consistency 
Theorem, the rank of the augmented matrix W must be equal to (k + 1) to guarantee that the 
linear system has a solution. The Gaussian elimination was used to check whether the 
augmented matrix had rank (k + 1) or not. The elementary row operations, provided we do 
not perform the operation of interchanging two rows, were used to reduce the augmented 
matrix W into the row-echelon form. 
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where ( )l iju  and 
( )i
jv  are the values of 
l
ju  and vj when the j-th row has “leading 1” at the i-th 
element, respectively. Note that the diagonal elements of equation (10) cannot be zero 
because the rank of matrix U is (k + 1). From the parts (a) and (c) of the Consistency 




+ ≠ , the linear system of equation (7) does not have a 
solution. Hence, there exists at least one chaff point in the set {(ui, vi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 2}, and we 
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all the points are probably the real points. Thus, we try to reconstruct the polynomial with (k 
+ 1) points and compare it with the true polynomial. 
Up to this point, we have explained how to reconstruct a k-degree polynomial from (k + 2) 
matched minutiae. In general, the unlocking set has nm minutiae, so let us consider a linear 
system of nm equations with (k + 1) unknowns as follows. 
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These nm points may contain some chaff points as well as the real points even if the user is 
genuine. Hence, in order to interpolate the k-degree polynomial, we have to select (k + 1) 
real points from among the nm points. After the polynomial is interpolated, it is compared 
with the true polynomial stored in the vault. A decision to accept/reject the user depends on 
the result of this comparison. If |U ∩ L| ≥ (k + 1), the k-degree polynomial can be 
successfully reconstructed by using the brute-force search. The most widely used algorithm 
for polynomial interpolation is the Lagrange interpolation. The number of cases that select (k 
+ 1) minutiae from nm minutiae is C(nm, k + 1). Let nreal be the number of real minutiae in set 
U, then the number of cases that correctly reconstruct the polynomial is C(nreal, k + 1). 
Therefore, the average number of polynomial interpolation is 









Furthermore, when a higher degree of polynomial is used, the Lagrange interpolation needs 
much more time to reconstruct the polynomial. More precisely, it can be done in O(k log2(k)) 
operations (Gathen & Gerhardt, 2003). Hence, it becomes impracticable as nm and/or k 
increases. So, Uludag used only 18 minutiae to prevent nm from being too large (Uludag et 
al., 2005). 
Juels et al. suggested that the chaff points can be removed by means of the Reed-Solomon 
decoding algorithm (Juels & Sudan, 2002). Among various realizations of the Reed-Solomon 
code, we used the Gao’s algorithm (Gao, 2003), which is one of the fastest Reed-Solomon 
decoding algorithms. It compensates one chaff point at the cost of one real point, so if there 
are many chaff points are matched along with real points, it is quite probable that the right 
user is rejected (i.e., false negative). The situation becomes much more serious when the 
degree of polynomial increases. 
3.3 Polynomial reconstruction  
If the matched point set of equation (5) contains more than (k + 1) real point, the true 
polynomial can be reconstructed by using the brute-force search. Brute-force search chooses 
(k + 1) points from among nm points and tries to reconstruct the k-degree polynomial using 
the Lagrange interpolation, which requires a relatively large number of computations. So, 
when the matched point set contains many chaff minutiae, the number of the Lagrange 
interpolation to be performed increases exponentially, and hence, the polynomial 
reconstruction cannot be performed in real time.  
In this section, we introduce a fast algorithm for the polynomial reconstruction (Choi et al., 
2008). To begin with, let us consider the following theorem which provides the conditions 




Let us consider a linear system of (k + 2) equations with (k + 1) unknowns. 
Consistency Theorem. If Ax = b is a linear system of m equations with n unknowns, 
then the followings are equivalent. 
(a) Ax = b is consistent. 
(b) b is in the column space of A. 
(c) The coefficient matrix A and the augmented matrix [A | b] have the same rank. 
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Then, the corresponding augmented matrix W is of the form. 
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It is straightforward that the rank of matrix U is (k + 1). According to the Consistency 
Theorem, the rank of the augmented matrix W must be equal to (k + 1) to guarantee that the 
linear system has a solution. The Gaussian elimination was used to check whether the 
augmented matrix had rank (k + 1) or not. The elementary row operations, provided we do 
not perform the operation of interchanging two rows, were used to reduce the augmented 
matrix W into the row-echelon form. 
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where nm > (k + 1). Clearly, if nm < (k + 1), then the polynomial cannot be reconstructed. 
Also, if nm = (k + 1), we can reconstruct the polynomial with the (k + 1) points. Suppose that 
we select (k + 2) real points from among nm points, we can reconstruct the true polynomial. 
However, if at least one chaff point exists in the (k + 2) selected points the true polynomial 
cannot be reconstructed. The procedure for the proposed polynomial reconstruction 
algorithm is as follows. 
1. (k + 1) points are selected from among nm points with real and chaff points mixed, and 
these points are placed to the top of equation (11). 
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3. To determine whether the (k + 1) points (u1, v1),…,(uk+1, vk+1) are valid candidates or not, 




+ . Therefore, the proposed algorithm needs one 
more real point than the brute-force search to reconstruct the polynomial. If there is at 




+ , we reconstruct the polynomial with the selected (k 
+ 1) points, and compare it with the true polynomial. 
4. Steps (1) ~ (3) are repeated until the true polynomial is reconstructed. 
However, the computations of the Gaussian elimination in step (2) take too much time to be 




+ , we do 
not have to apply the Gaussian elimination. We have found the following recursive formula, 
so the computation time can be considerably reduced. 
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 (13) 
This gives exactly the same solution as the Gaussian elimination. The proof can be found on 
the reference (Choi et al., 2008). 
3.4 Experimental results  
To evaluate the performance of the proposed polynomial reconstruction algorithm, we used 
DB1 and DB2 of FVC2002 (Maio et al., 2002). The fingerprint images were obtained in three 
distinct sessions with at least two week time separating for each session. During the first 
session, the fingerprint images were obtained by placing the fingerprints with a normal 
position. During the second session, the fingerprint images were obtained by requesting the 
individuals to provide their fingerprints with exaggerated displacement and rotation (not to 
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exceed 35 degrees). During the third session, fingers were alternatively dried and 
moistened. The characteristics of the databases are listed in Table 1. The databases were 
obtained from the optical sensors. The size of fingerprint image of DB2 is greater than that 
of DB1. The resolutions of the databases are about 500 dpi. Each database consists of 100 
fingers, and 8 impressions per finger. Each sample was matched against the remaining 
samples of the same finger to compute the Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR). Similarly, the 
first sample of each finger was matched against the first sample of the remaining fingers to 
compute the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). If the matching g against h is performed, the 
symmetric one (i.e., h against g) is not executed to avoid the correlation. For each database, 
the number of genuine tests was 2800, whereas the number of impostor tests was 4950. All 
experiments were performed on a system with a 3.2 GHz processor.  
 
 DB1 DB2 
Sensor Type Optical Optical 
Image Size 388 × 374(142 Kpixels) 296 × 560(162 Kpixels) 
Resolution 500 dpi 569 dpi 
Sensor “TouchView II” by Identix “FX2000” by Biometrika 
No. Fingers 100 100 
No. Impressions 8 8 
Table 1. Characteristics of FVC2002 Databases 
 
Database No. Minutiae (ne) Average Min Max 
DB1 30.5 5 60 
DB2 39.0 7 89 
Table 2. The number of minutiae for FVC2002 Databases 
 
Database No. Chaff Minutiae Test 
No. Matched Minutiae (nm) Matching Time 
(sec) Total Real Chaff 
DB1 
200 Genuine 19.7 18.8 0.9 0.76 Impostor 9.3 3.3 5.9 0.87 
300 Genuine 20.0 18.6 1.4 1.48 Impostor 10.9 2.9 8.0 1.73 
400 Genuine 20.4 18.4 2.0 2.45 Impostor 12.3 2.5 9.8 2.89 
DB2 
200 Genuine 24.3 23.4 0.9 1.26 Impostor 10.6 4.3 6.3 1.64 
300 Genuine 24.5 23.2 1.3 2.38 Impostor 12.4 3.9 8.5 3.17 
400 Genuine 24.9 23.1 1.8 3.87 Impostor 13.9 3.4 10.5 5.26 
Table 3. Average number of matched minutiae and matching time for FVC2002 databases 
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where nm > (k + 1). Clearly, if nm < (k + 1), then the polynomial cannot be reconstructed. 
Also, if nm = (k + 1), we can reconstruct the polynomial with the (k + 1) points. Suppose that 
we select (k + 2) real points from among nm points, we can reconstruct the true polynomial. 
However, if at least one chaff point exists in the (k + 2) selected points the true polynomial 
cannot be reconstructed. The procedure for the proposed polynomial reconstruction 
algorithm is as follows. 
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session, the fingerprint images were obtained by placing the fingerprints with a normal 
position. During the second session, the fingerprint images were obtained by requesting the 
individuals to provide their fingerprints with exaggerated displacement and rotation (not to 
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exceed 35 degrees). During the third session, fingers were alternatively dried and 
moistened. The characteristics of the databases are listed in Table 1. The databases were 
obtained from the optical sensors. The size of fingerprint image of DB2 is greater than that 
of DB1. The resolutions of the databases are about 500 dpi. Each database consists of 100 
fingers, and 8 impressions per finger. Each sample was matched against the remaining 
samples of the same finger to compute the Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR). Similarly, the 
first sample of each finger was matched against the first sample of the remaining fingers to 
compute the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). If the matching g against h is performed, the 
symmetric one (i.e., h against g) is not executed to avoid the correlation. For each database, 
the number of genuine tests was 2800, whereas the number of impostor tests was 4950. All 
experiments were performed on a system with a 3.2 GHz processor.  
 
 DB1 DB2 
Sensor Type Optical Optical 
Image Size 388 × 374(142 Kpixels) 296 × 560(162 Kpixels) 
Resolution 500 dpi 569 dpi 
Sensor “TouchView II” by Identix “FX2000” by Biometrika 
No. Fingers 100 100 
No. Impressions 8 8 
Table 1. Characteristics of FVC2002 Databases 
 
Database No. Minutiae (ne) Average Min Max 
DB1 30.5 5 60 
DB2 39.0 7 89 
Table 2. The number of minutiae for FVC2002 Databases 
 
Database No. Chaff Minutiae Test 
No. Matched Minutiae (nm) Matching Time 
(sec) Total Real Chaff 
DB1 
200 Genuine 19.7 18.8 0.9 0.76 Impostor 9.3 3.3 5.9 0.87 
300 Genuine 20.0 18.6 1.4 1.48 Impostor 10.9 2.9 8.0 1.73 
400 Genuine 20.4 18.4 2.0 2.45 Impostor 12.3 2.5 9.8 2.89 
DB2 
200 Genuine 24.3 23.4 0.9 1.26 Impostor 10.6 4.3 6.3 1.64 
300 Genuine 24.5 23.2 1.3 2.38 Impostor 12.4 3.9 8.5 3.17 
400 Genuine 24.9 23.1 1.8 3.87 Impostor 13.9 3.4 10.5 5.26 
Table 3. Average number of matched minutiae and matching time for FVC2002 databases 
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To examine the effect of the insertion of chaff minutiae on the performance of a fingerprint 
recognition system, we selected the number of chaff minutiae as 200, 300 and 400. For each 
database the numbers of minutiae (average, minimum and maximum) are listed in Table 2. 
Since the images of DB2 are obtained from bigger sensor, more minutiae are extracted from 
DB2 than from DB1. Also, the average numbers of the matched minutiae according to the 
number of inserted chaff minutiae are listed in Table 3. The more chaff minutiae are added, 
the more minutiae are matched. In addition, the number of chaff minutiae increases while 
the number of real minutiae decreases slightly. Hence, we can predict that both of GAR and 
FAR will decrease as more chaff minutiae are added. Also, we can find that the matching 






Brute-force Proposed Reed-Solomon 




93.1 7.4 7.1 92.2 4.8 6.3 92.0 2.6 5.3 
300 92.3 5.4 6.6 91.3 3.1 5.9 90.8 1.1 5.1 




90.7 4.1 6.7 89.6 2.2 6.3 89.4 1.3 6.0 
300 90.2 3.1 6.4 89.0 1.5 6.2 88.3 0.5 6.1 




88.1 2.2 7.0 87.0 1.2 7.1 86.7 0.7 7.0 
300 87.9 1.2 6.7 86.6 0.5 7.0 86.0 0.1 7.1 




85.0 0.8 7.9 84.0 0.4 8.2 83.5 0.3 8.4 
300 84.7 0.6 8.0 83.5 0.2 8.3 82.6 0.0 8.7 




82.0 0.2 9.1 80.4 0.1 9.9 79.4 0.1 10.4 
300 81.7 0.3 9.3 79.2 0.1 10.5 76.8 0.0 11.6 




78.9 0.1 10.6 76.9 0.0 11.6 75.8 0.0 12.1 
300 78.5 0.1 10.8 75.9 0.0 12.1 72.9 0.0 13.5 
400 77.6 0.1 11.2 74.6 0.0 12.7 71.2 0.0 14.4 
Table 4. Recognition accuracies of the FFV system of FVC2002-DB1 (unit: %) 
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed polynomial reconstruction algorithm, we 
compare it with both the brute-force search and the Reed-Solomon code. The error rates of 
the FFV system for DB1 and DB2 are listed in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. During the 
enrollment, if the number of the fingerprint minutiae is less than or equal to the degree of 
the polynomial, the fingerprint is rejected to be enrolled. Failure To Enrollment Rate (FTER) 
is the ratio of the rejected fingerprints to the total fingerprints. The FTER of DB1 is much 
higher than that of DB2 since fewer minutiae are extracted from DB1. To compare the 
recognition accuracies of the three polynomial reconstruction algorithms, Genuine 
Acceptance Rate (GAR) and False Rejection Rate (FAR) are used. In addition, Half Total 
Error Rate (HTER) is adopted for the purpose of direct comparison (Poh & Bengio, 2006), 
which is the average of False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate (FAR). The 
values of GAR, FAR and HTER are obtained by excluding the fingerprints rejected at the 
enrollment phase. As predicted above, the more chaff minutiae is inserted, the lower both 
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GAR and FAR become. Since the proposed algorithm needs one more real minutia than the 
brute-force search, the recognition accuracy of the proposed algorithm using the k-degree 
polynomial should be exactly the same as that of the brute-force search using the (k + 1)-
degree polynomial. In practice, however, the polynomial could not always be reconstructed 
even if the real minutiae are matched more than the degree of polynomial because the 
polynomial reconstruction process will be stopped after a pre-determined number of 
iterations to prevent from going into an infinite loop. Furthermore, another reason is the 
difference in FTER due to the different degree of polynomial. The overall recognition rates 
of the three algorithms are comparable. The averages of HTER of the brute-force search, the 
proposed algorithm and the Reed-Solomon code for DB1 are 8.1%, 8.5% and 8.8%, 
respectively, and 6.1%, 5.8% and 5.4% for DB2. The Reed-Solomon code is better for low 
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96.9 15.4 9.3 96.1 9.3 6.6 95.2 2.5 3.7 
300 96.3 11.3 7.5 95.3 7.0 5.8 94.2 1.1 3.5 




95.8 9.5 6.9 94.9 5.7 5.4 94.2 1.8 3.8 
300 95.1 6.8 5.9 94.3 4.2 4.9 93.3 0.6 3.7 




94.3 5.2 5.4 93.2 3.0 4.9 92.3 1.1 4.4 
300 94.2 4.3 5.1 93.2 2.5 4.7 91.7 0.4 4.3 




92.9 3.1 5.1 91.5 1.6 5.0 91.0 0.7 4.9 
300 92.3 2.5 5.1 90.6 1.5 5.4 89.2 0.3 5.6 




90.4 1.8 5.7 89.1 1.0 5.9 88.5 0.5 6.0 
300 89.9 1.1 5.6 88.5 0.6 6.1 86.8 0.1 6.7 




88.4 1.0 6.3 86.9 0.6 6.8 86.3 0.2 7.0 
300 88.0 0.7 6.4 86.1 0.5 7.2 84.6 0.1 7.8 
400 87.3 0.7 6.7 84.8 0.3 7.8 82.2 0.0 8.9 
Table 5. Recognition accuracies of the FFV system of FVC2002-DB2 (unit: %) 
Fig. 4 shows the execution times (average, min, max) and the average number of the 
Lagrange interpolations for the brute-force search, the proposed algorithm and the Reed-
Solomon code for FVC2002-DB1, respectively. Fig. 5 is the results of FVC2002-DB2. 
Although the Lagrange interpolation is an efficient technique to interpolate a polynomial, it 
requires more time. In the case of genuine tests, the average time of success is fast enough to 
be performed in real time. At the worst case, however, the brute-force search spends too 
much time because a huge number of the Lagrange interpolations are needed to reconstruct 
the true polynomial. On the other hand, the proposed algorithm and the Reed-Solomon 
code spend very little time even at the worst case. In our experiments, the Lagrange 
interpolation time for a 9-degree polynomial is 0.6 milliseconds, but in a certain case, it takes 
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GAR and FAR become. Since the proposed algorithm needs one more real minutia than the 
brute-force search, the recognition accuracy of the proposed algorithm using the k-degree 
polynomial should be exactly the same as that of the brute-force search using the (k + 1)-
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even if the real minutiae are matched more than the degree of polynomial because the 
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Fig. 4 shows the execution times (average, min, max) and the average number of the 
Lagrange interpolations for the brute-force search, the proposed algorithm and the Reed-
Solomon code for FVC2002-DB1, respectively. Fig. 5 is the results of FVC2002-DB2. 
Although the Lagrange interpolation is an efficient technique to interpolate a polynomial, it 
requires more time. In the case of genuine tests, the average time of success is fast enough to 
be performed in real time. At the worst case, however, the brute-force search spends too 
much time because a huge number of the Lagrange interpolations are needed to reconstruct 
the true polynomial. On the other hand, the proposed algorithm and the Reed-Solomon 
code spend very little time even at the worst case. In our experiments, the Lagrange 
interpolation time for a 9-degree polynomial is 0.6 milliseconds, but in a certain case, it takes 
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4. Attack methods for fuzzy fingerprint vault 
The attack of FFV is selecting real points more than the degree of polynomial. The efficient 
attack methods are to constitute a minutia set that contains many real points and a little 
chaff points. If the set contains real points more than the degree of polynomial, the 
polynomial can be reconstructed by the brute-force search. In addition, if the set contains 
more chaff points, more time is needed to reconstruct the polynomial. The correlation attack 
(Kholmatov & Yanikoglu, 2008) is known to be an efficient method that constitutes the 
minutia set using multiple vaults enrolled for different applications. On the other hand, 
when multiple vaults cannot be obtained and no information about the minutiae is 
available, the attacker should select the real minutiae from among the entire points 
including many chaff points. 
4.1 Brute-force attack 
The brute-force attack (Paar et al., 2010) is a method used to extract the real minutiae from 
the vault when no information is available. It tries to reconstruct the polynomial by using all 
the possible combinations until the correct polynomial is found. Given the (k + 1) points, a k-
degree polynomial is uniquely determined, which is computed by the Lagrange 
interpolation. Lagrange interpolating polynomial p(x) of degree k that passes through (k + 1) 








p x p x
+
=



















−∏  (15) 
This is written explicitly by 
 
2 3 1 1 3 1
1 2




( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )





n n k k
x x x x x x x x x x x xp x y y
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x y





− − − − − −
= + +





Recall that there are nr points in the vault, and among these points, ne points are real, and we 
want to reconstruct a k-degree polynomial. Then, the total number of trials which select (k + 
1) points from nr points is C(nr, k + 1), and C(ne, k + 1) combinations can reconstruct the true 
polynomial. If we can randomly select (k + 1) points and exclude the combination from the 
next selection, we need to try 0.5 × C(nr, k + 1) / C(ne, k + 1) times on the average. However, 
it requires too much memory to check whether the selected combination is used or not. For 
example, if nr = 230, ne = 7, and char (1 byte) type is used, then C(230, 8) ≈ 172 Terabytes, 
which is impossible to be allocated in RAM. Therefore, this attack can be seen as a Bernoulli 
trial with probability, 
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Hence, let NL be the number of executions of the Lagrange interpolation until the correct 
polynomial is reconstructed, then, NL has the geometric distribution with mean, 











In general, since nr is much greater than ne, this attack is time-consuming. For example, if nr 
= 230, ne = 30, and k = 9, then the average number of trials of the Lagrange interpolation is 
C(230, 10) / C(30, 10) ≈ 3 × 109. Even though the calculation of the Lagrange interpolation 
takes 1 millisecond, the attack will take about 36 days on the average. 
4.2 Correlation attack 
Scheirer et al. suggested the methods of attacks against fuzzy vault including the attack via 
record multiplicity, which is known as the correlation attack (Scheirer & Boult, 2007). Suppose 
that the attacker can obtain two vaults generated from the same fingerprint (different chaff 
minutiae and different polynomials), the real minutiae can be revealed by correlating two 
vaults. If the matching minutiae contain the real minutiae more than the degree of the 
polynomial, the true polynomial can be successfully reconstructed by the brute-force attack, 
and hence, all of the real minutiae will be revealed. In addition, even if the number of the 
real minutiae is larger than the degree of the polynomial, it would be computationally 
infeasible to reconstruct the polynomial when there are too many chaff minutiae in the 
matching minutiae with respect to the real minutiae.  
 
 
 a)  b) 
Fig. 6. Example of correlation attack. (a) shows the alignment of two vaults from the same 
fingerprint, and (b) from different fingerprints. (Kholmatov & Yanikoglu, 2008) 
Kholmatov et al. have realized the correlation attack against a database of 400 fuzzy vaults 
(200 matching pairs) of their own making (Kholmatov & Yanikoglu, 2008). Fig. 6 shows an 
example of their experimental results. If two vaults which are generated from the same 
fingerprint are correlated, many real minutiae are obtained, while two vaults from different 
fingerprints do not have enough real minutiae in their common area to reconstruct the true 
polynomial. They reported that 59% of them were successfully unlocked with two matching 
vaults. 
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4.3 Fast polynomial reconstruction attack 
The exhaustive search can be performed much faster than the brute-force search by using 
the method of the polynomial reconstruction described in Section 3.3. If a vault contains two 
more real points than the degree of the polynomial (i.e., ne ≥ k + 2), the true polynomial can 
be successfully reconstructed. The polynomial reconstruction time depends on the number 
of the real points and the number of the chaff points. The more chaff points and the less real 
points it contains, the more time it takes to reconstruct the polynomial. The process for the 
Fast Polynomial Reconstruction (FPR) attack algorithm is as follows. 
First, k points are selected from nr points with real and chaff points mixed. Second, the 
augmented matrix is obtained, and is reduced into the following row-echelon form. 
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+ , we reconstruct the polynomial 
with the k points selected and one of the two points which have the same v(k+1) value, and 
then, compare it with the true polynomial. 
As in the brute-force attack, we can estimate the number of the Lagrange interpolations to 
be performed. First, the (k + 1) points are chosen, and if at least one of the remaining (nr – k – 
1) points lies on the line through the (k + 1) points, the Lagrange interpolation is performed 
regardless of whether all these points are real points or not. Let us assume that the order of 
the Galois field is 2n, then the probability that at least one of the (nr – k – 1) points lies on that 
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Since the average number of trials until the (k + 1) real points are drawn is C(nr, k + 1) / C(ne, 
k + 1), the average number of the Lagrange interpolations to be performed until the real 
polynomial is reconstructed is as follows. 
 
1( , 1) 1( ) 1 1





C n kE N
C n k
− −⎧ ⎫+ ⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞= × − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (21) 
Since 2n is a very large number, equation (20) is very small. Hence, the Lagrange 
interpolation needs to be performed in a limited number of times. In addition, let NG be the 
number of executions of the Gaussian elimination of equation (19), then, the expected value 
of NG is as follows. 
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It is smaller than the expected number of the Lagrange interpolation of the brute-force 
attack in equation (18). Also, the execution time per combination of the FPR attack is much 
faster than that of the brute-force attack. Therefore, this attack is more efficient than the 
brute-force attack. Experimental results show the efficiency of this attack method. For 
example, if n = 20, k = 9, nr = 230, and ne = 30, the average numbers of executions of 
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It is considerable reduction compared to the brute-force attack. The number of the Lagrange 
interpolation is reduced by the order of 104. 
4.4 Experimental results 
To compare the three attack algorithms mentioned in the previous section (the brute-force 
attack, the correlation attack, and the FPR attack), we used DB1 of FVC2002 (Maio et al., 
2002), which consists of 8 impressions for each of the 100 distinct fingers. From among 8 
impressions, the first impressions of each fingerprint were used for the brute-force attack 
and the FPR attack. For the correlation attack, on the other hand, the first and the second 
impressions were used to get the correlated minutiae when the correlation reached its peak. 
Once the matched minutiae are obtained, the polynomial reconstruction is performed by the 
brute-force search. We chose the number of chaff minutiae as 200, and the degree of the 
polynomial as 7. The tests are performed to find out whether the attack algorithms can 
reconstruct the true polynomial or not within 24 hours.  
The results of the three attack algorithms are summarized in Table 6. The success rate is 
defined by the ratio of the number of successes to the total trials. The Correlation attack is 
known to be very efficient attack method for FFV. However, the brute-force attack and the 
FPR attack turn out to be much more efficient methods. Especially, the FPR attack cracked 
100% of the vaults, and the attack time is only half of that of the brute-force attack. 
 
Attack Method Brute-force Correlation FPR 
Success Rate (%) 95 17 100 
No. Lagrange (NL) 3.9 × 107 4.4 × 107 2.0 × 105 
E(NL) 6.6 × 107 2.4 × 108 9.6 × 104 
No. Gaussian Elimination (NG) - - 9.2 × 106 
E(NG) - - 2.1 × 107 
Time (sec) 4,562 5,089 2,424 
Table 6. The summary of the three attack algorithms (brute-force attack, correlation attack, 
and the FPR attack) 
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For the experiments of the correlation attack, after correlating two vaults, 23 tests extract 
more than 8 real minutiae, and perform polynomial reconstruction. The average correlation 
time is 42 seconds. Among 23 tests, 6 tests cannot reconstruct the true polynomial within 24 
hours, so 17% of the vaults are cracked by the correlation attack. On the other hand, 100% of 
the vaults are cracked by the FPR attack within 24 hours, and the average time is 2,424 
seconds, while the average time for the brute-force attack is 4,562 seconds. Since the fixed 
numbers of chaff minutiae are inserted, the smaller the number of real minutiae is, the more 
time the polynomial reconstruction requires. For the brute-force attack and the correlation 
attack, the attack time is proportional to the actual number of the Lagrange interpolations. 
Also, the time for FPR attack depends mainly on the number of the Gaussian eliminations 
which is computed by equation (13). 
Fig. 7 shows the histogram of the actual number of Lagrange interpolation and its expected 
value for the case of successful attack. Although the two histograms have some fluctuations, 
they have similar distributions. Therefore, we can predict the attack time based on the 
expected number of the Lagrange interpolations when the number of chaff points is more 
than 200 or the degree of polynomial is greater than 7. In our experiments, the Lagrange 
interpolation times for the polynomial degree of 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are 0.14, 0.28, 0.71, 1.6, 
3.9 and 9.8 milliseconds, respectively. Also, the Gaussian elimination times for 200 and 400 
chaff points are 0.26 and 0.52 milliseconds, respectively. The expected numbers of the 
Lagrange interpolations and the Gaussian eliminations can be calculated from the equations 
(18), (21) and (22). Table 7 shows the predicted time for the brute-force attack and the FPR 
attack. The security of FFV can be strengthened by adding more chaff points and by 
increasing the degree of polynomial. From the experimental result in the previous section, 
however, the more chaff points are added and the higher degree of polynomial is used, the 
recognition accuracy degrades significantly. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Histograms of the actual number of the Lagrange interpolation and its expected 
value 
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No. Chaff Polynomial Degree Brute-force FPR 
200 
8 10 hours 1 hour 
9 9 days 9 hours 
10 213 days 4 days 
11 14 years 35 days 
12 369 years 1 year 
400 
7 3 days 18 hours 
8 113 days 13 days 
9 14 years 214 days 
10 595 years 11 years 
11 26,964 years 200 years 
12 1,365,157 years 4,172 years 
Table 7. Predicted time for the brute-force attack and the FPR attack 
5. Conclusion 
Biometrics is an efficient and convenient method for authenticating persons’ identities. 
However, once the biometric template is compromised, the user’s identity is permanently 
stolen. Hence, many scientists have studied to protect the biometric templates against attack. 
Fuzzy vault gave a promising solution to user privacy and fingerprint template security 
problems. Inspired from fuzzy vault, fuzzy fingerprint vault was proposed to securely store 
fingerprint minutiae in a database. However, there are two problems for the fuzzy 
fingerprint vault to be used in real world. First, by using brute-force search, the polynomial 
cannot be reconstructed in real time. Second, fuzzy vault is vulnerable to correlation attack.  
In this work, we provided solutions to these problems. First, we proposed a fast polynomial 
reconstruction algorithm, which speed up the exhaustive search by using the Consistency 
Theorem. To reduce the execution time, it determines the candidate sets with chaff points by 
using Gaussian elimination and excludes them from the reconstruction trial. Since Gaussian 
elimination is a time-consuming process, we have found a recursive formula to perform 
Gaussian elimination effectively. We confirmed that the proposed algorithm can be 
performed in real time even at the worst case. 
Second, fuzzy vault was found out to be cracked quickly by the correlation attack in 2008. 
The correlation attack acquires a minutiae set with many real minutiae by correlating two 
vaults. However, if the minutia set contains a little more chaff minutiae, the attack can 
hardly crack the vault. In our experiments, brute-force attack was rather more efficient. In 
addition, the fast polynomial reconstruction algorithm is used to crack the vault. The FPR 
attack algorithm records 100% attack rate. Therefore, fuzzy fingerprint vault cannot store 
fingerprint minutiae securely anymore. Furthermore, if we add more chaff points and use 
higher degree of polynomial to strengthen the security, in return, the recognition accuracy 
degrades significantly. Therefore, a solution for enhancing security of FFV is required. One 
possible solution is one-time template (Ueshige & Sakurai, 2006) whose notion is from one-
time password. If we can define a one-time template for fingerprint and the corresponding 
transform, the security of fingerprint authentication system can be enhanced innovatively. 
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No. Chaff Polynomial Degree Brute-force FPR 
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400 
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10 595 years 11 years 
11 26,964 years 200 years 
12 1,365,157 years 4,172 years 
Table 7. Predicted time for the brute-force attack and the FPR attack 
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1. Introduction  
There is an established belief that biometrics, specifically fingerprinting, was invented in 
1900 by Sir Francis Galton. But in fact, the Chinese played a large role in biometrics' history. 
About 400 years B.C. the Chinese emperor was using his fingerprint as an official signature 
on the imperial documents (Onin.com). There were no cases on record identifying 
somebody attempting to falsify this unique signature or attempted to construct a decoy. It 
may well be that respectful handling of the emperor’s signature is not an indication of 
strength of biometric technology rather a proof that copying and cheating were not 
acceptable in the culture of early Chinese civilization. 
The major development of fingerprint technology in the form of wet-ink fingerprinting was 
initiated and improved for forensic applications by Scotland Yard about 100 years ago. 
However, the development of new fingerprinting methods has happened in recent years 
and continues to evolve. Fingerprint recognition technology is an integral part of criminal 
investigations. It is the basis for the design of numerous security systems in both private and 
public sector. It is also seen as an important tool for a variety of government organizations 
including Homeland Security, Immigration, Naturalization Services, and the Armed Forces, 
where fingerprinting procedures are used for recognition and verification of the identity for 
employees of federal departments and private contractors. In addition, the growth of the 
internet has made it necessary to verify the identity of individuals online. The simplest form 
of individual verification is the use of a password; however, this does not provide high 
levels of security. In the U.S., where the internet is widely used, an average citizen holds 
eleven passwords. Individuals tend to choose passwords that are easy to remember which 
makes them more vulnerable to online attacks.  This is exacerbated by the fact that 
cybercrime is increasing. It is the recognition of this inherent security flaw which amplifies 
the need to use biometrics in securing network communications. 
After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the need for improved and reliable fingerprint 
recognition technology drastically increased. We witnessed the replacement of wet ink 
fingerprinting by digitized contact-based methods. (S. Mil’shtein and U. Doshi, 2004) did a 
study which emulated the fingerprinting procedure used with computer optical scanners, it 
was found that on average the distance between ridges decreases about 20% when a finger 
is positioned on an imaging surface. Using calibrated silicon pressure sensors, the 
distribution of pressure across a finger was scanned pixel by pixel, and a map of average 
pressure distribution on a finger during fingerprint acquisition was created. This 
demonstrated that it is impossible to replicate the same distribution of pressure across a 
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pressure distribution on a finger during fingerprint acquisition was created. This 
demonstrated that it is impossible to replicate the same distribution of pressure across a 
  
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
106 
finger during repeated fingerprinting procedures. Unfortunately, most fingerprints stored in 
current databases were acquired by contact-based methods using computer scanners and 
carry at least 20% distortion even if the finger is not pressed forcefully against the scanner. If 
a large force is applied, as in cases with non-cooperative individuals, the distortion is worse. 
In order to avoid pressure induced distortion we developed a line of unique contactless 
fingerprint scanners where rolled fingerprint equivalent images are recorded in less than 
one second. In (Yang and Park, 2008 as well as Nanni and Lumini, 2009), non-minutiae 
based methods have been proposed to overcome invariance. 
Although fingerprinting is the most widely used biometric technique the common belief of 
law enforcement officials is that multi-modal biometrics is the future of this technology, i.e. 
the combination of fingerprinting with other types of biometric data such as face recognition 
or retina identification as mentioned by (Ross and Jain, 2004). This belief can explain the 
dynamics of the market’s development, as illustrated in Figure 1. The global biometrics 
market experienced a growth from $1.95 billion in 2006 to around $2.7 billion at the start 
of 2008 (Techbiometric.com). Due to an annual growth rate of 21.3%, biometrics 




Fig. 1. Global Biometric Market Projections by Technology 2005-2012 ($ Millions) 
Biometrics is starting to become a reality not only in the field of forensics, but in banking, 
internet services, medical services, food distribution, welfare, etc. The most integrated 
statewide approach to biometrics exists in Israel, where fingerprinting is mandatory and 
experimental passports with holographically imprinted fingerprints are expected to be 
issued in 2012. 
Despite the known deficiencies and drawbacks of contact-based fingerprinting, this method 
is deployed in a variety of small mobile devices due to a relatively low cost of production. 
At the conference of Biometric Consortium held in Tampa, Florida on September 2010, 
about 17 companies demonstrated various forms of state-of-the-art contact-based hardware. 
Although contactless methods are known for producing distortion free fingerprints, this is a 
rather new technological development, and very few universities and companies are 
involved in their development.  Figure 2 presents the major players involved in contactless 
fingerprinting. 
 




Fig. 2. Contactless Fingerprinting Systems (Valencia, 2009) 
Among these leaders of contactless fingerprinting only the Advanced Electronic Technology 
Center of UMass (AETC) has designed and tested systems where 180o contactless 
fingerprinting is combined with Infra-Red (IR) testing of blood vessels. Currently, the IR 
mapping of blood vessels is used to check whether a finger is alive and not a decoy; 
however, blood vessels can potentially be an additional biometric identifier. At the 
Advanced Electronic Technology Center, we designed and tested a novel, mobile, and 
contactless fingerprinting system based on line-scan technology. The system is capable of 
imaging the human palm, four fingers together, and nail-to-nail rolled-fingerprint 
equivalents, in a contactless fashion.  
In the following sections, we discuss contactless fingerprinting technology, its benefits, its 
capabilities, and some of its applications in law enforcement, financial transactions, and 
network security. 
2. Mobile contactless fingerprinting 
In this section we describe alternative designs based on aerial and line scan cameras, 
compare different imaging and optical systems and the trade-offs involved with various 
design choices. There are two main imaging technologies used within current optical-based 
fingerprinting units.  The first, and most widely used due to its simplicity, uses a two-
dimensional array of imaging elements, much like the standard CCD found in most 
consumer cameras. A typical imaging setup involves a positioning system used to hold the 
finger steady, and a lens system used to form an image of the finger on the surface of the 
sensor. This technique allows for full fingerprint images to be taken in a single exposure 
using inexpensive camera systems. Images can be taken quickly and successively, but the 
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design choices. There are two main imaging technologies used within current optical-based 
fingerprinting units.  The first, and most widely used due to its simplicity, uses a two-
dimensional array of imaging elements, much like the standard CCD found in most 
consumer cameras. A typical imaging setup involves a positioning system used to hold the 
finger steady, and a lens system used to form an image of the finger on the surface of the 
sensor. This technique allows for full fingerprint images to be taken in a single exposure 
using inexpensive camera systems. Images can be taken quickly and successively, but the 
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sides of the fingerprint image will carry an unavoidable distortion due to the finger’s edges 
being round. 
Edges of the finger are not perpendicular to the image sensor, which causes their projection 
onto the flat surface of the sensing element to be a distorted representation of the actual 
finger. Figure 3 displays an image of a standardized test finger made of aluminium, taken 
with a traditional CCD. This test finger was made by US-National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. The dense grid pattern in the center of the image consists of circular dots 
regularly spaced 0.4mm apart. It can be seen that the pattern appears to be compressed 
towards the top and bottom edges of the image due the fact these edges on the test finger 
are “falling away” from the sensor as shown in the red boxes. Depending on the systems 
optics, this compression can be accompanied by image blur in these areas due to depth of 
field limitations within the specific lens system. These limitations tend to increase as the 
distance between the lens and the finger decreases, making it difficult to achieve desired 
image resolutions as fingerprinting machinery decreases in size. If higher quality images are 
desired, an alternative method of optical imaging must be used.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Image of a test finger taken with a traditional CCD. Distortion in the form of 
compression and image blur in the top and bottom portions of the image can be seen 
It is possible to record a high quality, two-dimensional image of a finger using an image 
sensor, as opposed to the standard two-dimensional pixel array, is one pixel wide by 512, 
1024, 2048, or even 4096 pixels long. Such a sensor, known as a line-scan sensor, can capture 
an individual line of an image per exposure. By scanning an object across the sensing 
element, a two-dimensional picture can be built up from the individual image slices. When 
extended to fingerprinting, this technique can overcome the distortion issues encountered 
when using two-dimensional CCDs. 
A two-dimensional image of a finger is built by orienting a line-scan sensor lengthwise to 
the finger and then rotating it around the main axis of the finger completing an 180o arc. The 
image captured represents an uncoiled view of the finger equivalent to a “rolled-ink” print. 
The line-scanner views each portion of the finger perpendicularly, removing the projection 
errors inherent in conventional two-dimensional scanning techniques. If this semicircular 
path is concentric with the finger, the path maintains a constant object-to-lens distance 
throughout the scan, eliminating any possible depth of field issues. Figure 4 displays an 
image of the same test finger shown in Figure 3 taken using the line-scanning technique.  It 
can be seen that the irregularities present in Figure 3 are nonexistent, and the regular 
spacing of the grid pattern have been preserved. 
 




Fig. 4. Image of standardized test finger taken with the rotational line scanning approach 
In such a setup, high quality fingerprint images at greater than 1000 ppi resolution have 
been obtained by various prototype units. This high precision enables the detection of 
fingerprint ridges as well as pores, facilitating the extraction of additional biometric data, 
such as the locations of the pores on a fingers surface.  
2.1 Optical design 
The raw image quality of any optical fingerprinting system is directly related to the system’s 
optical design and configuration. Due to optical limitations which are deeply rooted in 
optical physics, designers of these systems are faced with design trade-offs which greatly 
affect the images produced by the system. For instance, a machine designed for imaging 
close objects will suffer from a smaller depth of field than the same machine if it were 
designed for imaging objects that are farther away. When viewed from a fingerprinting 
perspective, these optical limitations translate to practical considerations for a user or 
perspective buyer of fingerprinting hardware. For instance, the machine designed for up-
close imaging will have less tolerance in the positions that a fingerprintee is allowed to place 
their finger, as deviations from this allowed position will result in a higher degree of image 
degradation than the more zoomed out model. The trade-off is that for the increased 
resolution associated with the up-close unit, the price of an increased number of re-prints, 
longer fingerprinting times, and higher operator training costs will most likely be paid. 
2.2 Light control systems  
In addition to a fingerprint reader’s optical subsystem, the reader’s final image quality is 
also dependent on the unit’s lighting control system. Lighting control systems can be either 
Active or Passive, the distinctions, benefits, and drawbacks of each technique will be 
discussed in this section. 
Passive lighting control is the simplest form a lighting control system can take. A passive 
system has the ability to only turn the lights on to a preset intensity value at the start of a scan, 
and turn the lights off at the completion of a scan. This type of system can be created with 
relatively cheap, easily accessible parts, and with minimal development time. This translates 
to a cheaper cost of fingerprinting units that employ this technology. However, because there 
is no feedback on whether the lighting intensity is at an optimal value, the resulting image can 
become over or under exposed in some operating conditions. This is because differences in 
skin tone, cleanliness, and moisture affect the amount of light that it will reflect back to the 
image sensor, having a direct effect on the exposure of the resulting image.  
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sides of the fingerprint image will carry an unavoidable distortion due to the finger’s edges 
being round. 
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image resolutions as fingerprinting machinery decreases in size. If higher quality images are 
desired, an alternative method of optical imaging must be used.  
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If over exposed, the image sensor becomes saturated, and all usable data from over exposed 
region is lost. In the case of under exposure, image enhancement techniques applied in post 
processing of the image can  usually extract fingerprint ridge information, but in severe 
cases data can be lost.   If optimal exposures are required across all fingerprintees and all 
operating conditions an active lighting control system should be used.  
Active lighting control is a control system that utilizes feedback in real-time to adjust the 
light’s output intensity.  Active systems must use actual images from the camera to 
determine the correct lighting values for each use. This feedback requires the use of image 
processing, and relatively sophisticated control electronics. For this reason, active control 
systems can be more costly than passive control systems.  
Active control systems can control one or many lighting zones over an image. Systems that 
have more than one lighting zone have the added benefit of being able to correctly control 
the exposure over different parts or “zones” of a finger, where systems with only one zone 
can only adjust the lighting intensity of the image as a whole.  Multi-zoned lighting systems 
can be useful when fingers that are dirty over specific regions are trying to be imaged. For 
instance, a finger with grease only on its tip will have a high reflectivity on the dirty area, 
and a relatively low reflectivity on the areas not covered in grease.  In a single lighting zone 
imaging system, the high dynamic range of the reflected lighting values can create exposure 
problems in the resulting image. In a multi-zoned lighting system, the lights illuminating 
the greasy portion of the finger can simply be turned down.  
2.3 An example of a mobile contactless fingerprint system  
The Advanced Electronic Technology Center designed and fabricated a line of contactless 
fingerprinting systems. The design of these machines is based on the general principles 
described above.  Figure 5 depicts a front view of one of these fingerprinting systems. The 
finger is positioned in the center of the optical system illuminated by blue LEDs, and then a 
line by line image is taken by a system of three mirrors, where one of the mirrors rotates 
clockwise around the finger. The nail-to-nail fingerprint image is a collection of multiple one 
pixel thick line-scan images and is acquired in less than one second. In anti-clockwise the 
map of blood vessels is taken by using IR LEDs.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Front view of the contactless line scans fingerprinting system 
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The machine is provided with a touch screen interface, which is used to interact with an 
operator. The operator has the options to perform a contactless scan alone or with blood 
vessel imaging. Once the image acquisition is complete, it is transmitted over WLAN to a 
remote server which performs image processing and stores it. From this server the image 
may be send to law enforcement agencies for further processing. 
 
 
Fig. 6. a) presents an image of a fingerprint recorded in contact less fashion. b) presents an 
image of blood vessels taken by the contactless machine 
Figure 6 has two sub-images, Figure 6a and Figure 6b. Figure 6a presents a fingerprint 
taken by line-scan camera where the mirror goes clockwise around the finger. The scan 
takes ¾ of a second. Figure 6b presents a map of blood vessels in the finger. The finger is 
seen in transmitted IR light where the anti-clockwise rotation of the mirror takes ¾ of a 
second.  
3. Fingerprint processing algorithms   
Different modes of fingerprint acquisition pose challenges in the form of format, size of 
images, non-linear distortions of fingerprint ridges, differences in orientation, and variation 
of gray scale values. 
These challenges are mitigated by developing algorithms which pre-process raw images 
taken directly from acquisition devices, and facilitate reliable recognition of fingerprints.  
We have developed a new binarization method that is used to eliminate variations in gray 
scale levels of each image, leaving the resulting images looking like a traditional wet-ink 
rolled fingerprint. In this study we tested 720 fingerprints generated by wet-ink, flat digital 
scanners, taken from FVC 2004 and by the novel contactless fingerprinting scanner 
described in (J. Palma et. all, 2006) and (S. Mil’shtein et. all, 2008). In following sections, we 
describe the binarization steps, and the fingerprint alignment process. 
3.1 Binarization procedure 
Most fingerprint recognition algorithms rely on the clarity and details of ridges. Hence, it is 
necessary to clearly differentiate the fingerprint ridges and valleys using only two distinct 
values; this process is called binarization. Regardless of the quality of any image recognition 
algorithm, a poorly binarized image can compromise its recognition statistics. 
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taken by line-scan camera where the mirror goes clockwise around the finger. The scan 
takes ¾ of a second. Figure 6b presents a map of blood vessels in the finger. The finger is 
seen in transmitted IR light where the anti-clockwise rotation of the mirror takes ¾ of a 
second.  
3. Fingerprint processing algorithms   
Different modes of fingerprint acquisition pose challenges in the form of format, size of 
images, non-linear distortions of fingerprint ridges, differences in orientation, and variation 
of gray scale values. 
These challenges are mitigated by developing algorithms which pre-process raw images 
taken directly from acquisition devices, and facilitate reliable recognition of fingerprints.  
We have developed a new binarization method that is used to eliminate variations in gray 
scale levels of each image, leaving the resulting images looking like a traditional wet-ink 
rolled fingerprint. In this study we tested 720 fingerprints generated by wet-ink, flat digital 
scanners, taken from FVC 2004 and by the novel contactless fingerprinting scanner 
described in (J. Palma et. all, 2006) and (S. Mil’shtein et. all, 2008). In following sections, we 
describe the binarization steps, and the fingerprint alignment process. 
3.1 Binarization procedure 
Most fingerprint recognition algorithms rely on the clarity and details of ridges. Hence, it is 
necessary to clearly differentiate the fingerprint ridges and valleys using only two distinct 
values; this process is called binarization. Regardless of the quality of any image recognition 
algorithm, a poorly binarized image can compromise its recognition statistics. 
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A good binarization algorithm would produce an image which would have very clear and 
uniform black ridges on a white background even if the image is overexposed to a certain 
degree. We used the following binarization techniques: 
1. Region-Based thresholding as described below. 
2. Filter-Based technique mentioned by (Meenen and Adhami, 2005). 
The region based thresholding starts with division of the image into an N-by-N grid of 
smaller blocks. Identification of ridge regions within these smaller blocks is performed.  This 
is implemented by taking the gradients in the x and y direction and then finding the co-
variance data for the image gradients.   Once this step is completed, the orientation of ridges 
is computed by finding the angle with respect to the coordinate axis. Then, estimation of 
ridge frequencies in these blocks is performed. This is done to find out which blocks have a 
higher and a lower density of ridges. The image block is then rotated to make the ridges 
vertical. and is cropped to remove invalid regions. A projection of the grayscale values, 
down the ridges, is obtained by summing along the columns. Peaks in projected grey values 
are found by performing dilation and finding where the dilation equals the original values. 
The spatial frequency of the ridges is determined by dividing the distance between the 1st 
and last peaks by the number of peaks. If no peaks are detected, or the frequency of ridge 
occurrence is outside the allowed bounds, the frequency is set to 0. The information about 
ridge regions, orientation and frequencies returns a mask of a fixed size which defines the 
actual area where the fingerprint exists. The ridges are then enhanced with the help of a 
median filter. The image obtained after this process is thresholded to obtain the binary 
fingerprint. The threshold for binarization depends on the resolution for the image. This 
process can also be called Adaptive Binarization.  
This method works very well with the images that are obtained from the contactless 
fingerprinting system described in section 2.3. This binarization technique is not affected by 
varying brightness levels throughout the image, and results in a binary image that has 
consistent information throughout. The drawback of this process is that a relatively large 
number of calculations are needed, which adds to the time needed for the overall 
recognition algorithm to complete. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Grayscale image of a selected fingerprint (Left) and the corresponding binarized 
image (Right) 
 




Fig. 8. Strength of binarization even if the image is seemingly overexposed 
3.2 Fingerprint alignment 
Fingerprint alignment is an important stage that is performed before fingerprint recognition. 
One must be sure that the regions being compared are the same. Fingerprint alignment 
using eight special types of ridges extracted from thinned fingerprint image is reported by 
(Hu et. all, 2008). Other alignment techniques based on phase correlation of minutiae points 
as described by (Chen and Gao, 2007), using line segments as pivots based on minutiae as 
mentioned by (Carvalho and Yehia, 2004) and using similarity histogram detailed by (Zhang 
et. all, 2004), have also been reported, creates a need for for a new novel alignment 
technique not based on minutiae.  In this study, an alignment technique based on the 
Fourier Mellin Transform will be described. 
The Fourier-Mellin Transform is a useful mathematical tool in image processing because its 
resulting spectrum is invariant in rotation, translation and scale. The Fourier Transform 
itself (FT) is translation invariant. By converting the resulting FT to log-polar coordinates, 
we can convert the scale and rotation differences to vertical and horizontal offsets that can 
be quantified. A second transform, called the Mellin Transform (MT), gives a transform-
space image that is invariant to translation, rotation and scale. An application of the Fourier-
Mellin Transform for image registration can be found in (Guo et. all, 2005). 
The Mellin transform can be expressed as: 
 M u v f x y( , ) ( , )
∞ ∞
∞ ∞
= ∫ ∫ x-ju-1y-jv- 1dxdy; x, y>0   (1) 
Convert to polar coordinates using: 
 2 2r x y= +   (2) 
We now have: 
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Making  r = eỳ   and  dr = eỳ d ỳ  we have : 
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One must be sure that the regions being compared are the same. Fingerprint alignment 
using eight special types of ridges extracted from thinned fingerprint image is reported by 
(Hu et. all, 2008). Other alignment techniques based on phase correlation of minutiae points 
as described by (Chen and Gao, 2007), using line segments as pivots based on minutiae as 
mentioned by (Carvalho and Yehia, 2004) and using similarity histogram detailed by (Zhang 
et. all, 2004), have also been reported, creates a need for for a new novel alignment 
technique not based on minutiae.  In this study, an alignment technique based on the 
Fourier Mellin Transform will be described. 
The Fourier-Mellin Transform is a useful mathematical tool in image processing because its 
resulting spectrum is invariant in rotation, translation and scale. The Fourier Transform 
itself (FT) is translation invariant. By converting the resulting FT to log-polar coordinates, 
we can convert the scale and rotation differences to vertical and horizontal offsets that can 
be quantified. A second transform, called the Mellin Transform (MT), gives a transform-
space image that is invariant to translation, rotation and scale. An application of the Fourier-
Mellin Transform for image registration can be found in (Guo et. all, 2005). 
The Mellin transform can be expressed as: 
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 M{f(eỳ)} = 
∞
−∞
∫ f(eỳ) e-juỳ dỳ  (4) 
By changing coordinate systems from  the  Cartesian system to a Log-Polar system, we can 
directly perform a DFT over the image to obtain the scale and rotation invariant 
representation. The figures below show some of the results of the alignment using The 
Fourier-Mellin Transform. Figures 9 and 10 are the base image and the image in need of 
alignment. Figure 11 shows the two images aligned using Fourier-Mellin Transform. 
The inverse Fourier transform of the Mellin Transformed images helps to see how well the 
image is aligned with respect to the base image. While this step is necessary to see the 
alignment results, the Fourier transforms; however are stored in as separate database as 
from here they are now the templates that will be used for comparison. This will eliminate 
the need to take again the FFT of the aligned image and the base image when it comes to 
comparing the fingerprints. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Image of the 1st fingerprint 
The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) of the FBI has 
fingerprints for more than 66 million people and more than 25 million civil prints 
(fbibiospecs.org). Most of these fingerprints have been taken with the ink and paper 
technique on FBI cards and then converted to a digital database using a high resolution 
scanner.  But, it is well-known fact that most of these fingerprints are of poor quality due to 
smudging and smearing of the ink. In order to have improved quality of images and also 
improve the recognition rates, live-scan systems were used to obtain fingerprints. In these 
systems the image is acquired by sensing the tip of the finger using a sensor that is capable 
of digitizing the fingerprint on contact (Maltoni et. all, 2005). But recent studies (Mil’shtein 
and Doshi, 2004) have proven that fingerprints taken using the live-scan technique are also 
subject to pressure induced distortions. The distance between the ridges reduces depending 
on the pressure applied. Very recently, contactless fingerprinting techniques have been 
catching a lot interest due to their ability to produce almost distortion-free fingerprints. 
Also, because of their high resolution (Ross et. all, 2006), level 3 features can be used for 
identification. Figure 12 shows the fingerprint of the same finger taken using ink and paper, 
live-scan and touch-less technique. 
 




Fig. 10. Image of 2nd fingerprint (In need of alignment) 
 
 
Fig. 11. Aligned 1st and 2nd images (Image 2 superimposed upon image 1) 
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Fig. 11. Aligned 1st and 2nd images (Image 2 superimposed upon image 1) 
  




Fig. 12. Fingerprints taken via wet-ink, live scan and contactless techniques 
But the issue of conversion of existing database to a contactless database is now looming 
and large. Another issue is how wet-ink and live-scan fingerprints compare to their touch-
less counterparts. Can law enforcement agencies compare a fingerprint taken by wet-ink / 
live-scan methods to the same fingerprint taken using contactless technique? How will 
minutiae algorithm perform when it comes to comparing these two types of fingerprints? 
Dominant presence of wet-ink / live-scan fingerprints requires that these questions be 
answered immediately. In the following sections, we attempt to highlight these issues for 
contactless fingerprints that will come in the way of comparison of the databases.  
3.3 Problems 
3.3.1 Grayscale variations 
Figure 13 shows an image taken from (S. Mil’shtein et. all, 2008). Even though the resolution 
of the fingerprint is well above FBI requirements (fbi.gov), one can clearly see that the 
intensity is not consistent throughout the image. As a result, digitization leads to loss of 
information. Hence, the resulting image is rendered useless. 
3.3.2 Aspect ratio differences 
Figure 12 showed comparison between a fingerprint taken by conventional wet-ink method, 
live-scan, and contact-less method. The aspect ratios are nearly the same in the first two 
images but for the contactless fingerprint, the image looks stretched out and as a result the 
aspect ratio varies along with the location of the minutiae points. 
3.3.3 Lack of optimum illumination 
Very often, the illumination circuitry in contactless fingerprinting technologies are preset to 
certain values. As a result, when fingers with different skin tones are fingerprinted, the 
fingerprint images lack the optimum brightness which result in a completely under exposed 
or oversaturated image.  
3.3.4 Inverted background and foreground 
In Figure 14 and 15, the background and foreground in a fingerprint taken via wet-ink 
technique and contactless technique are switched. This creates significant problems for 
minutiae algorithms in locating and identifying the minutiae points. 
 




Fig. 13. Grayscale variations within the image 
 
 
Fig. 14. Minutiae points on fingerprints taken via different techniques 
  




Fig. 12. Fingerprints taken via wet-ink, live scan and contactless techniques 
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Fig. 15. Different foreground and background 
3.4 Solutions 
3.4.1 Adaptive binarization 
One of the methods to solve the problem of grayscale variations is to binarize   the image 
adaptively.  
3.4.2 Solution to the aspect ratio problem 
Since the fingerprint images are of different aspect ratios, there needs to be sensing   
mechanism that senses the size of the finger and then adjusts the resolution at which the 
camera is taking the image. Using software packages such as MATLAB or Adobe Photoshop 
to resize the images to equal sizes is also possible but it does not lead to a totally accurate 
result, and is not scalable to high throughput operations. 
3.4.3 Adaptive histogram equalization 
 
 
Fig. 16. Result of Histogram equalization  
To make up for insufficient illumination, the contactless technology can be equipped with 
an adaptive histogram equalization algorithm (Pizer et. all, 1987). This ensures that 
fingerprint image has consistent in brightness and contrast which in turn results in good 
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quality binarization. It could also be implemented at a hardware level by using the 
procedure described in (Jusoh et. all, 2001). Fig. 16 shows the result of this algorithm 
3.4.4 Inverted background and foreground 
There are two solutions to the problem described in the section 3.3.4. One can take the              
complement of the image at the machine level and then transfer it to a database where it is 
binarized and then compared. Or the image can be binarized first and then complemented 
again using MATLAB or Adobe Photoshop. In our comparisons we found that the later 
method gave better results for comparisons. 
4. Applications of contactless fingerprint technology 
Increased security threats with respect to terrorism and cyber-crime have recently 
necessitated the development of biometric systems to be used at commercial facilities, 
border crossings, airports, and government building access points. Additionally, fraud with 
credit card accounts, hacking of retail store websites, and most importantly, the critical 
interruption of governmental agencies such as the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Homeland Security, requires the development of systems capable of 
identifying individuals accurately to mitigate such attacks.  
When automated fingerprinting systems were introduced in the late 1960s, digital contact-
based fingerprinting replaced the old method of ink rolling. This facilitated a new range of 
fingerprinting applications.  The increased accuracy of contactless fingerprinting will create 
new applications in fingerprinting as well.  Specifically, applications will be found in the fields 
of information security, access control, and law enforcement.  Below are some examples of 
how contactless fingerprint systems can be used in both the private and the public sector. 
4.1 Law enforcement agencies 
Every organization has unique requirements for stored fingerprints, depending on how 
these prints are utilized. For example, agencies that deal with crime scene fingerprints prefer 
to have nail-to-nail images, because crime scene images may be partial; and the more 
information available at registration stage helps in matching them with partial prints lifted 
from a crime scene. This specific need of individual organizations has resulted in different 
agencies having their own unique and often incompatible databases.  
Recently, creation of a unified and accurate database across all agencies has been recognized 
as a necessary step in the evolution of law enforcement’s capabilities. A standardized 
method which captures a nail-to-nail image will help these agencies migrate towards a 
single large database, from which a specific portion of the image may be extracted 
depending on individual requirements. 
To make this step, a new standard of fingerprints and fingerprinting hardware will need to 
be developed and followed across all agencies.  Implementation details of such project will 
not be discussed here; however applications of such a database will be explored.  
Currently, it is impossible for law enforcement to identify an individual in real-time based on 
fingerprints only. This is partially due to a lack of computer processing power to sort through 
databases containing millions of images. Most important, the current databases contain 
fingerprints taken using contact-based methods, and thus have varying degrees of distortion.  
A database system containing high quality images and a repeatable method for fingerprint 
capture would facilitate applications such as real time recognition of individuals. For 
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example, police officers carrying mobile fingerprint capture units can successfully execute 
an arrest as soon as he verifies the identity of the individual.   
4.2 Access control  
Access control can also benefit from such devices. Current fingerprint based access control 
devices have a certain disadvantage in usability. Often a user may need to repeatedly scan 
their finger before they are granted access. The need to use a finger few times is caused by 
inconsistencies between the fingerprint data recorded by the capture device and the data 
stored within the system’s database.  This inconsistency increases the systems margin of error, 
translates to increased false rejections and a lower degree of confidence with every match.   
In high security access control, an additional measure can be taken to further increase the 
degree of confidence with every match.  Spoof detection is a technique that focuses on 
determining whether a finger is currently alive and attached to the body, and is in fact the 
person’s real finger. Systems have been designed, such as the AETC’s “Infrared Spoof 
Detection System”, that satisfy such requirements (M. Baier, et. all, 2011).  
4.3 Financial transaction 
In the commercial sector, accurate biometric based authentication can be implemented in 
electronic commerce and confidential email exchange. Methods of authentication such as 
tokens, cards, badges, passwords and pins are widely being used today. These methods can 
be supplemented by accurate fingerprint based authentication to obtain a higher degree of 
user confidence, as well as decrease the presence of fraud in online spaces.  At places of 
financial transactions, Automatic Teller Machines, and E-commerce are all areas that can 
potentially find solutions to long-standing security related problems through the use of 
commercialized contactless fingerprinting devices. 
5. Network security  
Using fingerprinting for computer and network safety is another example of applications of 
contactless fingerprinting. The importance of network security motivated us to present a 
separate section on this subject. 
Security of network transactions is a major concern today, as we move towards society that 
is increasingly dependent on the comfort of performing day to day activities like bill 
payment, shopping at home, etc. Use of a public network service requires some form of 
authentication, because it is easily accessible to anyone connected to the network; and is 
prone to unauthorized and potentially malicious usage (ICC, 2009). Majority of network 
based authentication is performed using knowledge based methods wherein a password is 
used for authentication. Contrary to appearance, this type of authentication is inherently 
(White paper, M86 Security, 2010) flawed.  A compromised password may be repeatedly 
used by a malicious user. There are limited means by which a second authentication system 
may be added in to the current infrastructure.  
Few options such as RSA SecureID, VeriSign token and eToken from Aladdin knowledge 
systems require the user to carry additional devices which generate one-time passwords. 
Although these systems are marginally effective, they have the disadvantage of the user 
having to carry these devices.  This may be inconvenient, and also if users forget to carry the 
device or if the device fails, they may not be able to use the system.  There is also the 
possibility of the devices being stolen and used for authentication by malicious users. Similar 
problems exist in systems which send one time passwords to user’s registered mobile phones.  
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5.1 Biometrics for authentication 
Shortcomings of the above mentioned systems may be easily overcome using systems which 
use biometric modes of authentication, in addition to conventional static passwords.  
Biometrics is the use of characteristic features of face, fingerprints, iris or retina scans, voice, 
signature etc for authentication. The merit of biometric systems is that its uniqueness, and 
users do not have to carry additional hardware. However these systems have a major 
deficiency when it comes to usability. Face recognition, fingerprints, voice and signature are 
not invasive and are convenient for users. But these often pose problems with data 
acquisition, resulting on high false recognition. Iris and retina scans are invasive, and often 
pose problems for people using eye-wear such as spectacles or contact lenses. Fingerprints 
by far are the least invasive and most secure in terms of individuality when compared to all 
other biometric modalities. 
5.2 Fingerprint based authentication 
Fingerprint acquisition devices are usually contact based and thus pose problems during 
recognition stage. Fingerprints differ if they are taken by contact methods due to contact 
based distortion. We propose using contactless fingerprinting for network based 
authentication. Using contactless acquisition technologies provide high resolution, 
undistorted and consistent images which may be used to generate high entropy keys. Such 
high resolution images provide better minutiae points if minutiae (Afsar et. all. 2004) based 
extractor is used. 
A major drawback of fingerprinting is that once a digitized fingerprint is compromised, the 
attacker merely needs to duplicate (Ratha et. all, 2001) it for authentication. The possibility 
of entire fingerprints being compromised is increased in case of transactions requiring 
transmission of full prints. This problem can be addressed by using partial fingerprints for 
identification, which is obtained from high resolution fingerprints using contactless 
technologies (Mil’shtein et. all, 2009). 
5.3 Network security using randomized partial fingerprint  
We describe a randomized partial contactless fingerprint based security protocol which uses 
a portion of the user’s fingerprint. Effective use of partial prints is enabled by the use of 
distortion-less high resolution images obtained from a contactless fingerprint reader. A 
simplified implementation of such a system is described below: 
1.  Once a fingerprint is registered, it is stored in the server.  
2. Upon receiving an authentication request from the authentication device, the server 
calculates a random Co-ordinate information key (CIK) using the image stored in it.  It 
also stores the transaction identifier (TID) and the CIK for verification. Figure 17 
describes these portions of the image. The cross-point shows the co-ordinate axis used, 
the circle shows the core, and the rectangle signifies the partial region used for 
matching. 
3. Server sends back CIK along with the TID to the acquisition device. 
4. The device perform acquisition and depending on the CIK, and transmits the valid 
portion of the image along with transaction ID back to the server. 
5. The CIK is recomputed and handshaking is repeated till the server can conclusively 
accept or reject the user’s request. 
Figure 18 describes the above steps.  For additional security a trusted third party maybe 
added in between the communication entities, as described in figure.  
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Fig. 17. A fingerprint showing CIK based region 
 
 
Fig. 18. A trusted third party based secure network transaction 
The system described above has the following benefits: 
1. The user does not have to remember multiple long passwords. 
2. Once the acquisition devices are standardized, there is no need for additional hardware 
to be carried by the user. 
3. An attacker who has access to multiple CIK will not be able to predict the next CIK, or 
infer which CIK will be used for a later transaction.  
4. Since only a portion of the fingerprint is actually sent over the network, even if it were 
compromised, it would not be possible to bypass the system because of the inability to 
predict CIK, and thus the resulting image for any given transaction. 
5. Since no complicated image processing is performed at the acquisition device, it keeps 
the device simple and thus economical, making it viable to be standardized. 
 




In the last decade, both the hardware and the software of biometric technologies have been 
rapidly improving. The wet-ink procedures are being replaced by digitized fingerprinting, 
where a finger is pressed against a computer scanner. Simultaneously, novel contactless 
methods are being developed. Responding to the needs of forensic investigations and 
requirements of law enforcement new systems have been designed which made the 
examination of the entire palm, four -slap fingers, and nail to nail fingerprinting possible. 
Although, based on the old minutia algorithms current recognition software was modified 
to replace an operator by a computer to analyze and compare fingerprints. Fast network 
communication between police stations and database centers became a reality of the 
everyday operation of law enforcement. The Advanced Electronic Technology Center of 
UMass contributed to the recent modification of fingerprinting technology by combining 
contactless fingerprinting with blood vessel mapping in a line of newly designed hand-held 
systems which allow for examining of a palm and four fingers simultaneously, as well as 
each individual finger from nail-to-nail. 
The best way to understand the future development of fingerprinting technology is to 
analyze the deficiencies of existing fingerprinting methods. In brief, these deficiencies could 
be classified into two groups.  
1.  General deficiencies related to biological conditions of human body are: 
a. The shape of fingerprint changes with age due to the appearance of wrinkles on human 
skin. Periodic recertification of individual fingerprints is a potential answer to this problem 
b. Medical conditions of the individual might modify the reflectivity of the skin and 
change the IR light absorption by blood vessels. Adjustable light intensity and contrast 
in a fingerprinting system is one of the potential solutions of this problem. 
2. The deficiencies related to technical limitations of fingerprinting systems are: 
a. Low accuracy of recognition in some existing systems necessitates use of a second 
method of recognition of an individual. Often, computer scanners after taking 
fingerprint images need to scan an employee badge or a picture to confirm the identity 
of an individual. Non-distorted images generated by contactless fingerprinting systems 
and tight recognition algorithms are the answer to the problem. 
b. Fingerprinting based on a physical contact of a finger with a scanner generates pressure 
induced distortions of the fingerprint. Network security requires non-distorted, thus 
contactless images, for the computer (not an operator) to verify the identity of an 
individual. 
c. There are three libraries of fingerprints produced by wet-ink technology, digitized 
techniques and contactless methods. A compatibility study of these three libraries is 
urgently needed. 
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Fig. 17. A fingerprint showing CIK based region 
 
 
Fig. 18. A trusted third party based secure network transaction 
The system described above has the following benefits: 
1. The user does not have to remember multiple long passwords. 
2. Once the acquisition devices are standardized, there is no need for additional hardware 
to be carried by the user. 
3. An attacker who has access to multiple CIK will not be able to predict the next CIK, or 
infer which CIK will be used for a later transaction.  
4. Since only a portion of the fingerprint is actually sent over the network, even if it were 
compromised, it would not be possible to bypass the system because of the inability to 
predict CIK, and thus the resulting image for any given transaction. 
5. Since no complicated image processing is performed at the acquisition device, it keeps 
the device simple and thus economical, making it viable to be standardized. 
 




In the last decade, both the hardware and the software of biometric technologies have been 
rapidly improving. The wet-ink procedures are being replaced by digitized fingerprinting, 
where a finger is pressed against a computer scanner. Simultaneously, novel contactless 
methods are being developed. Responding to the needs of forensic investigations and 
requirements of law enforcement new systems have been designed which made the 
examination of the entire palm, four -slap fingers, and nail to nail fingerprinting possible. 
Although, based on the old minutia algorithms current recognition software was modified 
to replace an operator by a computer to analyze and compare fingerprints. Fast network 
communication between police stations and database centers became a reality of the 
everyday operation of law enforcement. The Advanced Electronic Technology Center of 
UMass contributed to the recent modification of fingerprinting technology by combining 
contactless fingerprinting with blood vessel mapping in a line of newly designed hand-held 
systems which allow for examining of a palm and four fingers simultaneously, as well as 
each individual finger from nail-to-nail. 
The best way to understand the future development of fingerprinting technology is to 
analyze the deficiencies of existing fingerprinting methods. In brief, these deficiencies could 
be classified into two groups.  
1.  General deficiencies related to biological conditions of human body are: 
a. The shape of fingerprint changes with age due to the appearance of wrinkles on human 
skin. Periodic recertification of individual fingerprints is a potential answer to this problem 
b. Medical conditions of the individual might modify the reflectivity of the skin and 
change the IR light absorption by blood vessels. Adjustable light intensity and contrast 
in a fingerprinting system is one of the potential solutions of this problem. 
2. The deficiencies related to technical limitations of fingerprinting systems are: 
a. Low accuracy of recognition in some existing systems necessitates use of a second 
method of recognition of an individual. Often, computer scanners after taking 
fingerprint images need to scan an employee badge or a picture to confirm the identity 
of an individual. Non-distorted images generated by contactless fingerprinting systems 
and tight recognition algorithms are the answer to the problem. 
b. Fingerprinting based on a physical contact of a finger with a scanner generates pressure 
induced distortions of the fingerprint. Network security requires non-distorted, thus 
contactless images, for the computer (not an operator) to verify the identity of an 
individual. 
c. There are three libraries of fingerprints produced by wet-ink technology, digitized 
techniques and contactless methods. A compatibility study of these three libraries is 
urgently needed. 
7. References 
A. Ross, A. K. Jain, Multimodal Biometrics: An Overview, Proc. of 12th European Signal  
Processing Conference, pp:1221-1224, 2004. 
C. Carvalho, H. Yehia, Fingerprint Alignment using Line Segments, Biometric  Authentication, 
Springer, pp 1-10, 2004 
C. Hu, J. Yin, E. Zhu, H. Chen, Y. Li, Fingerprint Alignment using Special Ridges, Springer, 2008 
Davide Maltoni, Dario Maio, Anil K. Jain, Salil Prabhakar, Handbook of fingerprinting, 
Springer 2005 
  
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
124 
F.A. Afsar, M. Arif and M. Hussain, Fingerprint Identification and Verification System using 
Minutiae Matching, National Conference on Emerging Technologies, 2004 
L. Nanni and A. Lumini, Descriptors for image-based fingerprint matchers, Expert Systems 
With Applications, vol.36, no.10, pp.12414-12422, December 2009 
M. Baier, S. Foret, V. Oliyil Kunnil, M. Paradis, P. Bustos, S.Mil’shtein, Automatic 
Contactless Fingerprinting System, To appear:Proc. of PECCS 2011, Portugal. 
Noor Ashedah Binti Jusoh et. all, Adaptive lightning system and method for machine vision 
apparatus, patent # US 6,207,946 B1, 2001. 
N.K. Ratha, J.H. Connel, and R.M. Bolle, Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-
based authentication system, IBM Systems Journal, 2001 
P. Meenen, R. Adhami, Approaches to image binarization in current automated fingerprint  
identification systems, Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Southeastern Symposium on 
System  Theory, 2005, ISBN:0-7803-8808-9  
Palma J, Liessner C, Mil’shtein S, Contactless Optical Scanning of Fingerprints with 180°  
View, Scanning, 28, 6, pp 301-304, 2006 
Ross, Arun A., Nandakumar, Karthik, Jain, Anil K., Handbook of Multi-biometrics, Springer, 2006 
S. Mil’shtein, M. Baier, C. Granz and P.Bustos, Mobile System for Fingerprinting and 
Mapping of Blood -Vessels across a Finger, IEEE Intern. Conf. on Technologies for 
Homeland Security, ISBN 978-1-4244-4179-2, p.30-34, 2009 
S. Mil’shtein, J. Palma, C. Liessner, M. Baier, A. Pillai, and A.Shendye, Line Scanner for  
Biometric Applications, IEEE Intern. Conf. on Technologies for Homeland Security, 
ISBN 4244-1978-4 P 205-208, 2008. 
S. Mil’shtein, U. Doshi, Scanning of the Pressure-Induced Distortion of Fingerprints, 
Scanning, 26, 4, 323-327, 2004. 
S. M. Pizer, E. P. Amburn, John D. Austin, Robert Cromartie, Ari Geselowitz, Trey Greer, B. 
T. H. Romeny, John B. Zimmerman and Karel Zuiderveld, Adaptive histogram 
equalization and its variations, Computer Vision, Graphics, and Image Processing, 
Volume 39, Issue 3, September 1987, pp 355-368. 
T. Zhang, J. Tian, Y. He, J. Cheng, X. Yang, Fingerprint alignment using similarity  
histogram, International conference on audio and video-based biometric person 
authentication, pp 854-861, 2003 
V. Valencia, Intuitive Touchless Fingerprinting The Pressure’s Off, Biometric Consortium  
Conference, Tampa Bay, Florida, 2009. 
W. Chen, Y. Gao, Minutiae-based Fingerprint Alignment Using Phase Correlation,  
Mechatronics and Machine Vision in Practice, Springer Link, pp 193-198, 2007 
Xiaoxin Guo, Zhiwen Xu, Yinan Lu, Yunjie Pang, An Application of Fourier-Mellin 
Transform in Image Registration, The Fifth International Conference on Computer and 
Information Technology, Sep 2005, pp 619-623. 
Yang, J.C. ; Park, D. S., A fingerprint verification algorithm using tessellated invariant 





Internet Crime complaint Center, statistics for 2009   
http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2009_IC3Report.pdf 
Whitepaper M86 Security - August 2010, Cybercriminals Target Online Banking Customers - 
Use Trojan and Exploit Kits to Steal Funds from Major UK Financial Institution. 
7 
Cancelable Biometric Identification by 
Combining Biological Data with Artifacts 
Nobuyuki Nishiuchi and Hiroka Soya 
Tokyo Metropolitan University 
Japan 
1. Introduction 
In present day information-oriented society, the ability to accurately and rapidly identify 
an individual in various situations, such as identity verification at an ATM, login 
authentication, and permitting access to secured rooms, has taken on considerable 
importance. Personal identification systems that rely on knowledge, for example, a 
password and ID number, or possession, for example, an ID card or keys, are subject to 
loss, counterfeiting, and theft. In addition, such systems suffer from the inability to 
identify the genuine user if the information is borrowed on permission of the user. Due to 
these limitations, the development of an identification system based on biometrics has 
attracted a great deal of interest as it obviates the requirement for physical possession or 
memorization of a security code and has the potential to differentiate individuals with 
high accuracy (Ashbourn, 2000; Prabhakar et al., 2003; Jain et al., 2004a, 2004b). To date, 
fingerprints, veins, iris, retina patterns, facial and other features have been used for 
biometric identification. The ideal biological data for biometrics has the following five 
characteristics (Wayman, 2000): 
i. Distinctive: the biological data differs from one person to another. 
ii. Repeatable: the biological data remains constant over a long period. 
iii. Accessible: it is easy to view the biological data. 
iv. Acceptable: it is not objectionable to show the biological data. 
v. Universal: all people possess the biological data. 
From different viewpoints, the five characteristics are associated with the potential problems 
and limitations of biometric identification. 
1.1 Problems of biometric identification 
Current biometric identification systems have a number of problems that are related with 
the five characteristics of biological data described in the above section. The three main 
problems are as follows:  
Problem 1: The biological data cannot be replaced.  
For instance, if a user’s fingers are lost, or if fingerprint information is stolen, the 
user cannot use a fingerprint identification system. This problem is related with 
characteristics (ii) and (v). 
Problem 2: Users are specified only from the biological data. 
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As biological data is information linked directly with individuals, if biological 
data is leaked, the user can be specified using only the leaked biological data. 
This problem is related with characteristic (i). 
Problem 3: The biological data can be collected without consent of the user. 
In general, because biological features are exposed on the surface of the body, 
such as the face, fingerprints, and iris, it is difficult to keep these features 
concealed from others. This problem is related with characteristics (iii) and (iv). 
Due to these problems, current biometric identification systems have a major vulnerability: 
spoofing. Yamada et al. (2000), Stén et al. (2003), Hirabayashi et al. (2004), and Matsumoto 
(2006) described this vulnerability of biometric identification and demonstrated that it is 
possible with existing technology to obtain fingerprint information from adhered surface 
residue and replicate the fingerprint on an artificial finger. The theft and counterfeit of 
exposed biological information can be accomplished by first capturing an individual’s 
targeted information as a two-dimensional image, and then using the data to reproduce a 
counterfeit model.  
As a result of this vulnerability to spoofing, and despite progress with various types of 
biometric systems, users are often hesitant to submit their unique biological data during the 
initial enrollment process (Gunn, 2010). It is easy to envision that users of restricted facilities, 
such as buildings, commercial establishments, accommodations, and amusement parks, may 
not willingly submit the necessary biological information for a biometric identification 
system.  
To overcome these limitations, novel approaches for the development of practical biometric 
identification systems that do not retain or require potentially sensitive user information are 
needed.  
1.2 Proposed method of cancelable biometric identification 
In this chapter, we introduce a novel method of cancelable biometric identification that 
combines biological data with the use of artifacts and is resistant to spoofing. In this 
identification system, the user first attaches an artifact (a sticker with two dots) to the 
fingernail of the thumb or forefinger during the enrollment step, and subsequently presents 
the finger (biological data) with the attached artifact to the system for imaging. The position 
and direction of the artifact are uniquely detected based on the individual’s biological data 
(outline of finger) using image processing. In the identification step, the user presents the 
finger with the attached artifact, and identification is accomplished by comparison of the 
probe and reference data. As the randomness of the position and direction of the artifact on 
the fingernail is quite high, the user can be uniquely identified. Notably, this system 
represents cancelable biometric identification, because once the artifact is removed from the 
fingernail, re-enrollment is required. From the viewpoint of ease of use, our proposed 
method is more acceptable than other identification methods using artifacts, such as RFID 
implants (Rotter et al., 2008). 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, the details of the proposed method 
of cancelable biometric identification are described. In Sections 4 and 5, the results of 
experiments and simulations using this method are presented and discussed. In Section 6, 
the features of the proposed method are summarized and applications of the method are 
proposed. Finally, conclusions and future directions are offered in Section 7. 
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2. Experimental setup 
The artifact and hardware prototypes used in the experimental biometric identification 
system are shown in Figures 1 and 2. At the actual application stage, the artifact will be 
designed to have a less intrusive appearance and provide a higher level of security, and the 
imaging hardware will be smaller and more compact. 
2.1 Artifact 
We evaluated two artifact prototypes, having either a circular- or square-shaped design 
(Figure 1). For both types, a white base sticker was marked with one red and one blue dot. 
The circular artifact was 6 mm in diameter, and the square artifact was 5 × 1.5 mm in size. In 
the enrollment step, the user first attaches the artifact to the fingernail of the thumb or 
forefinger, and image processing is used to extract the dots on the artifact. As our initial 
evaluation did not detect any differences between the two types of artifacts during the data 
extraction, we selected the square type for use in further experiments because of its ease of 
fabrication. For practical use, the base sticker should be circular, transparent, and have dots 
printed with dye that can only be detected only under specific lighting, to maximize the 
difficulty of re-attaching the artifact at the same position and angle. To facilitate user 
acceptance of the system, ideally, the fingernail would not appear different from its usual 
appearance, and the attached artifact would not interfere with daily life. Moreover, it may 
also be possible to mark the fingernail directly with dye to serve as the artifact. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Artifact used in the present system (left: circular type, right: square type)  
2.2 Experimental device configuration 
The device configuration of the experimental biometric identification system is illustrated in 
Figure 2. After placing the thumb or forefinger (in this experiment, the thumb was used) 
with the attached artifact on the stage, an image of the user’s thumb was obtained with a 
single CCD camera (XC-505; Sony, Japan) under illumination by a LED light (NSF-150W; 
Shimatec, Japan). A black cloth was used as a backdrop to facilitate image processing. All 
images were analysed using Visual C++ 2008 software (Microsoft) and a 640 × 480 pixel 
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capture board (FDM-PCI4; Photron Ltd., Japan). A representative input image obtained 
using this system is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 




Fig. 3. A representative input image showing the artifact on a fingernail 
3. Algorithm for cancelable biometric identification 
The algorithm flow of the proposed cancelable biometric identification system is outlined in 
Figure 4. The enrollment step proceeds until feature extraction (edge pursuit and distance 
calculation) is performed, and the obtained reference data is then stored in the database. The 
algorithm flow of the identification step can be divided into four parts and begins with 
processing of the first input image for the artifact (binarization and center extraction; Figure 
4). The second step involves image processing for the finger (binarization and edge 
extraction), while the third and fourth steps consist of feature extraction (edge pursuit and 
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distance calculation) and comparison, respectively. The details of the algorithm are 
described in the following subsections. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Flow chart of the algorithm used for the identification step  
3.1 Image processing for artifacts  
In this step, the center of each dot on the artifact in the input image is determined. First, the 
input image is binarized by the color of each dot (blue and red), and the area of each dot is 
extracted (Figure 5(b)). To determine the center of the blue area, horizontal maximum Xbmax 
and minimum Xbmin and vertical maximum Ybmax and minimum Ybmin are searched by 
horizontal and vertical scanning, respectively. The intersection point of line segment 
XbmaxXbmin and YbmaxYbmin is determined to represent the center of blue point area (Bc). Using 
the identical process, the center of the red area (Rc) is also detected (Figure 5(c)). 
 
   
(a)                            (b)                          (c) 
Fig. 5. Image processing for the artifact, showing a (a) representative input image, (b) 
extraction of the two colored dots, and (c) detection of the center of each dot area (zoomed 
image) 
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In this study, we used colored dots on the artifact and the above algorithm to detect the 
center of each colored dot. However, as only the position of two points (or a vector) is 
needed, it is possible to introduce variations to the shape and color of the artifact. 
3.2 Image processing for fingers 
In the next step of image processing, the finger outline is determined from the input image. 
The input image is first processed by binarization to separate the background and finger 
area into a binary image (Figure 6(b)). The finger outline is then obtained by edge extraction 
using a Laplacian filter (Figure 6(c)). 
 
   
(a)                          (b)                            (c) 
Fig. 6. Image processing for the finger, showing a (a) representative input image, (b) 
extraction of the finger area (binary image), and (c) extraction of the finger outline (edge 
image) 
3.3 Feature extraction 
As a preprocessing step for feature extraction to equalize the volume of finger outline data, 
the finger outline is excised at a set distance (450 pixels) from the edge of the fingertip 
(indicated by a vertical line in Figure 7(a)), and the edges opposite the fingertip (towards the 
first finger joint) are connected with a line (Figure 7(a)). The fingertip location is decided 
based on the horizontal maximum point of the finger outline by horizontal scanning. 
 
  
(a)                                       (b) 
Fig. 7. Feature extraction. (a) Extracted outline of the finger and connection of the edges (red 
circles indicate the edges), (b) Detection of the starting point for pursuing the finger outline 
based on the points on the artifact  
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For the feature extraction processing, the finger outline pixels are pursued in an anti-
clockwise direction from the starting point until returning to that point (Nishiuchi, 2010), 
and the distance between pixels on the finger outline and the middle of the two dots 
(between Bc and Rc) on the artifact is measured continuously. The starting point for pursuing 
the finger outline is detected based on the intersection between the finger outline and the 
extended line connecting points Rc and Bc on the artifact (Figure 7(b)). 
A representative graph based on the feature extraction processing procedure is presented in 
Figure 8, where the horizontal and vertical axes represent the position of the pursued pixels 
and the measured distance, respectively. The data shown in Figure 8 is used for the 
reference and probe data during identification to determine whether a presented finger and 
artifact are genuine or an imposter. The red area in Figure 8 corresponds to the line 
connecting the two edges (red circles in Figure 7(a)) of the outline of the finger. The data 
within this area is not used during the comparison step. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Distance between the pixels on the outline of finger and the middle of the two dots on 
the artifact  
3.4 Comparison 
In the final comparison step, the correlation coefficient (R) is used for the comparison 
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In Equation (1), xi (i=1, 2, 3, …,n) represents reference data, yi (i=1, 2, 3, …, n) represents 
probe data, and xaa and yaa represent the arithmetic average of xi and yi, respectively. 
4. Experimental evaluation 
To evaluate the proposed biometric identification method, the following three experiments 
were conducted. 
EXP. 1 Genuine trial: validation of repeatability 
EXP. 2 Imposter trial: validation of anti-spoofing  
EXP. 3 Genuine trail- artifact is removed and re-attached: validation of anti-spoofing 
The set of EXP. 1 and EXP. 2 was performed as a general evaluation of the proposed 
biometric identification method to allow comparison with previous biometric systems, and 
EXP. 3 was conducted as a validation of the anti-spoofing property of our system using a 
genuine user who had removed and re-attached the artifact. The details and outcomes of 
each experiment are described in the following subsections.  
4.1 Genuine trial: validation of repeatability  
To validate the repeatability of the proposed biometric identification method, five images of 
a finger with an attached artifact were each captured for five subjects (A-E) with the finger 
resting on the stage of the imaging system. A representative set of captured images for 
subject A is shown in Figure 9. The reference data (Data A1) was then compared with the 
probe data (Data A2 to Data A4) of the genuine subject. 
The result of the comparison for subject A is shown in Figure 10, where the horizontal and 
vertical axes represent the position of the pursued pixels and the measured distance, 
respectively, and the five lines represent each feature extracted from the five images of the 
genuine finger with the attached artifact. On comparison of the plotted reference and probe 
data, it is clear that they are quite similar. This determination was confirmed by examining 
the correlation coefficients resulting from the comparison for all five subjects (Table 1). As 
the minimum values of the correlation coefficients are all 0.996 or greater, the repeatability 
for the identification was considered to be high. In addition, the repeatability could be 
increased by using a guide for fixing the finger in place during the capture of the input 
image (data not shown). 
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(d) A4           (e) A5 
Fig. 9. Five images of the identical genuine finger of subject A with an attached artifact 
 




Fig. 10. Distance between the pursued pixels on the outline of finger and the artifact for the 
genuine trial of subject A  
 
Subject A B C D E 
Average 0.9972 0.9976 0.9989 0.9993 0.9996 
Maximum 0.9984 0.9986 0.9998 0.9996 0.9998 
Minimum 0.9962 0.9964 0.9971 0.9991 0.9995 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients for the comparison of the reference and probe data obtained 
during the genuine trial for subject A-E  
4.2 Imposter trail: validation of anti-spoofing  
After validating the repeatability of the proposed method, its resistance to spoofing was 
next evaluated by capturing five images of fingers with an attached artifact from five 
subjects (A-E) (Figure 11). The reference data (Data A) was then compared with the probe 
data (Data B to E) of the four imposter subjects. As an added element to evaluate the 
spoofing resistance, the imposter subjects (B-E) attempted to mimic the position and angle of 
the artifact of the genuine user (A) by referring to an image of the genuine user’s finger with 
the attached artifact.  
The result of the comparison between the data of the imposters and genuine user is shown 
in Figure 12, where the horizontal and vertical axes represent the position of the pursued 
pixels and the measured distance, respectively, and the five lines represent the features of 
each subject (A-E). It can be seen that lines of subjects D and E are quite similar to subject A. 
Table 2 lists the correlation coefficients resulting from the comparison between genuine user 
A with each of the imposters. As can be seen in Table 2, the correlation coefficients of A-D 
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and A-E tended to be high. However, for the genuine trial, the correlation coefficient values 
were 0.996 or higher, whereas the imposter trial resulted in values ranging from 0.680 to 
0.983. In addition, the distributions from the genuine and imposter trials did not interfere. 
When the threshold value for identification was set at 0.995, both the false rejection rate 
(FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) were 0%. Even though the imposter subjects 
attempted to mimic the artifact position of the genuine user, it was difficult to set the artifact 
at the identical position and angle as that of the genuine user, demonstrating the resistance 
of our proposed system to spoofing.  
 
     
(a) A             (b) B             (c) C 
 
  
(d) D                    (e) E 
Fig. 11. Images of fingers with attached artifacts for five subjects (A, genuine user; B-E, 
imposter subjects)  
 
 
Fig. 12. Distance between the pixels on the outline of the finger and the artifact for the five 
subjects of the imposter trial  
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A-B A-C A-D A-E 
0.6844 0.7313 0.9705 0.9826 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients for the comparison of the reference (A) and probe data (B-E) 
obtained for the imposter trial  
4.3 Genuine trial: artifact is removed and re-attached  
In this experiment, we validated the ability of the proposed biometric identification system 
to reject a genuine user who had removed and re-attached the artifact. Two captured images 
of the identical finger of subject A with an attached artifact that was removed once and 
attached again in a random position are shown in Figure 13. The reference data (Data A) 
was then compared the probe data (Data A’; re-attached artifact) of subject A. 
 
  
(a) A                        (b) A’ 
Fig. 13. Images of a genuine finger with an attached artifact (left) that was removed once 
and re-attached in a random position (right)  
 
 
Fig. 14. Distance between the pixels on the finger outline and the reference artifact (A) and 
the artifact that was removed once and re-attached randomly (A’) 
 
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
134 
and A-E tended to be high. However, for the genuine trial, the correlation coefficient values 
were 0.996 or higher, whereas the imposter trial resulted in values ranging from 0.680 to 
0.983. In addition, the distributions from the genuine and imposter trials did not interfere. 
When the threshold value for identification was set at 0.995, both the false rejection rate 
(FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) were 0%. Even though the imposter subjects 
attempted to mimic the artifact position of the genuine user, it was difficult to set the artifact 
at the identical position and angle as that of the genuine user, demonstrating the resistance 
of our proposed system to spoofing.  
 
     
(a) A             (b) B             (c) C 
 
  
(d) D                    (e) E 
Fig. 11. Images of fingers with attached artifacts for five subjects (A, genuine user; B-E, 
imposter subjects)  
 
 
Fig. 12. Distance between the pixels on the outline of the finger and the artifact for the five 
subjects of the imposter trial  
 
Cancelable Biometric Identification by Combining Biological Data with Artifacts 
 
135 
A-B A-C A-D A-E 
0.6844 0.7313 0.9705 0.9826 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients for the comparison of the reference (A) and probe data (B-E) 
obtained for the imposter trial  
4.3 Genuine trial: artifact is removed and re-attached  
In this experiment, we validated the ability of the proposed biometric identification system 
to reject a genuine user who had removed and re-attached the artifact. Two captured images 
of the identical finger of subject A with an attached artifact that was removed once and 
attached again in a random position are shown in Figure 13. The reference data (Data A) 
was then compared the probe data (Data A’; re-attached artifact) of subject A. 
 
  
(a) A                        (b) A’ 
Fig. 13. Images of a genuine finger with an attached artifact (left) that was removed once 
and re-attached in a random position (right)  
 
 
Fig. 14. Distance between the pixels on the finger outline and the reference artifact (A) and 
the artifact that was removed once and re-attached randomly (A’) 
 
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
136 
The result of the comparison between Data A and A’ is shown in Figure 14. From the plotted 
data, it is clear that the two lines are markedly different with respect to the shift on the 
horizontal axis, which was also reflected in the low correlation coefficient between Data A 
and A’ of 0.660. Thus, even if the genuine user attempts to access the system after removal of 
the artifact, re-enrollment is necessary. In Section 4.2, the finger shapes of a few imposters 
were quite similar to the genuine user. However, even when an imposter attempted to spoof 
using the genuine finger outline and an imitation finger, spoofing is prevented by the 
randomness of the position and angle of the artifact. In Section 5.1, we confirmed the 
security level of the proposed biometric identification method depending on the 
randomness of the position and angle of the artifact. 
5. Validation of security level 
To validate the security level of the proposed biometric identification method, the following 
two simulations were conducted. 
SIM. 1: Security level depending on the position and angle of the artifact 
SIM. 2: Security level depending on the amount of biological data 
The level of security, as verified by each simulation, is an important factor for 
demonstrating the practical use of the proposed system. The details of each simulation are 
described in the following two subsections. 
5.1 Security level depending on the artifact position and angle  
In this simulation, we verified the allowable range of the position and angle of the artifact 
for identification when the artifact is removed and re-attached. Specifically, we attempted to 
determine the degree of change in the artifact position or angle that prevents the imposter 
from being verified by the system, as determined by the correlation coefficient. The position 
and angle of the artifact of Figure 5(a) were changed in the simulation program based on the 
following two conditions: 
Condition 1: The artifact is moved in the direction of x (horizontal direction) and the 
direction of y (vertical direction) by one pixel (approximately 0.05 mm). 
Condition 2: The artifact is rotated by one degree. 
The results of the simulation under conditions 1 and 2 are shown in Figures 15 and 16, 
respectively. If the threshold value for identification is set at 0.995 based on the results 
presented in Section 4.2, and the artifact is moved 11 pixels (0.55 mm) or more in the x 
direction, or 10 pixels (0.50 mm) or more in the y direction, the correlation coefficient falls 
below the threshold level and the genuine user is not accepted into the system (Figure 15). If 
the acceptable range for placement of the artifact on the fingernail is assumed to be 5.0 × 5.0 
mm, the randomness of the artifact position is calculated as follows:  
5.0／0.55 × 5.0／0.50 = 90 patterns 
If the threshold value is set at 0.995 and the artifact is rotated 5.0 degrees or more, the 
genuine user is not accepted into the system (Figure 16). Under this condition, the 
randomness of the angle of the artifact is calculated as follows:  
360／5 = 72 patterns 
Considering the combination between the position and angle of the artifact, and assuming 
that the position and angle are independent parameters, the randomness of the method is 
calculated as follows: 
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90 × 72 = 6480 patterns 
The relative scale of the range of positions (0.55 × 0.50 mm) and angles (5.0 degrees) with 
respect to the finger outline are shown in Figure 17. From these simulations, it was clearly 
demonstrated that the randomness of the artifact is quite high. Therefore, if someone 
attempted to mimic the position and angle of the genuine artifact, the inherent randomess of 
the proposed identification system would effectively prevent such spoofing attempts.  
 
 
Fig. 15. Effect on the correlation coefficient by moving the artifact in the x (blue line) or y 
(red line) direction 
 
 
Fig. 16. Effect of rotating the artifact position on the correlation coefficient 
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Notably, this estimation is based on the placement range of 5.0 × 5.0 mm for the artifact; 
however, the acceptable range for placement of the artifact on the fingernail is thought to be 
even wider. 
From the viewpoint of fingernail growth, which relates to Problem 1 described in the 
Introduction, the proposed method possesses the advantage of cancelable identification. It is 
estimated that the fingernails of adults grow approximately 0.1 mm per day. Thus, based on 
the simulation results and the constant growth rate of fingernails, a genuine user would 
need to re-enroll in the system within six days. 
 
  
(a)                                  (b) 
Fig. 17. Relative scale of the allowed range for identification with respect to the finger 
outline; (a) positional range (0.55 × 0.50 mm) and (b) angular range (5.0 degrees)  
5.2 Security level depending on the amount of biological data  
In a second simulation, we verified the relationship between the amount of biological data 
(finger outline data) and the security level of the proposed biometric identification system. 
The amount of finger outline data corresponds to the number of pursuit pixels counted from 
the starting point during the image processing step. All finger outline data shown in Figure 
8, with the exception of the red area, were used for the comparison in the experiments in 
Section 4. Although the uniqueness of the finger outline is relatively low, it represents 
biological data, similar to that provided by fingerprints, veins, or the iris. Therefore, 
depending on the situation, it is conceivable that users may hesitate to enroll finger outline 
data in the identification system, which relates to Problem 2 described in the Introduction. 
Thus, we have proposed identification using biological data that is not specific to the user, 
but is specific only with respect the artifact position. In the second simulation, the amount of 
required biological data was examined by decreasing the amount of finger outline data that 
allowed distinguishing between the genuine user and an imposter.  
All data of subject A and the imposters (B-E) were used for the simulation. Figure 18 is a 
graphical result of the simulation, where the vertical axis represents the correlation 
coefficient and the horizontal axis represents the decrease ratio of finger outline data. When 
the decrease ratio in the horizontal axis in Figure 18 is replaced with the number of data (the 
distance in pixels between the artifact and finger outline), 100% corresponds to 1283 and 
0.26% corresponds to 4. From the simulation results, even if the decrease ratio is decreased 
by as much as 0.56% (the number of data is 8), the genuine user can be distinguished from 
imposters. Based on this simulation experiment, it is clear that the collected biological data 
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cannot be used to identify the user, but can be used to specify the position of the artifact and 
identify the genuine user. Moreover, the meaningfulness of the collected data can be 
canceled by simply removing the artifact. Thus, for identification using the proposed 
method, the users are not required to enroll their highly unique biological data, which is 
unavoidable using current biometric systems. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Effects of decreasing the amount of finger outline data used in the identification on 
the correlation coefficient 
6. Summary and proposed application system 
6.1 Summary 
The proposed cancelable biometric identification system has a number of advantages over 
current systems. The features of the proposed method are summarized as follows: 
1. Cancelable biometric identification: Registered information can be canceled by simply 
removing the artifact. Even if the genuine user attempts to access the system, once the 
artifact is removed, re-enrollment is necessary (refer to Section 4.3). Moreover, due to 
the constant growth of fingernails, identification is not possible after a certain period of 
time (approximately one week). 
2. Controllable security level: The security level of the system can be adjusted by 
controlling the amount of permissible biological and artifactual data. 
I. Artifacts:  
I-a. Using sufficient information to allow identification of the artifact (random 
pattern, code, or artifact-metrics proposed by Matumoto et al. (2000): the 
secondary biological data is artificially appended to the fingernail). 
I-b. Using only information that allows the position and direction of the artifact to 
be detected (a few dots). 
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II. Biological data: 
II-a. Using all information that allows identification of the user (all data shown in 
Figure 8, except the red area). 
II-b. Using only information that allows the position and direction of the artifact to 
be detected. In other words, the user cannot be identified only by biological 
data (refer to Section 5.2). 
When (I-a) and (II-a) are combined, three identifications are performed. The first is the 
identification of the biological data, the second is identification of the artifact, and the 
third is the relation between the biological data and the artifact. Yamagishi et al. (2008) 
described this method using fingerprints and a random pattern as an artifact. When (I-
b) and (II-b) are combined, only the third identification is conducted. 
3. Non-necessity for the registration of unique biological information: Although the 
outline of the finger constitutes biological data, the information it provides in itself is 
not sufficient for individual identification. Moreover, when the amount of biological 
data collected for identification is decreased, it is impossible to identify an individual 
(refer to Section 5.2). Therefore, the enrollment of biological data that can uniquely 
identify the user is unnecessary in this proposed biometric verification system.  
4. Strength against spoofing: If the biological data and artifact are stolen, spoofing can be 
prevented due to difficulty of reproducing the biological data in relation to the artifact 
that is required for identification (refer to Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 5.1). 
6.2 Proposed application of the system 
The conditions for the application of the proposed method are as follows: (a) only a limited 
number of enrollments can be accommodated by the system, and (b) the use period is 
approximately five days. The flow of use of the proposed system at a hotel is illustrated in 
Figure 19. At the time of check-in, the user attaches the artifact to the fingernail and enrolls 
 
 
Fig. 19. Potential applications of the proposed system in a hotel setting  
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the artifact and biological data with the system. After the enrollment, the user can enter and 
exit his/her room without possession of a room key. Moreover, the possession of a wallet or 
purse becomes unnecessary while the user is within the hotel facilities, thus improving 
safety and convenience. For practical use, a transparent sticker containing the two dots 
marked with a dye that can only be detected using specific lighting (Takayanagi, 2009) 
would serve as the artifact (Figure 20). 
 
 
Fig. 20. Image of a fingernail with a transparent artifact (left: appearance under natural light, 
right: appearance under specific lighting) 
Under these conditions, the proposed biometric identification system would also be suitable 
for use as a one-day pass for office and factory buildings, and amusement and medical 
facilities, among numerous other potential applications. 
7. Conclusions  
We have described a novel method of cancelable biometric identification that combines 
biological data with the use of an artifact. The algorithm of the identification step can be 
divided into four parts: processing of the input image for the artifact; image processing for 
the finger; feature extraction, which involved determining the distance between the artifact 
and finger outline; and comparison of the reference and probe data. Based on the results of 
the three evaluative experiments and two simulations described here, several strengths of 
the proposed method can be recognized. First, the proposed method is a type of cancelable 
biometric identification, as registered information can be canceled by simply removing the 
artifact. Second, the proposed method allows control of the security level by adjusting the 
amount of biological and artifactual data. Third, the registration of unique biological 
information is not necessary for the identification system. Finally, the proposed method is 
resistant to spoofing. 
Despite these apparent strengths, a few limitations of the proposed method warrant 
mention. First, the application of the proposed method is limited by two conditions: (a) only 
a limited number of enrollments can be accommodated by the system, and (b) the use 
period is approximately five days. Although the potential field of applications is limited by 
these two conditions, the proposed method is characterized by user friendliness and relative 
simplicity that do not exist in current identification methods. Second, the usability of the 
identification system should be improved. Specifically, it is necessary to develop a material 
for use as the artifact that remains firmly in place and a mechanism that permits the user to 
easily detach the artifact on exiting the system. 
 
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
140 
II. Biological data: 
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Fig. 19. Potential applications of the proposed system in a hotel setting  
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Fig. 20. Image of a fingernail with a transparent artifact (left: appearance under natural light, 
right: appearance under specific lighting) 
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Biometrics have long been used as means to recognize people, mainly in terms of their
physiological characteristics, for various commercial applications ranging from surveillance
and access control against potential impostors to smart interfaces (Qazi (2004)) (Xiao (2005)).
These systems require reliable personal recognition schemes to either confirm or determine
the identity of an individual requesting their services. The biometric methods, that are usually
incorporated in such systems, can be categorized to physiological and behavioral (Jain et al.
(2004)), depending on the type of used features.
The most popular physiological biometric traits are the fingerprint (Maltoni et al. (2009)) that
is widely used in law enforcement for identifying criminals, the face (Chang et al. (2005))
and the iris (Sun & Tan (2009)). However, despite their high recognition performance, static
biometrics have been recently overwhelmed by the new generation of biometrics, which tend
to cast light on more natural ways for recognizing people by analyzing behavioural traits.
Specifically, behavioural biometrics are related to specific actions and the way that each
person executes them. In other words, they aim at recognizing livingness, as it is expressed
by dynamic traits. The most indicative cases of behavioural biometric recognition is gait
(Goffredo et al. (2009b)), facial expressions (Liu & Chen (2003)) or other activity related,
habitual traits (Drosou, Ioannidis, Moustakas & Tzovaras (2010)). As a result behavioural
biometrics have become much more attractive to researchers due to their significant
recognition potential and their unobtrusive nature. They can potentially allow the continuous
(on-the-move) authentication or even identification unobtrusively to the subject and become
part of an Ambient Intelligence (AmI) environment.
The inferior performance of behavioural biometrics, when compared to the classic
physiological ones, can be compensated when they are combined in a multimodal biometric
system. In general, multimodal systems are considered to provide an excellent solution to a
series of recognition problems. Unimodal systems are more vulnerable to theft attempts, since
an attacker can easily gain access by stealing or bypassing a single biometric feature. In the
same concept, they have to contend with a variety of problems, such as noisy data, intraclass
variations, restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof attacks, and unacceptable
error rates, i.e., it is estimated that approximately 3% of the population does not have legible
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fingerprints (Fairhurst et al. (2003)). Such biometric system may not always meet performance
requirements, may exclude large numbers of people, and may be vulnerable to everyday
changes and lesions of the biometric feature.
In this context, the development of systems that integrate more than one biometrics is an
emerging trend, since it has been seen that true multimodal biometric systems, that capture
a number of unrelated biometrics indicators, have significant advantages over unimodal
ones. Specifically, most of the aforementioned limitations can be addressed by deploying
multimodal biometric systems that integrate the evidence presented by multiple sources of
information. A multimodal biometric system uses multiple applications to capture different
types of biometrics. This allows the integration of two or more types of biometric recognition
systems, in order to meet stringent performance requirements. Moreover, such systems are
much more invulnerable to fraudulent technologies, since multiple biometric characteristics
are more likely to resist against spoof attacks than a single one.
Last but not least, a major issue of biometric systems is the protection of the sensitive biometric
data that are stored in the database, so as to prevent unauthorized and malicious use. Given
the widespread deployment of biometric systems and the wide exposition of personal data,
public awareness has been raised about security and privacy of the latter. Seemingly, the
voting of several laws concerning the ethical and privacy issues of private data provide a
universal solution unless it is accompanied by the appropriate technological tools.
Unfortunately, simple password-based systems, that provide regular cryptographic solutions
(Uludag et al. (2004)) can not be easily applied, since the representation of behavioural
biometric traits is not fixed over time. Thus, the current issue has been confronted with
modern, sophisticated encryption methods that do not require the exact match of the
prompted and the original signatures in order to grant access.
1.1 Related work
With respect to behavioural biometrics, previous work on human identification can be mainly
divided in two main categories. a) sensor-based recognition (Junker et al. (2004)) and
b)vision-based recognition. Recently, research trends have been moving towards the second
category, due to the obtrusiveness imposed by the sensor-based recognition approaches (Kale
et al. (n.d.)). Additionally, recent work and efforts on human recognition have shown that the
human behavior (e.g. extraction of facial dynamics features (Hadid et al. (2007)). However, the
most known example of behavioural biometrics is the human body shape dynamics (Ioannidis
et al. (2007) or joints tracking analysis (Goffredo et al. (2009a)) for gait recognition. In the same
respect, the analysis of dynamic activity-related trajectories (Drosou, Moustakas & Tzovaras
(2010)) provide the potential of continuous authentication for discriminating people, when
considering behavioural signals.
Although there have been already proposed a series of multimodal biometric systems
concerning static physiological biometric traits (Kumar et al. (2010)) (Sim et al. (2007)) there are
only a few dealing solely with behavioural traits (Drosou, Ioannidis, Moustakas & Tzovaras
(2010)). In any case, the main issue in a multimodal biometric system is the optimization
of its fusion mechanism. In a multimodal biometric system, integration can be done at
(i) feature level, (ii) matching score level, or (iii) decision level. However, matching score
level fusion is commonly preferred because matching scores are easily available and contain
sufficient information to distinguish between a genuine and an impostor case. In this respect,
a thorough analysis of such score-level fusion methods regarding biometric traits has been
presented in (Jain et al. (2005)).
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Since all biometric systems deal with the issue of storing biometric data, different approaches
regarding their security have been suggested. In the current work, an extension of the
security template scheme, presented in (Argyropoulos et al. (2009)), is proposed, that bases
on Error Correcting Codes (ECC) and the modeling of channel statistics. Channel codes have
been previously used for the development of authentication schemes. Earlier, in (Wadayama
(2005)), a generic authentication scheme based on channel codes was proposed to improve
security and prevent unauthorized access in secure environments. Also, in (Davida et al.
(1998)), a channel coding scheme was presented for secure biometric storage. Error correcting
codes were employed to tackle the perturbations in the representation of biometric signals and
classification was based on the Hamming distance between two biometric representations.
Based on this concept, the fuzzy commitment scheme was introduced to tolerate more
variation in the biometric characteristics and provide stronger security (Juels & Sudan (2006)).
In this scheme, the user selects at the enrolment a secret message c. Then, the template consists
of the difference between the user’s biometric data x and c along c with an encrypted version
of c. At the authentication, the stored difference d is added to the new biometric representation
y and y + d is decoded to the nearest codeword c′ using error correcting codes.
In this respect, a series of encryption methods have been developed to account for the inherent
variability of biometric signals. Apart from (Davida et al. (1998)), a methodology based on the
Slepian-Wolf theorem (Slepian & Wolf (1973)) for secure storage biometric via Low-Density
Parity Check (LDPC) codes was presented in (Martinian et al. (2005)). The multimedia
authentication problem in the presence of noise was investigated, the theoretical limits of
the system were identified, and the tradeoff among fidelity, robustness, and security was
discussed. This approach provides intuition for the proposed method in this paper; the
biometric recognition problem is considered as the analogous of data transmission over a
communication channel, which determines the efficiency of the system. Interestingly, the
problem of coding distributed correlated sources has also attracted much interest in the field
of video coding recently. The same framework was also employed in (Draper et al. (2007))
in order to secure fingerprint biometrics, image authentication (Yao-Chung et al. (2007)) and
biometric authentication as a wire-tap problem (Cohen & Zemor (2004)).
In the seminal work of (Pradhan & Ramchandran (2003)), the distributed source coding using
syndromes scheme was proposed. Based on this work, the field of distributed video coding
(Girod et al. (2005)) has emerged as a new trend in video coding. Finally, an interesting
approach of applying the LDPC methodology in multimodal biometric systems has been
proposed in (Argyropoulos et al. (2009)).
Similarly to above, one of the major concerns in applications that grant access based on a
password, a pin or a token, is the protection of the original data to prevent malicious use from
those who try to access them by fraudulent means. Although this problem in such systems
has been investigated in depth and sophisticated encryption methods have been developed
(Stallings (2006)), a significant issue remains the possibility of having the password stolen or
forgotten. Thus, methods which enable a biometric-related key have been proposed (Álvarez
et al. (2009)). Thus, the required pin is always carried by the user, since it is encoded on
himself.
1.2 Contribution
In the current chapter, a novel framework for activity related authentication in secure
environments based on distributed source coding principles and automatically extracted
biometric keys is proposed. The main novelty is the development of an integrated framework
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password, a pin or a token, is the protection of the original data to prevent malicious use from
those who try to access them by fraudulent means. Although this problem in such systems
has been investigated in depth and sophisticated encryption methods have been developed
(Stallings (2006)), a significant issue remains the possibility of having the password stolen or
forgotten. Thus, methods which enable a biometric-related key have been proposed (Álvarez
et al. (2009)). Thus, the required pin is always carried by the user, since it is encoded on
himself.
1.2 Contribution
In the current chapter, a novel framework for activity related authentication in secure
environments based on distributed source coding principles and automatically extracted
biometric keys is proposed. The main novelty is the development of an integrated framework
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that utilizes biometric key based encryption, in order to assist the channel decoding
process and to boost the system’s recognition performance. It is shown that the proposed
system increases the security of the stored templates and ensures privacy of personal
data, while indirectly provides “hybrid” fusion between static and dynamic biometric traits
towards improved recognition results. Moreover, unobtrusive, multimodal, on-the-move
biometric authentication is presented and evaluated in a bimodal scenario, which utilizes two
behavioural traits of the user. Namely, the gait and the activity-related motion trajectories
of the head and the hands during specific movements which are seen to provide a powerful
auxiliary biometric trait are inspected in terms of biometric means for user authentication.
2. Proposed methodology
The architecture of the proposed biometric recognition framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
Initially, from the captured gait image sequence, the moving silhouettes are extracted, the
shadows are removed and the gait cycle is estimated using state-of-art (SoA) algorithms
(Ioannidis et al. (2007)), (Cucchiara et al. (2001)). Using a stereoscopic camera, we detect
those frames in the sequence, whereby the user is standing and we discard them from those
where the user is walking. Then the visual hull of the moving silhouette is extracted using
disparity estimation. Once a view normalization is applied by rotating the silhouette, the
3D reconstructed silhouettes are denoised via spatiotemporal filtering, in order to improve
their quality. Finally, two SoA geometric descriptors are extracted based on the sequence Gait
Energy Image (GEI).
Fig. 1. System Architecture.
The gait recognition follows the principle of a model-free, feature-based analysis of the
extracted human silhouettes, whereby geometric methods implement a robust classifier. In
the following, the activity-related recognition is performed on the users’ movements while
they interact with a security panel installed at the end of the corridor. The extracted motion
trajectories that are used as the user’s biometric traits are classified by a Dynamic Time
Warping classifier and its result is finally fused with the corresponding gait results at the
score level towards an overall recognition outcome.
3. Behavioural biometrics
As it has already been mentioned, the development a novel biometric recognition method
or the improvement of current State of Art (SoA) methodologies in this area, are not within
the scope of the current work. In this context, a set of simple but robust activity-related
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recognition modules have been utilized in the context of the proposed security framework in
order to build a behavioural multimodal recognition system, where the proposed enhanced
security template framework (see Section 4) could be tested and evaluated.
In particular, the first biometric modality consists of SoA gait recognition methodology
(Ioannidis et al. (2007)) that bases on features extracted from spatiotemporal gait patterns.
Similarly, the second modality that has been utilized refers to a novel activity-related concept
that has been initially proposed in (Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)) and
deals with the motion related traits left by the user during the performance of some simple
activities that are performed on a regular basis. Both aforementioned modalities are not only
directly related to the users’ physiology, but they are also highly governed by the users’
habitual response to external stimuli. Thus, they have been seen to provide significant
recognition capacity, both as stand-alones, as well as in multimodal recognition systems
(Drosou, Ioannidis, Moustakas & Tzovaras (2010)).
For the convenience of the reader, a short functional description of the aforementioned
modalities is included hereafter. Before presenting the security framework, which is the main
contribution of the current work, a short description of the utilized biometric modalities is
included.
3.1 Gait recognition
Let the term “gallery” refer to the set of reference sequences, whereas the term “probe” stands
for the test sequences to be verified or identified, in both presented modalities.
Initially, the walking human binary silhouette is extracted as described in (Ioannidis et al.
(2007)). The feature extraction process of the gait sequences is based on the Radial Integration
Transformation (RIT) and the Circular Integration Transform (CIT) (Ioannidis et al. (2007)),
but instead of applying those transforms on the binary silhouette sequences themselves, the
Gait Energy Images (GEI) are utilized, which have been proven from one hand to achieve
remarkable recognition performance and on the other hand to speed up the gait recognition
(Han et al. (2006)) (Yu et al. (2010)).
Given the extracted binary gait silhouette images I� and each gait cycles k, the gray level (GEI)









where CL is the length of the gait cycle and k refer to the gait cycles extracted in the current
gait image sequence.
Fig. 2. Gait Energy Images from several users.
The RIT and CIT transforms are applied on the GEI, in order to construct the gait template
for each user, as shown in Figure 3 in according to the following equations:
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The RIT and CIT transforms are applied on the GEI, in order to construct the gait template
for each user, as shown in Figure 3 in according to the following equations:
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GEI(r0 + jΔu · cos(tΔθ), y0 + jΔu · sin(tΔθ))
for t = 1, ..., T with T = 360o/Δθ
(3)
for t = 1, ..., T with T = 360o/Δθ, where Δθ and Δu are the constant step sizes of the distance
u and angle θ and J is the number of the pixels that coincide with the line that has orientation
R and are positioned between the center of gravity of the silhouette and the end of the image
in that direction.
Fig. 3. Applying the RIT (left) and CIT (right) transforms on a Gait Energy Image using the
Center of Gravity as its origin.
Similarly, CIT is defined as the integral of a function f (x, y) along a circle curve h(ρ) with
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where du is the arc length over the path of integration and θ is the corresponding angle.
The center of the silhouette is again used as the origin for the CIT. The discrete form of the CIT







GEI(x0 + kΔρ · cos(tΔθ), y0 + kΔρ · sin(tΔθ)) (5)
for k = 1, ..., K with T = 360o/Δθ, where Δρ, and Δθ are the constant step sizes of the
radius and angle variables and finally KΔρ is the radius of the smallest circle that encloses
the grayscaled GEI (Figure 2).
The extracted RIT and CIT feature vectors are then concatenated, in order to form a single 1D
biometric trait.
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3.1.1 Matching
The comparison between the number of gallery GGEI and probe PGEI gait cycles for a specific
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whereby || · || is the L2-norm between the sG and sP values of the corresponding extracted
feature (i.e. RIT & CIT) for the gallery and the probe collections, respectively.
3.2 Activity-related recognition
The proposed framework extends the applicability of activity-related biometric traits
(Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)), and investigates their feasibility in user
authentication applications.
In (Kale et al. (2002)) and (Drosou, Moustakas & Tzovaras (2010)), it is claimed that the traits
of a subject’s movements during an activity that involves reaching and interacting with an
environmental object can be very characteristic for recognition of his/her identity. Indeed,
given the major or minor physiological differences between users’ bodies in combination
with their individual inherent behavioural or habitual way of moving and acting it has been
reported that there is increased authentication potential in common everyday activities such
as answering a phone call, etc.
In the following, an improved activity-related recognition framework is proposed, that
employs a novel method for the normalization of the trajectories of the user’s tracked points
of interest. The proposed algorithm also introduces a warping method that compensates
for small displacements of the environmental objects and has no effect on the behavioural
information of the movement at all.
As of today, activity related biometrics, where the activity is associated with reaching and
interacting with objects, have always assumed a fixed environment (Drosou, Moustakas &
Tzovaras (2010)), which is not always the case in real life scenarios. However, significant
performance degradations can be observed due to the small variances in the interaction
setting, which are introduced by the arbitrary position of the environmental objects in respect
to the user at each trial. Thus, a post-processing algorithm towards the improvement of the
overall authentication performance that can be employed into biometric systems which utilize
the reaching and interacting concept, is presented in the following.
3.2.1 Motion trajectory extraction
The core of the proposed authentication system used on dynamic motion tracking (4f) is
extensively described in (Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)) and is briefly
described in the following so as to make the paper self-contained. The userŠs movements
are recorded by a stereo camera and the raw captured images are processed, in order to track
the users head and hands via the successive application of filtering masks on the captured
image.
Specifically, a skin-colour mask (Gomez & Morales (2002)) (4a) combined with a motion-mask
(Bobick & Davis (2001)) (Figure 4d) can provide the location of the palms, while the head
can be accurately tracked via a combination of a head detection algorithm (Viola & Jones
(2004)) enhanced by a mean-shift object tracking algorithm (Ramesh & Meer (2000)) (4b).
Given the pre-calibrated set of CCD sensors mounted on the stereo camera, the real 3D
information can be easily calculated first by performing disparity estimation (4c) from the
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Fig. 4. Tracking methodology: a) Skin filtering - b) Head Tracking - c) Disparity image - d)
Motion Detection - e) Possible hands’ locations - f) Motion trajectories.
input stereoscopic image sequence and then by mapping the 2.5D information onto the 3D
space. After post-processing (Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)) that is applied
on the raw tracked points, based on moving average window and Kalman filtering, equally
sized and smooth 3D motion trajectories are extracted (Figure 5), which are then used as
activity related biometric traits for proposed modality.
A motion trajectory for a certain limb l (head or palms) is considered as a 3D N-tuple vector
sl(t) = (xl(t), yl(t), zl(t)) that corresponds to the x,y,z-axes location of limbs center of gravity
at each time instance t of an N − f rame sequence. The x,y and z data of the trajectories sl,
are concatenated into a single vector and all vectors, produced by the limbs that take part in a
specific activity c form the trajectory matrix Sc. Each repetition of the same activity by a user
creates a new matrix. Both gallery and probe user-specific set of matrices are subsequently
used as input to the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm 3.2.2 that has been utilized as
classifier for the current biometric modality, in order to provide an authentication score with
respect to the claimed ID (gallery).
3.2.2 Matching via DTW
DTW is used for calculating a metric about the dissimilarity between two (feature) vectors.
It is based on the difference cost that is associated with the matching path computed via
dynamic programming, namely the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm. The DTW
algorithm can provide either a valuable tool for stretching, compressing or aligning time
shifted signals (Sakoe & Chiba (1990)) or a metric for the similarity between two vectors
(Miguel-Hurtado et al. (2008)). Specifically, it has been widely used in a series of matching
problems, varying from speech processing (Sakoe & Chiba (1990)) to biometric recognition
applications (Boulgouris et al. (2004)). The matching between the two vectors is done and a
path is found using a rectangular grid (Figure 6).
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Fig. 5. 3D Motion Trajectories extracted during a “Phone Conversation” activity.
A short description of the functionality of DTW algorithm for comparing two
one-dimensional vectors (probe & gallery signal) is presented below:
The probe vector p of length L is aligned along the X-axis while the gallery vector g of length
L� is aligned along the Y-axis of a rectangular grid respectively. In our case L ≡ L� as a result
of the preprocessing steps (Section 3.2.1). Each node (i,j) on the grid represents a match of the
ith element of p with the jth element of g. The matching values of each p(i),g(j) pair are stored
in a cost matrix CM associated with the grid. c(1, 1) = 0 by definition and all warping paths
are a concatenation of nodes starting from node (1, 1) to node (L, L).
The main task is to find the path for which the least cost is associated. Thus the difference cost
between the two feature vectors is provided. In this respect, let (y1(k), y2(k)) represent a node
on a warping path at the instance t of matching. The full cost D(y1, y2) associated to a path
starting from node (1, 1) and ending at node (y1(K), y2(K)) can be calculated as:





Accordingly, the problem of finding the optimal path can be reduced to finding this sequence
of nodes (y1(k), y2(k)), which minimizes D(y1(k), y2(k)) along the complete path.
Fig. 6. Dynamic Time Warping Grid.
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As stated by Sakoe and Chiba in (Sakoe & Chiba (1990)), a good path is unlikely to wander
very far from the diagonal. Thus, the path with minimum difference cost, would be the one
that draws the thinnest surface around the diagonal as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 6.
In the ideal case of perfect matching between two identical vectors, the area of the drawn
surface would be eliminated. The size of the closed area SA around the diagonal can be
calculated by counting the nodes V(pi, qj) between the path and the diagonal at every row




1 , if (i > j) of N(pi, qj)
for j = j, j + 1, ..., j + d, where d = i − j
1 , if (i < j) of N(pi, qj)
for i = i, i + 1, ..., i + d, , where d = i − j
1 , if (i = j) of N(pi, qj)
0 , otherwise
(8)
Thus, the value V(pi, qj) = 1 to these nodes. On the contrary, all other nodes lying outside
the closed area will be assigned the value V(pi, qj) = 0. Then, the total area SA created by the










Finally the total dissimilarity measure DM between vector p and g (Equation 9) can be
computed as the product of area size Sc and the minimum full cost D(L, L) (Equation 7):
DM = SA · Dmin(L, L) (10)
4. Biometric template security architecture
As far as the security of the biometric data is regarded, multiple feature descriptors from the
gait modality and the activity-related modality are initially encoded via a Low Density Parity
Check (LDPC) encoder. In the following, the parity bits of the activity-related modality are
encrypted via a biometric-dependent key, so that double secured, non-sensitive biometric data
is stored in the database or in smart cards, which are useless to any potential attackers of the
system.
The proposed method, which resembles a channel coding problem with noisy side
information at the decoder, is shown to improve the authentication rates as they are provided
from the modality-specific classifiers. Additionally to the already known key-encryption
methodologies, the encryption of the parity bits of the second modality takes place before their
storage to the database. The novelty lies in the fact the personal encryption/decryption key
used, is inherent in the biometric trait of the first modality and thus, it remains unknown even
to each user. Specifically, in the implemented scenario the biometric key is selected according
to the height and the stride length of the user.
The architecture (Figure 7) of the proposed security is thoroughly described in the next two
Sections, whereby a functional analysis of the utilized distinct components is provided.
54 Recent Application in Biometrics Biometric Keys for the Encryptionof Multimodal Signatures 11
Fig. 7. Security subsystem Architecture.
4.1 Encoding scheme
The first step towards biometric template protection in the current multimodal biometric
cryptosystem is based on distributed source coding principles and formulates biometric
authentication as a channel coding problem with noisy side information at the decoder, as
presented in (Argyropoulos et al. (2009)). The main idea lies on the fact that perturbations
in the representation of the biometric features at different times can be modelled as a
noisy channel, which corrupts the original signal. Thus, the enrolment and authentication
procedures of a biometric system are considered as the encoding and decoding stages of
a communication system, respectively. The proposed formulation enables the exploitation
of the Slepian-Wolf theorem to identify the theoretical limits of the system and minimize
the size of the templates. Moreover, casting the problem of biometric authentication as a
communication problem allows the use of well known techniques in communication systems
such as the exploitation of correlation (or noise) channel statistics by integrating them in the
soft decoding process of the channel decoder.
The architecture of the multimodal biometric authentication system is included in Figure 7.
At the enrolment stage, the feature vectors Fgait and Factivity from the Gait and the Activity -
related modality are initially extracted as described in the previous section. Then, the extracted
feature vectors are quantized and encoded using an (n, k) LDPC channel encoder. It must be
stressed that the rate of the LDPC encoders in Figure 7 is different for each modality and is
calculated according to the Slepian-Wolf theorem
RX ≥ H(X|Y) RY ≥ H(Y|X) RX + RY ≥ H(X, Y) (11)
where RX and RY the achievable rates, H(X|Y) and H(Y|X) are the conditional entropies and
H(X, Y) is the joint entropy of X and Y gallery and probe feature vectors, respectively.
The resulting codewords Sgait and Sactivity comprise the biometric templates of the suggested
modalities and are stored to the database of the system. Thus, if the database of the biometric
system is attacked, the attacker can not access the original raw biometric data or their
corresponding features but only Sgait and Sactivity, which are not capable of revealing sensitive
information about the users.
Similarly the gait and activity-related feature vectors F�gait and F
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activity are extracted and
quantized at the authentication stage. Subsequently, the syndromes Sgait and Sactivity which
correspond to the claimed ID are retrieved from the database and are fed to the LDPC
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As stated by Sakoe and Chiba in (Sakoe & Chiba (1990)), a good path is unlikely to wander
very far from the diagonal. Thus, the path with minimum difference cost, would be the one
that draws the thinnest surface around the diagonal as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 6.
In the ideal case of perfect matching between two identical vectors, the area of the drawn
surface would be eliminated. The size of the closed area SA around the diagonal can be
calculated by counting the nodes V(pi, qj) between the path and the diagonal at every row




1 , if (i > j) of N(pi, qj)
for j = j, j + 1, ..., j + d, where d = i − j
1 , if (i < j) of N(pi, qj)
for i = i, i + 1, ..., i + d, , where d = i − j
1 , if (i = j) of N(pi, qj)
0 , otherwise
(8)
Thus, the value V(pi, qj) = 1 to these nodes. On the contrary, all other nodes lying outside
the closed area will be assigned the value V(pi, qj) = 0. Then, the total area SA created by the










Finally the total dissimilarity measure DM between vector p and g (Equation 9) can be
computed as the product of area size Sc and the minimum full cost D(L, L) (Equation 7):
DM = SA · Dmin(L, L) (10)
4. Biometric template security architecture
As far as the security of the biometric data is regarded, multiple feature descriptors from the
gait modality and the activity-related modality are initially encoded via a Low Density Parity
Check (LDPC) encoder. In the following, the parity bits of the activity-related modality are
encrypted via a biometric-dependent key, so that double secured, non-sensitive biometric data
is stored in the database or in smart cards, which are useless to any potential attackers of the
system.
The proposed method, which resembles a channel coding problem with noisy side
information at the decoder, is shown to improve the authentication rates as they are provided
from the modality-specific classifiers. Additionally to the already known key-encryption
methodologies, the encryption of the parity bits of the second modality takes place before their
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used, is inherent in the biometric trait of the first modality and thus, it remains unknown even
to each user. Specifically, in the implemented scenario the biometric key is selected according
to the height and the stride length of the user.
The architecture (Figure 7) of the proposed security is thoroughly described in the next two
Sections, whereby a functional analysis of the utilized distinct components is provided.
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Fig. 7. Security subsystem Architecture.
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where RX and RY the achievable rates, H(X|Y) and H(Y|X) are the conditional entropies and
H(X, Y) is the joint entropy of X and Y gallery and probe feature vectors, respectively.
The resulting codewords Sgait and Sactivity comprise the biometric templates of the suggested
modalities and are stored to the database of the system. Thus, if the database of the biometric
system is attacked, the attacker can not access the original raw biometric data or their
corresponding features but only Sgait and Sactivity, which are not capable of revealing sensitive
information about the users.
Similarly the gait and activity-related feature vectors F�gait and F
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quantized at the authentication stage. Subsequently, the syndromes Sgait and Sactivity which
correspond to the claimed ID are retrieved from the database and are fed to the LDPC
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decoders. A similar multimodal approach is thoroughly described in (Argyropoulos et al.
(2009)). Thereby, two biometric traits, i.e. face characteristics and face, have been combined
via concatenation of their feature vectors. Specifically, once the first modality was successfully
decoded, the decoded feature vector was concatenated to probe feature vector of the second
modality. The full feature vector was fed to a second decoder. Thus, enhanced security was
offered, since the second decoder requires that both feature vector resembles the gallery input.
In the proposed approach, the system deals with two behavioural biometric traits separately,
as far as the LDPC algorithm is regarded. However, it must be noted that the two biometric
templates in the proposed scheme are not secured independently from each other.
The basic guidelines of the LDPC encoding/decoding scheme will be presented below in
short, in order to provide a self-consistent paper.
Given the unimodal protection scheme had been used for every biometric modality
independently the rate required to code each feature vector. This in turn would affect the
size of the templates and the performance of the system.
Even if liveness detection is out of the scope of the paper, the multimodal framework provides
tools to guarantee that even if the user is wearing a mask, in order to fake the system, he/she
should also mimic the gait modality. Thus, we are not proposing a solution that will support
liveness detection at the sensor level, however, we can support security at the signal level due
to the multimodal nature of the proposed framework.
Initially, at the enrolment stage, the biometric signatures of an individual for gait and
activityrelated modalities are obtained. The extracted features form the vector Fi = [ f1, . . . , fk],
whereby i ∈ gait, activity related and fi ∈ Rk . The feature vector Fi is then uniformly
transformed from the continuous to the discrete domain of 2L levels through the function
u : Rk → Qk whereby Q = 0, 1. . . , l − 1. Each one of the resulting vectors q = u(Fi) is fed
to the Slepian.Wolf encoder, which performs the mapping e : Qk → Cn where C = {0, 1}
outputs the codeword c = e(q), c ∈ Cn.
As already mentioned, herein the Slepian-Wolf algorithm has been implemented by a
systematic LDPC encoder (Gallager (1963)) (see Figure 8). LDPC codes were selected due
to their excellent error detecting and correcting capabilities. They also provide near-capacity
performance over a large range of channels while simultaneously admitting implementable
decoders. An LDPC code (n, k) is a linear block code of codeword length n and information
block length k which is defined by a sparse (n − k)× n parity matrix H, where n − k denotes
the parity bits produced by the encoder. The code rate is defined as r = k/n. A code is a
systematic code if every codeword consists of the original k − bit information vector followed
by (n − k) parity-bits. In the proposed system, the joint bit-plane encoding scheme of (Girod
et al. (2005)) was employed to avoid encoding and storing the L bit-planes of the vector q
separately.
Fig. 8. Encoding via a Parity Check Matrix.
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Subsequently, the k systematic bits of the codeword ci are discarded and only the syndrome
s, that is the n − k parity bits of the codeword c, is stored to the biometric database. Thus, the
biometric templates of an enrolled user consist of the syndromes s = [ck+1. . . cn], s ∈ C(n− k),
and their size is n − k. It must be stressed that the rate of the two LDPC encoders is different
because the statistical properties of the two modalities are different.
Similarly to the enrollment procedure the biometric feature vector F�i is obtained quantized
at the authentication stage. This, together with encoded syndrome sencodedi are fed to the
LDPC decoder. The decoding function d : C(n − k) × Rk → Qk combines Fi with the
corresponding syndromes which are retrieved from the biometric database and correspond
to the claimed identity I. The decoder employs belief-propagation (Ryan (n.d.)) to decode the
received codewords.
If the errors introduced in the side information with respect to the originally encoded signal
are within the error correcting capabilities of the channel decoder then the correct codeword
is output after an experimentally set (Nc=30) number of iterations and the transaction is
considered as a client transaction. To detect whether a codeword is correctly decoded we
add 16 Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) bits at the beginning of the feature vector Fi. By
examining these bits the integrity of the original data is detected. If the codeword is correctly
decoded, then the transaction is considered as genuine. Otherwise, if the decoder can not
decode the codeword (Niter ≥ Nc) a special symbol ∅ is output and the transaction is
considered as an impostor transaction.
From the above, it is obvious that the level of security and the performance of the system
significantly bases on the number of the parity bits in syndrome si, apart from the error
correcting performance of the channel code.
On the one hand, a channel code with low code rate exhibits high error correcting capabilities,
which results in the decoding of very noisy signals. This means, that the channel decoder will
be able to decode the codeword even if the noise in the biometric signal has been induced by
impostors. Additionally, will consist of many bits and will be more difficult to forge. On the
other hand, channel codes of high code rate exhibit limited error-correcting capabilities and
reduce the security of the system since the parity bits produced by the channel encoder consist
of a few bits. Thus, the design of an effective biometric system based on the channel codes
involves the careful selection of the channel code rate to achieve the optimal trade-off between
performance and security. In this respect, a method for further securing the syndrome si
is proposed in the following section (4.2). Thus, both the security of a long syndrome is
preserved, while improved performance is provided.
4.2 Encryption scheme
The second phase of the security template algorithm, that is implemented via an encryption
algorithm (“Keygenerator�� box in Figure 7) has a dual mission. On the one hand, it further
ensures the security of the stored biometric syndromes Sgait and Sactivity (see Section 4.1) and
on the other hand, it provides a novel method for fusing static physiological information with
dynamic behavioural traits. An interesting novelty introduced by the specific methodology
is that the user is no longer obliged to memorize a pin, in order to secure his data. On the
contrary, the personal password is automatically extracted from a series of Nb soft biometric
features. Thus, the password can neither be stolen nor copied. The utilized methodology is
presented below.
In the current implementation of the proposed framework Nb = 2 soft biometric
characteristics have been included. However, the framework can be easily extended to
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because the statistical properties of the two modalities are different.
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at the authentication stage. This, together with encoded syndrome sencodedi are fed to the
LDPC decoder. The decoding function d : C(n − k) × Rk → Qk combines Fi with the
corresponding syndromes which are retrieved from the biometric database and correspond
to the claimed identity I. The decoder employs belief-propagation (Ryan (n.d.)) to decode the
received codewords.
If the errors introduced in the side information with respect to the originally encoded signal
are within the error correcting capabilities of the channel decoder then the correct codeword
is output after an experimentally set (Nc=30) number of iterations and the transaction is
considered as a client transaction. To detect whether a codeword is correctly decoded we
add 16 Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) bits at the beginning of the feature vector Fi. By
examining these bits the integrity of the original data is detected. If the codeword is correctly
decoded, then the transaction is considered as genuine. Otherwise, if the decoder can not
decode the codeword (Niter ≥ Nc) a special symbol ∅ is output and the transaction is
considered as an impostor transaction.
From the above, it is obvious that the level of security and the performance of the system
significantly bases on the number of the parity bits in syndrome si, apart from the error
correcting performance of the channel code.
On the one hand, a channel code with low code rate exhibits high error correcting capabilities,
which results in the decoding of very noisy signals. This means, that the channel decoder will
be able to decode the codeword even if the noise in the biometric signal has been induced by
impostors. Additionally, will consist of many bits and will be more difficult to forge. On the
other hand, channel codes of high code rate exhibit limited error-correcting capabilities and
reduce the security of the system since the parity bits produced by the channel encoder consist
of a few bits. Thus, the design of an effective biometric system based on the channel codes
involves the careful selection of the channel code rate to achieve the optimal trade-off between
performance and security. In this respect, a method for further securing the syndrome si
is proposed in the following section (4.2). Thus, both the security of a long syndrome is
preserved, while improved performance is provided.
4.2 Encryption scheme
The second phase of the security template algorithm, that is implemented via an encryption
algorithm (“Keygenerator�� box in Figure 7) has a dual mission. On the one hand, it further
ensures the security of the stored biometric syndromes Sgait and Sactivity (see Section 4.1) and
on the other hand, it provides a novel method for fusing static physiological information with
dynamic behavioural traits. An interesting novelty introduced by the specific methodology
is that the user is no longer obliged to memorize a pin, in order to secure his data. On the
contrary, the personal password is automatically extracted from a series of Nb soft biometric
features. Thus, the password can neither be stolen nor copied. The utilized methodology is
presented below.
In the current implementation of the proposed framework Nb = 2 soft biometric
characteristics have been included. However, the framework can be easily extended to
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any arbitrary number of soft biometric features, depending on the utilized modalities. In
particular, the Height and the StrideLength (see Figure 9) of the user have been utilized hereby
according to the following extendable methodology.
Fig. 9. Stride length (left) and Height (Right) of a user drawn on his/her Gait Energy Image
(GEI).
It has been experimentally noticed that the measurement regarding the user’s Stride are much
more noisy than the ones for his/her Height. Thus, the ratio of HeightStride has been preferred
over pure Stride scores, in order to provide a more uniform score distribution for the second
soft-biometric trait.
First, a two dimensional hash table is formed, whereby its dimension is limited by the
minimum and maximum expected value of each soft biometric trait, as illustrated in Figure
10/left. The resolution f heights and f strides of the grid in each dimension respectively is scalable,
in order to be optimally adjusted to the needs of each implementation of the framework (see
Section 6). Thereafter, a unique biometric key is estimated for each cell on the grid (or cube or
hypercube in the case of Nb ≥ 2), according to the corresponding Soft Biometric values. Thus,
we can write for the general case of Nb available soft biometric traits








). vi stands for the extracted value of the ith Soft Biometric trait.
In this context, it is expected that the same user will always obtain the same biometric key,
since his soft biometric properties will always assign his identity with the same hypercube in
the grid.
In the following, the syndromes Si of the ith modality are encrypted using the Rijndael
implementation (Daemen & Rijmen (1999)) of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Specifically, the 128 − bit extracted key is used to shuffle the syndrome bits. Simple
zero-padding technique is performed on the syndrome bits vector, in the cases where their
number is not a whole multiplier of 27 bits. Similarly, a 256 − bit key could have been
extracted, however it has been experimentally seen that it offers a bad trade-off between
computational resources and security improvement.
In this respect, the biometric key is used to shuffle/deshuffle the syndromes for the claimed
ID in the enrollment/authentication phase of the biometric system, respectively. It is easy
to understand that most probably an impostor would be assigned to a different cell on the
grid, given his different soft biometric characteristics with respect to the claimed ID. Thus, the
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Fig. 10. 2D Soft Biometric Grid (Left) - 3D Soft Biometric Grid (Right)
requested syndrome bits will be wrongly decrypted and the applied dynamic biometric trait
will never match the decoded one (see Section 4.1).
5. Score fusion
In order to provide an overall distance score between the user requesting access and the
corresponding claimed ID, a fusion of the partial matching distances for each modality has
to be performed. The fusion approach that has been utilized for the current biometric system
is based on score level fusion. Thus, the optimal fusion score, that would combine unequally
amounts of information from each RP is defined as follows




wjsj = w1s1 + w2s2 + . . . + wNsN (13)
whereby W is the weight coefficient matrix with N wj elements and Sj the score matrix having
as elements the corresponding partial matching distances sj.
In this respect, the most common problem that has to be solved in a score-level fusion
approach is the optimal estimation of matrix W. Given the general structure of a multimodal
biometric system, it is expected that the authentication capacity would be higher for
some modalities than for some others. Thus, a rational way for defining the partial
weight coefficients wj for each modality is to assign a value proportional to their overall
authentication performance, as follows:




where EERj stands for the Equal Error Rate score for the jth modality.
For the current bi-modal (N = 2) biometric system, the values for each wj are defined as:
w1 = 1 −
EER1
EER1 + EER2
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In order to provide normalized scores in the range of values for each modality, all scores have







where snormk is the normalized score value, sk the non-normalized score, s
max
k the maximum
possible score value and Tk an experimentally set threshold for the kth modality; k ∈
{RIT, CIT, DTW}.
6. Results
The current Section starts with a short description of the database on which the experiments
have been carried out. In the following, the identification and authentication results of the
presented framework implementation are exhibited and qualitatively evaluated. A short
discussion about the proposed framework is also included.
6.1 Database
The evaluation of the proposed secure multimodal biometric framework has been performed
on the proprietary ACTIBIO-dataset (ACTIBIO ICT STREP (2008)). The current annotated
database was captured in an ambient intelligence indoor environment and consists of 29
subjects, performing a series of everyday workplace & office activities. The workplace
recordings include 29 subjects walking in various paths of 6m, while being recorded by a
stereoscopic camera that was placed 2.5m away from the walking path and lateral to the
walking direction. In order to test the permanence of the biometric features, the recordings
have been repeated in a second session, few months after the first one.
Regarding the office recordings, the same 29 subjects have been recorded in an ambient
intelligence (AmI) indoor environment, while they have been performing a series of everyday
office activities with no special protocol, such as a phone conversation, typing, talking to a
microphone panel and drinking water. Each subject repeated the same sequence of activities
8 times in total, split in two sessions while a manual annotation of the database has followed.
Among the five cameras that have been recording the users from different view-angles, only
the recordings from a frontal stereoscopic camera have been used for the current work.
Within the current work, the traits of the aforementioned modalities have been combined,
in order to create 29 user-specific multimodal signatures. In this respect, each subject has
been registered to the system (gallery signatures) by using his gait biometric signature together
with his behavioural response during a phone conversation. Despite the fact that the current
dataset does also include complicated gait scenarios, whereby the subject is carrying a bag
or a coat, the simplest version has been utilized within the presented work. Similarly, only
the “Phone Conversation” activity has been used from the office environment. Similarly, the
recordings from each modality for a different repetition have been combined in order to form
the probe signatures for the system.
6.2 Authentication & verification results
As it has already been stressed out the major contribution of the current framework is that
it allows higher level of security of the biometric templates stored in the database, while
higher recognition performance is simultaneously provide via the encoding of soft biometrics.
The improved level of security can be easily noticed, when considering that the information
stored in the database is encrypted. In this respect, not data can be retrieved from the
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database without providing the correct key. Further, even if this encryption step is somehow
bypassed, the obtained data remain still of no use to the attacker, since they reveal no biometric
information as explained in Section 4.1.
Moreover, in order to illustrate the advances performed in the recognition performance
via indirect fusion/encoding of the soft biometric traits with the dynamic ones, the initial
recognition capabilities of the utilized traits is shown in Figure 11. In the same Figures
the reader can notice a slight degradation in the recognition performance of the activity
related modality, when the templates that are stored in the database are secured via the
LDPC encoding algorithm (Section 4.1). Contrary to the 1D feature vector of the gait
modality, activity related feature vectors are much more complex. Thus, a degradation
in the authentication performance is more likely due to the noisy errors at the decoding.
Moreover, a degradation is expected, since this is the trade off for adding enhanced security
in the biometric system. Specifically, such a deterioration have been mainly caused by the
unintended reconstruction of an impostor’s feature vector, so that it resembles a genuine user.
Fig. 11. EER Scores (left) and Identification performance (right) of the proposed modalities
prior to encryption.
As it has been mentioned in Section 4.2 the current framework allows a scalable resolution
of the hash table that is used for encryption, so that optimal performance of the system is
achieved, given different soft biometrics. In this respect, the Optimal Functional Point (OFP) of
the current system has been set according to the results illustrated in Figures 12. Specifically,
one can notice that an intense degradation of the system’s recognition performance for high
resolution values (≡ large number of available keys in Hash Matrix of Figure 10left). This
is caused by the noisy measurements of the soft biometric trait in different repetitions. For
instance, let us assume a user that has been registered to the system with a vHeight = 1.79 and
vStride = 1.62. He/she would be assigned the key K(17, 14). A noisy measurement of his soft
biometrics at the authentication stage might result that his stored syndrome s was attempted
to be decoded by a different key Key(nprobe1 , n
probe
2 ) �= K(17, 14). Thus, the decrypting would
never be successful and the recognition would fail. The reason for which the EER scores
of the activity related modality exhibits more fluctuations than the one of the gait bases on
the following fact: The soft biometric measurements of some impostors in the authentication
stage did not only lie within the same hash bin as the client, but also their activity related traits
managed to be decoded via LDPC using the syndrome of the claimed user’s ID.
In this concept, it can be concluded that high resolution values, which refer to a big number
of bins in the hash table, are intolerant to noisy measurements. On the other hand, small
resolution values may result to the fact that all subjects are assigned to the same key K and
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In order to provide normalized scores in the range of values for each modality, all scores have
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database without providing the correct key. Further, even if this encryption step is somehow
bypassed, the obtained data remain still of no use to the attacker, since they reveal no biometric
information as explained in Section 4.1.
Moreover, in order to illustrate the advances performed in the recognition performance
via indirect fusion/encoding of the soft biometric traits with the dynamic ones, the initial
recognition capabilities of the utilized traits is shown in Figure 11. In the same Figures
the reader can notice a slight degradation in the recognition performance of the activity
related modality, when the templates that are stored in the database are secured via the
LDPC encoding algorithm (Section 4.1). Contrary to the 1D feature vector of the gait
modality, activity related feature vectors are much more complex. Thus, a degradation
in the authentication performance is more likely due to the noisy errors at the decoding.
Moreover, a degradation is expected, since this is the trade off for adding enhanced security
in the biometric system. Specifically, such a deterioration have been mainly caused by the
unintended reconstruction of an impostor’s feature vector, so that it resembles a genuine user.
Fig. 11. EER Scores (left) and Identification performance (right) of the proposed modalities
prior to encryption.
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2 ) �= K(17, 14). Thus, the decrypting would
never be successful and the recognition would fail. The reason for which the EER scores
of the activity related modality exhibits more fluctuations than the one of the gait bases on
the following fact: The soft biometric measurements of some impostors in the authentication
stage did not only lie within the same hash bin as the client, but also their activity related traits
managed to be decoded via LDPC using the syndrome of the claimed user’s ID.
In this concept, it can be concluded that high resolution values, which refer to a big number
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Fig. 12. EER scores of the proposed modalities as a function of the HeightStride step.
thus, the encryption scheme would have no meaning. On the contrary, there is always an
functional point, whereby the recognition performance of the system is optimal.
Moreover, the reader can notice in Figure 12 that for the HeightStride step = 0.25 both modalities
achieve their authentication performance. Thus, this value can be considered the system’s
optimal functional point for a given Height resolution in the hash table, experimentally set at
f Heights .
Fig. 13. Client/Impostor Distributions for the gait modality at the optimal functional
point(left) and without Encryption(right) via the Biometric key.
Although there seems to be only small changes in the EER scores for small resolution values,
the distribution of the genuine/impostor scores significantly changes (see Figure 13).
Fig. 14. EER Scores (left) and Identification performance (right) of the proposed system.
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Given the optimal functional point of the encryption system, optimal fusion of the soft
biometrics with the dynamic traits has been also achieved. In this respect, the current test case
of the proposed framework has been evaluated in terms of its overall recognition performance,
by performing fusion between the two utilized behavioral biometrics (Sections 3.1 & 3.2) as
described in Section 5. The derived optimal recognition performance of the bimodal biometric
system system is illustrated in Figures 14, in terms of both authentication and identification
capacity.
Concluding, it must be noted that the potential of the proposed framework in terms of
recognition performance is significantly high. Given a larger number of soft biometrics,
an almost 1 − 1 proportion for keys-users can be achieved, which would lead to further
decreasing of the recognition error.
7. Conclusions
Summarizing, the advantages of the proposed method in terms of security and impact on
matching accuracy for recognition purposes have been thoroughly analyzed and discussed.
The performance of the proposed method is assessed in the context of ACTIBIO, an EU
Specific Targeted Research Project, where activity-related and gait biometrics are employed
in an unobtrusive application scenario for human recognition. The experimental evaluation
on a multimodal biometric database demonstrates the validity of the proposed framework.
Most important, the dual scope of the current framework has been illustrated. Specifically,
the utilization of the encryption algorithm does not only provide enhanced template security;
it does also provide indirect fusion with soft biometric characteristics and thus it improves
the recognition potential. Finally, the proposed user-specific biometric key, which exclusively
depends on the user’s biometry, increases the level of unobtrusiveness of the system, since the
user is not obliged anymore to memorize pins or to carry ID cards.
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security systems for information and physical objects. A number of researchers have studied 
the interaction between biometrics and cryptogra-phy, two potentially complementary 
security technologies (Hao et al., 2005). For such systems, the importance of authentication 
and identification subsystems is undeniable. One of the approaches to the implementation 
of authentication and identification subsystems is biometric systems. 
The process of creating biometric systems of authentication and identification has solved a 
large variety of problems among which the assurance of confidentiality and integrity of 
biometric information, which is by no means unimportant. As a rule, cryptographic 
transformations are used – encryption and electronic digital signature (EDS).  The analysis, 
carried out by the authors, has shown the prospectivity of algebraic curves theory for the 
implementation of cryptographic transformations. 
2.1 Elliptic curves 
The usage of elliptic curves (EC) for cryptographic purposes was first suggested by (Koblitz, 
1987) and (Miller, 1985).  
Basiri et al. (2004) present two algorithms for the arithmetic of cubic curves with a totally 
ramified prime at infinity. The first algorithm, inspired by Cantor's reduction for 
hyperelliptic curves, is easily implemented with a few lines of code, making use of a 
polynomial arithmetic package. 
In his research, Koblitz (1989) has proved the possibility of usage of hyperelliptic curves 
(HEC) in cryptographic applications. Their difference from EC is that for HEC the group 
(Jacobian) of more complex structures should be considered – divisors instead of curve 
points. It is known that HEC have a variety of advantages over EC: being a richer source of 
the Abelian groups (Koblitz, 1989; Menezes and Wu, 1998) they also use a base field of a 
smaller size (from the Abelian group, the size of which is defined by product of the base 
field size by a curve genus).  
2.2 Hyperelliptic curves 
Hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems (HCC for short) is a generalization of ECC. It has been 
drawing the attention of more and more researchers in recent years. The problem of how to 
decrease the amount of addition and scalar multiplication on the Jacobians of hyperelliptic 
curves so that the implementation speed can be improved is very important for the practical 
use of HCC (Zhang et al., 2001). 
During the time in which HEC cryptosystems were restricted to academic interest only, they 
had no practical application due to the high complexity of software and hardware 
implementation, low performance, absence of in-depth studies in the field of cryptoanalysis 
of such cryptosystems and the absence of comprehensible algorithms of cryptosystem 
parameters generation.  Active review research of papers (Koblitz, 1989; Menezes et al., 
1998; Lange 2002c; Matsuo et al., 2001; Miyamoto et al., 2002; Takahashi et al., 2002; Sugizaki 
et al. 2002, etc) has allowed us to overcome the majority of the described difficulties. The 
authors of publications, offer a variety of approaches which increase the performance of 
HEC cryptosystems essentially, and bring them close to the EC cryptosystems. 
2.3 Genus 2 HEC cryptosystems over prime fields 
The given research is devoted to the development of the approach (Cohen et al., 1998) and to 
the improved efficiency of genus 2 HEC cryptosystems over prime fields. 
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Scalar multiplication operation is used in encryption, decryption and electronic digital 
signature based on HEC. These computations are relatively expensive when implemented 
on low-power devices. A widely used standard method is the left-to-right binary method. In 
accordance with (Koblitz, 1989; Menezes et al., 1998; Lange 2002c; Matsuo et al., 2001; 
Miyamoto et al., 2002; Takahashi et al., 2002; Sugizaki et al. 2002; Lange, 2002; Kovtun and 
Zbitnev, 2004) the power consumption traces of divisor addition and doubling are not the 
same, they can easily be distinguished between these operations and derive the bit of scalar. 
The first method proposed, with resistance to the side channel attacks (SCA), is Coron’s 
dummy addition (CDA) (Coron, 1999). 
Several SCA-resistant scalar multiplication algorithms have been proposed that are faster 
than the CDA method. There are three basic approaches with SCA resistance: 
• The first is to use indistinguishable additions and doubling algorithms in scalar 
multiplication (Clavier and Joye, 2001). For example, Jacobi form and Hesse form of EC. 
However, this requires specially chosen EC and HEC curves and does not work for the 
standardized curves. 
• The second is the double-and-always-add approach. The CDA method is the simplest 
algorithm of this type. In paper (Okeya and Sakuri, 2000), the authors proposed to use 
the Montgomery form of EC and extended it to general curves (Brier and Joye, 2002). 
• The third approach is to use a special addition chain with a sequence of additions and 
doublings that does not depend on the bit information of the scalar (Izu and Takagi, 2002). 
In this paper, we are interested in scalar multiplication algorithms that do not require specially 
chosen curves and based on approach (Meloni, 2007) for genus 2 HEC over prime fields. 
3. Biometric cryptosystems 
In a generic cryptographic system the user authentication is possession based. That is, 
possession of the decrypting key is a sufficient evidence to establish user authenticity. 
Because cryptographic keys are long and random, (e.g., 128 bits for the advanced encryption 
standard (AES) (NIST, 2008; Stallings, 2003), they are difficult to memorize. As a result, the 
cryptographic keys are stored somewhere (for example, on a computer or a smart card) and 
released based on some alternative authentication (e.g., password) mechanism, that is, upon 
assuring that they are being released to the authorized users only. Most passwords are so 
simple that they can be easily guessed (especially based on social engineering methods) or 
broken by simple dictionary attacks (Klein, 1990). 
It is not surprising that the most commonly used password is the word “password”! Thus, the 
multimedia protected by the cryptographic algorithm is only as secure as the passwords 
(weakest link) used for user authentication that release the correct decrypting key(s). Simple 
passwords are easy to crack and, thus, compromise security; complex passwords are difficult 
to remember and, thus, are expensive to maintain. Users also have the tendency to write down 
complex passwords in easily accessible locations. Further, most people use the same password 
across different applications and, thus, if a single password is compromised, it may open 
many doors. Finally, passwords are unable to provide nonrepudiation; that is, when a 
password is shared with a friend, there is no way to know who the actual user is. This may 
eliminate the feasibility of countermeasures such as holding conniving legitimate users 
accountable in a court of law. Many of these limitations of the traditional passwords can be 
ameliorated by incorporation of better methods of user authentication. Biometric 
authentication (Jain et al., 1999; Maltoni et al., 2003) refers to verifying individuals based on 
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their physiological and behavioural characteristics such as face, fingerprint, hand geometry, 
iris, keystroke, signature, voice, etc. It is inherently more reliable than password-based 
authentication, as biometric characteristics cannot be lost or forgotten (cf. passwords being lost 
or forgotten); they are extremely difficult to copy, share, and distribute (cf. passwords being 
announced in hacker websites) and require the person being authenticated to be present.  
A brief comparison of some of the biometric identifiers based on seven factors is provided 
(Wayman, 2001):  
• universality (do all people have it?),  
• distinctiveness (can people be distinguished based on an identifier?),  
• permanence (how permanent is the identifier?), and  
• collectability (how well can the identifier be captured and quantified?) are properties of 
biometric identifiers.  
• performance (speed and accuracy), acceptability (willingness of people to use), and 
circumvention (foolproof) are attributes of biometric systems. 
4. Background 
Let's observe basic concepts of cryptosystems on HEC. More detailed information can be 
obtained from (Koblitz, 1989; Menezes and Wu, 1998). 
Let K  be a field and K  be the algebraic closure of K . Hyperelliptic curve C  of genus 1g ≥  
over K  is a set of points ( ),u v that satisfy the equation: 
 ( ) ( )
2:C v h u v f u+ = ,  ,k u v⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (1) 
and there are no solutions ( ),u v K K∈ ×  which simultaneously satisfy the equation (1) and 
the partial derivative equations with corresponding variables. 
 ( )2 0u h u+ = , ( ) ( ) 0h u v f u′ ′− =  (2) 
In case of genus 2 HEC, polynomials ( )f u and ( )h u  will be represented as:  




2 1 0h u h u h u h= + + , ,i jh f K∈ . (4) 
Divisor D  is a formal sum of points in C : 
..  p pPeCD m P m Z= ∈∑ (5) 
where only a finite number of the Pm  are non-zero. 
Divisor 0D∈D  is a principal divisor, if div( )D R=  for some rational function *( )R K C∈ . 
The set of all principal divisors, denotes ( ) {div(F) : ( )}CP K F K C= ∈ , in curve C  over K , 
moreover ( )CP K  is a subgroup of 
0D . Generally ( ) ( )CP C P K=  is called a group of principal 
divisors of curve C . The quotient group 0( ) div ( ) ( )C C CJ K K P K=  is called the Jacobian of the 
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curve C  over K . The quotient group ( ) ( ) ( )0divJ C C P C=  is called Jacobian of the 
curve C . 
Furthermore, we will operate with divisors in the Mumford representation (Menezes, 1998): 
( )2 1 0 1 0,D x u x u v x v= + + + , deg deg 2v u< ≤ , ( ) ( ) 2|u f u h u v v− −   
 where ( )iD J C∀ ∈ , ( ) 2iweight D = , 1, 2i =  (6) 
The result 3 1 2D D D= +  will have a 3( ) 2weight D = , which helps to avoid consideration of 
alternative addition methods for divisors of different weight and with intersecting support 
(containing intersecting sets of points) (Lange, 2003;  Wollinger, 2004). 
HECC uses a divisor scalar multiplication operation: 
 
k
D D D k D+ + + = ⋅  (7) 
At the intermediate computation phase of scalar divisor multiplication (scalar multiplier in 
binary notation) the binary algorithm performs the divisor addition and doubling operation. 
The addition and doubling algorithms use field ( )pGF  multiplicative inversion, which is 
the most computationally intensive and space critical operation. Projective divisor 
representation (Miyamoto et al., 2002; Takahashi, 2002; Lange, 2002c) is one of the most 
popular approaches which allows saving of a field inversion. 
In her work Lange (2002c), suggested a weighted divisor representation, being the 
development of a projective approach. 
In weighted representation, the divisor D we can present as Lange (2002c):  
 ( )2 1 0 1 0,D x u x u v x v= + + +  (8) 
which is of the form of: 
 2 21 0 1 0 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,D U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  (9) 
while 
 ( )2 3 32 21 1 0 1 2 0 21 1 1,D x U Z x U Z V Z Z x V Z Z= + + +  (10) 
Note, that arithmetic in Jacobian genus 2 HEC in weighted representation (Lange, 2002c) is 
the most efficient (Kovtun and Zbitnev, 2004). 
5. Co-Z approach 
The Co-Z approach was first suggested by Meloni (2007), in order to increase the efficiency 
of scalar multiplication in EC over ( )pGF  with double-free addition chain for the resistance 
side channel attacks (SCA) (Goundar, 2008). It results in a fixed sequence of operations; 
hence attackers could not detect any information through SCA. Its principles lie in 
transformation of EC points in SCA resistant scalar point multiplication in projective and 
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modified Jacobi representation with the same denominator and further operation with 
points of identical Z -coordinates. Note that the Co-Z approach is applicable for algorithms, 
based on the Euclidian addition chains approach by Meloni (2007) and scalar in the 
Zeckendorf representation, in order to replace doublings by Fibonacci numbers 
computations refer to Algorithm A.1. Indeed the Fibonacci sequence is an optimal chain 
(Meloni, 2007). 
The Zeckendorf number representation needs 44% more digits in comparison with the 
binary representation. For example a 80-bit integer will require around 115 Fibonacci digits. 
However, the density of 1’s in this representation in lower (near 0.2764). This means that 
representing a 80-bits integer requires, an average 40 powers of 2 but only 32 Fibonacci 
numbers (near 115x0,2764). 
More generally, for a n -bit integer, the classical double-and-add algorithm requires on 
average 1.5 n×  operations ( 2
n n+A D , where A -addition operation and D -doubling 
operation) and the Fibonacci-and-add requires 1.83 n×  operations ( 1.44 0.398n n× + ×F A , 
where A -addition step and F -Fibonacci step). In other words, the Fibonacci-and-add 
algorithms A.1 require about 23% more operations (Table 1.). Note, that in paper (Lange, 
2002c) the simplified version of HEC is used, such that ( ) 0h x = , 4 0f =  (since 
replacement 2y y h−  is admissible for the odd field characteristic and the replacement 
4 5x x f−  is admissible if 5p ≠ ), which allowed T. Lange to save 1 multiplication at the 
step A.2.7. However in this paper we will consider a more general case of curve with 
( )deg 2h = , 2ih ∈F , 0, 2i = ( )deg 5f = , 5 1f = , ( )if p∈GF , 0, 4i = . 
 
Input: CD J∈ , ( )2, ,l Zk d d= …  
Output: [ ] Ck D J∈  
begin 
     ( ) ( ), ,U V D D←  
     for 1i l= −  downto 2  
          if 1id =  then U U D← +  (add step) 
          ( ) ( ), ,U V U V U← +  (Fibonacci step) 
     end 
     return U  
end  
 
Table 1. Algorithm A.1 Fibonacci-and-add ( ),k P  
We can see, in Algorithm A.1 using the Addition and Fibonacci step for the adding divisors. 
In common case, addition of two reduced divisors in weighted coordinates can be 
represented by the Algorithm A.2 (Lange, 2002c) (Table 2). 
Assuming that 11 21 1Z Z Z= =  and 12 22 2Z Z Z= =  for 1D  and 2D , which allows the 
transformation of algorithm А.2 into algorithm А.3. Apply the approach described by 
Meloni (2007) to the divisor addition algorithm suggested by Lange (2002c) and weighted 
divisor representation. Further circumscribe the derivation of expressions in different steps 
of A.3 (Table 3). 
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11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Output: 2 2
1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
2 2
11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( )1 2 2weight D weight D= =  
# Expression Cost 
1 
Precomputations: 13 11 12z Z Z= ⋅ , 23 21 22z Z Z= ⋅ , 
12 11 13z z z= ⋅ , 22 21 23z z z= ⋅ , 21 11 21U z U= ⋅ , 20 11 20U z U= ⋅ , 
21 12 21V z V= ⋅ , 20 12 20V z V= ⋅  
8M 
2 
Compute resultant r  for 1u  and 2u : 1 11 21 21y U z U= ⋅ −  , 
2 20 10 21y U U z= − ⋅ , 3 11 1 2 11y U y y z= ⋅ + ⋅ , 
2
2 3 1 10r y y y U= ⋅ + ⋅ , 2 11 21Z Z Z′ = ⋅ , 2 12 22Z Z Z= ⋅ , 
2
1 2Z Z ′= , 
2 2 1Z Z Z= ⋅  , 2 2Z Z r= ⋅  , 2 2 2Z Z Z′ ′= ⋅  , 
2
2 2Z Z=  , 
2




Compute almost inverse 2 1modinv r u u= , 
1 0inv inv x inv= + : 1 1inv y= , 0 3inv y=  
 
4 
Compute ( )1 2 1mods v v inv u= − , 1 0s s x s= + : 
0 10 22 20w V z V= ⋅ −  , 1 11 22 21w V z V= ⋅ −  , 2 0 0w inv w= ⋅ , 
3 1 1w inv w= ⋅ , 0 2 10 3s w U w= − ⋅ , 
( ) ( ) ( )1 0 11 1 0 1 2 3 11 11s inv z inv w w w w z U= + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ +  
If 1 0s =  then consider special case 
8M 
5 
Precomputations: 21 1S s= , 0 0 1S s Z= ⋅ , 1 1 1Z s Z′ = ⋅ , 
1 1 0S Z S′= ⋅ , 
2
0 0S S= , 1R r Z ′= ⋅ , 0 0 1s s Z ′= ⋅ , 1 1 1s s Z ′= ⋅ , 
2
1 1z Z′ ′=  
3S, 6M 
6 
Compute 2l su= , 
3 2
2 1 0l x l x l x l= + + + : 0 0 20l s U= ⋅  , 
2 1 21l s U= ⋅  , ( ) ( )1 1 0 21 20 0 2l s s U U l l= + ⋅ + − −  , 2 2l l S= +  
3M 
7 
Compute ( )( ) 11 12u s l h v k u−′ = + + − , ( )21 1 1k f v h v u= − − , 
2
1 0u x u x u′ ′ ′= + + : 1 21V R V′= ⋅  , 1 1 1 22U S s y z′ ′= − ⋅ − , 
( )( )0 0 1 1 1 21 0 2 1 12 2U S y S y U s y s V′ ′= + ⋅ ⋅ + − + ⋅ + +   
( )2 1 212Z y U+ ⋅ +   
6M 
8 Precomputations: 2 2 1l l U ′= − , 0 2 0w l U ′= ⋅ , 1 2 1w l U ′= ⋅  2M 
9 
Compute ( )1 2 modv h s l v u′ ′≡ − + + , 1 0v v x v′ ′ ′= + : 
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modified Jacobi representation with the same denominator and further operation with 
points of identical Z -coordinates. Note that the Co-Z approach is applicable for algorithms, 
based on the Euclidian addition chains approach by Meloni (2007) and scalar in the 
Zeckendorf representation, in order to replace doublings by Fibonacci numbers 
computations refer to Algorithm A.1. Indeed the Fibonacci sequence is an optimal chain 
(Meloni, 2007). 
The Zeckendorf number representation needs 44% more digits in comparison with the 
binary representation. For example a 80-bit integer will require around 115 Fibonacci digits. 
However, the density of 1’s in this representation in lower (near 0.2764). This means that 
representing a 80-bits integer requires, an average 40 powers of 2 but only 32 Fibonacci 
numbers (near 115x0,2764). 
More generally, for a n -bit integer, the classical double-and-add algorithm requires on 
average 1.5 n×  operations ( 2
n n+A D , where A -addition operation and D -doubling 
operation) and the Fibonacci-and-add requires 1.83 n×  operations ( 1.44 0.398n n× + ×F A , 
where A -addition step and F -Fibonacci step). In other words, the Fibonacci-and-add 
algorithms A.1 require about 23% more operations (Table 1.). Note, that in paper (Lange, 
2002c) the simplified version of HEC is used, such that ( ) 0h x = , 4 0f =  (since 
replacement 2y y h−  is admissible for the odd field characteristic and the replacement 
4 5x x f−  is admissible if 5p ≠ ), which allowed T. Lange to save 1 multiplication at the 
step A.2.7. However in this paper we will consider a more general case of curve with 
( )deg 2h = , 2ih ∈F , 0, 2i = ( )deg 5f = , 5 1f = , ( )if p∈GF , 0, 4i = . 
 
Input: CD J∈ , ( )2, ,l Zk d d= …  
Output: [ ] Ck D J∈  
begin 
     ( ) ( ), ,U V D D←  
     for 1i l= −  downto 2  
          if 1id =  then U U D← +  (add step) 
          ( ) ( ), ,U V U V U← +  (Fibonacci step) 
     end 
     return U  
end  
 
Table 1. Algorithm A.1 Fibonacci-and-add ( ),k P  
We can see, in Algorithm A.1 using the Addition and Fibonacci step for the adding divisors. 
In common case, addition of two reduced divisors in weighted coordinates can be 
represented by the Algorithm A.2 (Lange, 2002c) (Table 2). 
Assuming that 11 21 1Z Z Z= =  and 12 22 2Z Z Z= =  for 1D  and 2D , which allows the 
transformation of algorithm А.2 into algorithm А.3. Apply the approach described by 
Meloni (2007) to the divisor addition algorithm suggested by Lange (2002c) and weighted 
divisor representation. Further circumscribe the derivation of expressions in different steps 
of A.3 (Table 3). 
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11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Output: 2 2
1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
2 2
11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( )1 2 2weight D weight D= =  
# Expression Cost 
1 
Precomputations: 13 11 12z Z Z= ⋅ , 23 21 22z Z Z= ⋅ , 
12 11 13z z z= ⋅ , 22 21 23z z z= ⋅ , 21 11 21U z U= ⋅ , 20 11 20U z U= ⋅ , 
21 12 21V z V= ⋅ , 20 12 20V z V= ⋅  
8M 
2 
Compute resultant r  for 1u  and 2u : 1 11 21 21y U z U= ⋅ −  , 
2 20 10 21y U U z= − ⋅ , 3 11 1 2 11y U y y z= ⋅ + ⋅ , 
2
2 3 1 10r y y y U= ⋅ + ⋅ , 2 11 21Z Z Z′ = ⋅ , 2 12 22Z Z Z= ⋅ , 
2
1 2Z Z ′= , 
2 2 1Z Z Z= ⋅  , 2 2Z Z r= ⋅  , 2 2 2Z Z Z′ ′= ⋅  , 
2
2 2Z Z=  , 
2




Compute almost inverse 2 1modinv r u u= , 
1 0inv inv x inv= + : 1 1inv y= , 0 3inv y=  
 
4 
Compute ( )1 2 1mods v v inv u= − , 1 0s s x s= + : 
0 10 22 20w V z V= ⋅ −  , 1 11 22 21w V z V= ⋅ −  , 2 0 0w inv w= ⋅ , 
3 1 1w inv w= ⋅ , 0 2 10 3s w U w= − ⋅ , 
( ) ( ) ( )1 0 11 1 0 1 2 3 11 11s inv z inv w w w w z U= + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ +  
If 1 0s =  then consider special case 
8M 
5 
Precomputations: 21 1S s= , 0 0 1S s Z= ⋅ , 1 1 1Z s Z′ = ⋅ , 
1 1 0S Z S′= ⋅ , 
2
0 0S S= , 1R r Z ′= ⋅ , 0 0 1s s Z ′= ⋅ , 1 1 1s s Z ′= ⋅ , 
2
1 1z Z′ ′=  
3S, 6M 
6 
Compute 2l su= , 
3 2
2 1 0l x l x l x l= + + + : 0 0 20l s U= ⋅  , 
2 1 21l s U= ⋅  , ( ) ( )1 1 0 21 20 0 2l s s U U l l= + ⋅ + − −  , 2 2l l S= +  
3M 
7 
Compute ( )( ) 11 12u s l h v k u−′ = + + − , ( )21 1 1k f v h v u= − − , 
2
1 0u x u x u′ ′ ′= + + : 1 21V R V′= ⋅  , 1 1 1 22U S s y z′ ′= − ⋅ − , 
( )( )0 0 1 1 1 21 0 2 1 12 2U S y S y U s y s V′ ′= + ⋅ ⋅ + − + ⋅ + +   
( )2 1 212Z y U+ ⋅ +   
6M 
8 Precomputations: 2 2 1l l U ′= − , 0 2 0w l U ′= ⋅ , 1 2 1w l U ′= ⋅  2M 
9 
Compute ( )1 2 modv h s l v u′ ′≡ − + + , 1 0v v x v′ ′ ′= + : 
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= − , 
2
11 1 2 11 1 2 1
1 2 2 2 4
1 1 1 1
U y y U y y Zy
Z Z Z Z
+
= ⋅ + = , 
22
3 10 2 3 1 102 1
2 4 4 2 6
1 1 1 1 1
y U y y y Uy yr
Z Z Z Z Z
+
= ⋅ + ⋅ = . 























= , 0 0 0 02 4 3 7
1 1 2 1 2
inv w inv ww
Z Z Z Z Z
= ⋅ = , 1 1 1 12 2 3 5
1 1 2 1 2
inv w inv ww
Z Z Z Z Z
= ⋅ = , 
( )( )20 1 1 0 1 32 11
1 2 7 5 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1
inv inv Z w w ww Us
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
+ + ⎛ ⎞
′ = − − +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
, 10 3 2 10 320 7 2 5 7
1 2 1 1 2 1 2
U w w U wws
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
−′ = − ⋅ = . 





1 Z Z Zw






1 1 2 1 2
2 1 6
1 1 1
Z Z Z Z Zrw r w
Z s r s
= ⋅ = ⋅ =
′⋅
 where 1 1s s r′ = ⋅ , 
( )
2 13
2 1 1 2 1
3 1 1 7
1 2 1 1 2
s Z Z sw s w
Z Z r s r Z Z
⎛ ⎞′ ′
′= ⋅ = ⋅ =⎜ ⎟ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠
, 
7
1 2 1 2
4 2 6
1 1 1
Z Z r Z Zrw r w
Z s s
⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ = ⋅ = , 
7
0 0 01 2
0 0 2 7
1 2 1 1 1
s s sZ Zs s w
Z Z s s s
′ ′
′′ ′= ⋅ = = =
′ ′
, 25 4w w= . 
5. Compute 2l su= , 3 22 1 0l x l x l x l= + + + : 
2
0 21 1 0 121
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
s U s s ZUl




, 0 20 21 0 20 1211 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
s U U s U sUl
Z s Z Z s
′ ′ ′+
= ⋅ + =
′ ′
, 20 0 20 00 2 2
1 1 1 1
U s U sl





6. Compute ( )( ) 11 12u s l h v k u−′ = + + − , ( )21 1 1k f v h v u= − − , 2 1 0u x u x u′ ′ ′= + + : 
( )( ) ( )0 0 11 0 1 2 4 10 1 1 21 42u s U s y h w U l h V w′ ′′ ′′= − − + − + + + +  
( )21 1 4 52U y f w+ + − = 0 0 1011 1 1 2 122 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s s UU y r Z Z lh
s Z s Z s Z Z s
′ ′⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⋅
− − + − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′ ′⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
( )21 221 1 2 21 1
1 43 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1
2
r Z ZV r Z Z U yh s f
Z Z s Z Z s
⋅ ⋅⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⋅ ⋅
+ + ⋅ + + − ⋅ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
2 2 3
2 0 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2, , ,s s Z R rZ Z s s Z R rZ Z= = = =
( )( )2 11 1 2 1 1 2 10 1 3 1 3
2 2
3 3
s U s s y s h R U s s l s
s s
− − + −
= − +
( ) ( )3 21 1 2 21 3 21 1 4 1
2 2
3 3




( )( )2 11 1 2 1 1 2 10 1 3 21 0 3 20 1 3
2 2
3 3
s U s s y s h R U s s U s s U s s
s s
− − + − −
= − +
( ) ( )3 21 1 2 21 3 21 1 4 1
2 2
3 3






0 1 1 2 1 2
1 0 1 2 4 5 22
1 1 1 1
2 2 s y rZ Z rZ Zu s y h w w h
s Z s s
⎛ ⎞
′ ′′= − + − = − + − =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
2 2 2
0 1 1 1 1
22 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
2s Z y s RZ Rh
s Z s Z s
−
+ − =
( ) 22 2 1 1 2 32 1 1 2
2 2
3 3 3
22 s y s h R s Rs y s h R R
s s s
− + −− +
− = . 
7. Compute ( )1 2 modv h s l v u′ ′≡ − + + , 1 0v v x v′ ′ ′= + : 1 2 1w l U ′= − , 2 1 2 0 1w u w u l′ ′= + − , 
( )1 2 3 21 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 3 21 1 2 1v w w v h h u u w u l w v h h u′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − − + = + − − − + = 01 2 1 1 1 21 11 22 2 2 3 2
3 3 3 3 3 1 2 3
UU l U l s V Uh h
s s s s s R Z Z s
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ′′ ′ ′
− − − − − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
( ) 2 3 31 2 3 1 0 3 1 3 21 3 2 1
13 2 3 2 2
3 1 3 1 3
U l s U U s l s V s r h Uh
s Z R s Z R s
′ ′ ′− − − ′
− − + = 3R s R= =
( ) ( )21 2 3 1 2 3 0 1 3 21 3 1
3
3
U l s U h R s U l s V s r h R
s R
′ ′ ′− + + − − −
, 
0 2 3 20 0 2 0v w w v h h u′ ′= − − − = ( ) ( )
2
0 3
2 3 1 2 3 20 3 0 0 33 3
3 3
U sl s U h s R V s r h R l s
s R s R
′
′− + − + + . 
8. Compute 1Z ′  and 2Z ′ : 1 3Z s′ = , 2Z R′ = . 
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Specify the modifications carried out in A.2, which allowed reducing quantity of field 
operations. 
Step A.2.1. This step is to be omitted due to existence of the same denominator of all 
coordinates, which allows saving 8 multiplications in ( )pGF . 
Step А.2.2. While computation of 1y  and 2y , reduction to common denominator of 
coordinates 1 jU  and 2 jU  is not required, saves 2 multiplications in ( )pGF . 
Moreover, the calculation of resulting 1Z′  and 2Z′  coordinates is also significantly 
simplified, that helps to save 5 multiplications and 3 squaring operations in ( )pGF . 
Step A.2.4. While computation of 1w  and 2w , reduction to common denominator of 
coordinates 1 jV  and 2 jV  is also not required, saves 2 multiplications in ( )pGF . 
Steps А.2.5 and А.2.6 The total number of multiplications remains unchanged, however the 
number of squaring operations in ( )pGF  decreases by 3, due to the interchange of 
calculations of coefficients 0l , 1l  and 2l  of polynomial l  on the step А.2.6 (Table 4). 
 
Input: 2 2
11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Output: 2 2
1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
2 2
11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( )1 2 2weight D weight D= =  
# Expression Cost 
1 
Compute resultant r  of 1u , 2u : 1 11 21y U U= − , 
2 20 10y U U= − , 
2
3 11 1 2 1y U y y Z= ⋅ + ⋅ , 
2
2 3 1 10r y y y U= ⋅ + ⋅  
1S, 4M 
2 
Compute almost inverse 2 1modinv r u u= , 
1 0inv inv x inv= + : 1 1inv y= , 0 3inv y=  
 
3 
Compute ( )1 2 1mods v v inv u= − , 1 0s s x s= + : 
0 10 20w V V= − , 1 11 21w V V= − , 2 0 0w inv w= ⋅ , 3 1 1w inv w= ⋅ , 
0 2 10 3s w U w= − ⋅  
( ) ( ) ( )2 21 0 1 1 1 0 2 3 1 11s inv inv Z w w w w Z U= + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ + , 
If 1 0s =  then consider special case 
6M 
4 
Precomputations: 1 2R r Z Z= ⋅ ⋅ , 
2
2 0 1s s Z= ⋅ , 
2
3 1 1s s Z= ⋅ , 
2
1R R Z= ⋅ , 3 1 1w s y= ⋅ , ( )5 3 1 21 1 11w w s U s U= + ⋅ = ⋅  
7M 
5 
Compute 2l su= , 
3 2
2 1 0l x l x l x l= + + + : 0 0 20l s U= ⋅ , 
2 1 21l sU= , ( ) ( )1 1 0 21 20 0 2l s s U U l l= + ⋅ + − − , 2 2 2l l s= +  
2M 
6 
Compute ( )( ) 11 12u s l h v k u−′ = + + − , ( )21 1 1k f v h v u= − − , 
2
1 0u x u x u′ ′ ′= + + : ( ) 21 3 2 3 22U s s w h R R′ = ⋅ − + −   
( ) ( )20 2 3 5 2 3 2 1 21 12 2U s w w s s y s r V h R′ = + ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + +  
( ) ( )22 2 5 11 21 4 1R h s w R U U f Z⎡ ⎤+ ⋅ − + ⋅ + − ⋅⎣ ⎦  
2S, 8M 
7 Compute weights: 1 3Z s′ = , 2Z R′ =  , 
2 2
1 3Z s′ = , 
2 2
2Z R′ =   1S 
8 
Compute ( )1 2 modv h s l v u′ ′≡ − + + , 1 0v v x v′ ′ ′= + : 
( )( ) ( )( )21 1 2 2 3 1 3 0 3 1 21 1V U l h R s U s U s h R rV l′ ′ ′ ′= ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ + + , 




Adjust: 2 21 1 1cZ s Z= ⋅ , 
3
2 3cZ s r= ⋅ , 20 20 1cU U Z= ⋅ , 
21 21 1cU U Z= ⋅ , 20 20 2cV V Z= ⋅ , 21 21 2cV V Z= ⋅  
1S, 6M 
5S, 41M  
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= − , 
2
11 1 2 11 1 2 1
1 2 2 2 4
1 1 1 1
U y y U y y Zy
Z Z Z Z
+
= ⋅ + = , 
22
3 10 2 3 1 102 1
2 4 4 2 6
1 1 1 1 1
y U y y y Uy yr
Z Z Z Z Z
+
= ⋅ + ⋅ = . 























= , 0 0 0 02 4 3 7
1 1 2 1 2
inv w inv ww
Z Z Z Z Z
= ⋅ = , 1 1 1 12 2 3 5
1 1 2 1 2
inv w inv ww
Z Z Z Z Z
= ⋅ = , 
( )( )20 1 1 0 1 32 11
1 2 7 5 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1
inv inv Z w w ww Us
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
+ + ⎛ ⎞
′ = − − +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
, 10 3 2 10 320 7 2 5 7
1 2 1 1 2 1 2
U w w U wws
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
−′ = − ⋅ = . 





1 Z Z Zw






1 1 2 1 2
2 1 6
1 1 1
Z Z Z Z Zrw r w
Z s r s
= ⋅ = ⋅ =
′⋅
 where 1 1s s r′ = ⋅ , 
( )
2 13
2 1 1 2 1
3 1 1 7
1 2 1 1 2
s Z Z sw s w
Z Z r s r Z Z
⎛ ⎞′ ′
′= ⋅ = ⋅ =⎜ ⎟ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠
, 
7
1 2 1 2
4 2 6
1 1 1
Z Z r Z Zrw r w
Z s s
⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ = ⋅ = , 
7
0 0 01 2
0 0 2 7
1 2 1 1 1
s s sZ Zs s w
Z Z s s s
′ ′
′′ ′= ⋅ = = =
′ ′
, 25 4w w= . 
5. Compute 2l su= , 3 22 1 0l x l x l x l= + + + : 
2
0 21 1 0 121
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
s U s s ZUl




, 0 20 21 0 20 1211 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
s U U s U sUl
Z s Z Z s
′ ′ ′+
= ⋅ + =
′ ′
, 20 0 20 00 2 2
1 1 1 1
U s U sl





6. Compute ( )( ) 11 12u s l h v k u−′ = + + − , ( )21 1 1k f v h v u= − − , 2 1 0u x u x u′ ′ ′= + + : 
( )( ) ( )0 0 11 0 1 2 4 10 1 1 21 42u s U s y h w U l h V w′ ′′ ′′= − − + − + + + +  
( )21 1 4 52U y f w+ + − = 0 0 1011 1 1 2 122 2 2 2
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Table 3. Derivation of expressions in different steps of A.3 
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Specify the modifications carried out in A.2, which allowed reducing quantity of field 
operations. 
Step A.2.1. This step is to be omitted due to existence of the same denominator of all 
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Input: 2 2
11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Output: 2 2
1 0 1 2 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
2 2
11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦
2 2
21 20 21 20 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( )1 2 2weight D weight D= =  
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1 
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2 20 10y U U= − , 
2
3 11 1 2 1y U y y Z= ⋅ + ⋅ , 
2
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1S, 4M 
2 
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6M 
4 
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2
2 0 1s s Z= ⋅ , 
2
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2
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7M 
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3 2
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6 
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2
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7 Compute weights: 1 3Z s′ = , 2Z R′ =  , 
2 2
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2 2
2Z R′ =   1S 
8 
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Adjust: 2 21 1 1cZ s Z= ⋅ , 
3
2 3cZ s r= ⋅ , 20 20 1cU U Z= ⋅ , 
21 21 1cU U Z= ⋅ , 20 20 2cV V Z= ⋅ , 21 21 2cV V Z= ⋅  
1S, 6M 
5S, 41M  
Table 4. Algorithm А.3. Co-Z reduced divisors addition 
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Step A.2.6. unlike algorithm A.2, the A.3 offers considering multiplier 3s , present in each 
coefficient 0l , 1l  and 2l  of polynomial l , when using coefficients il , 0,2i =  on the steps 
A.2.7 and A.2.9. This allows us factor out 3s , thus saving 3 multiplications in ( )pGF (steps 
A.4.6-A.4.8). 
Consider next the application of proposed algorithm for the mixed divisor addition 
2 2
1 11 10 11 10 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,D U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  and 2 21 20 21 20, , , , 1, 1, 1, 1D U U V V= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (mixed 
representation). Therefore it is necessary to reduce devisor 2D  to common Z -coordinate, 
i.e. 2 2 3 3 2 221 1 20 1 21 1 2 20 1 2 1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,U Z U Z V Z Z V Z Z Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎣ ⎦ , that requires 5 multiplications 
in ( )pGF . Hereinafter the provided algorithm A.4 should be used for addition of (prior 
formed) divisors with the same Z -coordinate. 
6. Results 
It is to be considered that after computing 3 1 2D D D= +  one of the items, for example 2D , 
should be transformed so that it has the same Z -coordinate as divisor 3D . For this purpose, 
at the step A.3.9, values 1cZ  and 2cZ , where 
2 2 2
1 3 1 1cZ s Z Z′ = = ⋅  and 
3 3 3
1 2 3 1 2 2cZ Z s R Z Z Z′ ′ = ⋅ = ⋅ , i.e. 
2 2
1 1 1cZ s Z= ⋅  and 
3
2 3cZ s r= ⋅ , this requires 2 additional 
multiplications and 1 squaring in ( )pGF . In other words, reduction of a divisor to unified 
Z -coordinates takes 6 additional multiplications and 1 squaring. Ultimately, for the divisor 
addition step in A.1 46M+5S (M - multiplication, S - squaring) field operations are required. 
For the Fibonacci step 41M+5S field operations are required. If we reduce the obtained 
complexity estimations to the parameters of the curve (Lange, 2002c), we obtain that for the 
divisor addition step 40M+5S are required and for the Fibonacci step 45M+5S operations are 
required. In accordance to the computational complexity estimation, the approach described 
in this paper, is not effective, due to the complexity of mixed addition is 36M+5S (Lange, 
2002c). However, the alternative approach to the divisor addition for the scalar 
multiplication implementation is proposed. Let us draw a computational complexity 
comparison between scalar multiplication algorithms described in (Kovtun and Zbitnev, 
2004) and those suggested in this paper, based on idea (Meloni, 2007). 
6.1 Comparison with other method 
The results of known and proposed algorithms comparison are set out in Table 5.  
The algorithm complexity represented in field operations (Table 6). 
Assume that S=0,8M and scalar multiplier is an 80-bit integer and refer to the estimations 
(Kovtun and Zbitnev, 2004; Meloni, 2007) for the estimation of complexity of scalar 
multiplication algorithms. The results of comparison are set out in Table 7. 
Computational complexity of Fibonacci-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm is by 23% 
greater than Binary left-to-right algorithm and by 12,5% greater than Window Fibonacci-
and-add. 
In other case computational complexity of Fibonacci-and-add scalar multiplication 
algorithm in weighted coordinates is by 23% greater than Binary left-to-right algorithm in 
mixed weighted coordinates and by 14,2% greater than Window Fibonacci-and-add. 
Weighted coordinates with Co-Z approach are more effective than ordinary projective 
coordinates with Co-Z approach. 
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Alg. # Curve description 
1 ( ) 0h x = (Harley, 2000)
2 2 1h =  (Lange, 2002a) 
3 ( ) 0h x =  (Matsuo et al., 2001) 
4 ( ) 0h x = , 4 0f =  (Miyamoto et al., 2002) 
5 ( ) 0h x =  (Takahashi, 2002) 
6 4 0f = , 2 0h ≠  (Lange, 2002a) 
7 ( )deg 2h = , 2ih ∈F  (Lange, 2002b) 
8 ( )deg 2h = , 2ih ∈F  (Kovtun and Zbitnev, 2004)
9 ( ) 0h x = , 4 0f =  (Kovtun, 2006) 
10 ( ) 0h x = , 4 0f =  (Lange, 2002c) 
11 ( )deg 2h = , 2ih ∈F  (Kovtun, 2010) 
12 ( ) 0h x = , 4 0f ≠  [proposed] 
13 ( ) 0h x = , 4 0f =  [proposed] 




General Mixed General Mixed 
()-1 ^2 * ^2 * ()-1 ^2 * ^2 * 
Affine coordinates 
1 2  27   2  30   
2 2 3 24   2 6 26   
3 2  25   2  27   
4 1  26   1  27   
5 1  25   1  29   
6 1 3 22   1 5 22   
Projective coordinates 1 0 1 0, , , ,U U V V Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
7  4 47 3 40  6 40 5 25 
8  4 46 4 39  6 39 5 25 
9  4 46 4 39  6 35 5 24 
Weighted coordinates 2 21 0 1 0 1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
10  7 47 5 36  7 34 5 21 
Co-Z projective coordinates 1 0 1 0, , , ,U U V V Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
11  4 46    4 42   
Co-Z weighted coordinates 2 21 0 1 0 1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,U U V V Z Z Z Z⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
12  5 46    5 41   
13  5 45    5 40   
Table 6. Computational complexity of group law in Jacobean of genus 2 HEC over ( )pGF  
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# Scalar multiplication algorithm Cost, M 
Addition in mixed projective coordinates (Kovtun and Zbitnev, 2004) 
1 Binary (left-to-right) 5192 
2 NAF 4629 
3 w -NAF, 4w =  4349 
Addition with Co-Z method in projective coordinates (Kovtun, 2010) 
7 Fibonacci-and-add 6773 
8 Window Fibonacci-and-add 5970 
Addition in mixed weighted coordinates (Lange, 2002c) 
4 Binary (left-to-right) 5104 
5 NAF 4570 
6 w -NAF, 4w =  4307 
Addition with suggested method, alg. #13 from table 1 
7 Fibonacci-and-add 6629 
8 Window Fibonacci-and-add 5829 
Table 7. Computational Complexity Of Scalar Multiplication Algorithms 
6.2 Another aspect of using the proposed approach 
Yet another aspect of using a biometric authentication on based Co-Z approach to divisor 
scalar multiplication in Jacobian of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves over fields with odd 
characteristic in weighted coordinates is using it in the fight against Cyber terrorism. Using 
this approach and biometric authentication will significantly reduce financial losses of 
enterprises. 
Primary solutions of the given problem are confirmed also with the data presented on figure 
1 on which (Kavun, 2007) finance indexations of the put damage for some countries are 
shown. Apparently from the presented statistics, the state infrastructure is more developed; 
the larger it receives damage from cyber criminality. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Damage from cyber criminalities 
During an epoch of the world economic crisis and modern transformations of economy of  
different countries the aspect of economic security becomes even more urgent . For example, 
the tendency of increase in crime in sphere of cyber terrorism, having an economic (money) 
basis is shown in figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Statistics of cyber criminality rate 
From the presented data which has been average for some years (Kavun, 2007), it can be 
seen, that on the average the amount of incidents in the sphere of cyber criminality over a 
year increased by 50 %. It testifies to negative tendencies of cyber criminality development 
in the world. 
Outcomes of the conducted analysis are presented in figure 3 from which it appears, that 
main sources of illegal operations are the USA and China which cover 50 % of all threats 
(Kavun, 2009). 
7. Conclusion 
In the paper, a new algorithm of weight 2 divisor addition with identical (shared) Z -
coordinates (by the Co-Z approach) has been proposed, which requires more ( )pGF  
operations then algorithm (Kovtun and Zbitnev, 2004), however it allows a decrease in 
computational complexity of Fibonacci-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm while 
approaching to the Binary left-to-right algorithm. 
Biometrics are not secrets and are not revocable (Schneier,1999) while revocability and 
secrecy have been critical requirements of conventional cryptosystem design, one then 
wonders whether it is possible to design a secure authentication system from the system 
components which in themselves are neither secrets nor revocable—for example, whether 
the methods of ensuring liveness of biometric identifiers and challenge–response schemes 
(Maltoni et al., 2003) obviate fraudulent insertion of “stolen” biometric identifiers. Is it 
possible to nontrivially combine knowledge and biometric identifiers to arrive at key 
generation/release mechanisms where biometric identifiers are necessary but not sufficient 
for cryptographic key generation/release? Is it possible to require multiple biometrics to 
make it increasingly difficult for the attacker to fraudulently insert multiple biometrics into 
the system? Is it possible to make it unnecessary to revoke/update the cryptographic key in 
the event of a “stolen biometric”? Exploring challenges in designing such systems is a 
promising (yet neglected) avenue of research. When cryptobiometric systems eventually 
come into practical existence, there is a danger that biometric components may be used as 
an irrefutable proof of existence of a particular subject at a particular time and place. Mere 
incorporation of biometrics into a system does not in itself constitute a proof of identity. We 
need to understand how these foolproof guarantees can be theoretically proved in a 
deployed cryptosystem and how to institute due processes that will provide both 
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incorporation of biometrics into a system does not in itself constitute a proof of identity. We 
need to understand how these foolproof guarantees can be theoretically proved in a 
deployed cryptosystem and how to institute due processes that will provide both 
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technological and sociological freedom to challenge the premises on which nonrepudiability 
is ascertained. 
Genus 3 curves might save about a third in key lengths and so 180-bit ECC (which is beyond 
the usual range, as given in standards) is equivalent to 60-bit HCC, which can be 
implemented on a fast 64-bit computer. In practice, 160-bit ECC is typically used and so 
there is even room for added security in case of computational speed-ups in attacks. Stein, in 
particular, has pointed out how the use of “real“ forms of hyperelliptic curves (i.e., with 
infrastructure) allows considerable speed-ups in implementation in some cases. 
On the other hand, Gaudry (2000), showed that hyperelliptic curves of genus bigger than or 
equal to 5 and possibly 4 are less secure than hyperelliptic curves of genus g<4 (or 5) (ICCIT 
Biometrics Research Group, 2005). That means that the key-per-bit-strength of hyperelliptic 
curves of genus 2 and 3 is the same as for elliptic curves, and thus far better than 
conventional systems based on discrete logs or integer factoring. In fact, genus 2 is 
particularly interesting because the arithmetic appears to be only minimally slower than 
elliptic curve arithmetic and the bit size of the underlying finite field is half as big as for 
elliptic curves having the same security level. To our knowledge nobody has performed a 
down-to-earth implementation of genus 2 hyperelliptic curves. 
We are considering hardware implementations of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 and 3 . 
Among the currently available hyperelliptic curves there are, for instance, Koblitz curves 
and curves constructed by a complex multiplication method (CM-method). Both are natural 
extension of ideas from elliptic curves. 
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1. Introduction 
The number of commercially-available web-based services is growing rapidly nowadays. In 
particular, cloud computing provides an efficient and economic means of delivering 
information technology (IT) resources on demand, and is expected to find extensive 
applications as network bandwidth and virtualization technologies continue to advance. 
However, cloud computing presents the IT industry not only with exciting opportunities, 
but also with significant challenges since consumers are reluctant to adopt cloud computing 
solutions in the absence of firm guarantees regarding the security of their information.  
Two fundamental issues arise when users applying cloud computing to software as a 
service (SaaS). First, if enterprise data is to be processed in the cloud, it must be encrypted to 
ensure its privacy. As a result, efficient key management schemes are required to facilitate 
the encryption (and corresponding decryption) tasks. Second, as the sophistication of the 
tools used by malicious users continues to increase, the data processed in the cloud is at 
increasing risk of attack. Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for robust 
authentication schemes to ensure that the data can be accessed only by legitimate, 
authorized users. 
Network attacks such as phishing or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks present a serious 
obstacle to consumer acceptance of cloud computing services. According to reports released 
by privacy watchdog groups in the US, more than 148 identity theft incidents, affecting 
nearly 94 million identities, occurred in 2005 in the US alone (Mark, 2006). Identity theft is 
therefore one of the most severe threats to the security of online services. As a result, it is 
imperative that SaaS providers have the means to authenticate the identity of every user 
attempting to access the system. Due to the non-denial requirements of remote user identity 
authentication schemes, this is most commonly achieved using some form of biometrics-
based method.  
The term “biometrics” describes a collection of methods for identifying individuals based 
upon their unique physiological or behavioral characteristics (Furnell et al. 2008). Generally 
speaking, the physiological characteristics include the individual’s fingerprint, vein pattern, 
DNA and shape of face, while the behavioral characteristics include the handwriting 
dynamics, voice and gait. Automated biometric recognition systems are now widely used 
 
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
182 
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf  
Okeya, K.; Sakurai, K. (2000). Power analysis breaks elliptic curve cryptosystems even 
secure against timing attack, Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory 
and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology, 
INDOCRYPT 2000, LNCS 1977, Springer-Verlag, pp.178-190. 
Schneier, B. (1999). Biometrics: uses and abuses, Commun. ACM, 42(8), p. 136. 
Sugizaki, H.; Matsuo, K.; Chao, J. & Tsujii, S. (2002). An extension of Harley addition 
algorithm for hyperelliptic curves over finite fields of characteristic two, Technical 
report IEICE. ISEC2002–09.  
Stallings, W. (2003). Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practices, 3rd ed. Upper 
 Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Takahashi, M. (2002). Improving Harley algorithms for jacobians of genius 2 hyperelliptic 
curves,  Symposium on cryptography and information security. SCIS'2002. Japan: IEICE, 
pp.155–160.  
Wollinger, T. (2004). Software and hardware implementation of hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems: 
PhD dissertation: Electronics and informatics. Worchester Polytechnic 
Institute,Germany: Bochum. 
Wayman, J. L. (2001). “Fundamentals of biometric authentication technologies,” Int. J. Image 
 Graph., 1(1), pp. 93–113. 
10 
A New Fingerprint Authentication Scheme 
Based on Secret-Splitting for  
Enhanced Cloud Security 
Ping Wang1, Chih-Chiang Ku1 and Tzu Chia Wang2 
1Department of Information Management, Kun Shan University, 
2Institute of Computer and Communication Engineering, 
National Cheng Kung University, 
 Taiwan 
1. Introduction 
The number of commercially-available web-based services is growing rapidly nowadays. In 
particular, cloud computing provides an efficient and economic means of delivering 
information technology (IT) resources on demand, and is expected to find extensive 
applications as network bandwidth and virtualization technologies continue to advance. 
However, cloud computing presents the IT industry not only with exciting opportunities, 
but also with significant challenges since consumers are reluctant to adopt cloud computing 
solutions in the absence of firm guarantees regarding the security of their information.  
Two fundamental issues arise when users applying cloud computing to software as a 
service (SaaS). First, if enterprise data is to be processed in the cloud, it must be encrypted to 
ensure its privacy. As a result, efficient key management schemes are required to facilitate 
the encryption (and corresponding decryption) tasks. Second, as the sophistication of the 
tools used by malicious users continues to increase, the data processed in the cloud is at 
increasing risk of attack. Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for robust 
authentication schemes to ensure that the data can be accessed only by legitimate, 
authorized users. 
Network attacks such as phishing or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks present a serious 
obstacle to consumer acceptance of cloud computing services. According to reports released 
by privacy watchdog groups in the US, more than 148 identity theft incidents, affecting 
nearly 94 million identities, occurred in 2005 in the US alone (Mark, 2006). Identity theft is 
therefore one of the most severe threats to the security of online services. As a result, it is 
imperative that SaaS providers have the means to authenticate the identity of every user 
attempting to access the system. Due to the non-denial requirements of remote user identity 
authentication schemes, this is most commonly achieved using some form of biometrics-
based method.  
The term “biometrics” describes a collection of methods for identifying individuals based 
upon their unique physiological or behavioral characteristics (Furnell et al. 2008). Generally 
speaking, the physiological characteristics include the individual’s fingerprint, vein pattern, 
DNA and shape of face, while the behavioral characteristics include the handwriting 
dynamics, voice and gait. Automated biometric recognition systems are now widely used 
  
Recent Application in Biometrics             
 
184 
throughout the automotive; IT and banking industries (see Figs. 1 and 2). For example, 
Miura et al. (2005) developed a biometric authentication system based on the individual’s 
finger vein for accomplishing secure online authentication over small devices such as 
notebook computers, cell phones, and so on.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Fingerprint scanner and smart card reader 
 
 
Fig. 2. Sensor-based scanning of user fingerprint template 
However, existing biometric authentication systems cannot absolutely guarantee the 
identity of the individual. For example, biometric features such as the fingerprint may be 
acquired surreptitiously and then used by a malicious user. Similarly, even in multi-factor 
authentication methods such as smart cards, in which the biometric information is protected 
using a password, the password may be cracked by network hackers and the biometric 
information then copied and counterfeited. These proposals are invariably based on the 
assumption of employee honesty. Unfortunately, this assumption cannot also be guaranteed 
in practical applications, and many real cases have been reported in which dishonest interior 
staff have stolen users’ authentication details from the authentication database and have 
then used these details to acquire the customers’ private information for financial gain (see 
Fig.3). 
 




Fig. 3. Theft of biometric features by dishonest staff 
To resolve the security issues described above, the present study proposes a new remote 
authentication scheme based on a secret-splitting concept. In the proposed approach, part of 
the biometric data is encrypted and stored on a smart card, while part of the data is 
encrypted and stored on a server (see Fig. 4). This approach not only resolves the problem of 
data abuse by interior staff, but also helps protect the users’ information against malicious 
attack such as hacking into the Certificate Authority (CA) since to counterfeit the entire 
biometric information, dishonest staff or hackers must simultaneously decrypt two secret 
keys rather than just one.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Proposed authentication scheme based on secret-splitting 
In addition to the secret-splitting concept, the proposed authentication scheme utilizes the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange / agreement algorithm (Diffie & Hellman, 1976) to guarantee 
the security of the data transmissions between the terminal and the server. The main 
differences between the scheme proposed in this study and existing methods can be 
summarized as follows: (i) the smart card stores only part of the fingerprint template used in 
the identity authentication process. As a result, the user’s identity is protected even if the 
card is lost or stolen. (ii) the template information stored on the smart card and server, 
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respectively, is independently encrypted. Consequently, the information obtained by a 
hacker or dishonest member of staff from a successful attack on the authentication database 
is insufficient to pass the liveness test.  
A remote authentication scheme based on a secret-splitting concept is proposed for 
resolving the problem of user privacy in cloud-computing applications. In contrast to 
existing multi-factor authentication schemes, the proposed method minimizes the threat of 
attacks by dishonest interior employees since only a subset of the information required to 
pass the liveness test is stored on the user authentication database.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the essential 
properties of identity authentication schemes and presents the related work in the field. 
Section 3 introduces the remote identity authentication scheme proposed in this study. 
Section 4 examines the robustness and computational efficiency of the proposed approach. 
Finally, Section 5 presents some brief concluding remarks.  
2. Existing multi-factor authentication methods 
Remote authentication is essential in ensuring that only legitimate individuals are able to 
access a network and make use of its resources. Typically, remote authentication is achieved 
using one of the following well-known schemes: (1) user account / password, (2) network 
address / domain name, (3) shared secret keys, (4) public keys, (5) digital signatures, (6) 
biometric authentication, (7) digital certificates, or (8) smart cards. Figure 5 shows a typical 
authentication procedure using a smart card in conjunction with the user’s fingerprint. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Remote authentication using smart card and fingerprint 
Password-based authentication schemes have the advantage of simplicity, but are reliant 
upon the user memorizing the password and remembering to modify it periodically in 
order to maintain the security of their account. Smart cards, in which the user’s identity 
authentication information is encrypted on an embedded chip, have a number of benefits 
compared to traditional password-based methods, namely (i) the user’s information is 
protected by a simple Personal Identity Number (PIN); (ii) the risk of identity theft is 
minimized by means of sophisticated on-chip defense measures; and (iii) single smart cards 
can be programmed for multiple uses, e.g. banking credentials, medical entitlement, loyalty 
programs, and so forth. Consequently, various multi-factor authentication schemes based 
upon smart cards and integrated biometric sensors have been proposed.  
In a pioneering work of multifactor authentication schemes, For example, J.K. Lee et al. 
(2002) proposed a remote identity authentication scheme in which a smart card was 
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integrated with a fingerprint sensor. In the proposed approach, the smart card, a secret 
password, and the user’s fingerprint were taken as inputs in the login process and the 
fingerprint minutiae, encrypted with the time stamp and the user’s authentication template, 
were then compared with the authentication value stored on the card. To enhance the 
security of the ElGamal public key system (ElGamal, 1985) used in J.K. Lee et al. (2002), the 
encryption parameters were randomly generated in accordance with both the user’s 
fingerprint minutiae and the time stamp. However, while the proposed method is therefore 
robust toward replay attacks, clock synchronization is required at all the hosts, which is a 
significant challenge in open network environments. 
Kim et al. (2003) proposed an integrated smart card / fingerprint authentication scheme in 
which a password list was not maintained at the server such that the users were able to 
change their passwords at will. Moreover, protection against replay attacks was provided by 
means of Nonce technology, thereby avoiding the need for clock synchronization at the 
hosts. However, Scott (2004) showed that the Nonce-based design rendered the system 
vulnerable to imitation attacks given the collection by a hacker of a sufficient number of 
network packets to calculate the authentication value.  
Later on, Lin and Lai (2004) showed that under certain circumstances, the method proposed 
by Lee et al. was unable to resist identity masquerade attacks. Accordingly, the authors 
proposed a new scheme for enhancing the security of the method presented in J.K. Lee et al. 
(2002) by allowing the users to choose and change their passwords at will.  However, 
Mitchell and Tang (2005) showed that the method proposed by Lin and Lai also contained a 
number of serious flaws, most notably (i) hackers may simply copy the fingerprint from the 
imprint cup; (ii) the time stamp generated during a legal login procedure may be detected 
by a malicious user and then modified in order to login illegally at some future point in 
time; and (iii) the system contains no rigorous mechanism for preventing malicious users 
from using old passwords to perform an illegal login operation when the legitimate users 
change their passwords. 
Recently, Fan et al. (2006) proposed a three-factor remote authentication scheme based on a 
user password, a smart card and biometric data. Importantly, in the proposed approach, the 
server only stores an encrypted string representing the user identity. That is, the biometric 
data is not revealed to any third party; including the remote server. The scheme is 
implemented using a two-step procedure. In the first step (the registration step), an 
encrypted user template is constructed by mixing a randomly-chosen string with the 
biometric characteristics of the user via an exclusive-or operation (XOR). In the second step 
(the login step), the fingerprint minutiae obtained via a sensor are encrypted using a second 
randomly-chosen string, and the two strings are then sent to a sensor for matching. The 
scheme has the advantage that all three security factors (the password, the smart card and 
the biometric data) are examined at the remote server, i.e., the system is a truly three-factor 
remote authentication system. Furthermore, the authentication process performed at the 
remote server does not require the exact value of the user’s biometric data to be known. As a 
result, the security of the user’s biometric information is improved. However, when the 
registration process is performed in a centralized way (e.g., a central Certificate Authority 
(CA) is used to issue certified users with a certificate), the scheme is vulnerable to the theft 
of the user’s fingerprint minutiae by interior dishonest staff. In other words, while the 
scheme preserves the privacy of the users in the login and authentication phases, the 
security of the biometric data is not guaranteed during the registration phase. 
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respectively, is independently encrypted. Consequently, the information obtained by a 
hacker or dishonest member of staff from a successful attack on the authentication database 
is insufficient to pass the liveness test.  
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3. A secret-splitting remote authentication scheme 
This section proposes a novel remote authentication protocol for network services based on 
the secret-splitting concept. The proposed protocol comprises three phases, namely the 
initialization phase, the registration phase, and the authentication phase (see Fig. 6).  
 
                  
Fig. 6. Proposed fingerprint matching concept 
In the initialization phase, the manufacturer produced a smart card and wrote a set of 
unique security parameters (AN) into it. In the registration phase, the user registers with a 
CA organization, and verifies their legal identity by means of traditional physical identity 
documents such as an identity card or a social security card. Encrypted fingerprint template 
A (EA’) is generated from the information extracted by a fingerprint scanner (EA) and the 
smart card information obtained from a card reader (AN), and the remaining part of the 
encrypted fingerprint template B (EB’) is directly extracted from the authentication 
database. Once the two templates (EA’, EB’) have been combined into a complete template 
by the terminal, the comparison results are sent to the server to verify the legality of the 
user, that is, (EF = EF’). Note that this step is designed to prevent counterfeit attacks in 
which a malicious hacker sends a “legal user” message directly from the terminal in order to 
deceive the server.  
Fig. 7 presents the function flow diagram of the proposed remote authentication scheme. 
The details of each phase in the scheme are presented in Sections 3.1~3.3. 
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3.1 Initialization phase 
When the smart card manufacturer accepts an order from the CA, it writes various security 
parameters into the cards (e.g., the card number or authentication number (AN)) and then 
sends the cards to the CA. The detailed procedure is shown in Fig. 8  
Step 1.1: Manufacturer randomly chooses a large prime number p and determines its root α. 
Step 1.2: Manufacturer generates a unique Authentication Number (AN) based on a pre-
defined coding rule.  
Step 1.3: Manufacturer randomly selects a 128-bit string K as a key for symmetric 
encryption and keeps (p, α, AN, K) secret. 
 
 
Step Executor Actions 
1.1 Manufacturer Randomly choose a large prime number p and determines its 
root α 
1.2 Manufacturer Generate a unique Authentication Number (AN) 
1.3 Manufacturer Randomly select a 128-bit string K as a key for symmetric 
encryption and keep [ p, α, AN, K ] Smart card secret. 
 
Fig. 8. Initialization phase 
3.2 Registration phase 
The user registers with the CA and receives a smart card once he or she has confirmed their 
legal identity using some form of physical identity document. As shown in Fig. 9, the 
registration phase comprises five steps, namely:  
Step 2.1: Let user Ui with identity IDi be about to register with the server. The user chooses a 
card password, PWi , the password is then saved to the smart card, and then protected by 
the encryption mechanism of smart card.  
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3.2 Registration phase 
The user registers with the CA and receives a smart card once he or she has confirmed their 
legal identity using some form of physical identity document. As shown in Fig. 9, the 
registration phase comprises five steps, namely:  
Step 2.1: Let user Ui with identity IDi be about to register with the server. The user chooses a 
card password, PWi , the password is then saved to the smart card, and then protected by 
the encryption mechanism of smart card.  
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Step 2.2: The fingerprint image of User Ui is obtained via a sensor and the minutiae are 
extracted from this image to form a fingerprint template Fi. The terminal separates Fi into 
two parts, FiA and FiB, where FiA and FiB represents part A and part B of fingerprint template, 
respectively. 
Step 2.3: The terminal computes EAi= h (FiA⊕AN), EBi= h (FiB⊕AN), and HEFi =h 
(EAi∪EBi ), where ∪ is a merge operation and h(.) is a public one-way hash function. 
Step 2.4: The terminal sends (IDi, hEBi, p, α, K, HEFi) to the server over a secure channel  
Step 2.5: The terminal stores (IDi , PWi, hEAi) in the smart card.  
 
 
Step Executor Actions 
2.1 Ui Determine a card password PWi 
2.2 Ui 
Terminal 
Form a fingerprint template Fi using the fingerprint 
minutiae obtained via a sensor. (Note that Fi represents the 
fingerprint template of user Ui.) Separate Fi into two parts, 
FiA and FiB . 
2.3 Terminal Compute EAi= FiA⊕AN, EBi= FiB⊕AN  
HEFi=h(EAi∪EBi) 
2.4 Terminal Server Send (IDi, hEBi, p,α,K, HEFi) 
2.5 Terminal Store (IDi , PWi , hEAi) on smart card 
Terminal Ui [ IDi , PWi, hEAi, p ,α, AN, K ] Smart card 
 
 
Fig. 9. Registration phase 
3.3 Authentication phase 
Users insert their smart card, containing a partial authentication template into a card reader 
and a login request is then sent to the authentication server. The fingerprint information is 
checked using the following eight-step procedure (see Figs. 10 and 11):  
Step 3.1: User Ui inputs his or her password PWi* into the terminal. If the password is 
correct, the AN is extracted; else the login request is rejected.  
Step 3.2: Users “provide their fingerprint via a sensor, and the fingerprint is then 
compared with that stored on the authentication server. Let Fi* represent the fingerprint 
minutiae extracted by the sensor. The terminal separates Fi* into FiA* and FiB*, and then 
computes EAi*= FiA*⊕AN and EBi*= FiB*⊕AN.  The two parts (i.e., EAi* , EBi*) are then 
merged to generate the full biometric template of the user, i.e., EFi*= EAi*∪EBi*. The server 
sends EBi to the terminal for comparison purposes in order to verify the user’s legal 
identity. If a match is obtained (i.e., EBi==EBi*), the authentication process proceeds to 
Step 3.3; else it terminates. 
Step 3.3: (Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm). The terminal randomly selects a 
number AX such that AX p< , and then computes modA
X
TY pα= and YA= IDi ||YT, where 
α and p are both stored on the smart card. The terminal then sends YA to the server. 
Similarly, the server randomly selects a number BX  such that BX p< , 
computes modBXBY pα= , and then sends YB to the terminal. 
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Step 3.4: The terminal uses YB to compute the session key ( ) modAXBSK Y p= . Similarly, the 
server uses YA to compute the common session key, ( ) modBXASK Y p= . Note that SK is a 
shared secret between the terminal and the server.  
 
Step Executor Actions 
3.1 Ui Input password PWi*  
Terminal Examine PWi* and gain AN 
3.2 Ui Scan finger to provide information required to 
construct fingerprint template Fi* 
Terminal Separate Fi* into FiA*  and FiB*, where  
EAi*= FiA*⊕AN , EBi*= FiB*⊕AN, and EFi*= EAi*∪EBi* 
Server  Terminal Extract EBi from server. If a match is obtained (i.e., 
EBi== EBi*), go to Step 3.5; else terminate the 
authentication process 
3.3 Terminal Randomly select a number XA such that XA <p 
Compute modAXTY pα= . 
Terminal  Server YA= IDi ||YT
Server Randomly select a number XB such that XB <p 
Server Terminal Send YB to terminal 
3.4 Terminal ( ) modAXBSK Y p=  
Server ( ) modBXASK Y p=  
 
Fig. 10. Authentication phase (Steps 3.1~3.4). 
Step 3.5: The server generates a one-time symmetric key RK, computes M=Esk(EBi||RK), 
and then sends M to the terminal. Note that Esk(.) denotes a symmetric encryption function 
(such as the AES method) based on the session key SK.  
Step 3.6: The terminal acquires EBi and RK by performing the decryption process DSK (M), 
and extracts EAi from the smart card. EAi and EBi, are then merged to obtain EFi= 
EAi∪EBi, where Dsk(.) denotes a symmetric decryption function based on the session key 
SK.  
Step 3.7: The terminal compares EFi* and EFi. If a match is obtained, the legal user is 
successfully identified; else the terminal sends RM=ERK(h(EFi)||CM) to the server for 
reconfirmation purposes. Note that ERK is a symmetric decryption function based on the key 
RK, and CM is a message indicating the matching result. 
Step 3.8: The server re-verifies the match h(EFi) == HEFi . If a match is obtained, the server 
accepts the login request of Ui; else it rejects the request. 
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and then sends M to the terminal. Note that Esk(.) denotes a symmetric encryption function 
(such as the AES method) based on the session key SK.  
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EAi∪EBi, where Dsk(.) denotes a symmetric decryption function based on the session key 
SK.  
Step 3.7: The terminal compares EFi* and EFi. If a match is obtained, the legal user is 
successfully identified; else the terminal sends RM=ERK(h(EFi)||CM) to the server for 
reconfirmation purposes. Note that ERK is a symmetric decryption function based on the key 
RK, and CM is a message indicating the matching result. 
Step 3.8: The server re-verifies the match h(EFi) == HEFi . If a match is obtained, the server 
accepts the login request of Ui; else it rejects the request. 
  




3.5 Server Generate a one-time private key RK 
Server Terminal Compute M=Esk(EBi||RK) and send M
3.6 Terminal Decrypt DSK (M) to obtain EBi and RK
Extract EAi using card reader, then merge two parts of 
template, i.e., EFi= EAi∪EBi 
3.7 Terminal If Match (EFi*== EFi), then CM=true; else CM=false 
Terminal Server Return the Comparison Message (CM) and EFi with 
encryption RM=ERK(h(EFi)||CM)
3.8 Server Decrypt DRK (RM) to obtain h(EFi) and CM
Verify (h(EFi) == HEFi) 
Accept the login request of Ui if match is obtained; else 
reject login request.
Fig. 11. Authentication phase (Steps 3.5~3.8).  
Summarizing the procedures shown in Figs. 9~11, the overall sequence diagram of the 
proposed remote authentication scheme can be illustrated as shown in Fig. 12.  
 
 
Fig. 12. Sequence diagram of proposed remote authentication scheme 
4. The security performance and computational efficiency 
This section discusses the security performance and computational efficiency of the 
proposed remote authentication scheme.  
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4.1 Security analysis 
This sub-section demonstrates the robustness of the proposed authentication scheme toward 
three common forms of attack, namely (i) authentication factor attacks; (ii) network attacks; 
and (iii) interior attacks originating from the card-issuing organization. 
4.1.1 Authentication factor attacks 
Given a three-factor authentication scheme (i.e., password, smart card and user biometrics), 
a hacker requires all three factors in order to successfully complete the authentication 
process. It is possible that the smart card and password may be stolen or duplicated. 
However, in the scheme proposed in this study, the biometrics template is strongly 
protected using a secret-splitting technique. Thus, even if a hacker manages to obtain the 
partial fingerprint template EBi, he or she cannot generate the partial template EAi without 
possessing the knowledge of the authentication number (AN) stored on the smart card. 
Besides, hackers have no matters to generate the other part of biometrics template (EAi), 
except they crack the program which is used for merging EAi* and EBi*, however, this 
program generally is an executive binary code and burn in the ROM of card issuing 
machine. In other words, it is extremely difficult for a hacker or a dishonest member of staff 
to obtain all three authentication factors for a particular user, and thus the proposed scheme 
is as safe as other multi-factor authentication schemes.  
As described above, in the proposed approach, the biometric data of a user is separated into 
two parts (EAi , EBi), encrypted and stored on a smart card and a server, respectively. This 
approach not only preserves the privacy of the users in the login and authentication phases, 
but also helps protect the users’ information against the theft of the user’s fingerprint 
minutiae by interior dishonest staff.  
4.1.2 Network attacks 
This section demonstrates the robustness of the proposed authentication scheme toward 
three common types of network attack, namely (i) man-in-the-middle attacks, (ii) dictionary 
attacks, (iii) replay attacks.  
Strong encryption authentication helps prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. In the proposed 
scheme, the authentication template, encrypted using a 128-bit AES symmetric encryption 
algorithm, is split into two parts; stored on the smart card and the server, respectively. To 
prevent from the man-in-the-middle attacks, the data transmissions between the terminal 
and the server are protected by a session key generated using the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange algorithm. Therefore, hackers are not easily able to steal the complete set of 
biometric data. Thus, the security of the biometric data is further enhanced since solving the 
Discrete-Logarithm Problem (DLP) in order to crack the Diffie-Hellman protected 
transmissions is extremely hard within a finite period of time [14]. In addition, the 
decryption process is further complicated (from the hacker’s perspective) by the fact that the 
session key is changed on a periodic basis. Thus, a hacker not only faces a major challenge in 
determining the AN of the smart card and the coding used to construct the partial 
authentication template EAi, but also encounters severe difficulties in cracking the encrypted 
transmission packets exchanged between the terminal and the server.  
For dictionary attacks, cracking a password needs either weak password strength or large 
quantity of hash of the target password; two cases can be prevented by both strong hash 
function algorithms such as MD5 and the SHA family and long character password with 
numbers, mixed case, and symbols in Step 2.1. 
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Server Terminal Compute M=Esk(EBi||RK) and send M
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4.1 Security analysis 
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authentication template EAi, but also encounters severe difficulties in cracking the encrypted 
transmission packets exchanged between the terminal and the server.  
For dictionary attacks, cracking a password needs either weak password strength or large 
quantity of hash of the target password; two cases can be prevented by both strong hash 
function algorithms such as MD5 and the SHA family and long character password with 
numbers, mixed case, and symbols in Step 2.1. 
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Assume that a hacker has attained the formation of the terminal (AN, EAi* , EBi*) in Steps 
3.1~3.4 from the terminal and smart card, and then launches a replay attack to counterfeit a 
legal user in the authentication process. In Step 3.5, a one-time session key (RK) is randomly 
generated by the server. This key is valid only for the current authentication process. In 
other words, old session keys cannot be re-used, and thus imitation attacks are thwarted. 
4.1.3 Attacks originating within card issuing organization 
This section demonstrates the robustness of the proposed scheme toward interior staff 
attacks in the registration phase and authentication phase, respectively.  
Registration phase  
In the registration process, the users scan their finger in order to provide the system with the 
fingerprint minutiae required to construct the finger template (see Step 2.2). The fingerprint 
template Fi, stored in the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the terminal is utilized only in 
the subsequent registration process. That is, to prevent exposure of the user’s biometric data 
to any unauthorized third party, Fi and its related parameters are deleted as soon as the 
authentication process is complete. Therefore, interior staff and external hackers have little 
chance of acquiring Fi since it exists within the system for only a short period of time and, 
moreover, its location within the terminal RAM varies dynamically.  
Authentication phase 
As shown in Fig. 6, the three components of the authentication template generated in the 
proposed scheme are stored separately in the cards, terminal and servers (“on two different 
physical components, namely (i) EAi is stored on the smart card; (ii) and (iii) EBi is stored at 
the authentication server. Thus, even if the template data at the authentication server is 
stolen by a dishonest member of staff, the authentication process cannot be completed since 
the remaining template information is missing. In practice, a dishonest member of staff can 
only complete the authentication without password and smart card, except someone is 
capable of copying process by somehow copying the user’s card and acquiring the user’s 
fingerprint from the imprint cup.  
4.2 Computational complexity 
In this section, the computational complexity of the proposed scheme is compared with that 
of the schemes presented by Fan et al. (2006), Lin and Lai (2004), Kim et al. (2003) and J.K. 
Lee et al. (2002) (see Table 1). Among the various computations performed by the different 
schemes, the exponential operation in the decryption procedure (E) is the most time 
consuming. It is observed that the number of exponential operations in the schemes 
proposed by Lee et al. and Lin and Lai, respectively, is slightly higher than that in the 
proposed scheme and significantly higher than that in the scheme proposed by Fan et al. In 
addition, it is seen that the overall computational complexity of the scheme proposed in this 
study is slightly higher than that of the scheme proposed by Fan et al. due to the separation 
of the authentication data and the encryption of the symmetric keys during transmission. 
Compared to the scheme proposed by Fan et al., the proposed scheme requires three 
additional exponential operations and two additional merge operations. However, the 
number of symmetric decryption operations is reduced by one, while the number of hash 
and XOR operations is reduced by three and one, respectively. Significantly, the scheme 
proposed by Fan et al. utilizes the Rabin algorithm (Rabin, 1979) to protect the symmetric 
keys during transmission. Whilst this approach reduces the number of exponential 
operations required, the security of the communications between the terminal and the 
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authentication server cannot be guaranteed in an open environment. By contrast, the scheme 
proposed in this study uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange /agreement algorithm to 
protect the terminal-server communications. Thus, while a greater number of exponential 
operations are required (i.e., to solve the Discrete-Log Problem), the security of the 
transmissions is significantly improved relative to that in Fan et al.’s scheme. 
It is acknowledged that the proposed scheme has certain limitations. For example, in the 
event that the user loses his or her smart card, the CA cannot immediately re-issue a new 
card since they do not possess the complete fingerprint template. In other words, the users 
must repeat the registration process in order to obtain a new card. Furthermore, the 
computational complexity of the proposed scheme is slightly higher than that of existing 
schemes. However, compared to existing methods, the proposed scheme ensures the 
security of the users’ biometric information even if the contents of the authentication 
database are stolen. In other words, the proposed scheme achieves a compromise between 
the need to reduce the computational cost of the remote authentication process and the need 











Proposed scheme 4E+3SE+3SD+H+2X+2M No No 
Fan et al. (2006) E+3SE+4SD+4H+3X Client No 
Lin and Lai (2004) 5E+3H+4X Client Yes 
Kim et al. (2003)
(Timestamp-based)
4E+2H Server Yes 
Kim et al. (2003)
(Nonce-based) 
4E+1H Server No 
J.K. Lee et al. (2002) 7E+2H+2X Server Yes 
Table 1. Comparison of related schemes (revised from Lee S.W. et al., 2005) 
Note that E represents the computational time required to perform modular exponentiation; 
SE denotes the computational time required to perform modular symmetric encryption; SD 
is the computational time required to perform modular symmetric decryption computation; 
H denotes the computational time required to perform a one-way hash function; X is the 
computational time required to perform a modular exclusive-or operation; and M represents 
the computational time required to perform a modular merge operation. 
5. Conclusions   
This paper has presented a novel remote authentication scheme based on a secret-splitting 
concept for cloud computing applications. Compared to existing methods, the proposed 
scheme has a number of important advantages, namely (i) the users can choose passwords 
(PWi) for their smart cards at will; (ii) the smart card and server each store a partial 
biometric template rather than the full template; and (iii) the partial templates are integrated 
only when the users have successfully completed the login process in the authentication 
phase. The proposed scheme is robust toward three common forms of attack, i.e., man-in-
the-middle attacks, dictionary attacks and replay attacks. As a result, it provides an effective 
solution for enhancing the security of cloud computing applications, and is therefore 
beneficial to SaaS service providers in improving user acceptance of their services. 
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1. Introduction  
In the last decade, affordable computing power has become available on platforms intended 
for low-power, mobile applications. For example, Gumstix Overo products integrate 
WiFi/Bluetooth connectivity, microSD storage, and 600 MHz Texas Instruments OMAP 
(Open Multimedia Application Platform) 35xx processors with up to 256 MB of flash 
memory/SDRAM, offering laptop-like resources and performance in a form factor of a stick 
of gum (Chaoui, et al., 2001). This speaks to the potential for wearable, wireless medical 
devices based on such products to process signals on-board; functionality that previously 
required expensive, bulky, benchtop/bedside equipment. These computational capabilities 
also show promise for smart devices that implement context-based intelligence and on-
device expert systems for clinical decision making. This move toward highly-capable and 
intelligent mobile medical devices drives the need for verification tools, data integrity 
checkers, and role-based security mechanisms that can also be implemented at the 
embedded level, since the potential usage scenarios and associated protection needs are 
numerous in comparison with legacy medical device applications in controlled hospital and 
home care settings. For example, many implementations of personal and body area 
networks have been developed to facilitate ambulatory monitoring of health status, where 
physiological parameters such as heart rate, heart activity, blood oxygen saturation, and 
respiration rate can be gathered through the use of mobile, wearable electrocardiographs 
and pulse oximeters (Jovanov, et al., 2009; Galeottei, et al., 2008; Chuo, et al., 2010). These 
data need to be authenticated and checked for integrity before they are stored in electronic 
patient records, which implies the need for “owner-aware” devices that verify user identity 
as part of the data acquisition process (Warren, et al., 2005; Warren & Jovanov, 2006). Many 
biometric authentication protocols are computationally intensive and can well-utilize the 
emerging computational capabilities of low-power mobile devices. 
A broad range of biomedical data, from physiological signals/images to behavioral traits, 
has been explored for its biometric authentication and identification potential (Biel, et al., 
2001; Chan, et al., 2008; Doi & Yamanaka, 2004; Duc, et al., 1997; Elsherief, et al., 2006; 
Faundez-Zanuy, 2005; Irvine, et al., 2001; Israel, et al., 2005; Shen, et al., 2002; Sullivan, et al., 
2007; Yao & Wan, 2010; G. H. Zhang, et al., 2009). Image-based mechanisms that assess 
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fingerprints (Doi & Yamanaka, 2004; Matsumoto, et al., 2002), retinal patterns (Elsherief, et 
al., 2006), facial features (Daugman, 1998; Koh, et al., 1999; Philips, et al., 2003), and 
vein/palm structures (Doi & Yamanaka, 2004) are the leading biometric modalities used 
today for identity verification. Recently, one-dimensional physiological signals such as 
electrocardiograms (ECGs) (Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008a, 2008b; Biel, et al., 2001; Israel, et 
al., 2005; Kyoso & Uchiyama, 2001; Micheli-Tzanakou, et al., 2009; Nasri, et al., 2009; 
Plataniotis, et al., 2006; Saechia, et al., 2005; Shen, et al., 2002; Singh & Gupta, 2008; Yao & 
Wan, 2008, 2010), photoplethysmograms (PPGs) (Ludeman & Chacon, 1995; Ludeman & 
Chacon, 1996; Love, et al., 1997; Ma et al., 2006; Bao et al., 2005; Gu, et al., 2003; Gu & Zhang, 
2003; Wan, et al., 2007; Yao, et al., 2007) and electroencephalograms (EEGs) (Marcel & 
Millan, 2007) have garnered attention as promising biometric candidates based on the 
following thoughts:  
• In many cases, these signals are already acquired and stored as part of the healthcare 
delivery process. It is therefore sensible to utilize them as identification attributes 
because no additional user action or data gathering is required, as is the case with most 
other biometric modalities. In other words, authentication, identification, or verification 
can occur behind the scenes even without subject awareness (Warren & Jovanov, 2006; 
Warren, et al., 2005). Further, no additional hardware would be required to implement 
this feature, which implies that biometric features can be added to the system without 
incurring significant additional device cost. The efficiency of this approach in terms of 
care delivery workflow, coupled with the ease of use and economic sensibility of such 
tools, should lead to increased technology acceptance by patients and providers.  
• Since they represent an individual’s underlying physiological status, these signals may 
be less sensitive to environmental factors that affect other biometric parameters, thereby 
avoiding substantial deteriorations in biometric performance when fully controlled 
environments are unobtainable. For example, environmental noise unavoidably 
interferes with voice-based biometric systems (Ming, et al., 2007). In such cases, costly 
environmental improvements are often required to ensure that identification systems 
work properly.    
• The use of physiological signals for identification or verification can help to prevent 
failure to enroll (FTE) issues that may occur when a subject does not possess a 
particular biometric. Most current biometric approaches are affected by this. In 
fingerprint identification, for example, it has been estimated that fingerprints from up 
to 4% of the population cannot be used for identification purposes due to the poor 
quality of the fingerprint ridges (Jain, et al., 2004).  
• Some current biometric approaches are subject to forgery. Artificial fingerprints, for 
example, can be constructed to circumvent a fingerprint verification system. Unlike 
most current biometric data, which are extracted from “surficial” parts of the human 
body, physiological signals represent core internal behavior and are hard to emulate 
with tissue phantoms (Jain, et al., 2004). This “innerness” makes the identification 
process less prone to forgery, preventing imposters from disguising their true identity 
by changing these metric patterns.   
A number of research efforts have attempted to address these thoughts within the context of 
one-dimensional biomedical signals. This chapter provides an up-to-date review of this 
research, summarized from the following four perspectives: (1) the signals used for 
identification, with an emphasis on ECGs, (2) signal processing methods, (3) classification 
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methods, and (4) identification algorithm performance. As noted in (Matyas & Riha, 2003), 
“the main issue in biometric authentication systems is performance.”  High identification 
accuracy is critical for practical biometric technologies.  
This chapter also presents some of the authors’ research findings geared toward 
quantitatively evaluating the identification accuracy of ECG data as population size 
increases. It presents the design of a wearable electrocardiograph and the associated signal 
processing algorithms, followed by an assessment of identification-algorithm performance 
for this application. In the analysis, three distance measures were defined in the wavelet 
domain:  the Distance of Discrete Wavelet Coefficients (DDWC), the Distance of Continuous 
Wavelet Coefficients (DCWC), and the Ratio of the volume of Intersection to the volume of 
Union (RItU). Evaluation results for all three distance measures demonstrated consistent 
declination as the population grew to a size of 50. Possible causes for this performance drop 
are discussed. These experiments also recognized that distinguishable information from 
these signals may not be as prevalent as the unique data acquired using more popular 
modalities. In other words, the number of possible combinations for the patterns of the 
statistical attributes that can be extracted from these signals is limited. Based on these 
findings, the chapter suggests scenarios that ECGs can be utilized as the sole modality for 
biometric purposes or those they can serve as a supplemental tool to other modalities.  
2. ECG as a biometric modality: a systematic review 
Researchers have recognized for some time that ECGs contain innate human attributes (i.e., 
they reflect the electro-myocytic properties of the heart), so it seems sensible that each 
individual’s ECG may demonstrate his or her uniqueness and therefore be useful for 
identity verification. This section provides a detailed review of research geared toward the 
usefulness of ECGs as biometric indicators.  
Since the first such effort was reported in 1999 (Biel, et al., 1999), approximately 20 different 
groups have researched this interesting area (Israel, et al., 2005; Chan, et al., 2008; Biel, et al., 
2001; Yao & Wan, 2008; Zhang & Wei, 2006; Biel, et al., 1999; Boumbarov, et al., 2009; Chan, 
et al., 2006; Chiu, et al., 2008; Fatemian & Hatzinakos, 2009; Gahi, et al., 2008; Israel, et al., 
2003; Kim, et al., 2005; Kyoso, 2003; Kyoso & Uchiyama, 2001; Micheli-Tzanakou, et al., 2009; 
Nasri, et al., 2009; Plataniotis, et al., 2006; Shen, et al., 2002; Sufi & Khalil, 2008; Wang, et al., 
2006; Yao & Wan, 2010) – see Table 1. Most of these published works use a similar approach 
to present research findings. They first start with a brief description of the physiological 
origin of the ECG and its characteristics (e.g., P wave, QRS complex, and T wave) (Webster, 
1998). They then present the three primary steps in a typical classification process—feature 
selection, pre-processing, and classification (which usually includes enrollment/training 
and identification/testing). Finally, they draw optimistic conclusions from the classification 
results. Despite this consistency in presentation format, the projects themselves differ with 
regard to (a) ECG data sources, (b) data collection processes, (c) classification feature 
selection, and (d) classification methods adopted to realize the final identification results. 
Each is detailed below: 
• ECG Data Sources:  Multiple groups experimentally acquired ECG data from 
volunteers (Biel, et al., 1999 2001; Chan, et al., 2006; Chan, et al., 2008; Gahi, et al., 2008; 
Israel, et al., 2005; Israel, et al., 2003; Kim, et al., 2005; Kyoso, 2003; Kyoso & Uchiyama, 
2001; Sufi & Khalil, 2008; Wan & Yao, 2008; Wang, et al., 2006; Yao & Wan, 2008, 2010). 
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1998). They then present the three primary steps in a typical classification process—feature 
selection, pre-processing, and classification (which usually includes enrollment/training 
and identification/testing). Finally, they draw optimistic conclusions from the classification 
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regard to (a) ECG data sources, (b) data collection processes, (c) classification feature 
selection, and (d) classification methods adopted to realize the final identification results. 
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In these cases, experimental conditions were often well controlled: subjects were 
requested to rest for a period of time prior to data collection (Biel, et al., 2001; Chan, et 
al., 2008; Yao & Wan, 2008, 2010), with the exception of studies that examined the 
performance of the identification methods under conditions where heart rate was 
increased (Kim, et al., 2005). Some of these groups developed their own devices (Kyoso, 
2003; Kyoso & Uchiyama, 2001; Wan, et al., 2007; Yao & Wan, 2008), while others 
collected data with off-the-shelf ECG products (Sufi & Khalil, 2008; Chan, et al., 2008). 
Other non-experimental data sources were employed, as in (Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 
2008a; Plataniotis, et al., 2006; Singh & Gupta, 2008; Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008b), 
where ECG data were extracted from existing databases (e.g., PTB ("The PTB Diagnostic 
ECG Database") and MIT-BIH ("MIT-BIH Database Distribution"); both of these 
databases are available through the Internet for public research use. 
• Data Collection:  Some publications provide subject demographic data, including 
gender (Biel, et al., 2001; Kim, et al., 2005; Yao & Wan, 2008), age range (Biel, et al., 2001; 
Yao & Wan, 2008; Chan, et al., 2008; Kim, et al., 2005; Yao & Wan, 2010), and heart 
condition (Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008a; Chiu, et al., 2008; Kim, et al., 2005; Plataniotis, 
et al., 2006; Singh & Gupta, 2008; Sufi & Khalil, 2008). However, few report complete 
demographic or health-condition information for participants. Furthermore, the time 
interval between subject enrollment and data collection, a critical element when 
determining the effectiveness of a biometric modality, is frequently overlooked (Chiu, 
et al., 2008; Gahi, et al., 2008; Israel, et al., 2005; Kim, et al., 2005; Kyoso, 2003; 
Plataniotis, et al., 2006; Saechia, et al., 2005; Sufi & Khalil, 2008).  Even studies that 
record this information often mention it vaguely (Chan, et al., 2008; Fatemian & 
Hatzinakos, 2009; Singh & Gupta, 2008) (see Table 1).  
• Selection of Classification Features:  Most investigators assess time domain features 
(e.g., time intervals between P, Q, R, S, and T waves, along with their amplitudes) (Biel, 
et al., 2001; Boumbarov, et al., 2009; Gahi, et al., 2008; Israel, et al., 2005; Kyoso, 2003; Z. 
Zhang & Wei, 2006) and angle information (Singh & Gupta, 2008). Others believe that 
post-transform features are more distinctive and will therefore improve identification 
performance. For example, wavelet transformation was used in (Chan, et al., 2006; 
Chan, et al., 2008; Chiu, et al., 2008; Yao & Wan, 2008, 2010) to find the wavelet 
coefficients and distances in the wavelet domain that optimally quantify the similarity 
between two ECGs. Autocorrelation coefficients are a third type of statistical feature 
under investigation (Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008a; Plataniotis, et al., 2006). In addition 
to these three types of analytical information, the appearance of the ECG waveforms 
was added as a classification feature in (Wang, et al., 2006). Finally, after recognizing 
the difficulties encountered when delineating ECG cycles, some investigators extracted 
classification features without the need to detect fiducial points (Plataniotis, et al., 2006; 
Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008a), where the DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) approach 
did not rely on the accurate location of each ECG cycle. 
• Classification Algorithms:  As in other pattern recognition domains, numerous 
classification algorithms have been created for human identification based on ECGs, 
where algorithm performance varies widely. While most of these approaches used 
variations of a “distance” concept (e.g., Euclidean distance (Israel, et al., 2003; 
Plataniotis, et al., 2006) or Mahalanobis’ distance (Kyoso, 2003; Kim, et al., 2005) to 
quantify the similarities between the unknown data and the waveforms enrolled in the 
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database, the classification algorithms they adopted were different, including (a) classic 
linear discriminate analysis (LDA) (Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008a; Chan, et al., 2008; 
Kim, et al., 2005; Kyoso, 2003; Wang, et al., 2006), (b) neural networks (Saechia, et al., 
2005; Shen, et al., 2002; Wan & Yao, 2008; Boumbarov, et al., 2009), and/or (c) voting 
after initial results were available from the first classification level (Israel, et al., 2005; 
Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008b). Rather than use the intuitive distance concept, other 
investigators employed a sequential approach that employs a hidden Markov model 
(Boumbarov, et al., 2009) and a probabilistic, Bayesian-theorem-based approach (Z. 




Group Year Subjects Time Span Success Rate 
Biel 2001 20 6 weeks 90-100% 
Kyoso 2003 9 N/A Wide range 
Shen 2002 20 N/A 80-95% 
Israel 2005 29 N/A 100% 
Kim 2005 10 N/A N/A 
Saechia 2005 N/A N/A 97% 
Zhang 2006 502 records Same datasets 82-97% 
Wang 2006 13 A few years 84.6% 
Plataniotis 2006 14 N/A 92.8-100% 
Chan 2008 50 > 1 day 95% 
Yao 2008 20 Hours to weeks 91.5% 
Agrafioti 2008 27 Mixed length 96%-100% 
Agrafioti 2008 14 A few years 85.6%-100% 
Sufi 2008 15 N/A 93-95% 
Gahi 2008 16 N/A 100% 
Singh 2008 25 Same time or unclear 98.5-99% 
Chiu 2008 45 N/A 100%  and 81% 
Table 1. Summary of research on ECG analysis as a biometric modality 
• Other Endeavors:  Unlike most of the aforementioned research, which sought better 
identification rates, other investigators wished to improve computational efficiency. 
They tried to reduce the number of necessary features by (1) selecting the most 
meaningful features after observing how each feature changed the classification results 
(Biel, et al., 2001; Agrafioti & Hatzinakos, 2008b) or (2) using methods such as principle 
component analysis (PCA) (Yao & Wan, 2008; Sufi & Khalil, 2008; Z. Zhang & Wei, 
2006; Yao & Wan, 2010).  
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3. ECG as a bioidentification modality: performance evaluation  
This section presents the authors‘ recent research on the performance and limitations of 
ECGs as biometric indicators, as well as other potential application fields.  
3.1 Data acquisition  
ECG data for this study were collected with an “in-house” device (see Fig. 1), and MATLAB 
scripts processed these data using wavelet-based approaches. Data collection and pre-
processing details were described in (Wan & Yao, 2008; Yao & Wan, 2010). Thirty 
participants (26 males and 4 females) with ages ranging from 18 to 51 years were recruited 
for data collection. A total of 121 datasets were collected from these subjects, where each 
subject participated in multiple ( 2 5iN≤ ≤ ) data collection sessions; consecutive sessions 
were a few weeks apart.  
 
 
Fig. 1. An “in-house“ ECG module for bioidentification data acquisition 
3.2 Signal preparation and feature extraction 
As specified in (Wan & Yao, 2008; Yao & Wan, 2010), the raw ECG signals were pre-
processed to remove signal noise, detect R waves, and normalize each signal to a pre-
defined length and amplitude range. Specifically, two major noise sources (low frequency 
signal drifts at around 0.06 Hz and higher frequency signal spikes at 60 Hz) were first 
filtered with “hard thresholding” after a scale 12 Daubechies’s db6 wavelet transform was 
applied to all of the heart beat cycles. Detailed wavelet parts at scales 2, 3, and 4 were 
reconstructed so that the R peaks could be located as the fiducial points to identify ECG 
cycles. Identified ECG cycles were interpolated to a pre-defined length for the convenience 
of future steps. Sixty consistent heartbeat cycles from each of the datasets were selected and 
their amplitudes were normalized to the range of [-1, 1]. In this step, data consistency was 
examined by calculating the Euclidean distance between the mean of each cycle and the 
mean of all cycles. 
A wavelet transform (Yao & Wan, 2008), similar to (Chan, et al., 2008; Chiu, et al., 2008), was 
applied to each processed time-domain signal, and then wavelet coefficients were calculated 
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for each cardiac cycle within that signal. Depending on the continuous or discrete wavelet 
transform applied, the number of coefficients varied, as discussed earlier when the specific 
measures were introduced. Six sets of wavelet coefficients (corresponding to sixty heart 
beats) were saved for each of the 121 ECG datasets. From this point on, the wavelet 
coefficients served as the “statistical features” and were manipulated for subsequent 
classification decisions. 
Out of the Ni coefficient sets obtained from each subject, one coefficient set (corresponding 
to one heart interval) was enrolled in the database, creating a database of 30 coefficient sets. 
The other Ni-1 coefficient sets (corresponding to Ni-1 heart intervals of the same subject) 
were used for classification tests:  121-30 = 91 coefficient sets.  
3.3 Measures of signal similarity/difference 
The goal of this exercise was to explore identification-algorithm performance as a function 
of test population size. Three distance measures were utilized to represent the level of 
similarity between the unknown wavelet coefficient set and the enrolled coefficient sets:  (1) 
Distance of Discrete Wavelet Coefficients (DDWC), (2) Distance of Continuous Wavelet 
Coefficients (DCWC), and (3) Ratio of Intersection to Union of continuous wavelet 
coefficients (RItU). The following paragraphs describe the three distance measures in detail. 
3.3.1 Distance of Discrete Wavelet Coefficients (DDWC) 
The wavelet distance proposed in (Chan, et al., 2008) was examined first (it was referred as 
WDIST in (Chan, et al., 2008)). This distance is notated here as DDWC to distinguish it from 
the distance obtained from a continuous wavelet transform. In this case, coefficients from a 
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p ,qc  is the qth wavelet coefficient at the pth scale of the unknown coefficient set; p ,qnc  is 
the qth wavelet coefficient at the pth scale of the enrolled coefficient set; P is the number of 
scales of the wavelet transform; and Q is the number of coefficients at a specific scale. T.H. is 
a pre-selected normalization constant. To obtain the DDWC measure, a scale 6, Bior1.1 
wavelet transform (Mallat, 1999) was applied to the pre-processed ECGs, yielding coefficient 
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3. ECG as a bioidentification modality: performance evaluation  
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for data collection. A total of 121 datasets were collected from these subjects, where each 
subject participated in multiple ( 2 5iN≤ ≤ ) data collection sessions; consecutive sessions 
were a few weeks apart.  
 
 
Fig. 1. An “in-house“ ECG module for bioidentification data acquisition 
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for each cardiac cycle within that signal. Depending on the continuous or discrete wavelet 
transform applied, the number of coefficients varied, as discussed earlier when the specific 
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translation parameters. The coefficients obtained from a continuous wavelet transform 
depict the detailed, smooth transitions of the signal energy distribution along the time and 


























Fig. 2. A 3-D coefficient surface obtained from a continuous wavelet transform 
Assuming that the inclusion of the smooth transition of coefficients at different scales will 


















p ,qc is the qth wavelet coefficient at the pth scale of the unknown coefficient set; p ,qnc is 
the qth wavelet coefficient at the pth scale of the enrolled coefficient set; P = 64 is the number 
of scales of the wavelet transform; and Q = 256 is the number of coefficients at a given scale. 
In this experiment, the continuous wavelet transform used the same basis function, Bior1.1, 
as was used in the discrete wavelet transform. Note that the denominator in Eq. (2) contains 
the maximum of the absolute value of the coefficients of the unknown subject. Experiments 
showed that this normalization could obtain better classification results than using the 
denominator in Eq. (1) and avoided the process of finding the threshold.  
3.3.3 Ratio of Volume of Intersection to Volume of Union (RItU) 
The waveform coefficients, when plotted as a mesh, form a 3-dimensional spatial surface as 
shown in Fig. 2. A more intuitive way to quantify the similarity of two signals is the ratio of 
the volume under the intersection of the two signals to the volume under the union of the 
two signals (see Fig. 3 for a graphical depiction of the intersection and union of two 2-D 
curves). The more two compared signals differ, the smaller the ratio. When the two signals 
are identical, the ratio is 1, and when the two signals do not overlap, the ratio is 0, implying 
that they are separate from each other and that the similarity between them is minimal. In 
addition to taking into account the distance between two coefficient sets, as in the other two 
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measures, the RItU measure also considers the coefficient locations over the temporal and 
frequency dimensions. This volume ratio is mathematically defined as 
 ( )T E T ERItU C , C / (C , C )= ∩ ∪  (3) 
where TC is the coefficient set to be tested, and EC  is one of the coefficient sets enrolled in 
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where the notation follows from Eq. (2) because the spatial surfaces used to calculate RItU 
were also determined from continuous wavelet transforms.  
 
 
Fig. 3. The intersection (gridded area) and union (all shaded areas) of two curves 
3.4 Evaluation of identification performance changes as population size increases 
The classification method used in this experiment finds the distances (D) (as defined in the 
previous section) from the to-be-tested coefficient set TjC  ( )1 91j≤ ≤  to the coefficient sets 
E
kC ( )1 30k≤ ≤  enrolled in the database and uses these distances as the quantitative measure 
of signal difference/similarity. After all of the distances are compared, TjC is classified to the 
closest enrolled subject iS . i.e., the unknown coefficient set: 
 Tj iC S→ , where   iji arg i minD=  (6) 
To evaluate the deterioration in accuracy as the test population size increases, a varied 
number (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30) of subject waveforms were tested with the wavelet distance 
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stored for testing purposes were randomly selected to perform identification tests. When a 
certain number (again, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, or 30) of subject waveforms were tested, the total 
number of coefficient sets selected for testing could vary since the number of coefficient sets 
Ni for subject t could be different. The identification accuracy rate (AR) is defined as 
 S TAR D / D=  (7) 
where DS is the number of coefficient sets that have been successfully identified and DT is 
the total number of coefficient sets selected for testing.  
Repeated random sub-sampling was implemented to eliminate possible classification biases. 
A total of 20 trials with randomly selected unknown datasets were conducted for each case 
with a specific subject number (5, 10, 15, 20, and 25); only one test was conducted for the 30-
subject case since all of the subjects were examined. In each trial, wavelet coefficient sets 
were selected randomly from those set aside for testing and classified according to the three 
measures. The average accuracy and standard deviation for all trials, using the three 
difference/similarity measures, was examined to analyze the biometric performance trend. 
4. Experimental results  
Fig. 4 illustrates identification performances when the three distance definitions, DDWC, 
DCWC, and RItU are utilized to measure subject similarity/difference. Comparing the three 
approaches, it is obvious that DDWC outperforms the other two distance measures. The 
latter two methods (DCWC and RItU) generate similar results, where the accuracy rate from 
the DCWC method is slightly higher than the RItU method. More importantly, these plots 
demonstrate that the classification accuracies for all three measures decline consistently by 
12% as the number of test subjects increases from 5 to 30. Note also that, as the number of 
subjects grows, the standard deviation of the accuracy rate decreases (e.g., the DDWC 
method yields standard deviations of 6.6 and 2.3 for 5 and 25 subjects, respectively). This is 
true because more repeated datasets (and therefore a larger percentage of subjects) existed 
when larger numbers of subjects were incorporated.  
 























Fig. 4. Identification accuracy rate with the three difference/similarity measures versus the 
number of test subjects 
 




Possible causes for this performance drop can be identified. First, since signals such as ECGs 
are collected to provide patient health status and diagnose suspected illness, the signals are 
expected to show variations over time. Even for individuals whose health status does not 
change significantly over a period of time, normal circadian rhythms (on both a cycle-to-
cycle basis and over a longer time interval) coupled with changes in stress level, emotions, 
and activity will in aggregate create variations that a robust identification algorithm must be 
able to tolerate. For some physiological signals, the detection environment may be another 
critical factor. PPGs, for example, which are based on light intensity either transmitted 
through or reflected by tissue, are extremely sensitive to motion artifacts, in spite of multiple 
existing approaches to help remediate these artifacts. ECGs are also sensitive to motion 
artifact and can be easily corrupted by electromagnetic interference that exists in most 
mobile patient environments. Without compensation, such variations and artifacts 
ultimately make one-dimensional signals less than ideal for identification or verification. 
More consistent attributes uniquely associated with patients are then desired.  
These experiments also recognized that distinguishable information from these signals may 
not be as rich as the unique data acquired using popularly adopted modalities. In other 
words, the number of possible combinations for the patterns of the statistical attributes that 
can be extracted from these signals is limited. As the number of subjects increases beyond a 
certain number (20 to 30 in this case), the likelihood of having subjects whose signals are 
very similar increases significantly.  
Therefore, despite the advantages that one-dimensional physiological signals may hold with 
respect to biometric identity assessment, performance assessments from previous research 
remind one that caution is required when such data are utilized for identification, especially 
when the subject population is large. The authors believe that these signals hold clear 
potential for this purpose, with the following qualifiers:  
• The class of one-dimensional signals discussed here should be used with caution as a 
sole source of blind identification, primarily due to the less than desired uniqueness of 
the signal shapes and their time-dependent variations. However, when these signals are 
used as supplemental traits combined with other biometrics (e.g., in a data fusion 
approach), they are desirable due to the natural physical coupling between these 
various signal modalities, which is expected to improve the overall performance of the 
affiliated identification algorithms.  
• While these nontraditional biometric modalities may not offer sufficient identification 
accuracy as required for legitimate authentication (i.e., where the goal is to identify an 
unknown subject given a large number of existing datasets), they may be better suited 
for individual verification, where the newly gathered signal is only compared to a 
recent set of data, with the assumption that the subject’s identity is already inferred. 
Current verification processes (e.g., the two-stage process that requires something you 
have and something you know) usually seek information such as a 
password/passphrase, date of birth, home address, mother’s maiden name, etc. A 
verification approach with one-dimensional signals, such as the ones proposed here, 
circumvents this process by employing non-transferrable datasets already native to the 
user.  
• As the demand for long term state-of-health monitoring increases, medical sensors 
implemented on personal, wearable, or implanted platforms demand strict rules of 
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user.  
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engagement to improve system interconnectivity and reliability so that they can be 
seamlessly woven into the user environment without requiring additional user 
intervention. Owner-aware sensors, or devices that recognize their owners based on an 
assessment of the data sets acquired from those individuals, are an appealing idea 
because they bolster security in the environment, minimizing their impact on normal 
human behavior, and increase the viability of the monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment 
process.   
• Although the performance of these identification algorithms requires improvements for 
large populations, some of these one-dimensional signals do offer fairly accurate 
classifications when the subject population is relatively small. This points to their 
feasibility for environments such as homecare settings or community health centers, 
both of which are vital to an aging population. In these applications, health data could 
be constantly or periodically collected, so identification performance deteriorations 
caused by long-term signal alterations are expected to be minimized. Indeed, these 
signal alterations may themselves provide trend data as an additional means to 
distinguish individuals.  
6. Conclusion  
This chapter recognizes several important questions that arise upon completion of a 
comprehensive review of existing research work that explores the possibility of using ECGs 
as waveforms for human identification. It answers one of these questions by investigating 
how identification performance changes as a function of subject population size. Using three 
wavelet coefficient-based distances to measure the similarity/difference between unknown 
datasets and those in a database, consistent performance trends were obtained from the 
three discrimination cases, confirming that accuracy declines as the population grows. This 
finding is a reminder that, although ECG-based authentication holds potential for 
applications where ECG data have already been acquired or stored, caution is needed when 
the population size is large.  
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wavelet coefficient-based distances to measure the similarity/difference between unknown 
datasets and those in a database, consistent performance trends were obtained from the 
three discrimination cases, confirming that accuracy declines as the population grows. This 
finding is a reminder that, although ECG-based authentication holds potential for 
applications where ECG data have already been acquired or stored, caution is needed when 
the population size is large.  
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Electromagnetic Sensor Technology for 
Biomedical Applications  
Larissa V. Panina 
School of Computing & Mathematics, University of Plymouth,  
United Kingdom 
1. Introduction  
Magnetic bio-detection constitutes a large area of research and development driven by its 
potential to provide versatile diagnostic tools in biology and medicine. Specific sensing 
technology is used depending on the applications which can be subdivided in two main 
groups: measuring a magnetic field from people and detecting magnetically labelled bio 
substances. The human body is mostly composed of what is normally regarded as 
nonmagnetic materials. In reality, every substance has some magnetic sensitivity, however 
small, being paramagnetic or diamagnetic. Their response is greatly limited by thermal 
fluctuations. In addition to this there is a further source of a magnetic field due to the neural 
activity which operates continuously throughout a living body. This neural activity involves 
movement of electric charges and, as such gives rise to magnetic fields. In principle, these 
fields represent a description of the neural activity and can be studied to help 
understanding the workings of the human body as well as provide an aid to diagnosis. On 
the other hand, they can be predicted and quantified by the fundamental laws of 
electromagnetic. In the other stream of applications, the use of magnetic labels allows the 
detection of various bio molecular reactions in immunoassays. It also results in a number of 
additional functionalities, such as transport of bio-molecules to a specific location, on-chip 
magnetic immuno-separation and testing or accelerating bio-molecular binding events. 
The magnitudes of the magnetic fields involved are very small, being in the sub-nanoTesla 
region and their detection requires very sensitive instrumentation. We have extremely 
sensitive magnetic technology: SQUID magnetometer (superconducting quantum 
interference device). The noise level of the SQUID detection is in femto-Tesla so it could 
become an ideal instrument for studying magnetic fields from biological subjects (see, for 
example, Sternickel & Braginski, 2006). However, the cost involved and the complex 
cryogenic technology present huge hurdles that have prevented SQUID (including high 
transition temperature requiring liquid nitrogen) from becoming widely used. Several field 
measurements from various parts of the body were published and summarised in (Wikswo , 
1999). Figure 1 presents comparison of some common magnetic fields and those generated 
by different parts of the human body. The signals from the brain are at about 1 picoTesla or 
less but from other parts of the body (such as the eyes and the stomach) are at levels an 
order of magnitude larger. One of the largest signals results from the heart which is at the 
level of about 25pT. The detection of this level of a magnetic field does not require all the 
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potential of SQUIDs and other high performance magnetometers (Ripka, 2001) can be used. 
Here we will discuss the potential of using as biosensors such magnetometers as giant 
magnetoresistive (GMR) and giant magnetoimpedance (GMI) sensors placing emphasis on a 
relatively new GMI sensing technology which could overcome many limitations of SQUID 
and magnetoresistive sensing platforms. As far as the detection of magnetic labels is 
concerned, we will consider the advantages of the detection method based on non linear 
magnetisation of magnetic labels through generation of high frequency harmonic spectra 
often referred to as magnetic particle spectral method (MPS). In both GMI and MPS the 
dynamic magnetisation processes are involved and we categorise them as electromagnetic 




Fig. 1. Comparison of some common magnetic fields with those from human body. 
Magnetoresitive sensing technology benefits from recent research and technological 
advances aiming the design of ultra high density magnetic memory hard discs and 
write/read heads (Prinz, 1998; Wolf 2001). However, limited sensitivity prevents the use of 
GMR sensors for measuring human magnetic fields, but they have been used to detect a 
variety of commercially available magnetic micro and nano beads as a basis for biochip 
development. The detection of molecular recognition (the interaction of complementary or 
affinity-linked biomolecules) with GMR has been shown. The sensor element can be made of 
a fraction of micron in size and can in principle provide the detection at the level of a single 
molecular interaction (Gaster et al, 2009). Yet, the GMR technology for biosensing is 
regarded as long-term development owing to the need to improve either sensitivity or 
highly spatial resolution. It requires precise manipulation of magnetic beads that must be 
transported to the sensor location. This approach makes the technology very specific, not 
suitable for a wider range of application, and in fact prevents its transfer from laboratory to 
end-user. GMI offers at least an order of magnitude higher magnetic field resolution (down 
to 10 PicoTesla) than GMR but is larger in size with a single sensing area limit of about 
5m×50m at frequencies of 20-250MHz. Integration of both GMR and GMI sensing 
concepts could be a possibility.  
The discovery of GMI effect in 1993 (Panina & Mohri, 1994; Beach & Berkowicz, 1994) had a 
strong impact on the development of micro magnetic sensors operating in the nano-Tesla 
 
Electromagnetic Sensor Technology for Biomedical Applications 217 
range (Zhukova et al, 2009; Mohri et al, 2001, 2002). In certain soft magnetic materials, such 
as composites of amorphous thin wires, the impedance change (GMI ratio) is in the range of 
more than 100 % in the MHz frequency band for the external magnetic fields of 0.1mTesla. 
One of the main activities in improving GMI technology is devoted to developing miniature 
GMI systems preserving high sensitivity. This could be realised in ultrathin 
amorphous/nanocrystalline wires and multilayer structures with inner silver/gold lead. In 
particularly, the modelling results for CoFeSiB/Au/CoFeSiB multilayers with in-plane size 
of 20m×100m and thickness of 1m demonstrate the GMI ratio of more than 300% at 350 
MHz (Morikawa et al, 1997;  Hika et al, 1994). Further miniaturisation and high GMI ratios 
are proposed to be achieved employing structures having a special spiral type of anisotropy 
(Panina et al, 2001). GMI sensors and particular their arrays provide the needed sensitivity 
for magnetic cardiography  (MCG) and some laboratories have already reported successful 
detecting cardiac signals with the use of GMI (Uchiyama et al, 2009). An MCG allows details 
of the localised electrical activity of the heart to be revealed, enabling accurate diagnosis of 
heart conditions. The development of room temperature MCG would be of great importance 
for wide practical use. 
We further will discuss the use of non linear magnetisation of magnetic labels for their 
sensitive detection. Magnetic labels or carriers, also referred to as microspheres, microbeads 
and nanoparticles, have found wide-ranging scientific and clinical application in 
biotechnological and biomedical research (Haukanes & Kvam, 1993), most notably in the 
areas of bioseparations, molecular biology and drug delivery. The labels used are non-
remanent paramagnetic or superparamagnetic beads. The magnetic material within the label 
exists as small particles (usually iron oxide), having random moments. A conventional 
magnetic sensor system relies on the alignment of these moments within the label to 
produce a measurable fringe field. On the other hand, the magnetisation of such magnetic 
particles is a nonlinear function of external magnetic field and capable of generating high 
frequencies harmonics having high signal to noise ratio, thus, high detection sensitivity.  
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be to promote relatively new magnetic sensing 
technologies for use in biomedical field. GMI and MPS can offer very high sensitivity (sub 
nano-Tesla range), low cost, with the benefit of a portable operation. In many areas of 
medical applications, such as MCG and magnetic immunoassays, the importance of these 
sensing technologies cannot be overestimated as they may provide relatively simple room-
temperature tests, which could be realised in any general hospital, unlike such expensive 
methods as SQUID magnetometry.  
2. SQUID magnetometers for biosensing applications 
SQUID instrument depends on the effects of magnetic fields on circuits containing 
superconducting (Josephson) junctions. The temperature at which these operate is 
traditionally at about 4 Kelvin which is the temperature of liquid Helium. A Josephson 
junction, which is the essential part of a SQUID device, is effectively a weak link between 
two superconductors that is capable of carrying supercurrents below a critical value. There 
are two types of SQUIDs: rf SQUIDs and dc SQUIDs. In both types, the device consists of a 
superconducting ring interrupted by one (rf) or two (dc) Josephson junctions. The difference 
between the two is in the nature of the biasing current being an rf or a dc. In either type, the 
properties of the Josephson junction cause the impedance of the ring to vary periodically as 
a function of the magnetic flux crossing the ring. With the use of a lock-in detector to 
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potential of SQUIDs and other high performance magnetometers (Ripka, 2001) can be used. 
Here we will discuss the potential of using as biosensors such magnetometers as giant 
magnetoresistive (GMR) and giant magnetoimpedance (GMI) sensors placing emphasis on a 
relatively new GMI sensing technology which could overcome many limitations of SQUID 
and magnetoresistive sensing platforms. As far as the detection of magnetic labels is 
concerned, we will consider the advantages of the detection method based on non linear 
magnetisation of magnetic labels through generation of high frequency harmonic spectra 
often referred to as magnetic particle spectral method (MPS). In both GMI and MPS the 
dynamic magnetisation processes are involved and we categorise them as electromagnetic 




Fig. 1. Comparison of some common magnetic fields with those from human body. 
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affinity-linked biomolecules) with GMR has been shown. The sensor element can be made of 
a fraction of micron in size and can in principle provide the detection at the level of a single 
molecular interaction (Gaster et al, 2009). Yet, the GMR technology for biosensing is 
regarded as long-term development owing to the need to improve either sensitivity or 
highly spatial resolution. It requires precise manipulation of magnetic beads that must be 
transported to the sensor location. This approach makes the technology very specific, not 
suitable for a wider range of application, and in fact prevents its transfer from laboratory to 
end-user. GMI offers at least an order of magnitude higher magnetic field resolution (down 
to 10 PicoTesla) than GMR but is larger in size with a single sensing area limit of about 
5m×50m at frequencies of 20-250MHz. Integration of both GMR and GMI sensing 
concepts could be a possibility.  
The discovery of GMI effect in 1993 (Panina & Mohri, 1994; Beach & Berkowicz, 1994) had a 
strong impact on the development of micro magnetic sensors operating in the nano-Tesla 
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range (Zhukova et al, 2009; Mohri et al, 2001, 2002). In certain soft magnetic materials, such 
as composites of amorphous thin wires, the impedance change (GMI ratio) is in the range of 
more than 100 % in the MHz frequency band for the external magnetic fields of 0.1mTesla. 
One of the main activities in improving GMI technology is devoted to developing miniature 
GMI systems preserving high sensitivity. This could be realised in ultrathin 
amorphous/nanocrystalline wires and multilayer structures with inner silver/gold lead. In 
particularly, the modelling results for CoFeSiB/Au/CoFeSiB multilayers with in-plane size 
of 20m×100m and thickness of 1m demonstrate the GMI ratio of more than 300% at 350 
MHz (Morikawa et al, 1997;  Hika et al, 1994). Further miniaturisation and high GMI ratios 
are proposed to be achieved employing structures having a special spiral type of anisotropy 
(Panina et al, 2001). GMI sensors and particular their arrays provide the needed sensitivity 
for magnetic cardiography  (MCG) and some laboratories have already reported successful 
detecting cardiac signals with the use of GMI (Uchiyama et al, 2009). An MCG allows details 
of the localised electrical activity of the heart to be revealed, enabling accurate diagnosis of 
heart conditions. The development of room temperature MCG would be of great importance 
for wide practical use. 
We further will discuss the use of non linear magnetisation of magnetic labels for their 
sensitive detection. Magnetic labels or carriers, also referred to as microspheres, microbeads 
and nanoparticles, have found wide-ranging scientific and clinical application in 
biotechnological and biomedical research (Haukanes & Kvam, 1993), most notably in the 
areas of bioseparations, molecular biology and drug delivery. The labels used are non-
remanent paramagnetic or superparamagnetic beads. The magnetic material within the label 
exists as small particles (usually iron oxide), having random moments. A conventional 
magnetic sensor system relies on the alignment of these moments within the label to 
produce a measurable fringe field. On the other hand, the magnetisation of such magnetic 
particles is a nonlinear function of external magnetic field and capable of generating high 
frequencies harmonics having high signal to noise ratio, thus, high detection sensitivity.  
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be to promote relatively new magnetic sensing 
technologies for use in biomedical field. GMI and MPS can offer very high sensitivity (sub 
nano-Tesla range), low cost, with the benefit of a portable operation. In many areas of 
medical applications, such as MCG and magnetic immunoassays, the importance of these 
sensing technologies cannot be overestimated as they may provide relatively simple room-
temperature tests, which could be realised in any general hospital, unlike such expensive 
methods as SQUID magnetometry.  
2. SQUID magnetometers for biosensing applications 
SQUID instrument depends on the effects of magnetic fields on circuits containing 
superconducting (Josephson) junctions. The temperature at which these operate is 
traditionally at about 4 Kelvin which is the temperature of liquid Helium. A Josephson 
junction, which is the essential part of a SQUID device, is effectively a weak link between 
two superconductors that is capable of carrying supercurrents below a critical value. There 
are two types of SQUIDs: rf SQUIDs and dc SQUIDs. In both types, the device consists of a 
superconducting ring interrupted by one (rf) or two (dc) Josephson junctions. The difference 
between the two is in the nature of the biasing current being an rf or a dc. In either type, the 
properties of the Josephson junction cause the impedance of the ring to vary periodically as 
a function of the magnetic flux crossing the ring. With the use of a lock-in detector to 
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measure the impedance, SQUIDs can operate as flux-to-voltage converters with highest 
magnetic sensitivity of any magnetometer in existence. Recently, with the discovery of high-
temperature superconductors, SQUID systems at liquid nitrogen temperatures (e.g. 70 
Kelvin) have been built although the noise level is significantly higher than that of the liquid 
helium systems (Mahdi & Mapps, 2000). A typical principle of operation is to detect two 
magnetic signals at different distances from the source and arrange for these to be in 
opposition around a local supercooled circuit. This ‘gradiometer’ approach eliminates most 
of the noise – caused by spurious magnetic fields originating from, for example, electrical 
devices or natural (geomagnetic) sources. A typical unshielded laboratory has a noise level 
in the dc to ten hertz frequency region of about 10-7 Tesla so a magnetically screened 
environment is usually required for these studies. The basic requirement has been for a 
noise level of the measuring environment to be lower than the sensor limit and this has 
caused the design and construction of sophisticated screened rooms in hospitals 
environments (Ter Brake, 1991). The screened rooms currently in use employ large amounts 
of mu-metal and are generally built as hospital rooms where patients can walk in and sit 
under comparatively large SQUID detector systems. For smaller systems this will not be 
necessary since screening is actually only needed in the detection zone, for example around 
the head. For this a screened ‘hat’ is envisaged which will be at much lower cost. Also 
various techniques are available for providing noise cancellation such as at the National 
Physical Laboratory, Teddington, U.K. where ‘negative’ noise is generated and added to the 
noise in the measurement zone by a Helmholz coil system (Hall, 2001).  
A single measurement of a field, for example, near the head has only a very limited value in 
neural analysis of the brain. Therefore, multiple SQUID systems have been devised and 
used in an attempt to build up a picture of the increased neural brain activity that results, 
for example, when the biological subject of the study has been stimulated in some way. The 
development of multiple SQUID systems has also led to an acceleration of research on MEG 
systems having, typically, 150 SQUID sensors arranged in a framework around the head. A 
great deal of research on this has been done by Professor Ueno in Japan (Iramina et al, 2001; 
Iramina et al, 1997). Similar multiple detection systems have also been developed for EEG in 
the past and an interesting comparison can be made with MEG.  
3. GMR for biosensing applications 
Giant magnetoresistive (GMR) sensors as biosensors are mainly developed in conjunction 
with magnetic immonoassays. Magnetoresistive-based biochips were first introduced in 
1998 by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and since then an increasing number of 
research laboratories and companies have been developing such systems (Graham et al., 
2004; Megens & Prinz, 2005; Tamanaha et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2008, Martinsa et al, 2009). The 
use of small magnetic particles or beads in biomedical sciences has increased significantly in 
recent years (Haukanes & Kvam, 1993). Integration of sensor design with magnetic-particle 
and assay development is a significant part of this research. Magnetic labels usually are 
superparamagnetic or non-remanent ferromagnetic in nature, with nano- or micrometer 
dimensions, and can attach to the target biomolecules. Under an applied magnetic field 
these particles or beads acquire a moment and their fringe field can induce a change in 
resistance of the magnetoresistive sensor, enabling biomolecular recognition detection. 
The change in material resistance, which occurs when the magnetisation changes from 
parallel, with respect to the direction of current flow, to transverse is known as anisotropic 
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magnetoresistive effect (AMR). AMR is present in ferromagnetic alloys such as NiFe, 
NiFeCo, but the resistance change is small. A large change in resistance up to 70% ( Baibich 
et al, 1988) is based on the spin dependent interfacial and bulk scattering asymmetry that is 
found for spin-up and spin-down conduction electrons crossing ferromagnetic–
nonmagnetic–ferromagnetic multilayer structures, where the parallel or antiparallel 
alignment of the ferromagnetic layers can be engineered. Then, the resistance of two thin 
ferromagnetic layers separated by a thin nonmagnetic conducting layer can be altered by 
changing the moments of the ferromagnetic layers from parallel to antiparallel. Layers with 
parallel magnetic moments will have less scattering at the interfaces, longer mean free paths, 
and lower resistance. Layers with antiparallel magnetic moments will have more scattering 
at the interfaces, shorter mean free paths, and higher resistance. For spin-dependent 
scattering to be a significant part of the total resistance, the layers must be thinner than the 
mean free path of electrons in the bulk material. For many ferromagnets the mean free path 
is tens of nanometers, so the layers themselves must each be typically thinner than 10 nm. 
There are various methods of obtaining antiparallel magnetic alignment in thin 
ferromagnet-conductor multilayers. The structures currently used in GMR sensors are 
unpinned sandwiches, antiferromagnetic multilayers and spin valves.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Spin-valve multilayer system. 
The structure of the spin-valve sensor used in (Martinsa et al, 2009) is shown in Fig. 2. The 
pinned and free layers are deposited with the easy axes in parallel orientation. The shape 
anisotropy is then used to rotate the easy axis of the free-layer at 90◦ to get a linear response. 
The sensor element is patterned by direct write laser photolithography and ion milling, 
resulting in U-shaped sensors with a final active area of 2.5×80 m2. Patterned sensors have 
an average magnetoresistance of 7.5%. A differential sensor set-up uses a reference sensor 
in the Wheatstone bridge architecture to enable thermal and electrical (mains) drift 
compensation between a biologically active sensor and a biologically inactive sensor.  
The fields required to change the magnetisation direction in one of the layers could be in 
kOe range resulting in a reduced sensitivity. When used as biosensors, the needed 
sensitivity was obtained thanks to the combination of detection and manipulation of 
magnetic particles. The secret of the sensitivity improvement lies within the location of the 
magnetic markers on the chip via active guiding of magnetic particles using on-chip 
generated magnetic forces. First, a sandwich assay is built up on the device surface, 
followed by labelling with magnetic particles. Then, the bound magnetic particles are 
released and transported to the position that theoretically gives rise to the maximal signal, 
ensuring the most sensitive detection. This process is schematically demonstrated in Fig. 3. 
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measure the impedance, SQUIDs can operate as flux-to-voltage converters with highest 
magnetic sensitivity of any magnetometer in existence. Recently, with the discovery of high-
temperature superconductors, SQUID systems at liquid nitrogen temperatures (e.g. 70 
Kelvin) have been built although the noise level is significantly higher than that of the liquid 
helium systems (Mahdi & Mapps, 2000). A typical principle of operation is to detect two 
magnetic signals at different distances from the source and arrange for these to be in 
opposition around a local supercooled circuit. This ‘gradiometer’ approach eliminates most 
of the noise – caused by spurious magnetic fields originating from, for example, electrical 
devices or natural (geomagnetic) sources. A typical unshielded laboratory has a noise level 
in the dc to ten hertz frequency region of about 10-7 Tesla so a magnetically screened 
environment is usually required for these studies. The basic requirement has been for a 
noise level of the measuring environment to be lower than the sensor limit and this has 
caused the design and construction of sophisticated screened rooms in hospitals 
environments (Ter Brake, 1991). The screened rooms currently in use employ large amounts 
of mu-metal and are generally built as hospital rooms where patients can walk in and sit 
under comparatively large SQUID detector systems. For smaller systems this will not be 
necessary since screening is actually only needed in the detection zone, for example around 
the head. For this a screened ‘hat’ is envisaged which will be at much lower cost. Also 
various techniques are available for providing noise cancellation such as at the National 
Physical Laboratory, Teddington, U.K. where ‘negative’ noise is generated and added to the 
noise in the measurement zone by a Helmholz coil system (Hall, 2001).  
A single measurement of a field, for example, near the head has only a very limited value in 
neural analysis of the brain. Therefore, multiple SQUID systems have been devised and 
used in an attempt to build up a picture of the increased neural brain activity that results, 
for example, when the biological subject of the study has been stimulated in some way. The 
development of multiple SQUID systems has also led to an acceleration of research on MEG 
systems having, typically, 150 SQUID sensors arranged in a framework around the head. A 
great deal of research on this has been done by Professor Ueno in Japan (Iramina et al, 2001; 
Iramina et al, 1997). Similar multiple detection systems have also been developed for EEG in 
the past and an interesting comparison can be made with MEG.  
3. GMR for biosensing applications 
Giant magnetoresistive (GMR) sensors as biosensors are mainly developed in conjunction 
with magnetic immonoassays. Magnetoresistive-based biochips were first introduced in 
1998 by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and since then an increasing number of 
research laboratories and companies have been developing such systems (Graham et al., 
2004; Megens & Prinz, 2005; Tamanaha et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2008, Martinsa et al, 2009). The 
use of small magnetic particles or beads in biomedical sciences has increased significantly in 
recent years (Haukanes & Kvam, 1993). Integration of sensor design with magnetic-particle 
and assay development is a significant part of this research. Magnetic labels usually are 
superparamagnetic or non-remanent ferromagnetic in nature, with nano- or micrometer 
dimensions, and can attach to the target biomolecules. Under an applied magnetic field 
these particles or beads acquire a moment and their fringe field can induce a change in 
resistance of the magnetoresistive sensor, enabling biomolecular recognition detection. 
The change in material resistance, which occurs when the magnetisation changes from 
parallel, with respect to the direction of current flow, to transverse is known as anisotropic 
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magnetoresistive effect (AMR). AMR is present in ferromagnetic alloys such as NiFe, 
NiFeCo, but the resistance change is small. A large change in resistance up to 70% ( Baibich 
et al, 1988) is based on the spin dependent interfacial and bulk scattering asymmetry that is 
found for spin-up and spin-down conduction electrons crossing ferromagnetic–
nonmagnetic–ferromagnetic multilayer structures, where the parallel or antiparallel 
alignment of the ferromagnetic layers can be engineered. Then, the resistance of two thin 
ferromagnetic layers separated by a thin nonmagnetic conducting layer can be altered by 
changing the moments of the ferromagnetic layers from parallel to antiparallel. Layers with 
parallel magnetic moments will have less scattering at the interfaces, longer mean free paths, 
and lower resistance. Layers with antiparallel magnetic moments will have more scattering 
at the interfaces, shorter mean free paths, and higher resistance. For spin-dependent 
scattering to be a significant part of the total resistance, the layers must be thinner than the 
mean free path of electrons in the bulk material. For many ferromagnets the mean free path 
is tens of nanometers, so the layers themselves must each be typically thinner than 10 nm. 
There are various methods of obtaining antiparallel magnetic alignment in thin 
ferromagnet-conductor multilayers. The structures currently used in GMR sensors are 
unpinned sandwiches, antiferromagnetic multilayers and spin valves.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Spin-valve multilayer system. 
The structure of the spin-valve sensor used in (Martinsa et al, 2009) is shown in Fig. 2. The 
pinned and free layers are deposited with the easy axes in parallel orientation. The shape 
anisotropy is then used to rotate the easy axis of the free-layer at 90◦ to get a linear response. 
The sensor element is patterned by direct write laser photolithography and ion milling, 
resulting in U-shaped sensors with a final active area of 2.5×80 m2. Patterned sensors have 
an average magnetoresistance of 7.5%. A differential sensor set-up uses a reference sensor 
in the Wheatstone bridge architecture to enable thermal and electrical (mains) drift 
compensation between a biologically active sensor and a biologically inactive sensor.  
The fields required to change the magnetisation direction in one of the layers could be in 
kOe range resulting in a reduced sensitivity. When used as biosensors, the needed 
sensitivity was obtained thanks to the combination of detection and manipulation of 
magnetic particles. The secret of the sensitivity improvement lies within the location of the 
magnetic markers on the chip via active guiding of magnetic particles using on-chip 
generated magnetic forces. First, a sandwich assay is built up on the device surface, 
followed by labelling with magnetic particles. Then, the bound magnetic particles are 
released and transported to the position that theoretically gives rise to the maximal signal, 
ensuring the most sensitive detection. This process is schematically demonstrated in Fig. 3. 
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Magnetic label detection has been accomplished by using different types of integrated GMR 
sensor designs, such as stripes, meander, spirals, and serpentine-shaped GMR sensors. 
Different shapes of GMR sernsors were tried in an attempt to optimize the sensor active 




Fig. 3. Schematic of a biochip which is composed of GMR sensors, an array of probe 
biomolecules (biomolecules B of known identity) immobilized onto the surface of the 
sensors, magnetic labels functionalized with target biomolecules (A) that bind to the sensor 
surface through biomolecular recognition. The magnetic fringe field resulting from the 
magnetic moment of the label induced by an on-chip applied magnetic field changes the 
resistance of the sensor, resulting in a voltage signal. 
Typical target analyte resolutions today are near 1pM for passive detection (INESC MN) 
using spin valve sensors (few nT/Hz 1/2) at thermal background. The sensor element covers 
partially the probe immobilization area (few hundred m2). Increase in sensitivity is being 
pursued by moving towards low noise magnetic tunnel junction based platforms. INESC 
MN has demonstrated field resolutions down to few tens pT/ Hz ½ (Martinsa et al, 2009). 
Although single molecule process detection is within reach by reducing the sensor size 
towards the magnetic label dimension, for practical applications, the challenge resides in 
increasing sensitivity to allow detection of few sub 100 nm labels with a dynamic range up 
to few thousand labels on a point of care portable device. Furthermore, the use of labelled 
targets has allowed the use of current lines for magnetically assisted hybridization. INESC-
MN has been exploring this ability to enhance the sensitivity and specificity via active 
guiding of magnetic beads using on-chip generated magnetic forces, hoping to reach 
detection sensitivity into the fM range (Martinsa et al, 2009). This approach makes the 
technology very specific, not suitable for a wider range of application, and in fact prevents 
its transfer from laboratory to end-user. 
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4. Biosensor based on non linear magnetization detection 
One of the most promising approaches in developing magnetic biosensors associated with the 
use of magnetic labelling is based on non-linear magnetisation of magnetic beads. Non-linear 
magnetisation processes result in the generation of higher order harmonics which can be 
detected and discriminated for use in remote sensing and monitoring (Ong & Grimes, 2002). 
Typically, as biological labels, nanosized magnetic particles are used which are in a single 
domain state and demonstrate superparamagnetic behaviour with an essential non-linearity. 
The non-linear magnetisation permits easy discrimination of these particles from surrounding 
paramagnetic materials and their reliable detection by high harmonic spectrum techniques for 
many biological applications. The magnetization of non-interacting particles obeys the 
Langevin function as shown in Fig. 4. If a system of such magnetic particles is excited by a 
harmonically oscillating magnetic field of frequency � its magnetisation response ���) is non-
linear and contains integer multiples of �, so-called higher harmonics. This non linear 
magnetisation response can be detected inductively and evaluated spectroscopically. 
Therefore, this detection method is often referred to as magnetic particle spectroscopy (MPS). 
The induced inductive voltage is proportional to the rate of the magnetisation change: 
���) � ����  
This represents the measurable quantity which also reflects the magnetisation response’s 
degree of distortion: it is clearly not harmonic anymore. The excitation magnetic field, the 
response functions and the voltage signals are depicted in Fig. 5.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Plot of the Langevin function representing the relative magnetization of a system of 
noninteracting and freely rotatable magnetic moments. 
The next step is to obtain the detected signal’s frequency spectrum, i.e. resolving the harmonic 
contributions and their amplitudes. Therefore, the time signal has to be transformed into the 
frequency domain by a Fourier transformation. Generally, the exact calculation of Fourier 
series coefficients is too difficult or impossible. Instead, ���)– no matter if it was gained 
synthetically (analytically/ numerically) or in an experiment – is analysed numerically using a 
discrete Fourier transformation (DFT). Therefore, ���) has to be sampled with a specific rate 
�������, yielding a set of data points �����). Then, DFT transforms �����) into �����), i.e. it 
resolves the complex amplitude �� for a specific frequency ��.  
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Magnetic label detection has been accomplished by using different types of integrated GMR 
sensor designs, such as stripes, meander, spirals, and serpentine-shaped GMR sensors. 
Different shapes of GMR sernsors were tried in an attempt to optimize the sensor active 
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surface through biomolecular recognition. The magnetic fringe field resulting from the 
magnetic moment of the label induced by an on-chip applied magnetic field changes the 
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using spin valve sensors (few nT/Hz 1/2) at thermal background. The sensor element covers 
partially the probe immobilization area (few hundred m2). Increase in sensitivity is being 
pursued by moving towards low noise magnetic tunnel junction based platforms. INESC 
MN has demonstrated field resolutions down to few tens pT/ Hz ½ (Martinsa et al, 2009). 
Although single molecule process detection is within reach by reducing the sensor size 
towards the magnetic label dimension, for practical applications, the challenge resides in 
increasing sensitivity to allow detection of few sub 100 nm labels with a dynamic range up 
to few thousand labels on a point of care portable device. Furthermore, the use of labelled 
targets has allowed the use of current lines for magnetically assisted hybridization. INESC-
MN has been exploring this ability to enhance the sensitivity and specificity via active 
guiding of magnetic beads using on-chip generated magnetic forces, hoping to reach 
detection sensitivity into the fM range (Martinsa et al, 2009). This approach makes the 
technology very specific, not suitable for a wider range of application, and in fact prevents 
its transfer from laboratory to end-user. 
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magnetisation processes result in the generation of higher order harmonics which can be 
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The next step is to obtain the detected signal’s frequency spectrum, i.e. resolving the harmonic 
contributions and their amplitudes. Therefore, the time signal has to be transformed into the 
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Fig. 5. Harmonic magnetic excitation H(t) of superparamagnetic particles. Transfer function 
M(H)(top left). Magnetization response M(t)  (top right). Response’s time derivative, which 
is proportional to measurable voltage V(t) (bottom right). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Idealised response function ����: linear for |�| � �� and constant for |�| � ��  
(top). Magnetic excitation and step-wise susceptibility ������(bottom). 
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For illustration of the method, an idealised response function: linear with saturation, as 
shown in Fig. 6 is considered. The magnetization saturates when the magnetising field 
exceeds a characteristic value, denoted by ��. Suppose, that the magnetising field is 
changing as � = ��������. Then, the voltage signal is proportional to 
� ∝ ����
��




The case of interest is when the amplitude of the magnetising field is sufficient to reach the 








Since the voltage signal in (1) is an odd function of time, the Fourier spectra will be 
represented by sin-series: 
�(�) = ��� sin ��
�
���
, −� � � = �� � �. (3) 
In this case, the harmonic coefficients �� can be expressed analytically for any �:  
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(5) 
In (5), = 1,2, … . The spectra calculated from (4) and (5) for different values of parameter 
� = ����� which reflects the degree of non-linearity are shown in Fig. 7.  
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It is seen that certain high –order harmonics preserve relatively large values (as harmonics 
19 and 21 for ℎ = 1.5 ) and can be used for determination of the magnetic particle 
concentration. It is also interesting to notice that the spectra have specific characteristics 
depending on parameter ℎ, such as non monotonic decrease with increasing �, which can be 
used for magnetic particle discrimination in multiparameteric analysis. The spectra will 
change dramatically in the presence of off-set dc magnetic field. Utilising spatially 
dependent off-set field, imaging techniques with non-linear magnetic particles can be 
developed (Gleich & Weizenecker, 2005; Weizenecker et al, 2009). The achieved resolution is 
well below 1 mm and the method has the potential to be developed into an imaging method 
characterised by both high spatial resolution as well as high sensitivity. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Arrays of inductive coils and immobilization zones for multi component 
immunoassay. 
Further, magnetic particles with non-linear response can be subjected to multi tone 
excitation. It was proposed to use the interrogation magnetic field with two frequencies, ��	 
and ��, the first one being considerably higher (Nikitin et al, 2007, 2008). The amplitude of 
the lower frequency tone is chosen high enough to get a strong non-linearity of ����. For 
example, this component may periodically ‘switch’ on and off the capability of magnetic 
particles to change the magnetisation. When the particle can be further magnetised, the 
higher frequency component �� contributes to the resulting induction signal. As a result, the 
response signal ���� is non-linearly modulated by both frequencies. The spectral response is 
measured at combinatorial frequencies ��� = ��� � ���, where � and � are integers. This 
technique results in much higher SNR than in the case of a single-tone excitation. It was 
successfully applied for multi-component analysis using coil-arrays and zones with 
different immobilised agents as shown in Fig. 9. Several sensing configurations for 
superparamagnetic particle detection have been developed in a wide linear dynamic range 
(3 ng–70 mg) in the volume of 0.1–0.4 cm3. The sensitivity of this type of magnetic 
immunoassays at the level of 0.1 ng/ml for soluble proteins of LPS from F. tularensis has 
been demonstrated (Nikitin et al, 2007). 
5. Giant magnetoimpedance (GMI)  
Giant magnetoimpedance (GMI) has at least one order of magnitude higher sensitivity than 
GMR and can be developed for measurements of magnetic fields from human body such as 
the fields from heart and muscles, as well as for magnetic immunoassays.   
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5.1 Basic principles of GMI  
First experiments on GMI dated to 1993 were obtained with amorphous magnetic wires and 
ribbons utilizing a simple concept of measuring an ac voltage in the presence of a dc 
magnetic field ��� applied in parallel with the current (Panina & Mohri, 1994; Beach & 
Berkowicz, 1994). For wires with the composition (Co0.94Fe0.06)72.5Si12.5B15 having almost zero 
magnetostriction of -10-7 the impressive sensitivity (the impedance ratio per a unit of 
magnetic field) of up to 100%/Oe at MHz frequencies was quickly realised. Since then, the 
range of materials exhibiting large and sensitive GMI rapidly expanded including 
nanocrystalline wires and ribbons, as well as more sophisticated materials as multilaered 
wires and films (Vazquez et al, 2011; Panina, 2009; Phan & Peng, 2008; Knobel & Pirota , 
2002). GMI can be considered as a high frequency analogy of giant magnetoresistance. 
However, the origin of GMI lies in classical electromagnetism and can be understood in 
terms of the skin effect in conjunction with the transverse magnetization induced by a 
passing ac current � = �����(−���). For some simple geometries and magnetic structures the 
impedance can be approximated by an analytical form valid for any frequency. Thus, for a 
wire with a circular cross section and circular domain structure placed in an axial magnetic 
field ��� and carrying a current �, the impedance is given by ( Panina et al, 1994): 
� = ���(��)��(��)2��(��)  
(6) 




In (6) and (7), ��� is the dc resistance of the wire, � is the wire radius, ��, �� are the Bessel 
functions, � is the conductivity, � is the velocity of light (cgs units are used),  ��  is the 
penetration depth depending on the wire circular  permeability ��, � = √−1 . The circular 
permeability should be defined considering the full ac permeability tensor �̂ from the 
constituent equation: �� = (�̂�)� = ��ℎ�, which connects the ac magnetic field � and 
induction �.  Equation (6) is valid if the induced axial induction �� = 0. For high frequencies, 
when the skin depth is smaller than the wire radius, the impedance becomes inversely 
proportional to ��, and hence, proportional to ���.      
 
 
Fig. 10. MI plots in glass-coated CoFeNiSiB wires having a metal core diameter of 48 m and 
the total diameter of 50 m with a dc current as a parameter    
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Therefore, the changes in permeability which could be few orders of magnitude when the dc 
magnetisation is rotated from circular direction to the axial direction can be detected by 
measuring the wire impedance (Garcia et al, 2000). The example of GMI characteristics in 
amorphous wires is given in Fig. 10 showing the sensitivity up to 90%/Oe. The samples are 
glass coated wires with well established circumferential anisotropy. 
In the MHz frequency range, the parameter �� in general has contributions from domain 
wall displacements and moment rotation. For sensor applications, it is preferable to 
eliminate the domain structure in order to avoid Barkhausen jumps noise. For wires with a 
helical type of anisotropy, this can be done by applying a dc bias current �� as shown in Fig. 
10. However, this current contributes to magnetic hardness so the sensitivity reduces and 
the value of �� should be carefully optimized. 
For a complicated magnetic configuration which support modes with axial induction ��, 
equation (6) becomes invalid and asymptotic or numerical methods should be used to 
calculate the impedance at arbitrary frequency even for a wire with a circular cross-section 
(Makhnovsky et al, 2001). However, at high frequencies when the skin effect is strong 
(� � ��), the following asymptotic form for the local surface impedance parameter ��� =
��/ℎ� , which is the ratio of the tangential components of electric and magnetic fields at the 








In (8), the angle � is the angle between the dc magnetisation and the current direction. The 
magnetic parameter �� is the effective transverse permeability with respect to the dc 
magnetisation. Equation (8) demonstrates clearly the role of the dc magnetisation in 
determining the high frequency impedance and is very useful for designing the materials 
with required GMI characteristics.  
Substantial amount of works on GMI have been devoted to the asymmetric effects (Panina 
et al, 2004; Ueno et al, 2004; Delooze et al, 2003; Panina et al, 1999). In the case of sensor 
applications, the linearity of GMI is an important feature. On the other hand, the GMI 
characteristics presented in Fig. 10 are not only non-linear, but also shaped in a way that the 
operation near zero-field point can present serious problems. Generally, a dc bias field is 
used to set properly the operating point on the GMI characteristics, which can be regarded 
as producing asymmetry with respect to the sensed field ���. Therefore, for linear sensing 
the asymmetrical magnetoimpedance (AMI) is of great importance. There are mainly two 
ways to realise AMI. The first one is due to asymmetrical static magnetic structure, which 
can be established in multilayers involving a hard magnetic layer or a layer with a helical 
anisotropy. The other method is based on the dynamic cross-magnetisation processes. The 
linear GMI characteristics can be also obtained when detecting the induced voltage from the 
coil mounted on GMI element when it is excited by a high frequency current (Sandacci et al, 
2004). This is based on off-diagonal component of the impedance. This configuration was 
adopted by Aichi Steel for the development of miniature compass for mobile 
communication (Mohri & Honkura , 2007; Honkura, 2002). 
The condition of a strong skin effect to obtain large GMI may not be required for 
multilayered systems having an inner conductive lead. If its resistance is considerably 
smaller than the resistance of the magnetic layers the current mainly flows along the 
conductive lead. With these assumptions, the expression for the impedance can be written in 
the form (Hika et al, 1996): 
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where �� is the resistance of the inner conductor and  Φ is the total transverse magnetic flux 
generated by the driving current � in the magnetic layers. The second term in (9) can be 
made much larger than �� in a wide frequency range from MHz to GHz bands in structures 
with Cu, Ag, Au inner leads and soft magnetic amorphous outer layers of submicron cross 
section. In particular, multilayered thin films would be of interest for sensing applications in 
the context of miniaturisation and compatibility with integrated circuit technology.  
5.2 Magnetic wires for GMI  
Thin amorphous ferromagnetic wires of Co-rich compositions having a negative 
magnetostriction are very popular for GMI applications (Vazquez et al, 2011; Mohri et al, 
2009; Zhukov & Zhukova, 2009). In the outer layer of the wire, an internal stress from 
quenching coupled with the negative magnetostriction results in a circumferential 
anisotropy and an alternate left and right handed circular domain structure (Takajo et al, 
1993). In this case, the circular magnetization processes determining the GMI behaviour are 
very sensitive to the axial magnetic field. Along with this, special types of anisotropy as a 
helical one can be established in the outer layer by a corresponding annealing treatment, 
which results in unusual asymmetric GMI behaviour. Many experimental results on GMI 
and designed magnetic sensors utilise amorphous wires of (Co1-xFex)SiB compositions with 
� � 0�0� to decrease the magnetostriction down to −10�� and the characteristic saturation 
magnetic fields down to few Oe.  
 
 
Fig. 11. AMI plots in torsion annealed wires (280 turn/m, 500C) with bI  as a parameter. 
Currently, there are basically two methods of wire fabrication techniques. The first one 
utilises in-water-spinning method for which as-cast wires have a diameter of 125 microns 
(Ogasawara & Ueno, 1995). The wires then cold drawn down to 20 - 30 m,  and finally 
annealed under stress to established a needed anisotropy. In the case of negative 
magnetostrictive wires, annealing under a tension induces a circumferential anisotropy for 
which the GMI plots shown in Fig. 10 are typical. If the wire is annealed under torsion stress 
a helical type of the anisotropy is introduced which is important for asymmetrical GMI as 
shown in Fig. 11 (Panina, 2004).  
 
Recent Application in Biometrics 226 
Therefore, the changes in permeability which could be few orders of magnitude when the dc 
magnetisation is rotated from circular direction to the axial direction can be detected by 
measuring the wire impedance (Garcia et al, 2000). The example of GMI characteristics in 
amorphous wires is given in Fig. 10 showing the sensitivity up to 90%/Oe. The samples are 
glass coated wires with well established circumferential anisotropy. 
In the MHz frequency range, the parameter �� in general has contributions from domain 
wall displacements and moment rotation. For sensor applications, it is preferable to 
eliminate the domain structure in order to avoid Barkhausen jumps noise. For wires with a 
helical type of anisotropy, this can be done by applying a dc bias current �� as shown in Fig. 
10. However, this current contributes to magnetic hardness so the sensitivity reduces and 
the value of �� should be carefully optimized. 
For a complicated magnetic configuration which support modes with axial induction ��, 
equation (6) becomes invalid and asymptotic or numerical methods should be used to 
calculate the impedance at arbitrary frequency even for a wire with a circular cross-section 
(Makhnovsky et al, 2001). However, at high frequencies when the skin effect is strong 
(� � ��), the following asymptotic form for the local surface impedance parameter ��� =
��/ℎ� , which is the ratio of the tangential components of electric and magnetic fields at the 








In (8), the angle � is the angle between the dc magnetisation and the current direction. The 
magnetic parameter �� is the effective transverse permeability with respect to the dc 
magnetisation. Equation (8) demonstrates clearly the role of the dc magnetisation in 
determining the high frequency impedance and is very useful for designing the materials 
with required GMI characteristics.  
Substantial amount of works on GMI have been devoted to the asymmetric effects (Panina 
et al, 2004; Ueno et al, 2004; Delooze et al, 2003; Panina et al, 1999). In the case of sensor 
applications, the linearity of GMI is an important feature. On the other hand, the GMI 
characteristics presented in Fig. 10 are not only non-linear, but also shaped in a way that the 
operation near zero-field point can present serious problems. Generally, a dc bias field is 
used to set properly the operating point on the GMI characteristics, which can be regarded 
as producing asymmetry with respect to the sensed field ���. Therefore, for linear sensing 
the asymmetrical magnetoimpedance (AMI) is of great importance. There are mainly two 
ways to realise AMI. The first one is due to asymmetrical static magnetic structure, which 
can be established in multilayers involving a hard magnetic layer or a layer with a helical 
anisotropy. The other method is based on the dynamic cross-magnetisation processes. The 
linear GMI characteristics can be also obtained when detecting the induced voltage from the 
coil mounted on GMI element when it is excited by a high frequency current (Sandacci et al, 
2004). This is based on off-diagonal component of the impedance. This configuration was 
adopted by Aichi Steel for the development of miniature compass for mobile 
communication (Mohri & Honkura , 2007; Honkura, 2002). 
The condition of a strong skin effect to obtain large GMI may not be required for 
multilayered systems having an inner conductive lead. If its resistance is considerably 
smaller than the resistance of the magnetic layers the current mainly flows along the 
conductive lead. With these assumptions, the expression for the impedance can be written in 
the form (Hika et al, 1996): 
 
Electromagnetic Sensor Technology for Biomedical Applications 227 




where �� is the resistance of the inner conductor and  Φ is the total transverse magnetic flux 
generated by the driving current � in the magnetic layers. The second term in (9) can be 
made much larger than �� in a wide frequency range from MHz to GHz bands in structures 
with Cu, Ag, Au inner leads and soft magnetic amorphous outer layers of submicron cross 
section. In particular, multilayered thin films would be of interest for sensing applications in 
the context of miniaturisation and compatibility with integrated circuit technology.  
5.2 Magnetic wires for GMI  
Thin amorphous ferromagnetic wires of Co-rich compositions having a negative 
magnetostriction are very popular for GMI applications (Vazquez et al, 2011; Mohri et al, 
2009; Zhukov & Zhukova, 2009). In the outer layer of the wire, an internal stress from 
quenching coupled with the negative magnetostriction results in a circumferential 
anisotropy and an alternate left and right handed circular domain structure (Takajo et al, 
1993). In this case, the circular magnetization processes determining the GMI behaviour are 
very sensitive to the axial magnetic field. Along with this, special types of anisotropy as a 
helical one can be established in the outer layer by a corresponding annealing treatment, 
which results in unusual asymmetric GMI behaviour. Many experimental results on GMI 
and designed magnetic sensors utilise amorphous wires of (Co1-xFex)SiB compositions with 
� � 0�0� to decrease the magnetostriction down to −10�� and the characteristic saturation 
magnetic fields down to few Oe.  
 
 
Fig. 11. AMI plots in torsion annealed wires (280 turn/m, 500C) with bI  as a parameter. 
Currently, there are basically two methods of wire fabrication techniques. The first one 
utilises in-water-spinning method for which as-cast wires have a diameter of 125 microns 
(Ogasawara & Ueno, 1995). The wires then cold drawn down to 20 - 30 m,  and finally 
annealed under stress to established a needed anisotropy. In the case of negative 
magnetostrictive wires, annealing under a tension induces a circumferential anisotropy for 
which the GMI plots shown in Fig. 10 are typical. If the wire is annealed under torsion stress 
a helical type of the anisotropy is introduced which is important for asymmetrical GMI as 
shown in Fig. 11 (Panina, 2004).  
 
Recent Application in Biometrics 228 
 
Fig. 12. Sketch of a glass-coated wire. 
 
 
Fig. 13. GMI plots in Co67Fe3.85Ni1.45B11.5Si14.5Mo1.7 glass-coated wires for different values of 
.  is about 22 m. 
The other technique produces amorphous wires in a glass cover (see Fig. 12) by modified 
Tailor method  which is also referred to as Talor-Ulitovsky method (Zhukov et al, 2009; 
Larin et al, 2002; Zhukov et al, 2000; Chiriac et al, 1996). The method is based on drawing a 
thin glass capillary with molten metal alloy. The diameter of the metal core is ranging 
between 1-50 microns and even submicron cross section size is possible (Zhukov et al, 2008). 
In this case, different temperature expansion coefficients of glass and metal alloy result in a 
longitudinal tensile stress, which is needed for the circumferential anisotropy. The value of 
this stress and induced anisotropy depends on the wire composition and ratio  of 
the metal core diameter  to the total diameter . This is a simple one-step process 
allowing a strict control of properties in as-cast state and optimisation of the GMI 
characteristics. Figure 13 (Zhukova et al, 2002) shows the GMI ratio vs. external field for 
different values of . For a very thin glass layer, the GMI ratio reaches 600% for a field of 
about 1 Oe at a frequency of 10 MHz. This is the best result obtained so far for any GMI 
system.  
5.3 Multilayered films for GMI 
Magnetic/metallic multilayers are especially important for miniaturisation of GMI elements 
and realising arrays of GMI sensors. The basic structure consists of an inner conductive lead 
(M) and two magnetic layers (F) as shown in Fig. 14. The magnetic layers could be made of 
the same alloy, yet, they can be produced with different magnetic anisotropies. In particular, 
for asymmetric magnetoimpedance the anisotropy axes have to be directed at an angle   
to the long (current) axis, respectively for the upper and lower magnetic layers. Such 
anisotropy can be induced, for example, by current annealing in the presence of a 
longitudinal field. 
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Fig. 14. Sketch of multilayered films. The case of crossed magnetic anisotropy axes in the 
bottom and top layers makes it possible to obtain almost linear GMR characteristics .  
If the edge effects are neglected (i.e., the film is treated as infinitely long in the plane 
directions) equation (9) for the impedance becomes (Hika et al, 1996): 




Here 2��� �� are the thicknesses of the inner and outer layers, respectively, �� is the skin depth 
in the metallic inner lead. Expression (10) shows that the GMI ratio in the sandwich film can be 
very large even at relatively low frequencies when the skin effect is not substantial, and has a 
linear dependence on the permeability. This conclusion can be illustrated as follows. At a 
frequency of 10 MHz, taking �� = �� = 0.5���  and ��� = 2 ∙ 10�����(conductivity of 
Copper), we get ������� = 0.045 (so, the skin effect is weak). A typical low-frequency change 
in the permeability �� (having a rotational mechanism) under the application of the field equal 
to the anisotropy field is from 1 to 500; then, the impedance varies over 200% according to (10). 
In the case of a similar magnetic layer of submicron thickness, the change in the impedance 
would not be noticeable at these conditions since the skin effect is week. A considerable 
enhancement of the GMI effect in multilayers can be achieved by insulator separation between 
the conductive lead and the magnetic films, which prevents layer diffusion and further 
decreases the DC resistance. A CoSiB/SiO2 /Cu/SiO2/CoSiB multilayer of total thickness of 7 
microns exhibited the GMI ratio of 620% for 11 Oe (Morikawa et al, 1997).  
For a practical device design, the effect of in-plane sandwich width on GMI has to be studied. 
If the edge effect is neglected (approximation of an infinite width), the magnetic flux generated 
by the current flowing along the inner lead is confined within the outer magnetic layers. In a 
sandwich of finite width 2b, the flux leaks across the inner conductor (Panina et al, 2001). This 
process eventually results in the considerable drop in GMI ratio, if the film width is smaller 
than some critical value �∗ depending on the transverse permeability and the thicknesses of 
the magnetic and conductive layers. This process is similar to that resulting in a drop in the 
efficiency of inductive recording heads and magnetoresistive thin-film devices. In the low- 
frequency limit, �∗ = �������. Typical parameters for the structures of interest are ��~��~0.1-
0.5 m, 2�~10-50 m and ��~10�. This gives the value of �∗~3-15 m, which is comparable to 
the half-width, suggesting that the size effects cannot be neglected. The results of modelling 
the maximum of the GMI ratio vs. frequency, with a width b as a parameter are shown in Fig. 
15. It can be concluded, that even for films narrower than 25 microns very high values of the 
GMI ratio can be obtained at higher frequency region which was  confirmed experimentally 
for  NiFe/Au/NiFe films (De Cos et al, 2005).  
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to the long (current) axis, respectively for the upper and lower magnetic layers. Such 
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Fig. 14. Sketch of multilayered films. The case of crossed magnetic anisotropy axes in the 
bottom and top layers makes it possible to obtain almost linear GMR characteristics .  
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for  NiFe/Au/NiFe films (De Cos et al, 2005).  
 
Recent Application in Biometrics 230 
The most interesting results on thin film GMI are obtained in amorphous films CoFeB/Cu/ 
CoFeB with cross-anisotropy (Delooze et al, 2003; Ueno et al, 2000). The films were made on 
a glass substrate by dc sputtering. During the deposition, a constant magnetic field of 200 Oe 
was applied in the transverse direction to the GMI element in order to add uniaxial 
anisotropy. Finally, crossed anisotropy was induced in the sample by current annealing (30 
mA) in a longitudinal field of 11.8 Oe at a temperature of 215C. The anisotropy axes in the 
upper and bottom layers are at approximately 67 to the long axis, which was estimated 
from the DC magnetization loop measurements. Applying a bias current produces highly 
asymmetrical GMI plots as shown in Fig. 16 (Delooze et al, 2004). The differential 
characteristic from two oppositely biased GMI films is also given, demonstrating a near 
linear region in the field interval of 5 Oe. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Maximum of GMI ratio calculated at the anisotropy field, vs. frequency at different 
values of width . , conductivity ratio is 50.  
 
 
Fig. 16. GMI characteristics in Co70.2Fe7.8B22 /Cu/ Co70.2Fe7.8B22 films with a DC bias current 
of 25 mA and their differential output. Magnetic films are amorphous. .  
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6. GMI sensor design and biomedical applications  
There is a number of high frequency circuits designed to drive GMI elements. One of the 
most successful solutions utilises a pulse excitation of the GMI element with the help of C-
MOS digital circuits(Mohri & Honkura, 2007; Mohri et al, 2002, Shen et al, 1997). The circuit 
with a C-MOS IC multivibrator as shown in Fig. 17 produces sharp-pulsed current of 
duration 5–20 ns. 
 
 
Fig. 17. High-stability CMOS IC with analog-switch type GMI sensor circuit 
 
 
Fig. 18. Three axis electric compass using amorphous wire GMI element. 
Pulse excitation provides: simplicity of electronic design, low cost components, and 
reasonably good stability since C-MOS multivibrator oscillation frequency almost does not 
depend on the impedance characteristics of the GMI elements. Power consumption of this 
circuit is also small (10mW). In addition, such pulsed current involves both high frequency 
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(20–100 MHz) and low (quasi-DC) harmonics. Therefore, it can be ideally used for the 
asymmetrical GMI requiring a dc or ac bias. Generally, the method provides the field 
detection resolution of 10-4 Oe (10nT) for dc fields and 10-6 Oe (100pT) for ac fields. Recently, 
Aichi Steel Co. has developed GMI-sensor IC-chip (shown in Fig. 18) for mobile phone 
electronic compass for mass production (Mohri & Honkura, 2007). The restrictions in the 
field resolution at that level are not due to the intrinsic limitations of advanced GMI 
elements, but related with the circuit performance. For biomagnetic sensing with GMI 
further improvements in circuitry are needed, which was achieved with the use of CMOS 
timer circuit as the multi-vibrator oscillator to effectively reduce circuit noise. In a shielded 
environment and differential signal amplification, the rms noise was estimated as 3 pT/Hz 
1/2 at 1 Hz (Uchiyama et al; 2009). 
In another approach to GMI sensor design, a single frequency excitation is used (Delooze et 
al, 2005; Yabukami et al, 2004; Yabukami et al, 2001). The sensor measurement system 
represents a single frequency network analyzer to measure the magnitude of the incident 
reflected power produced by a mismatch in the complex impedance between the source and 
load. Typically, GMI thin-film elements are used in this scheme. The incident power or 
carrier is produced by a Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) filtered crystal oscillator designed for 
low power, portable applications. The reflected power is separated from the incident power 
by means of a directional coupler based on an active op-amp design which provides non-
magnetic coupling approach to lower noise. When the impedance of the GMI element 
matches the impedance of the source (50Ω) the maximum amount of power is transferred to 
it. With no external field the carrier is suppressed by 60dB. An AC external field causes 
variation in the 50Ω impedance of the sensor element, which is measured as an AM 
modulation on the suppressed carrier in the reflected incident power. This is then 
demodulated, filtered, amplified and measured. For high frequency field detection 
(>10MHz), the resolution is in the range of pT. Low frequency phase noise (1/f) of the 
oscillator limits the performance of the sensor at frequencies lower than 1 kHz. A technique 
to overcome this problem is to firstly modulate (chop) the low frequency AC field to be 
measured with a locally produced high frequency field (1 to 5 kHz). The second local 
modulation field shifts the measurement field of interest to a higher frequency offset from 
the local modulation. This allows the measurement of the low frequency field in the 
spectrum of the oscillator that is not affected by the phase noise. The achieved ac biased 
field performance is as following: a 20 Hz field has a resolution of 5.27 x 10-6 Oe, and at 10 
Hz it is 9.33 x 10-6 Oe (Delooze et al, 2004). An improvement of the phase noise of the 
oscillator, electronics and the use of screening could further increase the performance of the 
sensor. With these improvements, the GMI sensor technique will be suitable for a wide 
range of bio-medical applications.  
After 10pT resolution of GMI sensors was confirmed in a number of laboratories, GMI-wire 
and GMI-multilayers sensors were tested for use in the fields of advanced intelligent 
transport systems, public automation systems, and security systems. It further was 
recognised that GMI sensors may represent a viable alternative for the conventional 
biosensors. Firstly, GMI- wire sensors were used in magnetic immunoassays (Chiriac. & 
Herea, 2007). The sensor system contained a pair of glass-coated amorphous microwires one 
of them was copolymer-functionalized. The sensor response to the presence of different 
magnetic microparticles as perturbating agents for the external dc magnetic field was 
studied. This type of magnetic biosensor prototype was then used for biomolecule detection.  
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More importantly, the GMI sensor technology was applied for biological magnetic field 
detection. The GMI sensor based on C-MOS IC with a pair of amorphous wires for 
differential output was successfully applied for measurements of biocell magnetic fields 
(Mohri et al, 2009; Uchiyama et al, 2009). This kind of detection can be developed to become, 
for example, an organ prediction method for iPS cell growth. When compared with the 
microelectrode method of biocell measurement, the magnetic method benefits from non-
invasion operations. The resolution of 10 pT was achieved when measuring the magnetic 
field generated by a smooth muscle tissue sample (4 mm width, 7 mm length, and 0.3 mm 
thickness) prepared from a guinea-pig bladder. The sample was dipped in an extracellular 
solution during the experiment. The pulsed wave was obtained due to Ca2+ flow through a 
membrane. The sample and differential sensor heads were separated by a cover glass. The 
distance from the sample to the upper sensor head was approximately 1mm. It is known 
that spontaneous electrical activities in smooth muscle cell clusters have a high temperature 
dependence (Nakayama et al, 2006). This was confirmed with magnetic detection. 
Maximum field strength of approximately 1 nT and a cyclic pulse wave can be observed at 
33 degrees centigrade. Alternatively, the amplitude of the magnetic field is less than 50 pT 
and cyclic pulse wave cannot be observed at 27 degrees centigrade.  
 
 
Fig. 19. Waveform of the cardiogram signal measured by CMOC GMI differential sensor in 
non-shielded environment. 
Both GMI-wire and GMI multilayers sensors were used for detecting cardiac magnetic field. 
The long axis of the sensor head is aligned parallel to the chest surface. The cardiogram 
signal was clearly detected under the no shield environment when the sensor head is very 
close to the chest surface. The waveform of the cardiogram is shown in Fig. 19 obtained with 
GMI-wire sensor(Uchiyama et al, 2009). The features of QRS and T waves correspond with 
the electrocardiogram. The maximum field strength of several nT is almost 50 times larger 
than the magneto-cardiogram measurement by a SQUID system using Sensor-to-Chest 
spacing of approximately 50 mm (Fong et al; 2004).  
7. Conclusions  
This Chapter summarises some magnetic technology used for detecting and measuring 
magnetic fields from human subjects and from magnetically tagged bio substances. It 
develops the argument that there will be an increasing desire for more ‘magnetic’ 
information about the human body in the future. The desire for this information will need to 
further the development of modern magnetic sensor techniques to compete with the now 
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low power, portable applications. The reflected power is separated from the incident power 
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well-established SQUID magnetometer technology. Measuring and monitoring magnetic 
fields from the human body is becoming a rapidly increasing subject of research. The very 
expensive use of the SQUID magnetometer up until now has produced many advances in 
the understanding of magnetic fields from our bodies. The advance of much cheaper room-
temperature sensor technologies offers the prospect of much greater use of magnetic field 
monitoring in medicine. In such cases it is also important to use low-cost shielding 
environments or carefully designed noise-suppressed detection systems. Two relatively new 
magnetic sensing technologies, namely, magnetoimpedance and magnetic particle 
spectroscopy, have a potential to replace the SQUID magnetometry in such areas as MCG 
and immunoassays.  
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well-established SQUID magnetometer technology. Measuring and monitoring magnetic 
fields from the human body is becoming a rapidly increasing subject of research. The very 
expensive use of the SQUID magnetometer up until now has produced many advances in 
the understanding of magnetic fields from our bodies. The advance of much cheaper room-
temperature sensor technologies offers the prospect of much greater use of magnetic field 
monitoring in medicine. In such cases it is also important to use low-cost shielding 
environments or carefully designed noise-suppressed detection systems. Two relatively new 
magnetic sensing technologies, namely, magnetoimpedance and magnetic particle 
spectroscopy, have a potential to replace the SQUID magnetometry in such areas as MCG 
and immunoassays.  
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1. Introduction  
The current technological age brings the knowledge and the means to continuously improve 
the quality of life of human beings. One example can be seen in the recent advances done in 
the field of biometrics, where those physiological (fingerprints, iris, hand geometry, face, 
etc.) and/or behavioural (voice, gait, keystroke dynamics, signature, etc.) characteristics of 
human beings, unique and different to each individual, are used in order to either 
authenticate or identify individuals in a more reliable way, enhancing thus those existing 
personal recognition applications based on physical tokens (ID cards, keys, etc.), PINs or 
passwords. The deployment of automatic biometrics-based personal recognition systems 
and their acceptance by the society depends on several factors such as the ease of use, the 
non-intrusive methods of operation and their related privacy concerns; as well as their 
recognition accuracy, reliability and security levels, response time and system costs. All 
these factors will determine the successful spread of the biometric security in a wide range 
of daily use applications such as electronic payment, access systems, border control, health 
monitoring, etc. all over the world.  
Among the different human traits analyzed in the field of biometrics, this work is focused 
on fingerprints. Fingerprints are the oldest and most deeply used signs of identity. Personal 
recognition based on fingerprints has been successfully deployed in law enforcement, 
government, and forensic applications for more than one century. The first recognition 
systems were based on human experts in charge of matching fingerprints. However, the 
current technological age demands the development of less expensive and fully automated 
fingerprint-based personal recognition systems, not only in the cited fields of application 
but also in many other daily use consumer applications (mobile phones, personal digital 
assistant devices, laptops, automatic teller machines, internet, e-commerce, etc.). Although 
big advances have been made in recent years, automatic and reliable biometric recognition 
is still an open research problem today. That ideal personal recognition algorithm able to 
unequivocally authenticate the identity of any user from his/her legitimate fingerprint 
features does not exist. The way to overcome the present limitations and improve the 
accuracy performance of current biometrics-based authentication systems consists of adding 
further processing stages into the recognition algorithms, which directly affects the 
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is still an open research problem today. That ideal personal recognition algorithm able to 
unequivocally authenticate the identity of any user from his/her legitimate fingerprint 
features does not exist. The way to overcome the present limitations and improve the 
accuracy performance of current biometrics-based authentication systems consists of adding 
further processing stages into the recognition algorithms, which directly affects the 
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complexity, the processing power and the costs of the physical systems where to implement 
those applications. 
This works focuses on the search of the proper system architecture able to face those 
demanding constraints for the application: a high computational power needed to achieve 
reliable recognition performances in terms of False Acceptance and False Rejection rates 
(FAR/FRR), a high security level in order to stand any kind of external attacks 
(cryptographic systems), real-time performance, and low cost. A novel approach of 
embedded system based on programmable logic devices such as field programmable gate 
arrays (FPGA), hardware-software co-design techniques, and the exploitation of run-time 
reconfigurable hardware is proven to successfully address the above requirements. 
This chapter is split in nine sections and in each of the sections specific research topics are 
addressed. Section 2 provides a general overview of the proposed application to be dealt in 
this work: the development of an Automatic Fingerprint-based Authentication System 
(AFAS) in charge of verifying the identity of any individual based on the analysis of that 
distinctive information available in fingerprints. A description of the proposed personal 
recognition algorithm to be used as reference in this work and to be implemented under 
different processing platforms is presented. The accuracy performance achieved by the 
suggested algorithm when evaluated on a large database of fingerprints is addressed in 
Section 3. One public database composed of up to 800 fingerprint images corresponding to 
100 different individuals is used for evaluation purposes. Impostor and Genuine 
distributions, as well as performance indicators such as FAR, FRR or EER (Equal Error Rate) 
are given in order to objectively compare the reached performance with the performance of 
other published algorithms evaluated with the same open database. After presenting the 
accuracy performance exhibited by the proposed recognition algorithm, Section 4 aims at 
defining the proper system requirements for the physical platform in charge of the 
authentication process. The main goal is to find a flexible and high-performance processing 
platform able to deploy the biometric security in a wide range of daily use applications at 
low cost, therefore an embedded system architecture is suggested. Two different 
implementations of the same recognition algorithm are carried out in this work. The first 
implementation, covered in Section 5, is based on purely software-based solutions. One high 
performance computing (HPC) platform under Windows operating system and three 
different embedded system platforms based on low-cost and mid-performance 
microprocessors are evaluated. The strengths and weaknesses of each of the architectures 
are pointed out, and based on that information, a different embedded system architecture is 
suggested in Section 6 to overcome the main limitations exhibited by the previous systems. 
An embedded system architecture based on a general-purpose microprocessor acting as 
application core processor, and a programmable and run-time reconfigurable logic region 
where to instantiate –multiplexed in time and under demand– application-specific hardware 
coprocessors in charge of the execution of those time-intensive tasks is proposed as 
alternative solution. Both the microprocessor unit and the hardware accelerators, together 
with memory blocks and other peripherals are all embedded under a System-on-
Programmable-Chip (SoPC) device to provide a highly integrated and more reliable 
solution. The second implementation of the AFAS application under the proposed 
embedded system architecture is covered in Section 7. The performance achieved in this 
new scenario is compared against that of previous scenarios. An outstanding improvement 
in performance is achieved at a reasonable cost. The work ends with some concluding 
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remarks in Section 8, and the citation of some research references in Section 9. The reached 
results prove that the suggested system architecture based on hardware-software co-design 
techniques under run-time reconfigurable FPGA devices is a cost-effective alternative 
solution to those existing software-based processing platforms in the deployment of AFAS 
applications. 
2. Fingerprint-based personal recognition algorithm 
The personal recognition process is composed of two main phases, as depicted in Fig. 1: the 
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Fig. 1. Processing phases of an Automatic Fingerprint-based Authentication System 
The enrolment phase is generally performed off-line, and consists in the registration of that 
set of biometric features extracted from the digital impression of the user’s fingertip –known 
as template– together with any other relevant information of the user within the 
authentication system, either in a secure database or a personalized smart card. The 
authentication phase however is normally done on-line, and aims at validating the user’s 
identity by comparing the set of on-line extracted biometric features –known as query– 
against those saved in the authentication system during the enrolment stage and linked to 
the legitimate individual claimed by the user –template–. The matching of both feature sets 
delivers a similarity score that is used to determine whether the user is really who claims to 
be, or on the contrary is an impostor who attempts to access the system fraudulently. 
As it is indicated in Fig. 1, both phases –enrolment and authentication– are composed of a 
set of sequential stages. Each of the stages is, at the same time, split into smaller processing 
operations called tasks, and some of the stages/tasks carried out with the template and 
query fingerprints are common, as shown in Fig. 2. The aim of the authentication system is 
the execution of both phases of the processing; therefore the system has to be designed to 
afford any of the requested tasks along the application. 
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Fig. 2. Enrolment and authentication stages decomposition 
The proposed recognition algorithm in charge of the enrolment and the authentication 
processes is not developed from scratch but based on some existing reference biometric 
algorithms and known techniques well described in the scientist literature. Specific image 
processing operations like convolutions, filters, etc. and other signal computations in the 
field of trigonometrics, statistics, etc. are performed on the acquired images in order to 
deduce that distinctive information available in the fingerprints. For a better understanding 
of the involved computational tasks refer to the authors’ work (Fons et al., 2010). Fig. 3 
shows the different processing steps that take place in the suggested fingerprint-based 
personal verification flow. A hybrid fingerprint matching algorithm that relies on the field 
orientation map and the set of minutia points extracted from the fingerprints is proposed for 
its physical implementation. Those classical biometric traits are considered as the genuine 
marks of identity of any individual. The computational load of the suggested algorithm is 
equivalent to those other similar or dissimilar algorithms that define the state of the art in 
fingerprint personal recognition today (Maltoni et al., 2009; Nanni & Lumini, 2009; Yang & 
Park, 2008). 
Exploiting Run-Time Reconfigurable Hardware  























Fig. 3. Intermediate results in the processing of template (left side) and query (right side) 
fingerprints 
A summary of the processing stages involved in the suggested personal recognition 
algorithm can be deduced from Fig. 3 when authenticating one query fingerprint (right side, 
red arrows) against one previously enrolled template fingerprint (left side, blue arrows). Up 
to 11 different tasks (A-K) are carried out along the processing, covering the image 
enhancement stage (tasks A-G), the feature sets extraction stage (tasks H-I), the feature sets 
alignment (task J) and the feature sets matching (task K) stages: 
- Task A refers to the image segmentation process, which takes as input the acquired 
fingerprint impression and aims at isolating the valid fingerprint area, also known as 
foreground, from the rest of the image, also known as background. 
- Task B refers to the image normalization process, which aims at adapting the variation of 
grey level intensities along ridges and valleys in the different regions of the fingerprint. 
- Task C refers to the isotropic filtering of the image, which aims at removing some of the 
hazard noise that could be present in the fingerprint impression. 
- Task D refers to the field orientation map computation, which consists in the calculation 
of the dominant direction of ridges and valleys in each local region of the fingerprint. 
- Task E refers to the filtered field orientation map computation, which pursues the 
enhancement of the previously computed field orientation map. 
- Task F refers to the image binarization process, which aims at discriminating ridges and 
valleys based on the directional filtering of the image according to the enhanced field 
orientation map. 
- Task G refers to the image smoothing process, which aims at enhancing the black and 
white representation of the image by removing some of the noise that could be present 
in the binary version of the fingerprint image. 
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in the binary version of the fingerprint image. 
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- Task H refers to the image thinning process, which aims at progressively removing the 
ridge pixels of the image preserving the geometric topology of the ridge-valley pattern 
till obtaining one skeleton of one single pixel wide to make easy the subsequent 
identification of minutia points. 
- Task I refers to the minutia extraction process, which aims at deducing those salient 
features spatially distributed along the ridge-valley pattern such as the ridge endings 
and the ridge bifurcations. Those features will be used as discriminatory information of 
the fingerprint, together with the filtered field orientation map. 
- Task J refers to the image alignment process, which aims at looking for any spatial 
correspondence between both template and query images based on the extracted 
feature sets. In case of positive alignment, the overlapped area between both fingerprint 
impressions is deduced. The overlapped area becomes the region of interest for 
comparison of template and query prints in the next stage. 
- Task K refers to the image matching process and the authentication result (match/non-
match) computation based on the comparison of the feature sets (field orientation maps 
and minutia points) previously aligned. 
Most of the cited tasks deal with fingerprint images and/or big amounts of data so a high 
computational demand is expected for the physical platform in charge of the processing. 
Although a first implementation of the recognition algorithm under a personal computer 
platform has been developed in order to validate the accuracy performance reached by the 
suggested algorithm, more cost-effective system solutions have also been evaluated in this 
work in order to make easy the spread of those fingerprint-based biometric applications in 
the consumer arena, accessible to whomever, wherever and whenever.  
3. Recognition accuracy performance 
In order to prove the validity of the suggested fingerprint recognition algorithm it is needed 
to proceed with the evaluation of its accuracy performance when submitted to test under a 
large fingerprint database. The fingerprint recognition algorithm needs to be properly tuned 
to the environment conditions (fingerprint sensor, sensing technique, attended/unattended 
acquisition method, etc.) of the real application. The selected database corresponds to the 
database DB3 of the Fingerprint Verification Competition FVC2004 contest (Maio et al., 
2004). This public database is 110 fingers wide, and 8 samples per finger in depth, which 
results in a total of 880 fingerprint images. All the images were collected by using a thermal 
sweeping sensor. The complete database is split in two subsets A and B. The subset A is 
composed of 100 fingers (800 images) and the subset B is composed of 10 fingers (80 
images). The subset B is firstly used in order to adjust some of the parameters of the 
algorithm to the properties of the fingerprint images acquired with the selected sensor, and 
once the algorithm is properly tuned, the subset A is used in order to verify the real 
performance of the application. The performance evaluation procedure follows the same 
criteria than in FVC contests: 
i. In order to get the impostor distribution, one sample of each finger in the subset A is 
collected. A total of 100 images are used, and each of the images is matched against the 
others to compute the False Match Rate –FMR– or False Acceptance Rate –FAR– 
distribution. If the matching of g against h is performed, the symmetric one (i.e., h 
against g) is not executed in order to avoid correlation. A total of 4950 matches are 
carried out. 
Exploiting Run-Time Reconfigurable Hardware  
in the Development of Fingerprint-Based Personal Recognition Applications 
 
245 
ii. In order to deduce the genuine distribution, each of the samples corresponding to one 
finger is matched against the other samples of the same finger. Similarly to the impostor 
distribution procedure, if the matching of g against h is performed, the symmetric one 
(i.e., h against g) is not executed in order to avoid correlation. The total number of 
genuine tests results in 2800, and from them it is possible to compute the False Non-
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Fig. 4. Genuine and Impostor distributions 
Given one template and one query fingerprints, the recognition algorithm provides a 
similarity score between both images within [0,1]. Similar images, understood as images 
belonging to the same finger, will have scores close to 1, while dissimilar images, 
understood as images from different fingers, will present scores close to 0. After 
performance evaluation with the subset A, the algorithm features an Equal Error Rate 
EER=4.162%. The Genuine and Impostor distributions –I(t) and G(t)–, the representations of 
the performance indicator rates FMR and FNMR as a function of the similarity threshold 
score t –FMR(t) and FNMR(t)–, and the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of 
the tested algorithm are shown in Figs. 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
The parameter EER is the main indicator used to evaluate the performance of the 
recognition algorithms in FVC contests. If comparing the performance of the proposed 
algorithm against those presented in FVC2004 with the same database, the proposed 
algorithm would be ranked in 17th position from a total of 41 participants in the open 
category (executed by one personal computer platform without resources constraints), 
where the winner algorithm presented an EER=1.18% and the last classified algorithm an 
EER=43.95%; or ranked in 5th position from a total of 26 participants in the light category 
(executed by a personal computer platform with restrictions on the execution time and the 
memory resources), where the winner algorithm presented an EER=2.92% and the last 
classified algorithm an EER=54.28%. 
  
Recent Application in Biometrics 
 
244 
- Task H refers to the image thinning process, which aims at progressively removing the 
ridge pixels of the image preserving the geometric topology of the ridge-valley pattern 
till obtaining one skeleton of one single pixel wide to make easy the subsequent 
identification of minutia points. 
- Task I refers to the minutia extraction process, which aims at deducing those salient 
features spatially distributed along the ridge-valley pattern such as the ridge endings 
and the ridge bifurcations. Those features will be used as discriminatory information of 
the fingerprint, together with the filtered field orientation map. 
- Task J refers to the image alignment process, which aims at looking for any spatial 
correspondence between both template and query images based on the extracted 
feature sets. In case of positive alignment, the overlapped area between both fingerprint 
impressions is deduced. The overlapped area becomes the region of interest for 
comparison of template and query prints in the next stage. 
- Task K refers to the image matching process and the authentication result (match/non-
match) computation based on the comparison of the feature sets (field orientation maps 
and minutia points) previously aligned. 
Most of the cited tasks deal with fingerprint images and/or big amounts of data so a high 
computational demand is expected for the physical platform in charge of the processing. 
Although a first implementation of the recognition algorithm under a personal computer 
platform has been developed in order to validate the accuracy performance reached by the 
suggested algorithm, more cost-effective system solutions have also been evaluated in this 
work in order to make easy the spread of those fingerprint-based biometric applications in 
the consumer arena, accessible to whomever, wherever and whenever.  
3. Recognition accuracy performance 
In order to prove the validity of the suggested fingerprint recognition algorithm it is needed 
to proceed with the evaluation of its accuracy performance when submitted to test under a 
large fingerprint database. The fingerprint recognition algorithm needs to be properly tuned 
to the environment conditions (fingerprint sensor, sensing technique, attended/unattended 
acquisition method, etc.) of the real application. The selected database corresponds to the 
database DB3 of the Fingerprint Verification Competition FVC2004 contest (Maio et al., 
2004). This public database is 110 fingers wide, and 8 samples per finger in depth, which 
results in a total of 880 fingerprint images. All the images were collected by using a thermal 
sweeping sensor. The complete database is split in two subsets A and B. The subset A is 
composed of 100 fingers (800 images) and the subset B is composed of 10 fingers (80 
images). The subset B is firstly used in order to adjust some of the parameters of the 
algorithm to the properties of the fingerprint images acquired with the selected sensor, and 
once the algorithm is properly tuned, the subset A is used in order to verify the real 
performance of the application. The performance evaluation procedure follows the same 
criteria than in FVC contests: 
i. In order to get the impostor distribution, one sample of each finger in the subset A is 
collected. A total of 100 images are used, and each of the images is matched against the 
others to compute the False Match Rate –FMR– or False Acceptance Rate –FAR– 
distribution. If the matching of g against h is performed, the symmetric one (i.e., h 
against g) is not executed in order to avoid correlation. A total of 4950 matches are 
carried out. 
Exploiting Run-Time Reconfigurable Hardware  
in the Development of Fingerprint-Based Personal Recognition Applications 
 
245 
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Fig. 6. Receiver Operating Characteristic curve 
The first implementation of the recognition algorithm is carried out under a personal 
computer platform and uses floating point operations in order to be as much accurate as 
possible in the different computations (statistical analysis parameters like standard 
deviation, square root calculation, trigonometric computing, etc.) carried out along the 
recognition process. After proving the validity of the proposed algorithm, a new version of 
the algorithm is developed by replacing those floating point operations by fixed point 
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operations in order to reduce the complexity of the processing and the computational 
demands of the physical platforms where to implement the AFAS application. A new 
evaluation performance loop of the modified version of the algorithm is performed with 
very similar results –the EER evolves from 4.162% to 4.242%–. Therefore the new version of 
the algorithm is also accepted and used as reference to be implemented under low-cost and 
low-performance microprocessors without floating point units (FPU) on embedded system 
platforms in the next stage. 
4. Application execution time requirements definition 
Nowadays most of the applications that exploit biometrics-based personal recognition 
demand a fast response time to the physical systems in charge of the processing. In case of 
fingerprint-based authentication systems, soft real-time performance is normally required. 
In this specific context, soft real-time is understood as providing the proper recognition 
response within a reaction time short enough to be unnoticed by the user. This reaction time 
covers the interval elapsed since the user presents his identity credentials to the system and 
puts his finger on the sensing surface of the capture device till the moment when the 
automatic authentication system provides the result of the verification process. Reaction 
times in the range between 1.5s and 3.5s are usually accepted as normal and valid 
authentication response times for any AFAS application. Therefore, this work focuses on the 
evaluation of the execution time performance of the proposed fingerprint recognition 
algorithm when implemented on different computational platforms in order to determine 
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5. Proof of concept I: software-only implementation 
Different computational platforms addressing the execution of software-based applications 
have been selected for processing speed evaluation purposes. The scope covers from high-
cost and high-performance personal computer platforms to low-cost and mid-performance 
embedded system platforms based on general-purpose hard-core or soft-core processors. 
One personal computer and three embedded system platforms have been evaluated, as 
indicated in Table 1. The evaluation procedure permits to point out in an easy way which 





































Processor Intel Core 2 Duo T5600 ARM922T MicroBlaze MicroBlaze 
Processor data bus 64 bits 32 bits 32 bits 32 bits 
Number of cores 2 1 1 1 
Type of core Hard-core Hard-core Soft-core Soft-core 
Technology 65 nm 180 nm 90 nm 90 nm 
Clock speed 1.83 GHz 200 MHz 66.667 MHz 100 MHz 
Bus speed 667 MHz 200/100 MHz 133.3/66.6 MHz 200/100 MHz 
Cache 2 MB L2 8 KB Inst. Cache 8 KB Inst. Cache8 KB Data Cache
32 KB Inst. Cache 
64 KB Data Cache 






















data bus 64 bits 32 bits 16 bits 32 bits 
SDRAM 
frequency ≥ 200MHz 125 MHz 133.333 MHz 100 MHz 
Table 1. Computational platforms used in the execution time performance evaluation 
process 
The execution time performance reached in each of the platforms, in both enrolment and 
authentication stages, is presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. The enrolment process of 
the template fingerprint and the authentication process of the query fingerprint with the 
enrolled template are evaluated. The authentication execution times are obviously longer 
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than the enrolment times. Special attention needs to be done to the authentication stage 
since, unlike the enrolment stage, the authentication process is normally carried out on-line 
in the real application so real-time response is usually requested. The enrolment stage tends 
to be less critical since it is normally carried out off-line –under the supervision of 
application staff to guarantee the reliable enrolment of the user in the system– so no real-
















Task 1 Image segmentation 2.810 ms 1083.219 ms 299.578 ms 227.035 ms 
Task 2 Image normalization 0.470 ms 178.940 ms 46.960 ms 32.772 ms 
Task 3 Image isotropic filtering 7.030 ms 5304.010 ms 719.703 ms 467.329 ms 
Task 4 Field orientation 2.190 ms 834.062 ms 344.651 ms 244.916 ms 





13.440 ms 3792.712 ms 860.133 ms 609.518 ms 
Task 7 Image smoothing 12.350 ms 1536.114 ms 360.012 ms 229.732 ms 





0.630 ms 76.626 ms 35.404 ms 23.982 ms 
Total Execution Time: 40.790 ms 14598.674 ms 3240.934 ms 2256.663 ms 
Table 2. Enrolment process execution time performance 
As it can be deduced from the tables, the real-time performance requested to the application 
is not achieved in all the scenarios. The personal computer platform is able to meet the 
requested performance, but those other scenarios based on low-cost and mid-performance 
embedded processors running at low operation frequencies are far away from the requested 
timing performance. The big latency exhibited by the embedded system platform 1 with 
regard to the other two embedded system platforms is justified by the fact that no data 
cache is enabled in that scenario, which severely affects the final performance of the 
application.  
On the one hand, although the powerful processor embedded in the personal computer 
platform is able to reach the requested performance, its cost is excessive for those low-cost 
consumer applications demanding biometric recognition. On the other hand, although the 
embedded system platforms tested in this work are able to meet the system cost 
requirements of the consumer applications arena, the exhibited execution time performances 
are clearly insufficient. Therefore, it is needed to find alternative system architectures able to 
meet both key requirements: high performance and low cost. 
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Task 1 Image segmentation 2.810 ms 1083.219 ms 299.578 ms 227.035 ms 
Task 2 Image normalization 0.470 ms 178.940 ms 46.960 ms 32.772 ms 
Task 3 Image isotropic filtering 7.030 ms 5304.010 ms 719.703 ms 467.329 ms 
Task 4 Field orientation 2.500 ms 987.089 ms 407.445 ms 289.661 ms 





15.940 ms 4460.569 ms 1014.939 ms 720.095 ms 
Task 7 Image smoothing 14.220 ms 1752.322 ms 412.503 ms 261.745 ms 





0.630 ms 93.783 ms 45.002 ms 29.487 ms 








4.220 ms 370.712 ms 161.973 ms 107.972 ms 
Total Execution Time: 3274.380 ms 295748.055 ms 213961.035 ms 140767.219 ms 
Table 3. Authentication process execution time performance 
6. Run-time reconfigurable embedded system design 
There exist in the market many automatic biometrics-based personal authentication systems 
implemented on high performance computer platforms –HPCs, PCs, etc.– (One Touch SDK, 
n.d.; Verifinger SDK, n.d.), embedded general-purpose or application-specific processors –
MPUs, MCUs, GPUs, ASSPs– (FxIntegrator, n.d.; plusID, n.d.; SDA, n.d.), embedded digital 
signal processors –DSPs– (MV1210 and MV1250, n.d.; SFM, n.d.; TMS320, n.d.), or 
embedded systems based on central processing units –CPUs– plus application-specific 
hardware accelerators –ASICs– off-chip or on-chip (FPC2020 and FPC-AM3, n.d.; 
ML67Q5250, n.d.; SecurASIC, n.d.; TCD50D, n.d.). Furthermore, many research articles have 
been published dealing with the acceleration of some of the stages that take place in one 
personal recognition algorithm by means of field programmable logic –FPGAs, SoPCs– (Liu-
Jimenez et al, 2006; Lopez-Ongil et al, 2004; Pavan Kumar et al, 2007; Yang et al, 2006). 
However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, up to date there is no work that takes 
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advantage and exploits the dynamic reconfigurability performance of FPGAs (Becker et al, 
2007) in the physical implementation of a complete personal recognition application based 
on biometrics. 
Time-to-market pressures and cost constraints are pushing embedded systems to new levels 
of flexibility and system integration. In this work, a novel embedded system architecture is 
proven to successfully address the demands of today’s biometrics-based personal 
recognition systems in terms of computational complexity, real-time performance, 
development cycles and cost. The proposed embedded system architecture is based on five 
key factors to afford the challenging demands: 
a. General-purpose microprocessor system. 
As in most of the embedded systems in the market today, the usage of low-cost and mid-
performance microprocessors (of 16-bits or 32-bits, running at operating frequencies of up to 
200-600MHz) provides certain flexibility required in any application. Software-based 
solutions have additional advantages such as the rapid development of the application by 
making use of a set of libraries with application-specific functions, which avoids writing the 
software application from scratch, and provides a cost-effective solution.  However, in those 
applications demanding a high computational power and real-time performance, certain 
limitations exist when trying to develop the entire application with purely software 
platforms based on either one single processor (MPU, MCU, DSP, etc.) or 
multicore/multiprocessor systems due to the inherent limitations in working frequency, 
restricted data path, shared resources, sequential workflow execution, and reduced 
parallelism characteristics featured by those standard products. 
b. Programmable logic device embedded in the system. 
When purely software-based systems are not enough to meet the expected real-time 
performances of one real-world application, the usage of hardware-based accelerator 
devices as complementary processing units has been proven to be an efficient solution. 
Programmable logic devices such as FPGAs are much more flexible than semi-custom or 
custom devices like ASSPs or ASICs. ASSPs and ASICs have a fixed peripheral set that 
limits the number of applications that they can be efficiently used in; but FPGAs allow 
implementing custom peripherals and made-to-measure glue logic tailored to the 
requirements of any application. Over recent years, FPGA devices have gained an enormous 
amount of processing power and functionality thanks to the continuous advances in silicon 
technologies. The current FPGAs are able to embed much more memory and logical 
resources, as well as many DSP blocks, multiple clock management units and big amounts 
of high-speed transceivers for fast communication purposes in one single device. The 
technology has evolved till the point that the size of today’s FPGAs is several orders of 
magnitude higher than the first FPGAs, reaching values above two millions of flip-flops and 
LUTs. The programmability performance of FPGAs make them unique in the market and 
the continuous improvements in the semiconductors field permits reducing the costs of 
FPGA devices, making them more and more competitive. The flexibility of FPGAs 
eliminates the long design cycle associated with ASICs, and the usage of IP libraries written 
in standard hardware description languages and automated design/verification tools 
reduce the development cycles of those applications based on programmable logic devices. 
c. Hardware-software co-design techniques. 
The usage of one general-purpose MPU and one FPGA as a companion chip offers a much 
greater degree of flexibility and allows the development of any application by means of 
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hardware-software co-design techniques. The exposed system architecture approach gives 
flexibility at two levels: at software level, with the MPU-based application management; and 
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Fig. 8. Physical implementation of one computational platform based on a general-purpose 
MPU (system CPU), several hardware cores (HW coprocessors) and one memory block. 
Process execution flow example of one image processing task carried out by one of the 
application-specific hardware coprocessors instantiated in the system 
The FPGA is introduced in the system as a general-purpose device where to instantiate 
those application-specific hardware coprocessors required to speed up those critical tasks of 
the application. It permits to design an adaptive and highly-integrated multiprocessor 
system oriented to the development of real-time applications. Apart from the inherent 
flexibility featured by the microprocessor, the programmable logic device provides 
additional flexibility and a high degree of parallelism in the implementation of functional 
circuits. In the FPGA it is possible to instantiate either additional microprocessors (e.g. 
VHDL instances of soft-core processors) or made-to-measure VLSI hardware accelerators 
in charge of specific tasks aiming at offloading those MPU algorithm-intensive operations, 
as shown in Fig. 8. With an improved bandwidth among the MPU –system CPU-, the 
FPGA, the memory resources and the rest of peripherals available in the embedded 
system, soft and hard real-time applications can be successfully developed through this 
approach. 
d. Run-time reconfigurable FPGAs. 
The FPGA device embedded in the system allows exploiting the parallelism and 
acceleration features inherent to the programmable logic design, so it is possible to meet 
real-time performance by spreading the functionality across the different core resources 
(MPU and FPGA) available in the system. However, the resources available in the FPGA are 
not unlimited, and the cost of those resources increases exponentially when the size of the 
FGPA increases. Therefore, it is convenient to reduce the size of the FPGA in the design to 
reach affordable costs for the complete system. In this direction, and owing to the fact that 
the proposed biometrics-based personal recognition applications feature a sequential 
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nature (the personal recognition algorithm consists of a set of mutually exclusive image 
processing tasks executed one after the other), it is possible to exploit the reconfigurability 
performance featured by some FPGA devices in order to minimize the system hardware 
needs. 
Dynamic partial reconfigurability performance of some existing FPGAs refers to the ability 
of modifying the functional content of one portion of the FPGA –reconfigurable region– on-
the-fly while keeping the rest of the FPGA –static region– fully operative without 
interruption. The main benefit of doing so is the optimization in the functional density of the 
device: the same hardware resources available in the reconfigurable region of the FPGA can 
be time-multiplexed in order to allocate different functionalities (FPGA contexts) along the 
application execution time. Therefore the amount of needed resources in any application can 
be minimized, and the total size of the FPGA can be reduced in comparison to the static 
implementation of all the functionalities instantiated permanently in a bigger FPGA. The 
main constraint in the usage of run-time reconfigurable FPGAs is the reconfiguration 
overhead: the time needed in order to modify the functional content of the reconfigurable 
region in the different contexts. Therefore the minimization of the reconfiguration latencies 
plays an important role in those systems. Fig. 9 shows the comparison between static and 
dynamic FPGA-based design concepts. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Comparison between static FPGA-based design concept (left side) and run-time 
reconfigurable-FPGA-based design concept (right side). The coloured boxes represent each 
of the different functional blocks in which the application is partitioned 
Any application that can be structured as a sequence of mutually exclusive tasks can be 
proposed to be implemented by means of run-time reconfigurable FPGAs. Fig. 10 shows the 
scheduling of one application into a sequence of mutually exclusive stages, and the 
partitioning of each of the processing stages present in the chain into either series or parallel 
tasks. Each of the tasks can be executed by hardware or by software. Those critical tasks are 
implemented by hardware to take advantage of higher processing bandwidths and 
acceleration data path architectures. In this direction, it is possible to make the process truly 
parallel and at the same time to free some master CPU resources. The rest of less expensive 
tasks remain as software tasks to be handled by the master CPU of the system. The final 
partitioning of the application into software tasks, static hardware tasks and dynamically 
reconfigurable hardware tasks mainly depends on the cost (resources availability, power 
consumption, etc.) and timing (real-time performance) constraints demanded to the 
system. 
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Fig. 9. Comparison between static FPGA-based design concept (left side) and run-time 
reconfigurable-FPGA-based design concept (right side). The coloured boxes represent each 
of the different functional blocks in which the application is partitioned 
Any application that can be structured as a sequence of mutually exclusive tasks can be 
proposed to be implemented by means of run-time reconfigurable FPGAs. Fig. 10 shows the 
scheduling of one application into a sequence of mutually exclusive stages, and the 
partitioning of each of the processing stages present in the chain into either series or parallel 
tasks. Each of the tasks can be executed by hardware or by software. Those critical tasks are 
implemented by hardware to take advantage of higher processing bandwidths and 
acceleration data path architectures. In this direction, it is possible to make the process truly 
parallel and at the same time to free some master CPU resources. The rest of less expensive 
tasks remain as software tasks to be handled by the master CPU of the system. The final 
partitioning of the application into software tasks, static hardware tasks and dynamically 
reconfigurable hardware tasks mainly depends on the cost (resources availability, power 
consumption, etc.) and timing (real-time performance) constraints demanded to the 
system. 
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Fig. 10. Deployment of one application as a set of mutually exclusive stages that can be 
implemented through dynamic reconfigurable embedded systems. Partitioning of each of 
the stages into hardware and software tasks executed either sequentially or in parallel 
taking advantage of programmable logic 
e. System-on-programmable chip platform. 
The usage of a general-purpose MPU together with programmable and reconfigurable logic 
gives a high level of flexibility to the system and provides the mechanisms to achieve real-
time performance. However, higher integration means lower costs. Therefore, the 
integration of those main resources and other key peripherals such as memory, timers, 
interrupt controllers, etc. on a single chip provides an efficient way of optimizing the whole 
system cost. Embedded biometric recognition is therefore possible by making use of highly 
integrated platforms. Additional benefits of the system integration are the improvements in 
reliability and security. It is possible to embed most of the processing in a single SoPC 
device well-protected against external attacks by means of security protocols and 
cryptographic processors dealing with the exchange of information between the SoPC 
device and the external world. For this reason, the usage of SoPC or system-on-chip devices 
that embed one FPGA is especially encouraged in the experimental tests carried out in this 
work. 
The suggested system architecture is depicted in Fig. 11. At least one run-time 
reconfigurable region is present in the programmable logic device to synthesize those 
flexible application-specific hardware coprocessors that can be dynamically instantiated on 
demand along the application execution time. One specific reconfiguration controller is in 
charge of the reconfiguration task, supervised by the master processing unit. The AFAS 
application is connected to the external world by means of a series or parallel 
communication link with a Host. All or some of the functional blocks depicted in Fig. 11 are 
embedded in the same chip. 
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Fig. 11. Run-time reconfigurable embedded system architecture 
7. Proof of concept II: hardware-software implementation 
A run-time reconfigurable embedded system is presented in this section as general-purpose 
processing platform where to implement the AFAS application by means of hardware-
software co-design techniques. A commercial development board ML401 based on the 
system-on-programmable-chip device Virtex-4 XC4VLX25 from Xilinx Inc. is used to verify 
the validity of the proposed system architecture. Additionally to the highly-integrated 
ML401 development platform, a fingerprint sensor has been connected to the I/O expansion 
ports of the evaluation board in order to make possible the acquisition of fingerprints in the 
application, and one RS-232 link has been established between the evaluation board and a 
personal computer platform in order to simulate the interface between the recognition 
module and the host or high-level application that makes use of the personal recognition 
result, as shown in Fig. 12. 
The selected SoPC/FPGA device is partitioned in two regions in the biometric application: 
one static region and one partially reconfigurable region (PRR). In the static region, different 
components that will be permanently present along the application execution time are 
instantiated such as one 32-bit MicroBlaze soft-core processor (CPU), data and instruction 
caches, local memory, one memory management unit (MMU) and other memory controllers 
to access on-chip and off-chip memory blocks, one dedicated reconfiguration controller in 
charge of the dynamic reconfiguration of the device, other standard peripherals such as 
interrupt controller, timer, UART, general-purpose input/output ports, etc. and one specific 
interface between the static region and the reconfigurable region based on FIFO memories 
and dedicated 32-bit registers. In the reconfigurable region, application-specific hardware 
coprocessors will be instantiated under demand along the application execution time in 
order to perform those image and signal processing tasks required by the AFAS 
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7. Proof of concept II: hardware-software implementation 
A run-time reconfigurable embedded system is presented in this section as general-purpose 
processing platform where to implement the AFAS application by means of hardware-
software co-design techniques. A commercial development board ML401 based on the 
system-on-programmable-chip device Virtex-4 XC4VLX25 from Xilinx Inc. is used to verify 
the validity of the proposed system architecture. Additionally to the highly-integrated 
ML401 development platform, a fingerprint sensor has been connected to the I/O expansion 
ports of the evaluation board in order to make possible the acquisition of fingerprints in the 
application, and one RS-232 link has been established between the evaluation board and a 
personal computer platform in order to simulate the interface between the recognition 
module and the host or high-level application that makes use of the personal recognition 
result, as shown in Fig. 12. 
The selected SoPC/FPGA device is partitioned in two regions in the biometric application: 
one static region and one partially reconfigurable region (PRR). In the static region, different 
components that will be permanently present along the application execution time are 
instantiated such as one 32-bit MicroBlaze soft-core processor (CPU), data and instruction 
caches, local memory, one memory management unit (MMU) and other memory controllers 
to access on-chip and off-chip memory blocks, one dedicated reconfiguration controller in 
charge of the dynamic reconfiguration of the device, other standard peripherals such as 
interrupt controller, timer, UART, general-purpose input/output ports, etc. and one specific 
interface between the static region and the reconfigurable region based on FIFO memories 
and dedicated 32-bit registers. In the reconfigurable region, application-specific hardware 
coprocessors will be instantiated under demand along the application execution time in 
order to perform those image and signal processing tasks required by the AFAS 
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Fig. 12. Run-time reconfigurable embedded system architecture proposed in the physical 
implementation of an Automatic Fingerprint-based Authentication System 
 
Resources Xilinx XC4VLX25 
Spatial Partitioning 
Static Region Reconfigurable Region 
1-bit Flip Flop 21504 10240 11264 
4-input LUT 21504 10240 11264 
1-bit RAM 1327104 921600 405504 
DSP Block 48 4 44 
Table 4. Spatial partitioning of the programmable logic device into one static region and one 
reconfigurable region 
The proposed system-on-programmable-chip is a SRAM-based device. Only volatile 
memory is embedded on the chip. Additionally to the on-chip volatile memory, the 
suggested platform is provided with off-chip volatile and non-volatile memory ICs, as it is 
shown in Fig. 12. Two different types of off-chip non-volatile memories are used: 
- The Platform FLASH memory block (4 Mbytes) stores the initial bitstream that defines 
the configuration of the FPGA upon power up. This initial configuration is composed 
of the hardware content of the static region (master CPU, memory controllers and 
other peripherals), and one bootloader application which is executed by the master 
CPU and is in charge of initializing the system. The initial content of the 
reconfigurable region of the FPGA remains blank after power up. The transfer of the 
initial bitstream from the platform FLASH to the internal configuration memory of the 
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FPGA is automatically done during power up through a dedicated SelectMAP 
interface present in the FPGA. 
- The Linear FLASH memory block (8 Mbytes) contains the definition of those 
reconfigurable hardware coprocessors to be instantiated in the reconfigurable region of 
the FPGA along the application execution time, as well as the AFAS program code to be 
executed by the master CPU. Moreover, the linear FLASH is used in the AFAS 
application as storage memory where to save the templates of those genuine users 
registered into the system in the enrolment stage. The reconfiguration process of the 
PRR is done by means of the dedicated hardware reconfiguration controller instantiated 
in the static region and the ICAP controller inherent to the device. 
Apart from the off-chip FLASH memories, one off-chip SDRAM memory block is also 
present in the system. During the power up sequence, the bootloader is in charge of 
initializing the different controllers instantiated in the static region of the FPGA and 
transferring to the SDRAM memory block (64 Mbytes) the content of the linear FLASH, that 
is, the AFAS program code and the partial bitstreams that define each of the contexts in 
which the reconfigurable region is time-multiplexed along the AFAS application. In this 
way, the off-chip SDRAM memory acts as program and data memory in the application and 
can be accessed by either the CPU through the PLB bus or the MMU master controller 
through a dedicated NPI bus. Once all the information is properly transferred to the 
SDRAM memory, the bootloader gives the control to the AFAS application, and the AFAS 
application starts. 
A multi-bus system architecture permits the interconnection between the different 
processing blocks. Two specific made-to-measure memory management units –MMU 
master and slave in Fig. 12– are instantiated in the static region, which aim at interfacing 
the master CPU and the rest of controllers provided in the static region with those 
reconfigurable coprocessors instantiated in the reconfigurable region. The interface 
between the static and reconfigurable regions is built through specific Bus Macros (BM) 
and some bidirectional FIFO memories intended for a fast exchange of big amounts of 
data. Moreover, some 32-bit registers are instantiated in the static region in order the 
master CPU to configure the static and reconfigurable hardware coprocessors, and to 
control and monitor the application processing flow. The interface between the MMU 
master and the PRR reconfiguration controller present in the static region is also 
implemented through a dedicated FIFO memory, as depicted in Fig. 12. The reconfiguration 
controller is in charge of reading the partial bitstreams previously saved in the SDRAM 
memory block during power up, and transferring them to the ICAP, which configures the 
reconfigurable region of the FPGA with the new functional content defined by each 
bistream. Another FIFO memory block is instantiated in the static region, which acts as a 
temporary buffer of that information that needs to be shared between different contexts of 
the PRR region. Before reconfiguring a new context in the PRR region, those parameters 
that have to be used in the next contexts are saved in that FIFO. After the reconfiguration 
process, the content of that dedicated FIFO is transferred again to the reconfigurable 
region in order the new reconfigurable coprocessors instantiated in the PRR to make use 
of such information. 
The interface between the master CPU and those application-specific hardware coprocessors 
instantiated in the FPGA, either in the static or reconfigurable regions, is provided with 
some interrupt lines in order any of those hardware coprocessors to be able to notify to the 
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FPGA is automatically done during power up through a dedicated SelectMAP 
interface present in the FPGA. 
- The Linear FLASH memory block (8 Mbytes) contains the definition of those 
reconfigurable hardware coprocessors to be instantiated in the reconfigurable region of 
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way, the off-chip SDRAM memory acts as program and data memory in the application and 
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A multi-bus system architecture permits the interconnection between the different 
processing blocks. Two specific made-to-measure memory management units –MMU 
master and slave in Fig. 12– are instantiated in the static region, which aim at interfacing 
the master CPU and the rest of controllers provided in the static region with those 
reconfigurable coprocessors instantiated in the reconfigurable region. The interface 
between the static and reconfigurable regions is built through specific Bus Macros (BM) 
and some bidirectional FIFO memories intended for a fast exchange of big amounts of 
data. Moreover, some 32-bit registers are instantiated in the static region in order the 
master CPU to configure the static and reconfigurable hardware coprocessors, and to 
control and monitor the application processing flow. The interface between the MMU 
master and the PRR reconfiguration controller present in the static region is also 
implemented through a dedicated FIFO memory, as depicted in Fig. 12. The reconfiguration 
controller is in charge of reading the partial bitstreams previously saved in the SDRAM 
memory block during power up, and transferring them to the ICAP, which configures the 
reconfigurable region of the FPGA with the new functional content defined by each 
bistream. Another FIFO memory block is instantiated in the static region, which acts as a 
temporary buffer of that information that needs to be shared between different contexts of 
the PRR region. Before reconfiguring a new context in the PRR region, those parameters 
that have to be used in the next contexts are saved in that FIFO. After the reconfiguration 
process, the content of that dedicated FIFO is transferred again to the reconfigurable 
region in order the new reconfigurable coprocessors instantiated in the PRR to make use 
of such information. 
The interface between the master CPU and those application-specific hardware coprocessors 
instantiated in the FPGA, either in the static or reconfigurable regions, is provided with 
some interrupt lines in order any of those hardware coprocessors to be able to notify to the 
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master CPU about the end of the processing task that is being executed by hardware. 
Furthermore, in order to reduce the reconfiguration time of the PRR, the size of the 
reconfigurable region has been minimized as much as possible. A specific reconfiguration 
controller is instantiated in the static region of the FPGA in order to allow fast 
reconfiguration without impacting on CPU load. The CPU is only responsible for 
indicating to the reconfiguration controller the specific partial bitstream that has to be 
downloaded in the PRR at any time, and once this is defined, the reconfiguration 
controller is in charge of the reconfiguration process without the need of any further 
action by the master CPU. Once the reconfiguration is done, the reconfiguration controller 
notifies the end of the task to the CPU, and the master CPU continues driving the AFAS 
application program flow. The soft-core processor (master CPU) has been configured to 
operate at a maximum frequency of 100MHz, and the hardware coprocessors instantiated 
in the FPGA are designed to operate at either 100MHz or 50MHz depending on the 
specific task. 
The required skills to develop any design based on FPGAs or SoPCs are more demanding 
than those needed to develop purely software applications. Some background on electronic 
circuits and programmable logic design, as well as the knowledge of one hardware 
description language like Verilog or VHDL is required to develop applications based on 
such kind of architectures. Similarly to what happens with software programming 
languages and their libraries of functions, some libraries of Intellectual Property 
descriptions (IPs) of certain functionalities are available to speed up the development of 
designs based on programmable logic. Moreover, specific EDA tools dependent on the 
device vendor are normally available to reduce the development cycles when designing 
with FPGA devices, and the designer needs to get familiar with the processing flow of each 
automated tool.  
Although commercial non-volatile FPGAs have enjoyed great success as development, 
rapid-prototyping and testing platforms, their use in certain embedded applications has 
been limited due to their relative high cost in comparison with other solutions. At this level 
(using the FPGA to implement a static design which keeps invariant during all its 
execution), the design flow and development tools have been successfully deployed by 
many vendors (Altera, Actel, Atmel, Lattice, Xilinx, etc.) since decades. However, if the 
FPGA resources become static after configuration, the device turns into an expensive, 
power-hungry, low-performance on-field programmable ASIC solution. For FPGAs to 
become more practical as end-use devices it has been promoted their dynamic 
reconfiguration capability, i.e., once powered up, the FPGA can be partially reconfigured at 
run-time, while other part of the FPGA continues operating uninterrupted and 
automatically maintaining state information between two consecutive reconfigured 
contexts. In this way, the functions processed in the FPGA can be sequentially swapped in a 
similar way to the program flow of a CPU-based software application. For this more flexible 
FPGA conception, however, the designer needs to possess some specific background in 
those techniques linked to the exploitation of dynamic partial reconfiguration. Moreover, 
the development tools that automate the new design flow for those applications based on 
run-time reconfigurable hardware have been an open issue since a long time ago. Recently, 
however, this landscape experienced a great and definitive change. Xilinx Inc. pushed a 
definitive impulse to that long-time open issue related to the software tools needed in the 
PR design flow. Just in 2006, Xilinx presented the new PR design flow fully supported in 
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Virtex-4 devices. The new top-down design flow eliminated the weakest points highlighted 
in the previous flows. While still unreleased to the general public, these tools are nowadays 
presented in the way of an early access version restricted to a limited number of qualified 
partners who deploy them and contribute feedback to their improvement. This research 
work is focused on Virtex-4, the first device equipped with a level of PR performance (both 
technological aspects and supported development tools) acceptable for commercial 
perspectives. Once finished all the development of our proof-of-concept application, authors 
think that the current PR flow is today an accepted practice for expert developers with a 
deep knowledge of the FPGA low-level configuration architecture and, then, it is ready for 
industrial use. The current Xilinx toolset available in the Xilinx Early Access Partial 
Reconfiguration (EAPR) lounge and used in this work made possible to automate all the PR 
design methodology and finish all the phases of the design flow at a reasonable time with 
no concerns. The toolset used in this work is composed of EDK 9.2.02i to build the PLBv46 
bus processor system, PlanAhead 9.2.7 to constrain the floorplan in a friendly graphical 
way, ISE 9.2.04i_PR12 to generate the bitstreams, as well as ChipScope Pro 9.2i to facilitate 
the system debugging.  In Fig. 13 it is shown all the process to generate both partial and full 
bitstreams to be downloaded at run-time into the FPGA. 
The application is split into a set of sequential stages, and each stage is partitioned into 
hardware and software tasks. Only those tasks demanding a high computational power or 
those time-critical tasks that would take too much time if executed by the system CPU are 
ported to hardware. Specific hardware coprocessors are instantiated in the reconfigurable 
region of the device to execute such tasks meanwhile the remaining and computationally 
less expensive tasks are assigned to the system CPU, which furthermore acts as the master 
processor in charge of driving the application, scheduling the tasks, monitoring the 
execution flow, and handling the reconfiguration of the PRR when needed along the 
authentication process. Those partially or fully pipelined hardware coprocessors 
instantiated in the dynamically reconfigurable region of the FPGA play the role of slave 
processors in charge of executing those tasks commanded by the master CPU. The dynamic 
hardware coprocessors are present only when they are needed, thus the same hardware 
resources available in the reconfigurable region are reused to instantiate different circuits in 
the application. In Fig. 14 it is shown how the different coprocessors are downloaded into 
the FPGA to reach a time-multiplexing of the resources placed in the defined PR region of 
the FPGA. This work results one of the first contributions in the scientific literature that 
exploits the Xilinx Early Access Partial Reconfiguration electronic design automation tools. 
In Section 5 the algorithm has been ported to the presented embedded system (referenced as 
Embedded System Platform 3 in Tables 1, 2 and 3) and executed purely by software by its 
MicroBlaze core processor alone. No dedicated hardware was implemented in that scenario, 
and the application was not able to meet the demanded real-time performance. However, 
as a result of that implementation under a purely software-based embedded platform, it 
has been possible to identify those time-expensive computational tasks that constrain the 
real-time performance of the application in the embedded system. Those time-critical 
tasks identified in Section 5 are now transferred to hardware to speed up the processing. 
Owing to the limited resources available in the programmable logic device, up to 9 
different reconfigurable contexts have been needed in order to instantiate all the 
hardware coprocessors along the execution time. Outstanding real-time performances are 
achieved. 
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master CPU about the end of the processing task that is being executed by hardware. 
Furthermore, in order to reduce the reconfiguration time of the PRR, the size of the 
reconfigurable region has been minimized as much as possible. A specific reconfiguration 
controller is instantiated in the static region of the FPGA in order to allow fast 
reconfiguration without impacting on CPU load. The CPU is only responsible for 
indicating to the reconfiguration controller the specific partial bitstream that has to be 
downloaded in the PRR at any time, and once this is defined, the reconfiguration 
controller is in charge of the reconfiguration process without the need of any further 
action by the master CPU. Once the reconfiguration is done, the reconfiguration controller 
notifies the end of the task to the CPU, and the master CPU continues driving the AFAS 
application program flow. The soft-core processor (master CPU) has been configured to 
operate at a maximum frequency of 100MHz, and the hardware coprocessors instantiated 
in the FPGA are designed to operate at either 100MHz or 50MHz depending on the 
specific task. 
The required skills to develop any design based on FPGAs or SoPCs are more demanding 
than those needed to develop purely software applications. Some background on electronic 
circuits and programmable logic design, as well as the knowledge of one hardware 
description language like Verilog or VHDL is required to develop applications based on 
such kind of architectures. Similarly to what happens with software programming 
languages and their libraries of functions, some libraries of Intellectual Property 
descriptions (IPs) of certain functionalities are available to speed up the development of 
designs based on programmable logic. Moreover, specific EDA tools dependent on the 
device vendor are normally available to reduce the development cycles when designing 
with FPGA devices, and the designer needs to get familiar with the processing flow of each 
automated tool.  
Although commercial non-volatile FPGAs have enjoyed great success as development, 
rapid-prototyping and testing platforms, their use in certain embedded applications has 
been limited due to their relative high cost in comparison with other solutions. At this level 
(using the FPGA to implement a static design which keeps invariant during all its 
execution), the design flow and development tools have been successfully deployed by 
many vendors (Altera, Actel, Atmel, Lattice, Xilinx, etc.) since decades. However, if the 
FPGA resources become static after configuration, the device turns into an expensive, 
power-hungry, low-performance on-field programmable ASIC solution. For FPGAs to 
become more practical as end-use devices it has been promoted their dynamic 
reconfiguration capability, i.e., once powered up, the FPGA can be partially reconfigured at 
run-time, while other part of the FPGA continues operating uninterrupted and 
automatically maintaining state information between two consecutive reconfigured 
contexts. In this way, the functions processed in the FPGA can be sequentially swapped in a 
similar way to the program flow of a CPU-based software application. For this more flexible 
FPGA conception, however, the designer needs to possess some specific background in 
those techniques linked to the exploitation of dynamic partial reconfiguration. Moreover, 
the development tools that automate the new design flow for those applications based on 
run-time reconfigurable hardware have been an open issue since a long time ago. Recently, 
however, this landscape experienced a great and definitive change. Xilinx Inc. pushed a 
definitive impulse to that long-time open issue related to the software tools needed in the 
PR design flow. Just in 2006, Xilinx presented the new PR design flow fully supported in 
Exploiting Run-Time Reconfigurable Hardware  
in the Development of Fingerprint-Based Personal Recognition Applications 
 
259 
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Tables 5 and 6 provide the execution time performance of the application in both enrolment 
and authentication stages in two different scenarios: (i) when the application is executed 
purely by software under the system CPU alone, and (ii) when the application is 
implemented by means of hardware-software co-design techniques making use of the 
dynamic reconfigurability performance of the suggested FPGA. The final partitioning of the 
application into hardware and software tasks is also detailed. In the second scenario all 
tasks are ported to hardware except the fingerprint acquisition process, which is kept as 
software task under the action of the system CPU. The FPGA resource usage in both the 
static and reconfigurable regions is shown in Table 7. 
 
Task  





Sw-only Task Hw-Sw Task 
Task 0 Fingerprint acquisition 500.000 ms 500.000 ms  
Task 1 Image segmentation 232.046 ms 0.672 ms 
Task 2 
Reconfiguration 1 → 2 0.841 ms 
Image normalization 33.087 ms 0.850 ms 
Task 3 
Reconfiguration 2 → 3 1.045 ms 
Image isotropic filtering 512.171 ms 2.563 ms 
Task 4 
Reconfiguration 3 → 4 1.025 ms 
Field orientation 285.485 ms 0.669 ms 
Task 5 
Reconfiguration 4 → 5 1.046 ms 
Filtered field orientation 19.143 ms 0.419 ms 
Task 6 
Reconfiguration 5 → 6 1.107 ms 
Image directional filtering  
and binarization 656.043 ms 2.465 ms 
Task 7 
Reconfiguration 6 → 7 1.045 ms 
Image smoothing 253.553 ms 0.447 ms 
Task 8 
Reconfiguration 7 → 8 0.974 ms 
Image thinning 416.316 ms 0.902 ms 
Task 9 
Reconfiguration 8 → 9 0.943 ms 
Minutiae extraction and 
minutiae filtering 25.699 ms 4.919 ms 
Total Execution Time (2): 2433.543 ms 21.932 ms 
(1) : The software-only execution times are slightly higher than in the Embedded System 3 scenario of 
Table 2 because of the reduction of the cache memory size in this new scenario in order to allocate 
additional memories in the hardware coprocessors (only 8KB of Instruction and Data caches are 
instantiated in MicroBlaze interface instead of the initial 32KB Instruction cache and 64KB Data cache). 
(2) : Task 0 is not included in the computation of the total execution time. 
Table 5. Execution time performance reached in the enrolment stage: SW-only versus HW-
SW implementations 
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Tables 5 and 6 provide the execution time performance of the application in both enrolment 
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purely by software under the system CPU alone, and (ii) when the application is 
implemented by means of hardware-software co-design techniques making use of the 
dynamic reconfigurability performance of the suggested FPGA. The final partitioning of the 
application into hardware and software tasks is also detailed. In the second scenario all 
tasks are ported to hardware except the fingerprint acquisition process, which is kept as 
software task under the action of the system CPU. The FPGA resource usage in both the 
static and reconfigurable regions is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 2 because of the reduction of the cache memory size in this new scenario in order to allocate 
additional memories in the hardware coprocessors (only 8KB of Instruction and Data caches are 
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(2) : Task 0 is not included in the computation of the total execution time. 
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Field orientation maps 
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Task B 
Reconfiguration A → B 1.035  ms 
Minutiae alignment, feature 
sets matching and 
authentication decision 
108.608 ms 20.737 ms 
Total Execution Time (2): 142693.451 ms 205.025 ms 
(1) : The software-only execution times are slightly higher than in the Embedded System 3 scenario of 
Table 3 because of the reduction of the cache memory size in this new scenario in order to allocate 
additional memories in the hardware coprocessors (only 8KB of Instruction and Data caches are 
instantiated in MicroBlaze interface instead of the initial 32KB Instruction cache and 64KB Data cache). 
(2) : Task 0 is not included in the computation of the total execution time. 
Table 6. Execution time performance reached in the authentication stage: SW-only versus 
HW-SW implementations 
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– Application flow  (static design) 7005 8888 755712 4 
Task 0 Fingerprint acquisition – – – – 
Task 1 Image segmentation 4978 4612 147456 20 
Task 2 Image normalization 371 334 0 8 
Task 3 Image isotropic filtering 5275 5831 92160 28 
Task 4 Field orientation 3339 3166 92160 8 
Task 5 Filtered field orientation 2857 2983 129024 0 
Task 6 Image directional filtering  and binarization 5462 4166 313344 29 
Task 7 Image smoothing 4892 3265 147456 0 
Task 8 Image thinning 1013 2821 239616 0 
Task 9 Minutiae extraction and minutiae filtering 487 3379 55296 0 
Task A Field orientation maps alignment 2632 8943 387072 0 
Task B 
Minutiae alignment, feature 
sets matching and 
authentication decision 
642 4379 258048 5 
Total Design Resources: 38953 52767 2617344 102 
Total Device Resources: 21504 21504 1327104 48 










VIRTEX-4 XC4VLX25  
Fig. 14. Temporal partitioning of the application in sequential tasks running in the PRR of a 
FPGA. The bitstream gets composed of a static region and a reconfigurable region (left). 
Spatial partitioning of the application floorplanned in both static and reconfigurable regions 
on the Xilinx Virtex-4 XC4VLX25 device (right) 
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The physical resources needed to implement each of the hardware coprocessors are detailed. 
From the resources usage shown in Table 7 it can be deduced that the reconfigurability 
performance of the FPGA permits a notorious reduction of the amount of resources needed 
in the programmable logic device in comparison with the amount of resources that would 
be needed in case of using a non-reconfigurable FPGA, where all coprocessors would be 
instantiated permanently in a static way. Thanks to the reconfigurability performance 
exhibited by the suggested device and the hardware-software partitioning of the application 
it has been possible to develop one application that demands 38953 1-bit flip-flops, 52767 4-
bit LUTs, 2617344 1-bit RAM cells and 102 DSP blocks with one device that features 21504 1-
bit flip-flops, 21504 4-bit LUTs, 1327104 1-bit RAM cells and 48 DSP blocks. The reuse of the 
hardware resources allows reducing the amount of resources at the expense of the 
reconfiguration overhead, which is also minimized by the design of an efficient 
reconfiguration controller. The amount of needed resources and the reached performances 
exhibited by the suggested run-time reconfigurable embedded system clearly outperform 
those featured by one PC platform. The total authentication execution time results in 205.025 
ms, which leads to a speed up of ×686.58 (or ×695.980 depending on the used cache) when 
compared against the purely software implementation of the recognition algorithm under 
the same embedded system platform, and a speed up of ×15.97 with regard to the 
application execution time featured by the PC platform presented in Section 5. 
8. Conclusion 
The successful spread of products and services that exploit the advantages provided by 
fingerprint biometrics in both public and private sectors depend on several factors today. 
Although the universality, distinctiveness and permanence characteristics of human 
fingerprints are proven facts that make them reliable signs of identity, the acceptance of 
automated fingerprint-based personal recognition systems, focused on either identification 
or authentication purposes, is constrained by social and technical factors. Among the social 
factors, the most important ones refer to the security and privacy concerns related to the 
protection of the user’s information integrity; and among the technical factors, the most 
limiting ones refer to the accuracy of the recognition system, the authentication response 
time and the cost of the whole application. All they are barriers to the broad adoption of that 
kind of systems worldwide. If fingerprint recognition technology continues to mature and 
efficient and reliable systems able to overcome all those barriers are designed, automated 
fingerprint-based recognition can have a profound influence on the way we conduct our 
daily business in the near future. 
As far as authors know at the moment of publication of the present work, there does not 
exist in the market any AFAS application based on dynamically reconfigurable hardware. 
Flexible and dynamically reconfigurable hardware allows a more efficient usage of the 
system resources by having hardware present in the FPGA device only when it is in use. 
Thus given a fixed size for the FPGA, it is possible to instantiate specific coprocessors at a 
given time, and to eliminate them after they have been used in order to allow further 
coprocessors to be instantiated making use of the same FPGA resources in the following 
stages of the application. This technique allows reducing the overall hardware system size at 
nearly null cost –FPGA reconfiguration overhead–. 
The results presented in this work prove that the suggested system architecture can be an 
efficient alternative to those existing AFAS based on either expensive personal computer 
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platforms or embedded systems that make use of MPUs, GPUs, DSPs, ASSPs or ASICs. This 
novel approach, focused on the exploitation of run-time reconfigurable FPGA devices and 
hardware-software co-design techniques, pursues two main objectives: (i) to meet the 
required expectations for the application, which means to fulfil the functionality demands 
(accurate FAR/FRR personal recognition rates) with the proper response time (real-time) 
and reliability levels (protection against fraudulent attacks); and (ii) to meet those 
requirements with the minimum possible cost for the system, and with the proper flexibility 
to allow future changes/improvements in the personal recognition algorithm (added-value). 
There are endless uses for embedded systems based on SoPC or FPGA devices in the 
consumer, military, aerospace, automotive, communications, and industrial markets 
worldwide. In this direction, the proposed embedded system architecture, based on run-
time reconfigurable hardware, is proven to be a valid and cost-effective solution that 
encourages the reduction of system resources in the physical implementation of those 
complex computational applications demanding high processing power and real-time 
performances such as the ones resulting from the biometrics field. As computer technology 
continues to advance and economies of scale reduce costs, fingerprint biometric systems 
based on the suggested topology can become a more efficient and cost-effective means for 
personal verification in both public and private sectors. The proposed system architecture 
can thus help in paving the way for the exploitation of biometric systems all over the world. 
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1. Introduction 
Biometrics plays an increasingly important role in authentication and identification systems. 
The process of biometric recognition allows the identification of individuals based on the 
physical or behavioral characteristics. Among the most common biometric features used are 
fingerprint, iris, face, voice, signature and hand. Hand based biometric systems exhibit 
many desirable characteristics when working with low resolution sensors (which are most 
appropriate for civil and commercial applications), including low cost sensors, acceptable 
indentification performance, robustness to environmental conditions and individual 
anomalies, and high speed identification algorithms. For higher security applications such 
as forensics, high resolution images are more suitable (Jain et al, 2001) (Konga et al, 2009). 
Most hand-based biometric schemes in the literature are based on measuring the hand 
silhoutte as a distinctive personal attribute for an authentication task. First it was 
accomplished using guiding pegs mounted on a flat surface of the imaging device (Sanchez-
Reillo et al, 2000) (Jain et al, 1999).  Although the guiding pegs provide consistent measuring 
positions, they cause some problems as well:  1) The pegs can deform the shape of a hand 
(Wong & Shi, 2002) and 2) The users must be well trained to cooperate with the system. 
Thus, peg-free hand geometry techniques were considered giving the hand some motion 
freedom (Bulatov et al, 2004). 
There are two main approaches for geometrical features extraction; those based on measure 
the finger lengths and widths at various positions, palm size, etc. and another based on 
represent the global hand shape (Öden et al, 2003) (Yörük et al, 2006). Both approaches use 
the finger tip points and the finger valley points as the landmarksfor image alignment. 
The palm texture can be also used as biometric trait for personal identification. It can be 
used both by itself (Han et al, 2003) (Ribarić  & Fratric, 2005) (Sun et al 2005) (Kong & Zhang, 
2004) (Badrinath & Gupta, 2009) or combined with hand shape (Ribaric et al, 2003) (Li et al, 
2006) (Kumar et al, 2006) (Kumar & Zhang, 2004) at score level or at representation level. 
Although fusion increases accuracy, it generally increases computation costs and template 
sizes and reduces user acceptance. 
Recently, perhaps due to hygiene consideration, contact-free hand biometric systems have 
been proposed. The two main issues to be dealt with in a contact-free system are hand 
segmentation and the projective distortions associated with the absence of the contact plane. 
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Previous research on contactless systems includes (Haeger, 2003), where once the centroid of a 
segmented hand was detected a number of concentric circles were drawn around the centroid 
passing through the fingers. Using these circles 124 different finger sizes were measured and 
used for biometric identification with limited results. (Hao et al, 2008) proposes a contactless 
biometric system based on a fusion of palm texture and palm vein pattern based on feature 
level and image level fusion. To realize the acquisition the user introduces the hand in a black 
box. Therefore illumination and background were controlled. The use of such black box can 
raise concerns or unwillingly scare the users and lower the user acceptance. Doi and 
Yamanaka (Doi et al, 2003) created a mesh of a hand image captured by an infrared CCD 
camera. The mesh was created using 20 to 30 feature points extracted from the principal 
creases of the fingers and palm. Root-mean-square (rms) deviation was used to measure the 
alignment distance between the meshes, which was was also sensitive to perspective 
distortion. In reference (Morales et al, 2008), the contactless hand geometry system able to 
obtain images in non controlled environments is investigated. The hand geometry based 
feature extraction methods show poor results due to projective distortion problems. Palmprint 
authentication based on contactless imaging was proposed in (Morales et al 2010). In this 
chapter was proposed a combined method based on two palm features approaches. The 
combination with an uncorrelated biometric as hand geometry was mentioned as future work.    
As result of the above experience, the aim of this chaper is get together all the previous 
experience and propose a contact-free biometric system based on the combination of hand 
geometry and palmprint using only low cost devices for medium security environments. 
The device uses infrared illumination and infrared camera to reduce some problems as 
changing lighting conditions or complex background containing surfaces and objects with 
skin-like colors.  To acquire the the palm texture information a second camera in the visible 
band is added. The visible image can then be segmented using the information from the 
infrared camera. We propose the use of Active Shape Models to correlate the hand 
contourns from the infrared and visible images.  The projective distortion problem is 
alleviated using a template guide on the video screen. The verification methodology 
includes 1000 hand images from a database acquired with the proposed device. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we will introduce the proposed 
bispectral contactless hand-based biometric device. Section III describes the geometry 
parameters and Section IV presents the palmprint approaches based on OLOF and MSIFT.  
Section V presents our experimental results we assess the proposed device. The chapter is 
closed with conclusions, acknowledgements and references. 
2. Acquisition device 
The acquisition device used consists of two inexpensive, standard web cams that obtain 
images of the hand at the same time. The so called infrared (IR) webcam acquires images in 
the infrared band (750 to 1000nm) and the so called visible (V) camera acquires images in 
the visible range (400 to 700nm).  
The IR webcam was created by simply taking out the webcam lens that eliminates the 
infrared radiation and adding a filter that eliminates the visible band. We used Kodak filter 
No 87 FS4-518 and No 87c FS4-519 with no transmittance below 750 nm. 
The images of the IR webcam were used for hand geometry. So, we increase the image 
contrat by setting the IR webcam specification as follows: maximum value of contrast and 
low values of brightness, gain and exposure time. An example of the image acquired can be 
seen in Figure 1. 
 




Fig. 1. Left, hand acquired with a standard webcam; right, hand acquired with the IR 
webcam. 
The infrared illumination is composed of a set of 24 GaAs infrared emitting diode (CQY 99) 
with a peak wavelength emission of 925 nm and a spectral bandwidth of 40 nm. The diodes 
were placed in an inverted U shape with the IR and V webcams in the middle (see Figure 2). 
The open part of the U shape will coincide with the wrists of the hand image. The focus of 
the IR webcam lens is adjusted manually the first time the webcam is used. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Bispectral hand based biometric system 
To alleviate the projective distortion of the hand image acquired we used a hand mask in the 
video screen of the computer: the user places his or her hand over the camera and adjusts 
the position and pose of the hand in order to overlap with the hand mask drawn on the 
device screen. When the hand and mask overlap more than 70%, the device automatically 
acquires both the IR and visible image. An example of this process can be seen in Figure 3. 
The mask used was the averaged hand silhouette from the GPDS hand database scaled to 
the webcam resolution and dilated with a 30 by 30 structuring element.  
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Fig. 3. Hand mask and hand overlapping. Valid stands for overlapping greater than 70%. 
The V webcam used for palm print biometries is located just 2 centimeters below the IR 
webcam. The settings of the V webcam are configurated by default. The lens focus is adjusted 
manually the first time it is used. The illumination consists of a set of 4 white LEDs emitting in 
the 400nm to 700nm band.  An example of images acquired can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Left: image acquired by the IR webcam, right: visible image of the hand palm. 
3. Geometrical hand biometries 
Due to the webcam setup and IR illumination, a reliable hand contour can be obtained 
binarizing the IR image with its Otsu’s threshold.  
To work out the tips and valleys between the fingers we convert the Cartesian coordinates 
of the contour to polar coordinates (radius and angle) considering the center of the image 
base as the coordinates origin. The peaks in the radius coordinate locate the provisional 
position of the finger tips and the minima of the radius indicate the valleys between fingers. 
Let  and ( ) ,1c i i Lϕ ≤ ≤  the radius and angle of the thi  hand contour pixel. The index jpi of 
the thi  radius peaks are obtained as: 
 ( ) ( ){ }max 100 100j j j jp c p c p pi peak if r i r i i i i∈ = − ≤ ≤ +  (1) 
With 1 2 5101 100p p pi i i L< < < < < −… . If the number of radius peaks obtained is greater than 5, we 
suppose than the hand detector has been fault and go to hand detection module waiting for 
a hand. As the hand is expected, 1pi  corresponds to the little finger tip. 
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The index jvi of the 
thj valley is worked out as:  
 ( ) ( ){ }1minj j j jv c v c p pi valley if r i r i i i i +∈ = ≤ ≤  (2) 
The exterior base of the index and little fingers are obtained as the nearest pixel of the 
exterior contour to the valley between the index and middle fingers and the valley between 
the index and little fingers, respectively, i.e.: 




∈ = ≤ ≤  (3) 




∈ = ≤ ≤  (4) 
Being ),( ⋅⋅d the Euclidean distance. We will call littlev ii =
1 , and indexv ii =




Fig. 5. Tips, valleys and exteriors of fingers localization 
The position of the tip of the finger is finely adjusted as follow. The lines that minimize the 
square error with each side finger contour are obtained as follows: 
1. Four equal spaced points are selected from the 35% to the 80% of each finger side. The 
35% is selected to avoid the presence of rings, and the 80% is selected to avoid the tip 
curvature of the finger tip. For the right side of the finger, the four points are calculated 
as 1 1( ) ( )j j j jp p vrfsi i i C k i
− −= − ∗ + , being { }( ) 0.35,0.50,0.65,0.80C k = , and for the left finger side are 
calculated as 1( ) ( ) ( )j j j jv p plfsi k i i C k i+= − ∗ + . 
2. The lines that minimize the square error with the selected point of each finger side are 
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being pinv the pseudoinverse. For the left side, the line jl
j
l bxmy +⋅=   is obtained as above 
using )(ki jrfs , Fig 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Finger contour line approximation jr
j




l bxmy +⋅=   




a bxmy +⋅=   being 2)( jljrja mmm += and 2)( jljrja bbb += , see Fig 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Finger axis caluculation. 
4. The tip of the finger is the point where the finger axis and the finger contour intersect, 
Fig 8. 
 { }1 1argmin ( ( ), ( ) , )j j j j jp c c a a v vii d x i y i y m x b i i i− += = ⋅ + ≤ ≤  (6) 
 
 
Fig. 8. In green initial tip localization; in red accurate tip localization. 
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The geometric features are obtained by measuring the widths of each finger. It is done as 
follows: The center base of each the finger ,j jfb fbx y is defined as the point where the finger 
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pc iyix as follows: 
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The perpendicular line to the finger axe is obtained in this point as 
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are obtained by measuring 100 widths of each finger from the 15% to 85% of the finger 
length. An example can be seen in figure 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Finger widths measured for the geometrical template 
  




1 ( (1)) ( (1))
1 ( (2)) ( (2))
( (3))1 ( (3))
( (4))1 ( (4))
j j
rfs rfs





x i y i
x i y ib
pinv
m y ix i
y ix i
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟





being pinv the pseudoinverse. For the left side, the line jl
j
l bxmy +⋅=   is obtained as above 
using )(ki jrfs , Fig 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Finger contour line approximation jr
j




l bxmy +⋅=   




a bxmy +⋅=   being 2)( jljrja mmm += and 2)( jljrja bbb += , see Fig 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Finger axis caluculation. 
4. The tip of the finger is the point where the finger axis and the finger contour intersect, 
Fig 8. 
 { }1 1argmin ( ( ), ( ) , )j j j j jp c c a a v vii d x i y i y m x b i i i− += = ⋅ + ≤ ≤  (6) 
 
 
Fig. 8. In green initial tip localization; in red accurate tip localization. 
 
BiSpectral Contactless Hand Based Biometric Identification Device 
 
273 
The geometric features are obtained by measuring the widths of each finger. It is done as 
follows: The center base of each the finger ,j jfb fbx y is defined as the point where the finger 





( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )





y i y iy x x i y i








We select 12 equal space points between j
fb
j




pc iyix as follows: 
 ( ( ) ) ( )j jj js c p fb fbx x i x C k x= − ∗ +  (8) 
 ( ) ( )j j j js a s ay k m x k b= ⋅ +  (9) 
with { }( ) 0.20,0.26,0.32, ,0.80,0.86C k = … . 
The perpendicular line to the finger axe is obtained in this point as 
 1 ( ( )) ( )j j j js s pa paj
a
y x x k y k m x b
m
−= − + = ⋅ +  (10) 
The nearest contour points this line 
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Being the width at this point ( ) ( ( ), ( ) , ( ), ( ) )jw c cr c cr c ccl cld k d x i y i x i y i= . The geometric features 
are obtained by measuring 100 widths of each finger from the 15% to 85% of the finger 
length. An example can be seen in figure 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Finger widths measured for the geometrical template 
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The width measures of the four fingers are concatenated resulting in a vector of 400 
components 1001,41),( ≤≤≤≤ kjkd jw . The maximum of the vector is normalized to 1 to 
reduce the projection distortion and its average substracted. In order to reduce the 
dimensionality of the vector, the DCT transform is applied and the geometrical hand 
template is obtained by selecting from the 2nd to the 50th coefficients of the DCT transform. 
As verifier we have used a Least Squares Support Vector Machine (LS-SVM). SVMs have 
been introduced within the context of statistical learning theory and structural risk 
minimization. Least Squares Support Vector Machines (LS-SVM) are reformulations to 
standard SVMs which lead to solving linear KKT systems. Robustness, sparseness, and 
weightings can be imposed to LS-SVMs where needed and a Bayesian framework with three 
levels of inference is then applied (Suykens et al, 2002). 
The meta-parameters of the LS-SVM model are the width of the Gaussian kernels  and the 
regularization factor γ . The regularization factor is taken as 20=γ and is identical for all 
the LS-SVM models used here. The Gaussian widthσ parameter is optimized as follows: the 
training sequence is randomly partitioned into two equal subsets 21, ≤≤ iPi . The LS-SVM 
is trained 30=L times with the first subset 1P , 20=γ and Gaussian width equal to L  
logarithmically equally spaced values between 110 and 410 Lll ≤≤1,σ . Each one of the L  
LS-SVM models is tested with the second subset 2P obtaining L  Equal Error Rate 
LlEERl ≤≤1,  measures and their associated thresholds LlTEERl ≤≤1, . As the positive 
samples are trained with target output +1 and the negative samples with target value -1, the 
threshold is limited to values between 11 ≤≤− lTEER . The Gaussian width σ  of the 
signature model and its decision threshold TEER are obtained as 
jσσ = and 
18.0)1( −⋅+= jTEERTEER , where  { }lLl EERj ≤≤= 1minarg . Finally, the user hand model is 
obtained training the LS-SVM with all the training sequence. 
To verify that an input image belongs to the claimed used, we calculated the score of the LS-
SVM that models the claimed user. If the score is greater than the claimed user TEER , it is 
accepted as genuine. 
4. Palm print subsystem 
4.1 Hand segmentation 
To extract the palm texture we use the visible image of the hand. The major problem in the 
visible image is the hand segmentation to obtain an invariable area of the hand palm. As the 
relation between the pixels of both images is variable depending of the distance from the 
camera to the hand, the contour obtained by the IR image is taken as initial guess of the 
hand contour in the visible image and the orientation, scale, position, and shape of the IR 
contour is adjusted to the visible image using an Active Shape Model (ASM) (Cootes et al, 
1995). 
ASMs are flexible models of image structures whose shape can vary. The models are able to 
capture the natural variability within a class of shapes, in this case hands, and can then be 
used for image segmentation (in addition to other applications). The ASM model was 
constructed from a dataset of 500 hand contours from the first 50 users of the GPDShand 
database (Ferrer et al, 2007).  
For the point distribution models of the contours, we selected as landmark points the valley 
of the fingers. Between each pair of consecutive landmark points we selected 70 additional 
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points. In the trained model 96% of the variance could be explained by the first 9 
eigenvectors or modes of variation. 
Trained the ASM model, to segment the hand in the visible image, the landmarks and point 
between landmarks are obtained over the contour of the acquired hand in the IR image and 
they are displaced, rotated and distorted inside the ASM limits looking for edges in the 
visible image.The edges of the visible images were obtained summing the morphological 
gradient of the red, green and blue images. Figure 10 shows the results at the initial and 
final stages of the algorithm. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Visible image, dotted line: initial contour, solid line: final contour.. 
4.2 Palmprint texture parameterization 
The Orthogonal Line Ordinal Features (OLOF) method was originally introduced in (Sun et 
al, 2005) and was investigated for the palmprint feature extraction. The comparison of OLOF 
method with several other competing methods (Kong & Zhang, 2004) in this reference 
suggests the superiority of OLOF with such competitive feature extraction methods. The 
OLOF presented significantly improvement results but on conventional databases that are 
acquired from constrained imaging.  
This method is based on 2D Gaussian filter to obtain the weighted average intensity of a 
































θθθ  (13) 
where θ denotes the orientation of 2D Gaussian filter, xδ  denotes the filter’s horizontal scale 
and δy denotes the filter’s vertical scale parameter. There no signicicant differences on 
results in the range xδ , ]105.0[ −∈yδ . We empirically selected the parameters as xδ  = 5 and 
yδ  = 1. 
To obtain the orthogonal filter, two Gaussian filters are used as follows: 
 )
2
,,(),,()( πθθθ +−= yxfyxfOF  (14) 
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Each palm image is filtered using three ordinal filters, )(θOF , )6(πOF and )3(πOF to 
obtain three binary masks based on a zero binarization threshold. In order to ensure the 
robustness against brightness, the discrete filters )(θOF , are turned to have zero average. 
Once filtered the central portion for images is cropped and binarized giving a value of 1 to 
25% of the highest gray level pixels and the rest reset to 0 values. Finally, the three images 




Fig. 11. Invariant area of the hand palm and the OLOF features overlapped to the palm 
To verify that an input texture Q belongs to the identity with image texture (template) P we 
























j  (15) 
where the boolean operator ⊗  is equal to zero if and only if the two bits ),( jiP and ),( jiQ  
are equals. It is noted that D  is between 0 and 1 (best matching). Because of the imperfect 
preprocessing, we need to vertically and horizontally translate one of the features a range of 
4 to 4 and match again. The maximum D  value obtained is considered to be the final 
matching score. If the matching score is greater than a threshold, the hand is accepted. 
4.3 Palmprint MSIFT parameterization 
The Scale Invariant Feature Transform was originally proposed in (Lowe, 2004). The 
features extracted are invariant to image scaling, rotation, and partially invariant to change 
in illumination and projective distortion. The SIFT is a feature extraction method based on 
the extraction of local information. The figure 12 resume the major stages to generate the set 
of features proposed by Lowe and our proposal to adapt it to palmprint contactless 
biometric systems called MSIFT. 
 




Fig. 12. On the Left the Lowe (Lowe, 2004) SIFT approach; on the right the contactless 
palmprint MSIFT approach proposed on this chapter. 
The SIFT algorithm is based on detecting keypoints with similar propierties that are present 
in the reference and questioned image. In palmprint images acquired contactless from hand 
on movement with CMOS sensors of low quality, the images include blurring and several 
above mentioned distortion that reduce the ability of the SIFT algorithm to detect common 
keypoints. To alleviate such a problem we propose a preprocessing that highlight the 
interesting keypoints.  The algorithm that preprocesses the image previous the application 
of the SIFT algorithm is called by us Modified SIFT (MSIFT) and consist of 6 steps: 
Step 1. Preprocessing: In this chapter we propose a Gabor preprocessing to add robustness 
to SIFT approach. Assuming that the reference and questioned hand have similar 
orientation inside the image which is achieve during the segmentation stage. The 















−=  (16) 
where u  is the frequency of the sinusoidal wave, θ  defines the orientation 
selectivity of the function, and ϕ  is the standard deviation of the Gaussian 
envelope. In this chapter we used a Gabor filter setting with 0=θ , 0.2=ϕ and 
1.0=u . Greater robustness against brightness variation is assured by turning the 
discrete Gabor filter to average zero. 
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ϕθϕθ  (17) 
Step 2. Scale-space extrema detection: It is applied over all scales and image locations. It is 
based on difference-of-Gaussian function to identify potential interest points that 
are invariant to scale and orientation. The input data is transformed to the space 
),,( σyxL  as follows: 
 ),(),,(),,( ' yxIyxgyxL ∗= σσ  (18) 
where ∗  corresponds to convolution operator, ),(' yxI is the preprocessed input 
image and ),,( σyxg  is a Gaussian function with bandwidth σ . The difference-of-
Gaussian function is defined as: 
 ),,(),,(),()),,(),,((),,( ' σσσσσ yxLkyxLyxIyxgkyxgyxD −=∗−=  (19) 
Step 3. Keypoint localization: A detailed model is fit to determine location and scale of 
each candidate location. The interpolation is done using the quadratic Taylor 
expansion of the Difference-of-Gaussian scale-space function ),,( σyxD  with the 
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where the maxima and minima of D  and its derivatives are evaluated at the 
candidate keypoint and  ),,( σyxx = is the offset from this point, Fig 13. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Invariant area of the hand palm and the MSIFT features overlapped to the palm 
Step 4. Orientation assignment: In our experiments we had used 16 orientations for each 
keypoint location based on local image gradient directions. For an image sample 
),( yxL at scale σ, the gradient magnitude, ),( yxm , and orientation, ),( yxθ , are 
processed using pixel differences 
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Keypoint descriptor: Around each keypoint, the local gradients are measured at 
the selected scale to obtain a descriptors vector { }Miid 1= with M  keypoints. Once the 
keypoints are extracted, the query image is matched and compared with each of 
the features extracted with the corresponding images in the registration database 
(from the training feature sets).  The verifier evaluates the number of matches 
between a questioned and the training images. Let { }Mitid 1=  and { }Ljqid 1= be the set of 
training and questioned keypoint descriptors respectively. The distance between 
keypoint descriptors is calculated from: 
 2),( qj
t
id ddjiD −=  (23) 
Where ⋅  is the Euclidean norm. We define a match between a training tid and a 
questioned qid keypoint when: 
 { }Lndd niDjiD 1),(min),(5.1 =<  (24) 
with n j≠ . The threshold is estimated heuristically during the training stage and it 
is not particularly sensitive to values in the range of 1.2 to 1.7.  
Matches Validation: matches validation is common on fingerprint and other 
biometric feature approaches. In this chapter we propose a validation based on 
coordinates distance between keypoints to improve the SIFT performance on 
contactless palmprint biometrics. The hypothesis is that the coordinates from two 
keypoints matched must be similar if we correct the average displacement from all 
the matches. Let { }Mitititi yxc 1, == and { }Liqiqiqj yxc 1, == be the set of training and 
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where ⋅  is the Euclidean norm. We define a match between a training tic and a 












25.1),(  (26) 
Due to high pose variance in contactless imaging we used a 1.5 weight factor to 
allow small alignment errors between palms. 
The maximum number of matches between the questioned and the training set is 
the similarity score. If the similarity score is grater than a threshold, the questioned 
image is autheticated. 
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Due to high pose variance in contactless imaging we used a 1.5 weight factor to 
allow small alignment errors between palms. 
The maximum number of matches between the questioned and the training set is 
the similarity score. If the similarity score is grater than a threshold, the questioned 
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5. Scores combination 
Combining scores obtained from different procedures is a usual way of improving the 
performance of a biometric scheme. In this section we propose a method to combine the scores 
obtained from Geometry, MSIFT and OLOF. Figure 14 shows the distribution of genuine and 
imposter matching scores from the three feature extraction approaches. We can ascertain that 
the matching scores from the both features are widely separated. The distribution of matching 
scores also suggests that the matching scores from the two matchers are likely to be 




















Fig. 14. Scores distributions for genuines (blue) and impostors (red) obtained for geometry, 
OLOF and MIFT. 
Previous to combinate scores, we normalize the LSVM scores  and OLOF scores based on 
max/min approach (Jain et al, 2005). The scores coming from the Hamming distance are not 
normalized. Now, it is possible to combine them at score level fusion based on a linear score 
combination functions as: 
 palmgeomcomb swwss )1( −+=  (27) 
Where geoms , and 2)( MSIFTOLOFpalm sss +=  are the scores obtained with the image 
acquired in the visible and IR band respectively, w  is the weighting factor and combs  is the 
combined score which will be used for verify the input identity. 
The value of w  is obtained as follows. Let )(isggeom and )(is
g
palm , gNi ≤≤1 the scores of the 
genuine training samples in the visible and IR band respectively. A genuine score is 
obtained using two features vectors from the same user. Let )(is fgeom  and )(is
f
palm , fNi ≤≤1  
the scores of the impostor training samples of in the visible and IR band respectively. An 
impostore score is obtained using features vectors from two different users (user x try to 
spoof the identity of user y ). A distance measure between the distribution of genuine and 
impostor scores is obtained in visible band as follows: 
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1 ))(( −Σ=Σ =  and 
2
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fNf f f
geom geom geom fi s i m N=Σ = Σ −  the covariance matrixes.  
The distance between genuine and forgeries for the palm scores palmΔ  is obtained in the 
same way. The weighting factor is obtained as: )( geompalmpalmw Δ+ΔΔ= . 
6. Experiments and analysis 
The database acquired with the proposed device consists of 1000 images captured in one 
session of 100 users. The image was acquired automatically in a supervised experiment. 
Each experiment was performed as follows. We randomly selected four hands from each 
user to train and left the remaining hands for testing. Table 1 list the average EER rates after 







Table 1. Averaged EER Obtained by the Hand Biometric System 
 















Fig. 15. DET curves of the proposed device. Dotted line: DET curve of geometrical device. 
Dash Dotted line: DET curve of OLOF features. Discontinuous line: DET curve of MSIFT 
features. Continuous line: DET curve of the combined scheme (OLOF+SIFT-Geometry). 
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The results show how MSIFT outperform OLOF and Geometry approaches. Geometry 
approach show better performance than OLOF. The fusion of all biometrics improves the 
performance with 0% of EER with our database.The DETs curves can be seen at Fig 15. 
6.1 Computational time comparison 
An analysis of the computational load of the biometric device is considered. Table 2 
provides the executions times using a Dual Core processor at 1.66GHz programmed in the 
Matlab language for obtaining the geometric and palm texture parameters, the verification 
time, and (for the case of the analyzed scheme) the time that the ASM model toke to 
segment the hand in the visible image. Working with just the geometry, the analyzed 
devices answer in less than 1 second, which is appropriate for real time applications. In the 
case of IR plus visible images it takes less than 3 seconds, which should be speed up for real 
time applications. 
 
Features Run Time 
Geometry 0.52 sec. 
ASM  2.11 sec. 
OLOF 0.07 sec. 
MSIFT 1.51 sec. 
Verification      0.38 sec. 
Table 2. Time Consuming for Parameter Extraction and verification 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter has proposed a bispectral hand biometric system which acquires hand images 
in visible and IR band. The acquisition devices are two webcams, one per band, and the 
hand aquisition is contactless.The database used was built in an operational environment 
with a supervised enrollment. 
The infrared images were used for geometric measures and the visible image for palmprint 
parameterization. An Active Shape Model was used to segment the hand in the visible 
image and a Least Square Support Vector Machine performed verification. An equal error 
rate of 0% was obtained combining biometries at score level. 
Table 3 presents a summary of the most promising related work on contactless hand 
authentication. 
 
Reference Methodology Database Subjects EER(%) 
(Kumar 2008) Cohort Information IITD (public) 235 1.31% 
(Hao et al, 2008) Multispectral Palmprint Proprietary 165 0.5% 
This Chapter Geometry, Texture Proprietary 100 0.0% 
Table 3. Releated work on contactlesshand authentication  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Fuel cells related 
Over the past few decades, there has been a growing interest in the fuel cell system of power 
generation and micro-mixers because it has been widely applied in mobile and microfluidic 
systems, respectively. Regarding the fuel cell systens, Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel 
Cells (PEMFC) seem to be one of the better solutions for a vehicular power source in the 
future due to their high power density, solid electrolytes, low corrosion and low-
temperature operation. However, some issues are still of concern, in particular the cost, the 
size, the weight and the complexity of peripheral devices (Marsala et al., 2009). Bipolar 
plates are one of the most important and expensive components of PEM fuel cells. This is 
because they account for more than 60% of the total weight and 30% of the total cost of the 
system. Therefore, improving or addressing a novel flow slab design seems to be workable 
for improving these issues with respect to weight, volume and cost. 
From past studies, it is known that the uniformity of oxygen distribution in cathode 
channels significantly affects the performance of PEM fuel cells. Different types of flow- 
fields have been addressed and studied to improve power performance (Mei et al., 2006; 
Weng et al., 2005; Yan et al., 2008). Results show that increasing the fuel rate (Mei et al., 
2006) and higher flow field uniformity (Weng et al., 2005; Yan et al., 2008) are useful to the 
performance of fuel cells. In addition, pressure drop would be one of the important  factors 
for flow-field design because it can simultaneously cause an excess of motor power 
dissipation (Yan et al., 2007). In other aspects, the aspect ratio of the channel would also 
simultaneously affect the pressure drop and even the cell performance (Perng et al., 2009). 
Also of importance, the new flow slab designs originating from bionic features, addressed 
by Kloess et al., (2009) and Wang et al., (2009), are of significance to fuel cells but have rarely 
been noted. A biophysical flow slab design, created to mimic features of vascular flow 
networks, was employed by Wang et al., (2009) due to its excellent performance in the 
uniformity of flow distribution and lower pressure drop. Latterly, two new types of 
biometric flow slab, namely BFF1 and BFF2, originating from the prototype type were 
addressed by Wang et al., (2009) and confirmed by the performance of the cells (Wang et al., 
2010). 
Furthermore, it has been also extended to the study of microbial fuel cells to enable the 
improvement of power performance, ( Chen, 2010), because of the desire for clean energy. 
The development of processes by which to generate biofuels and bioenergy have been of 
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1.1 Fuel cells related 
Over the past few decades, there has been a growing interest in the fuel cell system of power 
generation and micro-mixers because it has been widely applied in mobile and microfluidic 
systems, respectively. Regarding the fuel cell systens, Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel 
Cells (PEMFC) seem to be one of the better solutions for a vehicular power source in the 
future due to their high power density, solid electrolytes, low corrosion and low-
temperature operation. However, some issues are still of concern, in particular the cost, the 
size, the weight and the complexity of peripheral devices (Marsala et al., 2009). Bipolar 
plates are one of the most important and expensive components of PEM fuel cells. This is 
because they account for more than 60% of the total weight and 30% of the total cost of the 
system. Therefore, improving or addressing a novel flow slab design seems to be workable 
for improving these issues with respect to weight, volume and cost. 
From past studies, it is known that the uniformity of oxygen distribution in cathode 
channels significantly affects the performance of PEM fuel cells. Different types of flow- 
fields have been addressed and studied to improve power performance (Mei et al., 2006; 
Weng et al., 2005; Yan et al., 2008). Results show that increasing the fuel rate (Mei et al., 
2006) and higher flow field uniformity (Weng et al., 2005; Yan et al., 2008) are useful to the 
performance of fuel cells. In addition, pressure drop would be one of the important  factors 
for flow-field design because it can simultaneously cause an excess of motor power 
dissipation (Yan et al., 2007). In other aspects, the aspect ratio of the channel would also 
simultaneously affect the pressure drop and even the cell performance (Perng et al., 2009). 
Also of importance, the new flow slab designs originating from bionic features, addressed 
by Kloess et al., (2009) and Wang et al., (2009), are of significance to fuel cells but have rarely 
been noted. A biophysical flow slab design, created to mimic features of vascular flow 
networks, was employed by Wang et al., (2009) due to its excellent performance in the 
uniformity of flow distribution and lower pressure drop. Latterly, two new types of 
biometric flow slab, namely BFF1 and BFF2, originating from the prototype type were 
addressed by Wang et al., (2009) and confirmed by the performance of the cells (Wang et al., 
2010). 
Furthermore, it has been also extended to the study of microbial fuel cells to enable the 
improvement of power performance, ( Chen, 2010), because of the desire for clean energy. 
The development of processes by which to generate biofuels and bioenergy have been of 
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special interest of late. Among these, microbial fuel cells have received increased attention. 
This process, which collects the electricity generated by microbes when they metabolize 
substrates, is considered to be one of the most efficient energy sources because no burning is 
required to produce energy (Watanabe, 2008). Also, the only raw materials needed to power 
fuel cells are simple organic compounds or even waste materials from other reactions 
(Watanabe, 2008; Lovely, 2008). There are still many obstacles that need to be overcome 
before this technology can be put to use. Currently the voltage and amperage generated by 
microbial fuel cells is so low that they have no useful applications (Watanabe, 2008; Lovely, 
2008). In order to develop solutions to these problems, research is being done to engineer 
more efficient hardware for fuel cells in addition to understanding how different microbes 
interact with the anodes/cathodes when transporting electrons (Lovely, 2008; Bergel et al., 
2008). As for the flow slab design of MFCs, there is an absence of sufficient discussion and 
research regarding the design of the flow channel and flow field (Hameler et al., 2006; Logan 
et al., 2004), and even less discussion as to why and how they could be applied to MFCs. 
However, a biometric flow channel applied to rumen microbial fuel cells (RMFCs) was first 
addressed by Chen ( 2010). 
1.2 Passive micro-mixer related 
A biometric concept could also be applied to the design of a passive micro-mixer because it 
is simple to operate and provides an excellent mixing performance under the condition of 
lower pressure (Wang et al., 2009). Recently, microfluidics have received a lot of attention in 
the development of automated miniaturized analytical devices in (bio)analytical chemistry. 
Microfluidics deals with microscale, physical phenomena of fluid and particle flows in 
microchannels that connect various functional sites on a miniaturized analytical device. 
Among the various functionalities, rapid mixing is crucial because biological analyses, like 
enzyme reactions, protein folding, and cell activation, require a rapid reaction process that 
can be controlled by the mixing of reactants. Unfortunately, mixing at a microscale mainly 
depends on molecular diffusion, resulting in an extremely slow process and long 
microchannel for complete mixing. This is because almost all microchannel flows are 
laminary, and the Reynolds number is so slow that turbulent mixing is hard to be achieved 
(Song et al., 2006). 
As for micro-mixers, application fields of microchannel-based mixers encompass both 
modern, especialised issues such as sample preparation for chemical analysis in addition to 
the traditional, widespread usable mixing tasks, such as reaction, gas absorption, 
emulsification, foaming and blending (Bayer et al., 2003; Ehrfeld et al., 2000; Hessel et al., 
2004; Jensen, 1998; Lowe et al., 2000). Moreover, they are suitable for integration with other 
devices. 
Many passive micro-mixers have been developed in order to enhance and control mixing in 
a microchannel ( Nquyen and Wu, 2005). A passive mixer uses special geometries 
embedded in a microchannel, such as grooves, rivets or posts, to increase the vorticity and, 
subsequently, to cause a chaotic advection ( Johnes and Aref, 1998). Another type of passive 
mixer is the lamination mixer, which decreases the diffusion length and increases the 
contact area of fluids by splitting incoming streams into multiple substreams, and then 
laminating them into one stream again (Kamholz and Yager, 2002). 
Concerning the most traditional passive micro-mixers, they have been constructed with 
straight fluid channels and designed with a combination of fillisters and/or fold paths to 
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enhance the mixing effect (Wong et al., 2003). However, the design of a straight channel 
requires a longer length to achieve the goal of uniform mixing. Hence, it is always 
associated with the problems of mixer size and full-field inspection. In addition, fluid 
mixing at the microscopic scale is far more difficult than that in macroscopic fluid devices. 
In a typical microfluidic device, viscosity dominates the flow and the fluid streams prefer to 
adopt laminar flow patterns. Thus, fluid mixing that depends primarily on molecular 
diffusion is very slow. To achieve optimal mixing, an efficient passive micro-mixer usually 
involves complex 3-dimensional geometries, which are utilized to enhance the fluid 
lamination, stretching and folding. As mentioned above, mixing in the passive micro-mixer 
occurs with the diffusion of molecules in the microsystem and the process is very slow. 
Therefore, the complex geometry, or long microchannel, should be utilized for efficient 
mixing, but would cause a large pressure drop and difficulties in the design and fabrication 
process. In order to overcome this, a biophysical micro-mixer that originates from the 
biometric concept with a higher flow uniformity and lower pressure drop would be utilized 
by Wang et al., (2009) to provide better flow mixing within a limited device. 
2. Biometric concept applied to fuel cells 
2.1 Fuel cell bionic flow slab design (Wang et al., 2009) 
Fuel cells possessing high potency and low pollution are well-known and considered the 
new generation of power technology. However, fuel cell performance and efficiency must be 
improved. The cost, reliability, and safety issues must be considered in the realization of 
commercial fuel cells. To enhance fuel cell performance and reliability, it is necessary to 
learn more about the mechanisms that cause performance losses. These include non-uniform 
concentrations, current density distributions, high ionic resistance due to dry membranes, 
and high diffusive resistance due to cathode flooding. The flow field and water/thermal 
management fuel cells require optimal designs to achieve high performance and reliability. 
Flow-field plate design is one of the most significant factors that affects fuel cell efficiency. 
This work presents a novel bionic concept flow slab design, which is shown in Figure 1, to 
improve fuel cell performance and compare it with other known flow slabs. 
The variations in velocity and pressure drop uniformity are influenced by the wall effect 
and alter fuel cell performance. An index of the aspect ratio defined as AR=D/L was 
employed for 3D simulations at Re=10 and 100. Here, D is the flow channel depth and L is 
the flow channel width. Although flow field plate design is one of the most significant 
factors in fuel cell efficiency, the simultaneous effect of velocity uniformity and pressure 
drop on the performance of the system has rarely been examined. In this work, an 
index χ was used to quantitatively address the coupling effect between the velocity 





SDχ −= +  (1) 
where SD and PD indicate the standard deviation and pressure drop, respectively. The 
subscript p denotes that it is the value for parallel flow design, which is used as the basis 
when taking the ratio of the standard deviation and pressure drop. Therefore, when the 
value of χ is larger, fuel cell performance is better. 
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special interest of late. Among these, microbial fuel cells have received increased attention. 
This process, which collects the electricity generated by microbes when they metabolize 
substrates, is considered to be one of the most efficient energy sources because no burning is 
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microchannel for complete mixing. This is because almost all microchannel flows are 
laminary, and the Reynolds number is so slow that turbulent mixing is hard to be achieved 
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enhance the mixing effect (Wong et al., 2003). However, the design of a straight channel 
requires a longer length to achieve the goal of uniform mixing. Hence, it is always 
associated with the problems of mixer size and full-field inspection. In addition, fluid 
mixing at the microscopic scale is far more difficult than that in macroscopic fluid devices. 
In a typical microfluidic device, viscosity dominates the flow and the fluid streams prefer to 
adopt laminar flow patterns. Thus, fluid mixing that depends primarily on molecular 
diffusion is very slow. To achieve optimal mixing, an efficient passive micro-mixer usually 
involves complex 3-dimensional geometries, which are utilized to enhance the fluid 
lamination, stretching and folding. As mentioned above, mixing in the passive micro-mixer 
occurs with the diffusion of molecules in the microsystem and the process is very slow. 
Therefore, the complex geometry, or long microchannel, should be utilized for efficient 
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process. In order to overcome this, a biophysical micro-mixer that originates from the 
biometric concept with a higher flow uniformity and lower pressure drop would be utilized 
by Wang et al., (2009) to provide better flow mixing within a limited device. 
2. Biometric concept applied to fuel cells 
2.1 Fuel cell bionic flow slab design (Wang et al., 2009) 
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commercial fuel cells. To enhance fuel cell performance and reliability, it is necessary to 
learn more about the mechanisms that cause performance losses. These include non-uniform 
concentrations, current density distributions, high ionic resistance due to dry membranes, 
and high diffusive resistance due to cathode flooding. The flow field and water/thermal 
management fuel cells require optimal designs to achieve high performance and reliability. 
Flow-field plate design is one of the most significant factors that affects fuel cell efficiency. 
This work presents a novel bionic concept flow slab design, which is shown in Figure 1, to 
improve fuel cell performance and compare it with other known flow slabs. 
The variations in velocity and pressure drop uniformity are influenced by the wall effect 
and alter fuel cell performance. An index of the aspect ratio defined as AR=D/L was 
employed for 3D simulations at Re=10 and 100. Here, D is the flow channel depth and L is 
the flow channel width. Although flow field plate design is one of the most significant 
factors in fuel cell efficiency, the simultaneous effect of velocity uniformity and pressure 
drop on the performance of the system has rarely been examined. In this work, an 
index χ was used to quantitatively address the coupling effect between the velocity 





SDχ −= +  (1) 
where SD and PD indicate the standard deviation and pressure drop, respectively. The 
subscript p denotes that it is the value for parallel flow design, which is used as the basis 
when taking the ratio of the standard deviation and pressure drop. Therefore, when the 
value of χ is larger, fuel cell performance is better. 
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Numerical results obtained show that this novel biometric flow slab design will exhibit a 
better performance than traditional flow slabs, regardless of Reynolds numbers and aspect 
ratios, as it possesses a more uniform velocity and a lower pressure drop. Furthermore, the 
performance in the biometric flow slab’s reaction area was determined to be superior 
(shown in Tables 1 and 2). Hence, increasing the bionic flow slab performance is worth 
investigation in order to obtain an optimal design, and the required numbers of inlet and 
outlet channels need to be studied. Different inlet and outlet numbers influence the velocity 
distribution and pressure drop variations, resulting in an integral performance. Two inlet 
channels and three outlet channels are suggested for the optimal bionic flow slab design. 
These findings show that the bionic concept and flow slab design addressed in this paper 
will be useful in enhancing fuel cell performance (Wang et al., 2009). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Prototype of Biometric Flow Slab (unit: mm). Source: Wang et al., (2009) 
 
 Parallel Bionic Net Serpentine 
χ  0.5 0.479 0.325 0.027 
ARea 0.001438 0.001324 0.001 0.001512 
Re aA
χ  347.7 361.78 325 17.857 
Table 1. Performance Index Versus Four Kinds of Flow Slabs at Re=10. Source: Wang et al., 
(2009)  
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  Parallel Bionic Net Serpentine 
χ  0.5 0.535 0.372 0.046 
ARea 0.001438 0.001324 0.001 0.001512 
Re aA
χ   347.7 404.08 372 30.423 
Table 2. Performance Index Versus Four Kinds of Flow Slabs at Re=100. Source: Wang et al., 
(2009)  
2.2 Biometric flow slab applied to PEMFC (Wang et al., 2010) 
As for the bipolar plates, they are one of the most important and expensive components of 
PEM fuel cells because they account for more than 60% of the total weight and 30% of the 
total cost of the system. Therefore, improving or addressing a novel flow slab design seems 
to be workable to improve these issues with respect to the weight, volume and cost. In this 
work, two kinds of novel biophysical flow slabs, namely BFF1 and BFF2, originating from 
the prototype of the biophysical flow slab shown in Figure 1, and due to their possession of 
a lower pressure drop and excellent flow uniformity, (Wang et al., 2009) shown in Figures 2 
and 3,would be utilized in PEMFCs (Wang et al., 2010). They would then be compared with 
the two convectional flow slabs, the serpentine and parallel, which would be used for the 
investigation of cell performance. 
The I–V cell polarization curves and I–W cell power density curves of the parallel, 
serpentine and two new biometric flow slabs were the first investigated and are shown in 
Figure 4. The results in Figure 4 show that serpentine and two biometric flow slabs (BFF1 
and BFF2 ) have the appearance of a better performance than that of the parallel flow slab. 
The limited current densities at Vcell＝0.27 for the serpentine, BFF1, and BFF2 compared 
with the parallel flow slab are increased by the amount of 58.19%, 58.48%, and 57.13%, 
respectively. When the operating voltage is lower than 0.57V, the performance of the 
parallel flow field seems to increase much more slowly than other flow slabs. This is because 
of its strong dependence on the distribution of the oxygen mass flow rate at the cathode 
GDL–CL interface, and a high oxygen mass flow rate will cause more oxygen to enter the 
CL for the electrochemical reaction. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution and relation between the oxygen and liquid water at the 
three segments C-C1, C2-C3 and C4-C5 for BFF1. As the oxygen mass flow rate increases, 
the amount of liquid water from inlet to outlet decreases. The amounts of oxygen at the 
cross-section C-C1 and C4-C5 are less than C2-C3, resulting in lower current densities. Some 
baffles could be used and applied to promote the mass transport of C-C1 and C4-C5 in 
future studies (Perng et al., 2009). 
Figure 6 indicates clearly that the BFF1 flow slab will produce a higher uniform distribution 
of current densities at the section of C-C1, C2-C3 and C4-C5. Hence, a higher performance 
for BFF1 would be expected because a higher uniform distribution of current density is one 
of the important factors for promoting the cell performance. Generally speaking, the lower 
the pressure loss is, the higher the net performance of the cell will be (Perng et al., 2009). To 
design a flow slab with a lower pressure drop, new flow slabs, named BFF1 and BFF2 
respectively, were designed by the biophysical conception in this study.  
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the prototype of the biophysical flow slab shown in Figure 1, and due to their possession of 
a lower pressure drop and excellent flow uniformity, (Wang et al., 2009) shown in Figures 2 
and 3,would be utilized in PEMFCs (Wang et al., 2010). They would then be compared with 
the two convectional flow slabs, the serpentine and parallel, which would be used for the 
investigation of cell performance. 
The I–V cell polarization curves and I–W cell power density curves of the parallel, 
serpentine and two new biometric flow slabs were the first investigated and are shown in 
Figure 4. The results in Figure 4 show that serpentine and two biometric flow slabs (BFF1 
and BFF2 ) have the appearance of a better performance than that of the parallel flow slab. 
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with the parallel flow slab are increased by the amount of 58.19%, 58.48%, and 57.13%, 
respectively. When the operating voltage is lower than 0.57V, the performance of the 
parallel flow field seems to increase much more slowly than other flow slabs. This is because 
of its strong dependence on the distribution of the oxygen mass flow rate at the cathode 
GDL–CL interface, and a high oxygen mass flow rate will cause more oxygen to enter the 
CL for the electrochemical reaction. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution and relation between the oxygen and liquid water at the 
three segments C-C1, C2-C3 and C4-C5 for BFF1. As the oxygen mass flow rate increases, 
the amount of liquid water from inlet to outlet decreases. The amounts of oxygen at the 
cross-section C-C1 and C4-C5 are less than C2-C3, resulting in lower current densities. Some 
baffles could be used and applied to promote the mass transport of C-C1 and C4-C5 in 
future studies (Perng et al., 2009). 
Figure 6 indicates clearly that the BFF1 flow slab will produce a higher uniform distribution 
of current densities at the section of C-C1, C2-C3 and C4-C5. Hence, a higher performance 
for BFF1 would be expected because a higher uniform distribution of current density is one 
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the pressure loss is, the higher the net performance of the cell will be (Perng et al., 2009). To 
design a flow slab with a lower pressure drop, new flow slabs, named BFF1 and BFF2 
respectively, were designed by the biophysical conception in this study.  
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Figure 7 displays the distribution and relation between oxygen and liquid water at the cross-
sections of D-D1, D2-D3, D4-D5 and D6-D7 for BFF2. The trend of oxygen and liquid water 
distribution of D-D1, D2-D3, D4-D5 referred to are similar to C-C1, C2-C3 and C4-C5 of 
BFF1. The average oxygen distribution at the section of D6-D7, resulting from the shear 
stress, would be found to be the highest. Figure 8 shows that BFF2 would possess a better 
uniformity of flow distribution than BFF1. In addition, the shear stress would push more 
oxygen into CL for an electrochemical reaction, thus a greater current at the cross-section of 
D6-D7 could then be produced. 
In this study, a pressure drop loss with respect to power density ( Perng et al., 2009 ), 






=  (2) 
In this equation, pW represents the cathode pressure drop loss, PΔ  is the total cathode 
pressure drop of the fuel cell, Acha is the cross-sectional inlet flow area of cathode, V is the 
fuel velocity at the inlet of cathode, and Atotal is the reaction area. The pressure drop losses of 
the cathode and output power of the cell, with respect to a parallel, serpentine, BFF1 and 
BFF2 flow slab, would be calculated and listed in Table 3. Due to a high pressure drop in 
channels, the Wnet of serpentine is lower than that of the BFF2 in spite of the fact that the 
Wcell of serpentine is higher than that of BFF2. In addition, the pressure drop of BFF2 is 
lower than that of BFF1. Hence, the net power of the four kinds of flow slab would be 
obtained and shown in Table 3. It shows that the novel biometric flow slab of BFF1 and BFF2 
would have a better performance than that of the serpentine and parallel flow slabs (Wang 
et al., 2010). 
To sum up, the total pressure drop and the uniformity of flow distribution are two 
important factors for flow slab design because of their significant influence on the 
performance of the PEMFC. In this study, the two biometric flow slabs, BFF1 and BFF2, 
addressed in this study would have a better cell performance than the serpentine and 
parallel flow slabs because they possess a higher uniformity of flow distribution and a 
stronger ability to remove the liquid water. The novel biometric flow slab would have an 
enhanced cell power performance compared to the serpentine and parallel flow slabs. These 
findings, with respect to biometric flow slabs, would be useful to improve the PEMFC and 




Flow field type △P (Pa) Wcell (w/m2) Wp (w/m2) Wnet (w/m2) 
Parallel 248 3529 4.4 3524.6 
Serpentine 5137 5583 91 5492 
BFF1 2073 5593 37 5557 
BFF2   730 5546 13 5533 
Table 3. Estimation of Pressure Drop Losses at an Operating Voltage of 0.27V.  
Source: Wang et al., (2010)  
 






Fig. 2. Biophysical Flow Slab (BFF1). Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Biophysical Flow Slab (BFF2). Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
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Fig. 2. Biophysical Flow Slab (BFF1). Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Biophysical Flow Slab (BFF2). Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
 





Fig. 4. The I–Vcell and I–Wcell Curves for Types of Parallel, Serpentine, BFF1 and BFF2, 
respectively. 
Source: Wang et al. (2010) 
 
 
Fig. 5. Oxygen Mass Flow Rate (kgm-2s) and Liquid Water Distributions at the sections of C-
C1, C2-C3, C4-C5 Related to 0.7V for BFF1. 
Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
 




Fig. 6. Oxygen Mass Flow Rate (kgm-2 s) and Current Density Distributions (Am-2) at the 
Sections of C-C1, C2-C3, C4-C5 Related to 0.7V for BFF1.  
Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
 
 
Fig. 7. Oxygen Mass Flow Rate (kgm-2 s) and Liquid Water Distributions at the Sections of 
D-D1, D2-D3, D4-D5, D6-D7 Related to 0.7V for BFF2. 
Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
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Fig. 7. Oxygen Mass Flow Rate (kgm-2 s) and Liquid Water Distributions at the Sections of 
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Fig. 8. Oxygen Mass Flow Rate (kgm-2 s) and Liquid Water Distributions at the sections of D-
D1, D2-D3, D4-D5, D6-D7 Related to 0.7V for BFF2.  
Source: Wang et al., (2010) 
2.3 Biometric flow slab applied to Microbial Fuel Cells (MFCs) (Wang et al., 2011) 
In the academic studies of microbial fuel cells (MFCs), there is a significant absence of 
sufficient discussion and research regarding to the design of flowchannels and flow-fields 
(Hameler et al., 2006; Logan et al., 2004), and even less discussion as to why and how they 
could be applied to MFCs. However, the research of flow channels being applied in fuel 
cells have been proven to have a significant contribution to power performances (Wang et 
al., 2009; Sabir et al., 2005), especially with regards to fuel efficiency and power density 
(Sabir et al., 2005). A new biometric flow channel, shown in Figure 9 and applied in rumen 
microbial fuel cells (RMFCs), was first addressed by (Wang et al., 2011). Looking at Figure 
10 and Table 4, the obstacle groups of No.A and No.C have a higher flow mixing efficiency 
inside the chamber of RMFCs. The obstacles can cause flow to split and recombine to 
enhance flow mixing. Since the Reynolds number is higher in the case of No.C, the flow 
convection at the inlet entrance of RMFCs is more intensive than in the case of No.A and 
also has a higher flow mixing. In Case No.D, without obstacles, flow separation is created 
due to a high Reynolds number (Lashkov et al., 1992; Jadhav et al., 2009) and the Coanda 
effect.  
Therefore, proton exchange seems to be unevenly mixed because the main flow and the 
separation flow are almost without interaction. In addition, the electron and proton from the 
reactants will continue to be exhausted from the charged reaction of RMFCs, and finally 
creates a concentration loss in some regions of the chamber. Conversely, Case No.B does not 
experience that problem because of the lower Reynolds number, thus creating a smoother 
flow and more even reaction. Even though the flow obstacles do not exhibit noticeable 
benefits in the flow mixing, the effect on the flow field is overall beneficial to the electricity 
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system (Wang et al., 2009). This creates a better interaction on the surfaces of electrodes and 
proton exchange membranes, thus avoiding concentration loss and proving more efficient 
than flow fields that are uneven. In this study rumen microbes and plant fibers that acted as 
substrates were utilized in single chambers in the cases of both using obstacles and different 
Reynolds numbers respectively to investigate the power performance of RMFCs. The RMFC 
system with a biometric flow channel (with obstacles), and at a higher Reynolds number 
(Re= 496.18), will produce a higher power performance with a voltage potential and power 
density of 0.716 V and 0.022mW/m2 respectively. This is much better than in the cases 
without obstacles showing a positive effect of a biometric flow channel on the power 
performance of RMFCs.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Geometrical Dimensions of a Biometric Flow Channel for RMFCs. Source: Wang et al., 
2011  
 
MFCs Re No. 
Flow mixing efficiency at analyzed positions (%) 
a b c d e 
No.A 
19.85 
99.6 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.8 
No.B 99.0 99.3 99.0 99.3 99.4 
No.C 
496.18 
99.8 99.8 99.9 99.7 99.9 
No.D 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 4. Flow Mixing Efficiency Versus Different Flow Conditions and Cross-sections 
analyzed. 
Source: Wang et al., 2011 
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496.18 
99.8 99.8 99.9 99.7 99.9 
No.D 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 4. Flow Mixing Efficiency Versus Different Flow Conditions and Cross-sections 
analyzed. 
Source: Wang et al., 2011 
 










Fig. 10. 3D Flow Velocity Images Versus Different Flow Conditions and Cross-sections 
Analyzed (shown in Table 4). 
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3. Biophysical micro-mixer (Wang et al., 2009) 
In this work, a biophysical concept was applied to passive micro-mixers, named as a 
biophysical micro-mixer and shown in Figure 11, to promote mixing efficiency. The vertical 
width of a channel would be gradually increased from 20 μm at the inlet to 40 μm at the 
middle section of the device, and then gradually decreased along the flow downstream to 
the outlet. During the flow transmission process, the flow would be split first and then 
recombined with a flow motion. When the flow passes through the middle section of the 
system, increasing interfaces were created exponentially by laminating the interfaces 
continuously along the channel. In addition, the convection flow in the biophysical channels 
had a high flow uniformity and low pressure drop to enhance the flow mixing (shown in 
Figure 12). The mixing coefficient will approach 0.95 when the Reynolds number of the inlet 
mid-channel is larger than 160. This result shows that the Reynolds number positively 
affects mixing although it induces an increase in pressure drop (Wang et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the prototype of a biophysical micro-mixer is simple and possesses a better 
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uniformity and lower pressure drop, so it can be expected to be useful to promote the 
mixing performance of passive micro-mixers when the mixing distance is restricted. These 
findings will be useful in the design of an optimal biophysical passive micro-mixer in 
further research. Parameters, such as the Reynolds number ratio and aspect ratio and their 
effect on mixing and pressure drop, required investigation because finding the optimal 
Reynolds number ratio, Rer, and aspect ratio, AR, is important for the operation of the 
micro-mixer. 
To address the effect of the different inlet flow conditions on the mixing performance, a 


















Where ρ is the density of the fluid, Uave  is the average velocity of the inlet channel; W, whose 
value is 20 μm, represents the width of inlet channel I2 and the outlet channel. μ  is the 
dynamic viscosity of the working fluid. 
In addition, the aspect ratio, AR, ranging from 0.5 to 10 is defined in (5) and was 
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where D is the depth of the channel and W is fixed at 20μm for the inlet at mid-channel. 
Hence, the Reynolds number ratio was decided and based on the variations of inlet 
Reynolds numbers from Re = 0.5 to 10 for the inlet channels. In addition, variations of aspect 
ratio were set as 0.5, 1, 2 and 10 for determining the sidewall effect on mixing and pressure. 
The results, shown in the Table 5, are addressed as follows:  
First, the optimal Reynolds number ratio was Rer = 0.85, because of its outstanding mixing 
performance at different aspect ratios. Second, the sidewall effect will influence the 
variations in pressure drop and mixing performance, and increasing the AR will also 
decrease the pressure. An optimal aspect ratio with the highest mixing effect was found at 
AR = 2, which exhibited a good mixing for studied cases. In addition, the inlet angle of the 
side-channels and its effect on mixing and pressure was considered in the design of the 
micro-mixer. Hence, a variety of inlet angles of the side-channels, represented by θ, were 
executed with Reynolds number ratios ranging from Rer = 0.5 to 2 in the case of Re2 = 1 and 
its relationship to mixing performance and pressure drop are shown in Table 5.  
The results of Table 6 show that a side-channel inlet angle of 30° was a better choice because 
it possesses a better mixing effect and has a lower pressure drop. These findings will be 
useful in the optimal design of a passive micro-mixer based on biophysical concepts in 
further experimental studies. 
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Fig. 11. Prototype of a Biophysical Micro-mixer (unit: μm) 
(Arrows indicate the inlet and outlet flow direction). 
Source: Wang et al., (2009) 
 
 
Fig. 12. Reynolds Number Effect Versus the Mixing and Pressure Drop at Rer = 1 
Source: Wang et al., (2009) 
 







Rer 0.5 0.85 1 2 1 
Re1 0.5 0.85 1 2 10 
Re2 1 1 1 1 10 
ΔP AR = 0.5 1890.52 2333.07 2522.87 3790.44 25999.58 
ΔP AR = 1 746.72 922.50 1891.34 1503.66 10908.40 
ΔP AR = 2 449.06 555.37 601.07 908.16 6915.66 
ΔP AR = 10 320.69 396.79 429.52 649.51 4956.02 
εmixing AR = 0.5 0.72 0.79 0.78 0.61 0.76 
εmixing AR = 1 0.73 0.79 0.78 0.59 0.80 
εmixing AR = 2 0.69 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.85 
εmixing AR = 10 0.73 0.79 0.79 0.62 0.83 
 
 
Table 5. Variations of Mixing Coefficient (εmixing) and Pressure Drop (ΔP; unit: Pa) Versus the 
Reynolds Number Ratio (Rer) and Aspect Ratio (AR). 









εmixing ΔP εmixing ΔP εmixing ΔP εmixing ΔP 
90° 0.737 310.901 0.786 384.537 0.771 417.240 0.581 632.116 
60° 0.738 300.758 0.791 371.628 0.776 403.076 0.580 609.910 
45° 0.739 300.025 0.796 371.122 0.779 401.692 0.584 607.082 
30° 0.738 300.781 0.803 371.240 0.790 402.526 0.589 607.998 
0° 0.729 289.187 0.764 356.386 0.750 385.829 0.575 586.702 
 
 
Table 6. Inlet Angle of Side-channel Versus the Mixing (εmixing) and Pressure Drop (ΔP; 
unit: Pa) with Variations of Reynolds Number Ratios ranging from Rer = 0.5 to 2 in the 
case of Re2 = 1. 
Source: Wang et al., (2009) 
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In this chapter, the biometric concept was applied to the fuel cells, microbial fuel cells and 
micro-mixer. To sum up, some results are addressed as follows:  
In the study of a biometric fuel cell, the novel flow slab provides a better performance when 
using the bionic concept because it can control the velocity distribution, pressure drop, 
coupling effect and has a stronger ability to remove the liquid water and so providing a 
better power performance of cells. These findings, with respect to a biometric flow slab, 
would be useful to improve PEMFCs and could even be expanded to other types of cells. In 
addition, a new design of biometric flow channel was also applied to RMFCs. Experiments 
in a circulation system were executed by using a double two-inlet Y-type inlet channel and 
connecting it with the RMFCs. The biometric flow channel would create a more uniform 
flow field with obstacles than one without, regardless of the Reynolds number. An extra 
voltage output of 0.2 V, based on the example without obstacles, was provided as in the case 
of the one with. This further explains the design of biometric flow channels having a greater, 
more positive effect on power performance. 
In the study of the biometric micro-mixer, a novel micro-mixer design based on the 
biophysical concept was addressed. The prototype was simple and possessed a better flow 
uniformity and lower pressure drop, so it could be expected to be useful to promote the 
mixing performance of passive micro-mixers when the mixing distance was restricted. The 
highest mixing coefficient with εmixing = 0.876 occurred at a Reynolds number ratio, Rer = 
0.85. These findings will be useful in the design of an optimal biophysical passive micro-
mixer in future research and even show the feasibility and potential of the biometric concept 
widely applied in biochemical, biological andchemical analysis, along with fuel cells and 
bioenergy.  
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